Wednesday, December 30, 2015

Genius of CII


http://www.dawn.com/news/1243241/article-6-applicable-against-punjab-assembly
March 3, 2016: "ISLAMABAD: The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) on Wednesday said that Article 6 of the Constitution, which deals with treason, could be applied against the Punjab Assembly for approving a bill without the council’s consent. “Pakistan was established on the basis of the two nation theory and Islam is the religion of the country, and the council is a constitutional body to ensure that all the laws are formulated in accordance [with] Sharia,” Maulana Mohammad Khan Sherani, the council chairperson, told the media after the first of a two-day CII meeting. He said the council has received the Protection of Women against Violence Bill 2015, with was recently passed by the Punjab Assembly, but the council has not yet reviewed it because it is in English."
http://tribune.com.pk/story/1049717/khula-without-husbands-consent-is-un-islamic-rules-cii/
Feb 18, 2016: "ISLAMABAD: The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) has declared it un-Islamic for courts to use ‘Khula’ (right of a woman to seek divorce) without the consent of a husband to dissolve a marriage."

http://tribune.com.pk/story/1026581/islamising-laws-in-a-first-senate-debates-cii-annual-report/
Jan 13, 2016: "The PPP senator also cited some controversial CII announcements: the body had rejected a draft bill for establishing homes for the elderly saying the idea was against the norms and traditions of society, rejected the Women’s Protection Bill 2006, and declared that DNA test results were ‘unacceptable’ as primary evidence in rape cases."

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/29/pakistan-council-of-islamic-ideology-clerics-fight-over-ahmadi-sect
Dec 29, 2015: "A scuffle broke out on Tuesday between the two at a gathering of Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) when the chairman, Mohammad Khan Sherani, called on the group to consider whether Ahmadis, who are declared non-Muslims by the constitution, should be considered murtads that have rejected Islam.
A declaration of apostasy by the constitutional body charged with advising parliament on lawmaking would likely put Ahmadis in even greater peril, given that many interpretations of Islamic law prescribe death for people who quit the religion."
...
"At Tuesday’s meeting, Sherani also attempted to force a discussion on whether millions of non-Muslims in Pakistan should be subject to the medieval practice of paying a jizya tax, despite enjoying equal rights under the constitution."

http://tribune.com.pk/story/976546/cii-wants-co-education-abolished-at-the-earliest/
"October 21, 2015. CII wants co-education abolished at the earliest "

http://tribune.com.pk/story/976119/women-not-required-to-cover-faces-hands-and-feet-under-sharia-cii/
October 20, 2015: "Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) said women are not required to cover their faces, hands or feet under Islamic Sharia law, a rare judgement from the conservative council of clerics seen as “encouraging” by rights activists on Tuesday."

http://tribune.com.pk/story/893571/khula-is-prerogative-of-husband-not-courts-says-cii/
March 28, 2015: "ISLAMABAD: Chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani said on Wednesday courts cannot use the term ‘Khula’ (right of a woman to seek divorce) while dissolving a Nikkah (marriage contract).
“Courts are dissolving Nikkah in the name of Khula, which is not correct. Courts can dissolve marriage contracts but only the husband has the right to grant Khula,” Maulana Sherani told a news conference after the 199th meeting of the CII.
He said the council has recommended an amended computerised Nikkah form to facilitate the masses. Letters will be issued soon to ask concerned ministries to implement the new forms, he added. Regarding the ‘Quran Asan Tehreek’, the CII chairman said the Holy Quran used specific language which should be understood properly in Arabic only and added that such campaigns should not be encouraged."

http://www.dawn.com/news/1092468/pakistani-laws-prohibiting-underage-marriage-un-islamic-cii
March 11, 2014: "ISLAMABAD: The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) concluded its 191th meeting, here Tuesday with the ruling that the laws related to minimum age of marriage were un-Islamic and that children of any age could get married if they attain puberty."

http://www.dawn.com/news/1092435/cii-wants-law-to-make-2nd-marriage-easy
March 11, 2014: "ISLAMABAD: Maulana Mohammad Khan Sheerani, chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), said on Monday that the laws regarding second marriage of a man in the presence of first wife were against religious principles.
“Sharia allows men to have more than one wife and we demanded that the government should amend the law,” he told reporters after a CII meeting.
The marriage laws were discussed in reply to letters sent by citizens seeking advice.
The laws require a man to have written approval from his existing wife or wives for another marriage."

