US & Pakistan - who betrayed whom?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHFEul4kxSM
Rumsfeld comes to defend Pakistan about OBL killing

http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p05177lm
Pakistan's role in transferring nuclear technology to North Korea

http://warontherocks.com/2015/06/how-pakistan-beguiles-the-americans-a-guide-for-foreign-officials/
"The Americans were very clear that the various pacts that Pakistan insisted upon joining (CENTO and SEATO) were not meant to be used against India, but rather as a deterrent to an attack from a communist aggressor. When Pakistan started its war with India in 1965, the United States sanctioned both countries. Pakistan, which had become more dependent upon U.S. weapons systems, was hurt more. Pakistani officials carped that the United States did not help a treaty partner. The claim was outrageous because the treaties did not apply to Pakistan, the aggressor, who started a war with India, a non-communist state."

"[1971] Again, the Pakistanis grumbled that the United States did not support its treaty ally. This complaint was misplaced for two reasons. First, Pakistan was still under sanctions from the 1965 war. Second, as Gary Bass has brilliantly detailed, the United States actually did provide Pakistan with military support in complete violation of U.S. law. President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, believed that it was necessary to help the military general-cum-president, Yahya Khan, because Khan was facilitating the famed opening to China. As Bass details, Khan was not the only option for this opening. However, Nixon and Kissinger had personal feelings for him and deep contempt for India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

While Pakistanis decry America’s “failure” to come to its aid when the United States had no obligation to do so, Pakistan courted communist China during the same period that it insisted upon being included in pacts that were explicitly designed to counter communism. Moreover, despite its treaty obligations to the United States through SEATO, Pakistan did not participate in the Korean or Vietnam Wars and demurred from citing China as the aggressors."

"Pakistanis routinely distort the intention of the Pressler Amendment as being designed to punish Pakistan. The 1985 Pressler Amendment permitted American assistance to Pakistan, conditional on an annual presidential assessment and certification that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons. Prior to its passage, security assistance was possible only with a waiver of the 1979 sanctions. Thus, in effect, Pressler allowed the United States to continue providing assistance to Pakistan even though other parts of the U.S. government increasingly believed that Pakistan either had a nuclear weapon or was close to developing one. Most importantly, the amendment was passed with the active involvement of Pakistan’s foreign office, which was keen to resolve the emergent strategic impasse over competing U.S. nonproliferation and regional objectives on one hand and Pakistan’s resolute intentions to acquire nuclear weapons on the other."

"Logically, the United States could not have intended to “suck” Pakistan into an American-led jihad, as Pakistanis claim, because Washington had sanctioned Pakistan in April of 1979. Had the United States intended to coerce Pakistan to do America’s bidding in Afghanistan, why would it make working with Pakistan illegal even as events began to churn in Afghanistan? As is well known, the United States was not terribly interested in the events in Afghanistan until the summer of 1979. After all, Afghanistan’s neighbor, Iran, was mired in an Islamist revolution that began in early 1978. However, once President Ronald Reagan came into the White House, he worked to secure the waivers needed to begin working with Pakistan. It was not until 1982 that security assistance began flowing to Pakistan. It should be noted that Saudi Arabia matched the U.S. contribution. It should also be noted that it was Zia ul Haq who insisted upon fighting the Russians in Afghanistan in the lexicon of jihad, not that of the United States."

https://newrepublic.com/article/63866/back-front
As bizarre as it may sound to the antiwar left, the CIA was deeply wary of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. The Agency didn't think the mujahedin rebels could beat Moscow, and it feared that if it ran the war, it would take the blame if things went awry. As Vincent Cannistraro, who led the Reagan administration's Afghan Working Group from 1985 to 1987, puts it, "The CIA was very reluctant to be involved at all. They thought it would end up with them being blamed, like in Guatemala." So the Agency tried to avoid direct involvement in the war, and to maintain plausible deniability. For the first six years following the 1979 Soviet invasion, the U.S. provided the mujahedin only Eastern-bloc weaponry, so the rebels could claim they had captured it from Soviet troops rather than received it from Washington. And while America funded the mujahedin, it played barely any role in their training. To insulate itself, the U.S. gave virtual carte blanche to its allies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to direct the rebel effort as they saw fit.


