Sufism an antidote to extremism?

http://www.dawn.com/news/652996/where-have-all-the-allah-walay-gone
"Sufism being a product of a multi-religious society cannot be resurrected in Pakistan where Islam is a monolith, casting shadows over the small patches of minority religions. During the middle and early modern era religion was the only ideology: Even an ideological opposition was possible through a counter-religious ideology such as Sufism. This was the limit of human thought process at a certain point in time. However, now the goals of progressive Sufis, equity, art, culture or promotion of people’s languages can be achieved through other ideologies. Let me give you a hint with this episode. Pathany Khan, not popular yet, used to visit a progressive group in the Punjab University, Lahore, who promoted him and helped him to get on TV and other platforms. Someone asked him, being a strong devotee singer of Sufis, why does he stay with these non-religious people and he replied “Sain eeh bare Allah wale lok hun!” (Sir, these are really men of God!)."


https://www.hudson.org/research/13480-justifying-war-the-salafi-jihadi-appropriation-of-sufi-jihad-in-the-sahel-sahara


During the jihadist campaigns of the 1800s in the Sahel-Sahara region, the Muslim scholars who led the armed movements identified themselves with the Sufi brotherhoods. In the Sahel-Sahara region today, core ideological concepts that animated the historical jihads of the 19th Century—including ideas about takfīr(excommunication), Dār al-Islām (abode of Islam), Dār al-Kufr (abode of unbelief), ḥijrah (migration) and al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ (fealty and disavowal)—can be found in contemporary Salafist ideologies and have also been appropriated by present-day Salafi-Jihadi groups like Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda to justify their campaigns.⁴


http://dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/23-Feb-11/pollution-of-religion
"The Chishtia were anti-establishment and the Bahauddin-led Suharwardia (headed by Shah Mahmood Qureshi these days) were pro the Delhi kings. Both schools adhered to the basic tenants of Islam, i.e. praying five times and performing all other mandatory Islamic duties. Wahabi propaganda that said the Sufis were bhangi charsi (drug addicts) had and has no basis. Only the Malamtia sect to whom Shah Hussain belonged was against the entire ambit of ritualistic religion. Shah Hussain's pre-condition for initiation (mureedi) was to drink alcohol and shave the beard, moustaches, head hair and even eyebrows. In most cases, many were just intellectuals and thinkers following a certain mode of life that resembled Sufism. Many of us confuse the great classical Punjabi poets with the Sufi tradition.
By the end of the 18th or 19th century, the Sufi movement had come to a close and what were left were the rituals of the Barelvi mullahs and sajjada nasheens (holders of the saintly seat). The Sufi tradition could only survive in a multi-religious society, which Punjab and Sindh had before 1947. The purging of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan created an anti-Sufi environment. Therefore, it is not surprising at all that the followers of the Sufis, namely the Barelvis, have become just like the Wahabi and Deobandi maulvis. They could not avoid the dictates of the environment they lived in. In contrast, the Barelvis in India are much more tolerant of other religions because they have to live with them. More Hindus visit the Ajmer shrine of Moeenuddin Chishti than Muslims.
As a matter of fact, the Barelvis had abandoned the Sufi tradition long ago. They had become a ritualistic sect that considered khatam darood (rituals) as their basic distinction. The Sufi shrines had become the jagirs (estates) of sajjada nashins who were running them like feudal dynasties. This trend had started much earlier in history. Baba Farid and his ilk had refused to see kings and their men but his great grandsons joined the Tughlaqs and were awarded a huge estate in Pakpattan. It was a noteworthy estate when Ranjeet Singh conquered Punjab and he had to negotiate with the then sajjada nasheen."