http://tribune.com.pk/story/627636/islamic-ideology-body-okays-test-tube-babies-terms-sex-change-operations-un-islamic/
Nov 5, 2013: "ISLAMABAD: The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) Pakistan on Tuesday declared that human cloning and sex change as un-Islamic acts while conditionally approving test tube babies."

http://tribune.com.pk/story/608359/rape-cases-dna-test-not-admissible-as-primary-evidence/
Sep 24, 2013: "ISLAMABAD: First, it said that DNA tests are not admissible as evidence in rape cases. Then it went back, and instead blamed the media for ‘irresponsible reporting’. On Monday, however, the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) ruled against the admissibility of the DNA test as ‘primary evidence’. Not only that, the council also ruled against death penalty for anyone making false accusation of blasphemy."

http://www.dawn.com/news/158803/charity-collection-through-lottery-un-islamic-cii
"Sep 28, 2005: ISLAMABAD, Sept 28: The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) has declared charity-based business through lottery as un-Islamic."

http://newsweekpakistan.com/losing-their-religion/
"Syed Afzal Haider, a Council member, in his 974-page book, Council of Islamic Ideology: Evolution and Activity, tells us how the Council came to its final draft of the Hudood Ordinance as it was later promulgated by General Zia. It records that Dualibi visited the offices of the Council. However, the Council’s own report to the government in December 1981 observed that Hudood laws were discussed by the Council and the law ministry “under the guidance of Dr. Maruf Dualibi, who was specially detailed by the government of Saudi Arabia for this purpose.”
The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, was framed by Dualibi in Arabic sitting in the Council office. It was then translated into Urdu by the government and applied equally to both the Muslim sects despite the fact that the Shia traditionally did not pay zakat to the state. The first clash with the Shia community took place when it staged its “long march” to Islamabad against imposition of zakat on them not permitted by their jurisprudence. The consequence of going against good sense led to comic results. The Supreme Court first exempted all the Shia from paying zakat, which caused most Sunnis to submit certificates under oath that they were Shia, thus preventing deduction of the tax from their bank accounts. Later, the court, acting on equity, extended this exemption to Sunnis as well, thus making zakat voluntary, in violation of the traditional interpretation of Islamic law. Ushr, meaning 10 (percent), fared even worse.
In Agrarian History of Pakistan, land-revenue expert A. K. Khalid has made a study of ushr, coming to the conclusion that it was not correct on the part of General Zia to accept the clerical demand that ushr be treated as zakat. The act of haste that produced the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance ignored the disparity of rates between rain-fed land (10 percent tax) and canal-fed land (5 percent tax). Canal-fed land deserved the 10 percent deduction, but the fear of a backlash from the ulema suspended reason. Now the subterfuge part of the policy on ushr collection is that while ushr on canal-fed lands is compulsory (on the basis of self-assessment), it is “voluntary” in the case of rain-fed lands—even though it is only 5 percent.
The next chief of the Council, given to somewhat fiery advocacy of laws on TV, often rebuking the Supreme Court for letting modern banking run in Pakistan, was S. M. Zaman who led it for two three-year terms. He was said to be a Harvard graduate but was nonetheless hardline and is now in the academic council of Jamaat-e-Islami’s Institute of Policy Research headed by Dr. Khursheed Ahmed and which also features two distinguished retired ambassadors, Akram Zaki and Shamshad Ahmad Khan."

=======
The myth of ‘misinterpreted’ Islam
Khaled Ahmed's


A n a l y s i s

There is a common fallacy that Islam as enforced in Pakistan is misinterpreted and somehow there exists a true religion of Islam which should be revived. At least Masud Mufti in Dawn (29 December 2001) seems to imply that. The truth of the matter is that under the prevailing principles of interpretation, what we have is the correct interpretation of Islam. The ‘rational’ Islam of Sir Syed Ahmad was rejected in his lifetime by all schools of thought among the Muslims, Deobandi and Barelvi alike. In Egypt the reformist spirit of Muhammad Abduh has been challenged and set aside by the Islamists of the 21st century including the ulema of Al-Azhar. There is an emphasis on fiqh under the principles of ijtehad (reinterpretation) . Not many people know that Islamic law is based on fiqh and that ijtehad is allowed only on matters not decided by fiqh . Allama Iqbal once tried to write on ijtehad and corresponded with Maulana Salman Nadvi, asking him tough questions on points where fiqh actually supersedes the Quran, to which the maulana made no reply.