https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/850292309153521664
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=sRhZDrJb0zgC&pg=PA65#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=sRhZDrJb0zgC&pg=PA66#v=onepage&q&f=false
CIA had few operatives on the ground and no direct contact with militants. Extract from pages 65-66 of the book "Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden" By Peter L. Bergen

https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/817531053913079809
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7czT4fipTyoC&pg=PA30&dq=Zia+and+Iran&hl=en&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=true
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/17/world/iranians-captured-stinger-missiles-from-afghan-guerrillas-us-says.html
General Zia covertly selling weapons to Iran in 1980s


https://youtu.be/UAhhlbEg57g?t=15m41s
7 May 2012: In HotLine on Waqt News, Air Commodore Shehzad Chaudhary saying that Pak military fans anti-Americanism to buy bargaining space with Americans


https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/pakistan/2015-08-18/unworthy-ally
"For starters, the United States was not obligated to help Pakistan in its 1965 war with India, both because Pakistan had initiated that conflict and because Washington’s various agreements with Islamabad pertained only to communist threats. In fact, even though sanctions imposed on both India and Pakistan after the 1965 war legally prohibited the United States from helping Pakistan when conflict with India reignited over East Pakistan in 1971, the Nixon administration nonetheless came to Islamabad’s assistance. Indeed, President Richard Nixon bent U.S. law to authorize military aid even as American officials understood that Pakistan was committing genocide against ethnic Bengalis in East Pakistan.
Over the next decade, Washington would repeatedly compromise its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation to the benefit of Pakistan’s military rulers. "


https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/pakistan/2015-08-18/unworthy-ally
"Washington would repeatedly compromise its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation to the benefit of Pakistan’s military rulers. When Afghanistan became mired in Soviet-backed chaos in December 1979, for example, the administration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter decided to drop the nuclear-related sanctions it had imposed on Pakistan earlier that year and instead sponsor Pakistan’s efforts to oust Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Yet Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq rebuffed Carter’s offer of some $325 million in aid as “peanuts,” betting that a Republican president would offer Pakistan a better deal after the 1980 election. He was right. After assuming office in January 1981, Ronald Reagan secured a waiver of the 1979 sanctions, and by 1982, the United States had initiated a six-year aid package worth some $3.2 billion.

As for the claim that Islamabad was drawn into Washington’s Afghan jihad, the chronology suggests otherwise. Seeking leverage against the government in Kabul, Pakistan had been supporting Islamist militants in Afghanistan at its own expense since 1974—five years before Soviet troops crossed into the country. In other words, Pakistan brought the United States, and its wallet, into a campaign it had been pursuing on its own for years."

 
http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/04-Sep-2002/second-opinion-pre-election-rigging-is-no-whodunit
"Indus Vision (22 August 2002) discussed America's planned attack on Iraq with ex-ambassador Shahid Amin, journalist Abdul Hameed Chchapra and ex-ambassador Najmus Saqib. Chchapra thought America had planned to take over Iraq. It had come to Japan, South Korea and the Philippines and not gone back. From Pakistan too it would not go back. He said in 1991, America created a pretext for attacking Iraq but did not capture Saddam Hussein again under a subtle plan. Now it wanted to annex the UAE, but the punishment meant for Saddam Hussein should not be inflicted on the Iraqi people. Ambassador Najmus Saqib tried to make the discussion objective after the emotional outburst of Chchapra. He referred to the global consensus the US was able to create against Saddam Hussein and to the UN resolutions which made Iraq accept inspectors. Shahid Amin dwelt on the villainy of Saddam Hussein to balance the debate. A caller said flatly that America was doing terrorism which simply derailed the discussion.
Chchapra's new revelations about what America wanted to do in the Middle East are typical and were delivered with typically put-on anger. Japan and South Korea are paying for the American troops and were not under coercion. The Philippines begged the Americans not to go. Last time the Americans tackled Afghanistan we complained that they left after defeating the Soviet Union. Now we complain that they might not go."