http://thewire.in/2016/03/17/why-sufism-is-not-the-answer-to-the-radicalisation-of-muslims-24941/
"Sufism is not unique to India, nor is there any evidence of it being uniquely peaceful. In December 1930, Dervish Mehmet Efendi, a Naqshbandi Sufi in the land of Sufis – Turkey – raised the banner of armed revolt against Mustafa Kemal’s policies of forced secularisation. In response, not only was the army and air force used to crush the uprising, a state of emergency was declared and Sufis from around the country were arrested, some executed, and many imprisoned. The Naqshbandi order is also dominant in Chechnya, and was the base around which resistance to Russia coalesced – first on a spiritual basis, and then later on a military basis. Over time, this resistance led to the replacement of the Sufi orders with more radical Islamists.
This is the second part of the Sufi story that glib assessments tend to ignore. In fact, Sufism has not provided any sort of bulwark against radicalisation. No other part of India is as dominated by Sufi Islam as the Kashmir Valley, so if Sufism was such a great bulwark, how did Kashmiris swing to militancy? The easy answer to this would be the introduction of Saudi money and ideas, and the growth of Wahhabi or Salafi Islam. But the most influential Salafi in India is Zakir Naik, a televangelist based out of Bombay, whose Peace TV channel has a viewer base of up to 100 million people across the region. Although the Indian government has banned Peace TV broadcasts in India since 2012, and Naik has often expressed ignorant, and even repugnant, views, there are no recorded incidents of him or any of his affiliates encouraging, or being linked to, any act of political violence. The Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith Hind proudly refers to a “directory of madarsas of Ahle Hadees…comprising of 650 pages”. These exist across the country, and yet their growth has not resulted in militancy."



http://www.dawn.com/news/883429/past-present-is-sufism-relevant-to-our-time
"Generally, Sufis do not incite the people to rebellion or encourage them to protest against the rulers. They exhorted the people to endure sufferings and seek spiritual salvation for their worldly problems. Submission and obedience were principles which were observed by their disciples. Realising their spiritual importance, Sultans and the nobility built monasteries for them and financially supported them to maintain their establishment. The Sufis always relied on the donation of the rulers or nobles. This is how the Sufis of the Sultanate period supported the political system and never raised a voice against it."

"Those in Pakistan, who are interested in fighting against religious extremism, should first understand it in the present context and then encounter it with fresh ideas to change the political and social structure of the society. Society can neither be reformed by reviving old and rusted ideas nor by delivering sermons and reciting Sufi poetry."


http://www.dawn.com/news/1101990
 "In the subcontinent, the Sufis emerged during the medieval period to support the Muslim rule by preaching religious tolerance among the Hindus and the Muslims. Later, Sufi shrines became the centre point for disciples and common people to gather and pay homage to Sufi saints; as well as pray for fulfilment of their wishes and desires. Based on the assumption that they inherit spiritual powers from their ancestors; the successors or sajjada nashin of the Sufi saints assumed a position of authority, became spiritual leaders and earned themselves a high status in the society.
Becoming political leaders, winning elections from their constituencies and getting into the parliament is not difficult for them as they have a secure vote bank in their disciples who vote for them irrespective of their ability or merit. If Sufi culture was revived, these individuals would be at a further advantage. Considering the above, will the revival of Sufi teachings really eliminate religious extremism from our society?
An analysis of the negative impact of religious prejudice and the positive influence of religious tolerance shows that a society with sectarian and religious conflicts suffers politically and socially. On the other hand, religious harmony creates peace and prosperity and all people are treated equally irrespective of their religion or sect. Religious tolerance should be propagated as an idea by itself without attributing it to the Sufis."


http://pakteahouse.net/2009/03/11/mr-zardari-tear-down-this-wall/
"Sufism can no more fight the Taliban than Mickey Mouse. Sufism is flight. It is escape. Those of us who have watched the ecstasy unfold at Nizamuddin Awliya and Baba Shah Jamal and a million heretical shrines in India, Hindu and Muslim, know that most of us can only be weekend Sufis. Sufism’s message of wahdat ul-wajood leads us away from doctrine, and that is an intellectual journey. Sufism cannot fight because it makes no demands. "

http://nation.com.pk/columns/10-Nov-2014/fighting-fire-with-fire
"Barelvi Islam, with its folk origins, is not exactly a non-violent tradition. For Deobandis, the rallying cry is “Jihad” while the Barelvis can be riled up with the cry of “Blasphemy”. It is dangerous to choose one over the other; the options include a rock and a hard place."