The verdict on riba by the Supreme Court Shariat Appellate Bench in 1999 shocked many, but it was according to the standard application of fiqh . Right after that, the Federal Shariat Court also abolished the old Family Law Ordinance and allowed men to practise polygamy without the permission of their first wives. In an effort to make the verdict rational, the Court said it was good for Pakistan because there were more women here than men! After that the wife of Dr Israr Ahmad, the famous Lahore cleric, said that she would not mind her husband taking another wife. Famous leader of Lashkar-e-Tayba Hafiz Saeed never stopped saying that democracy was against Islam and that those who believed that Islam allowed parliament were ullu (owl). Only the army liked what he kept on saying, but he was right. The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs should not be blamed for issuing outrageous Islamic proposals (the latest being that all banknotes be withdrawn and the photo on them of the Quaid-e-Azam be erased) because they are following the rules of accepted interpretation in Islam.

Most people think that extremism comes out of a misinterpretation of Islam. This is wrong. Extremism and violence occur when people do not accept what the Islamists regard as the irreducible crux of Islam in the shape of shariah . (What is shariah may differ from country to country). The mood among the clergy and the Islamists is aggressive since the turn of the 20th century and violence is normally resorted to when a literalist version of fiqh-dominated Islam is not enforced. That is where extremism starts. As for the practicability of literalist Islam, many laws in force have either produced malpractice or have simply lain dormant, as in many cases of dyat (blood money) and qatt-e-yadd (cutting of hands). In such cases the stand of the Islamists is that only they will enforce them correctly when they come to power through aggressively isolationist policies in the manner of Mulla Umar. Below are produced some of the ‘strange-sounding’ statements issued by institutions and individuals charged with the task of enforcing Islam in Pakistan:

Blasphemy to apply to Allah

According to daily Jang, Council for Islamic Ideology will soon hold its session to recommend that anyone blaspheming against Allah too should be punished. It will also recommend that no woman be allowed to marry without the permission of her wali (male guardian). It is expected to ban kite-flying, organ transplant and smoking.

Religion ministry okays Taliban idol-bashing

According to Khabrain , the ministry for religious affairs in Islamabad gave its verdict on the destruction of ancient statues in Afghanistan by saying that the Taliban were right in doing so. The Foreign Office had asked the ministry about the status of this destruction in shariat . Thus Pakistan had now to support the destruction of the ancient Buddha statues in Afghanistan, although it was not made clear what should be done to such statues ion Pakistan.

Objection to Christian hangman

According to Khabrain , the Council for Islamic Ideology had become seized with the question of Christian jallad (hangman) executing Muslim convicts in Pakistan. Among issues taken to the Council by the religion ministry was the issue of girls marrying of their own choice.

Closure during namaz

According to daily Din, religion ministry had given the task of preparing a draft ordinance for the enforcement of namaz in Pakistan. Its directive was that all businesses should be closed down five times during namaz and during Friday namaz, and no one should be allowed to break this law. The entire country will have the same namaz and azan (call) timings.

Religion minister against Punjabi Conference

Quoted in daily Insaf , federal religion minister Mehmud Ghazi said that the Gandhis of Pakistan were trying to raise the slogan of Punjabi to undermine the Islamic ideology of Pakistan. He said that the Punjabi Conference held in Lahore was an Indian scheme which emphasised the region at the cost of Islam.

No songs on PTV, please!

According to daily Jang , the federal ministry for religious affairs headed by Mr Mahmud Ghazi had sent a recommendation to the ministry of information that all songs and dances shown on PTV be banned. The ministry’s letter said that PTV was involved in emulating Indian TV channels and was showing women shaking their bodies.

Ideology Council recommends ‘wali’

According to Khabrain , Council for Islamic Ideology (CII) announced that nikah of a girl without the permission of wali (male member of family) was un-Islamic and those girls getting married of their own choice should be punished under law. A verdict undoing such a marriage at Lahore High Court was set aside by the Supreme Court not long ago, but the CII favoured the earlier verdict. The other enlightened opinion of the CII was that co-education should be banned, that all lotteries like prize bonds should be banned and the paper used for printing the Quran should not be recycled.

Ideology Council critical of Supreme Court

According to daily Din , chairman of the Ideology Council of Pakistan (CII) criticised the Supreme Court for postponing the removal of bank interest for another year. Its chairman Mr S.M. Zaman said that it was not an economic issue but an issue related to the Quran and the Prophet PBUH. CII had earlier endorsed the destruction of Afghanistan’s archaeological heritage by the Taliban and criticised the Hanafi law of letting girls marry without the permission of the wali. According to Nawa-e-Waqt , the Council also rejected religion minister Mahmood Ghazi’s plan to use zakat to allow the poor to invest in businesses by saying that zakat could not be used for investment of any kind.