http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/23-Sep-2002/second-opinion-the-nation-we-have-become
"Columnist Ataur Rehman wrote in daily "Pakistan" (6 September) that the biggest lesson of the 1965 war with India was that Pakistan got nothing out of SEATO and CENTO which were one-sided in favour of America and were of no use when Pakistan was facing war with India. America would have come to Pakistan's help only if it was attacked by the Soviet Union. But Pakistan learned no lesson and General Yahya Khan in 1971 kept waiting for the American 7th fleet to rescue Pakistan army in East Pakistan.
Pakistan knew that SEATO and CENTO were not against India, yet it joined them. It signed SEATO with a "reservation" about China. What does it signify? That Pakistan meant to use the two pacts to fortify itself against India. Who was resorting to subterfuge? When it triggered the 1965 war, Pakistan army used the armament it got from the US against India. Pakistan was superior in war technology in the air, on the ground, and was able to put India on the defensive at the sea. Pakistan used its weapons after having expressly committed against doing so. When the Americans stopped giving Pakistan any arms after that, what was wrong with it? When General Zia took Pakistan into the Afghan war, he made another deal and got more armament from the United States. The biggest thing it did during the Afghan war was to develop its nuclear capability, besides getting the F16s. It is another matter what Pakistan did to itself after getting dollars and money from America and what it did with the nuclear capability it had acquired thanks to America looking the other way."

Pakistan tried to have SEATO shield include attacks from any country, but US insisted that SEATO would deal only with communist aggression. Page 71 of the book "The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies" By Dennis Kux:
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=LFzbDYmWVpwC&pg=PA71&lpg=PA7#v=onepage&q&f=false

Pakistan signed border agreement with China in 1963, and US and UK claimed that Pakistan weakened SEATO by signing agreement with China. Page 120 of "Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India" By Aparna Pande:
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=ceg-kSmft94C&pg=PA120&lpg=PA120#v=onepage&q&f=false

http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/05-Dec-2003/second-opinion-how-islam-is-used-by-us-khaled-ahmed-s-urdu-press-review
"Columnist Nusrat Mirza wrote in 'Nawa-e-Waqt' (6 November 2003) that Foreign Office had not formulated Pakistan foreign policy on the basis of its permanent self-interest but on short-term advantage. It had done the right thing by siding with the United States during the cold war and then getting the US and China to unite, but was not afterwards able to ensure Pakistan's benefits. It got Pakistan into the big global gambles where the country was used by others as a pawn. The last great blunder was the adoption of America's war against Al Qaeda as its own war. This was the most dangerous gamble striking at the very root of Pakistan's identity as a state.
Pakistan exploited America to confront India, then got money and weapons out of America during the Afghan war. In return, it gave heroin to America and made its nuclear weapons in defiance of American law. In short, all states look to their self-interest. How is the Foreign Office responsible for the anti-Al Qaeda policy? This was made by General Musharraf when President Bush rang him up."

http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/22-Aug-2006/second-opinion-pakistan-s-capacity-to-defy-a-superpower-khaled-ahmed-s-tv-review
Prime TV (June 26, 2006) had Dr Moid talking to editor Najam Sethi who said that the military rulers of Pakistan always ended up giving away more to America without proper bargaining than the civilian rulers. He said General Musharraf was losing a lot of support in the United States as well as in Pakistan because he had undertaken to do too much with very little domestic political support, especially from the two mainstream parties that made up the national vote bank. He however regarded Musharraf as the only statesmanlike figure in Pakistan who could make the major decisions needed to bring Pakistan back to normal. He was of the opinion that America always sought its objectives and was able to bend Pakistan to its self-interest, and the generals played into its hands.

Another angle to this issue is presented in The White House and Pakistan (OUP) by FS Aijazuddin who quotes a 1966 memorandum to President Johnson on the same theme: "Thus, while we can't blame the Paks for being unhappy with us, it isn't because we betrayed them; it is because their own policy of using us against India has failed. They know full well we didn't give them $800 million in arms to use against India (but they did). Even so we built up Pakistan's own independent position and sinews —to the tune of almost $5 billion in support. We've protected Pakistan against India; we had more to do with stopping the war Ayub had started than anyone else (just in time to save Paks)." After the Cold War we discovered that we were on the right side, but refused to wipe our tears. The same sort of thing is happening now that we are placed in the anti-terrorist camp.

http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/28-Apr-2006/second-opinion-brain-damage-from-our-american-connection-khaled-ahmed-s-review-of-the-urdu-press
"Most senior officers have been anti-American because America "let us down" in 1965 and afterwards. No one acknowledges that we reneged on our pledge not to use weapons supplied to us under the CENTO and SEATO umbrella against India. America had global interests; Pakistan had only regional concerns."