http://www.1stethical.com/the-civil-war-among-muslims-in-britain
"What is at stake is the definition of “extremism”. For example, Barelvi Muslims have been defining “extremism” as what their historical enemies, Deobandi Muslims, believe. Likewise Sufi Muslim groups have grabbed on the funding opportunity presented by the government’s Prevent programme to settle old theological scores with their arch rivals, Salafi Muslims.
Nowhere has this been more reflected than in the way that radicalisation and extremism have been covered in some of the TV documentaries produced in Britain in the past 4 years where Barelvi and other Sufi sources have been used to investigate extremism among Deobandis or Salafis. However, the reality is more complex than what is often reported. Soon after the 7/7 bombings a Salafi organisation in Birmingham was the first Muslim organisation to print and distribute a collection of fatwas titled “The Corruption of Terrorism and Suicide Bombings: Exposing the Perpetrators of Evil” which attacked and condemned the 7/7 bombers as evil. In June 2008 Deobandi theologians based at the spiritual home of the Taliban, the influential ultra-conservative Islamic seminary at Deoband, India, issued a detailed Fatwa condemning terrorism and suicide attacks as the “most inhuman crime” which should be eradicated from society. Specialists on Islamic theology agree that the Salafi and Deobandi fatwas are more likely to succeed in challenging the extremist ideology than the widely publicised fatwa published early this year by the Pakistani-born Barelvi theologian Sheikh Tahir ul-Qadri http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/sheikh-issues-fatwa-against-all-terrorists-1915000.html .
The Taliban, Al-Qaida and their affiliate organisations justify their violence by drawing upon Deobandi and Salafi interpretations of Islamic texts. Thus, Deobandi and Salafi fatwas against violent extremism are more effective in delegitimizing extremist groups than fatwas and theological arguments from Sufi scholars such as Tahir al-Qadri and others however well-meaning they may be.
It is tempting to view Sufi Islam as the cuddly and apolitical expression of Islam that should be promoted among all Muslims in Britain as a strategy of dealing with the problem of violent extremism. Such an approach is dangerous. It can be argued that the religious quietism adopted by Sufis (both within the Barelvi and Deobandi communities) is what is driving young Muslims into the hands of extremists. Anyone who has studied religious quietism in different faiths knows that it always produces more radical expressions of the faith."

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-road-from-ajmer-leads-nowhere/article3321349.ece
"Bulleh Shah, a great Sufi saint in Pakistan who raised his voice against all forms of power — both religious and secular — would turn in his grave if he knew how his successors had partnered with the state. Sarah Ansari's work on the pirs in Sindh has explained the political corruption of Sufi institutions in the province. The British had a policy of distributing land among the pirs in return for endorsement of their policies and public support."
One of the major problems with this formula is that it reinforces exploitation rather than allowing for spiritual reassessment. For instance, like the pirs of Ajmer, those in Pakistan such as Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Pir Pagara, Yusuf Raza Gilani and others have no capacity to offer a competing narrative. They do not offer a varied view on blasphemy or issues for which the radicals provide evidence from the scripture or sharia. Not to forget their vested interest in maintaining the status quo. Hence, it is not surprising that pockets of radicalism have emerged and been strengthened in south Punjab and now Sindh, both areas known for their Sufi saints."
"According to the Pakistani sociologist, Hamza Alavi, Sufi and Barelvi Islam represent the peasant's religion, a form which is getting rapidly challenged due to increased urbanisation and socio-economic development. Sufism cannot catch up with this trend unless it offers an alternative narrative in a convincing and modern way."

http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/10/state-sponsored-sufism/
"In short, after years of bemoaning official Saudi sponsorship of Wahhabism, and condemning official Iranian sponsorship of milleniarian Islam, we are now being asked to celebrate a state-sponsored brand of Islam in Pakistan. We are asked to believe this is different from those other cases solely because it’s a version of the religion that looks benign.But not only is this unprincipled — it is going to backfire, leaving Sufism discredited and more religious resentment among the numerous peaceful Salafis in the world."


http://www.islamdaily.org/en/islam/8658.terrorism-and-religious-identities.htm/
http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/11-Jul-2010/analysis-terrorism-and-religious-identities-dr-hasan-askari-rizvi
"This Barelvi activism may impel the Punjab government to take action against hardline and sectarian Islamic groups. However, Barelvi activism is not necessarily a positive development. After all, Barelvi groups also represent religious orthodoxy and they question Pakistan's current foreign and security policies. They share most of the perspective on terrorism outlined above and want to establish an Islamic order as articulated by them. Until the Barelvi religious interests were not directly hit, they were not publicly critical of Islamic militancy, although they did not participate in it.
If religious extremism and terrorism are to be eliminated, Pakistan's official and societal circles will have to discard the Islamic orthodoxy discourse on issues and problems. They will have to rise above religious-sectarian or narrow partisan political considerations and articulate the meanings of terrorism in the context of the Pakistani state and its constitution and law."


http://ww4report.com/node/7502
"Making Sufis the pawns and proxies of the West will delegitimize them in the eyes of precisely those the strategists would seek to win over. It will also make them more of a target—or at least give a propaganda boost to those who target them. Even Sufis who feel the need to take allies where they can find them are doubtless worldly enough to realize this."