http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/02-Sep-2005/second-opinion-our-barren-honeymoons-with-america-khaled-ahmed-s-review-of-the-urdu-press
In his book, Pakistan between Mosque and Military (Vanguard), Irshad Haqqani's namesake Husain Haqqani has debunked the thesis that Pakistan was one-sidedly exploited by America. He thinks Pakistan milked America every time by asking for a big price. In 1953, General Ayub as commander-in-chief of the army visited the US ahead of the then political leadership to offer America a Cold War deal: Pakistan as the West's eastern anchor in an Asia Alliance structure. Haqqani quotes Shirin Tahir-Kheli to show how Ayub bargained hard for a 'price' as he refused to give America a full-fledged military base. The price included not only money but also a security guarantee against India. After 1979, General Zia too drove a hard bargain for Pakistan's use against the Soviet Union. Haqqani in fact theorises on the basis of this pattern of behaviour (later confirmed by General Musharraf) to conclude that the state in Pakistan has behaved consistently. Today we bemoan our 'honeymoons' with America. Imagine Pakistan without these honeymoons! What does Pakistan want? A dull marriage instead? The truth is that the bride (Pakistan) is not a virgin, if you examine her mind. She must learn to extract pleasure from these honeymoons, lest the honeymoons too disappear. The alternative bridegroom (India) is not too sexy.


http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/opinion/nixon-and-kissingers-forgotten-shame.html
Nixon and Kissinger were not just motivated by dispassionate realpolitik, weighing Pakistan’s help with the secret opening to China or India’s pro-Soviet leanings. The White House tapes capture their emotional rage, going far beyond Nixon’s habitual vulgarity. In the Oval Office, Nixon told Kissinger that the Indians needed “a mass famine.” Kissinger sneered at people who “bleed” for “the dying Bengalis.”
They were unmoved by the suffering of Bengalis, despite detailed reporting about the killing from Archer K. Blood, the brave United States consul general in East Pakistan. Nor did Nixon and Kissinger waver when Kenneth B. Keating, a former Republican senator from New York then serving as the American ambassador to India, personally confronted them in the Oval Office about “a matter of genocide” that targeted the Hindu minority among the Bengalis.
After Mr. Blood’s consulate sent an extraordinary cable formally dissenting from American policy, decrying what it called genocide, Nixon and Kissinger ousted Mr. Blood from his post in East Pakistan. Kissinger privately scorned Mr. Blood as “this maniac”; Nixon called Mr. Keating “a traitor.”


https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/pakistans-anxieties-are-incurable-so-stop-trying-to-cure-them/ 
Afghanistan also lays claim to vast stretches of Pakistani territory and has supported insurgencies in Balochistan as well as Pashtun nationalism.  As a consequence, Pakistan organed its first “jihad” policy in 1974 under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Islamists were fleeing Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan ‘s brutal crackdown on Islamist opposition in Afghanistan and Islamabad was able to put them to good use. While Pakistan implored the United States to aid its efforts in Afghanistan, Washington did not do so until after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 1979. General Khalid Mahmud Arif has said of these activities that “Pakistan adopted the . . . option to protect her national interest and to uphold a vital principal” by providing “covert assistance to the Mujahideen.” Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s former foreign secretary, agrees with Zia. According to Sattar, for more than a year after the Soviet invasion, Pakistan “continued to support the Afghan resistance . . . providing it modest assistance out of its own meager resources.” For Sattar, Pakistan’s motives were clear: “[T]he Mujahideen would be fighting also for Pakistan’s own security and independence.”

http://www.vox.com/2016/4/27/11497942/america-bad-allies
Pakistan is perhaps the most egregious example of an ally behaving badly. As Lawrence Wright has documented, despite (and arguably because of) the billions of dollars the United States has invested in its relationship with Pakistan since 1954, its government (or, more precisely, its military) has diverted US military assistance to build nuclear weapons; harbored Islamic militant groups that kill American soldiers in Afghanistan; sheltered the Taliban and al-Qaeda sympathizers (and probably Osama bin Laden); and gave succor to the AQ Khan network, which became a WMD Walmart for countries like North Korea, Libya, and Iran that were shopping around for equipment and expertise on how to build nuclear weapons.