Namaz defaulters to be punished

According to Khabrain , religion ministry had sent the draft of a new law called Amr bil maruf wa nahi anal munkir Ordinance to the cabinet for approval and enforcement. Under this law everyone will be required to say namaz , all government employees will have to lay aside work during namaz timings and will be fined if they didn’t say namaz. At all levels, ulema committees will see to it that non- namazi Muslims are punished. All those who refuse to say namaz after three warnings will be fined.

Insurance is un-Islamic

According to Khabrain , Council for Islamic Ideology (CII) ruled that insurance of all kinds was against Islam and should be abolished forthwith. Instalments paid into a policy should be given under mudaraba (leasing) to make insurance Islamic. Mudaraba business did not do well in Pakistan.

Non-alcoholic beer un-Islamic

According to Jang , the Council of Islamic Ideology came to the conclusion that soft drinks sold as non-alcoholic beer were not jaez (allowed) in Islam. The Council said that any drink which is not sharab (alcohol) could not be called sharab or that the name beer should not be put on it. It said preparation and trade of non-alcoholic beer inside or outside Pakistan was haram (prohibited).

Kalima for the flag

Daily Khabrain reported that despite the passage of 23 years since the Council of Islamic Ideology made its first proposal about it, the government had not changed the flag. The recommendation was that kalima tayyaba be inscribed on the Pakistan national flag along with Allah Akbar. It was a pity that such a good scheme for Islamising the national flag was not accepted so far.

No women in ads, please!


Quoted in Jang , the Council for Islamic Ideology (CII) said that women should be disallowed from appearing in ads and that only men should be used to promote products through photographs. It said that women were allowed to work as air hostesses but they should wearing burqa or hijab on board. Also, no darzi (tailor) should be allowed to sew the clothes for women and that only women darzi should be used for women. According to the daily, CII also recommended that ACRs of all state employees should contain sections indicating religious observance and those not saying namaz should not be promoted.

Jehad is no defensive war!

According to Jang , the Council for Islamic Ideology in Islamabad declared that it was wrong to label jehad as a defensive war alone. The truth according to CII was that jehad could be offensive as well. According to Nawa-e-Waqt , the CII stated that Western propaganda against jehad had pushed it into the background, but everyone should be grateful to Afghanistan for having revived it. It said that the greatest act of piety was participation in jehad and one cause of the decline of the Muslims was their abandonment of it.

Currency will be banned


Daily Jang magazine quoted Lashkar-e-Tayba chief Hafiz Saeed as saying that when Islamic government is imposed on Pakistan currency will be abolished and gold and silver coins only will be legal tender. He said that the constitution too would be abolished as there was no need of a constitution in the presence of Quran. According to Khabrain , an insulter of the Prophet PBUH was sentenced to death in a Lahore Sessions Court because Yusuf ‘Kazzab’ had claimed to be the khalifa (appointee) of the Prophet PBUH.

Get rid of ‘bainamaz’ officers

According to daily Pakistan , the Council of Islamic Ideology recommended to the government that it should fire civil servants who did not say their namaz, and that areas where people said their namaz should be selected for concessional development funds.

Against Sunday holiday

According to daily Pakistan , Islamic Ideology Council (IIC) resolved in Islamabad that Pakistan should revert to Friday as weekly holiday for Islamic blessings, which supported a similar demand made by some shopkeepers in Lahore. However, two members of the CII, not member Afzal Haider, insisted that instead of reverting to Friday, the government should ensure that people said their Friday prayer.Jail against Islam

Prison not allowed in Islam

According to Khabrain , Council of Islamic Ideology declared that sending anyone to prison was against Shariat and recommended that prison sentences be abolished. Early Islam had no jails, no police, and no banks. Thieves used to have their hands cut.


Tuesday, December 29, 2015

Iran-sponsored terrorism


Iran's theocrats have been the pioneers of suicide bombing, hostage-taking of diplomats, using child soldiers and global bounty hunting of alleged blasphemers. Iran has been a prime exporter of terrorism in Lebanon (Hezbollah), Palestine (Hamas and Islamic jehad), Iraq (Badr militia), Syria (Shia militants exported from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan). However, unlike Salafi terrorism, Iran-supported terrorism: 1) is not a freelance activity but strictly a state-controlled venture i.e. all acts require approval from Supreme Iranian marj'ah, and 2) has a much smaller recruitment pool (less than 10% of global Muslim population).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_and_state-sponsored_terrorism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quds_Force


http://www.thetower.org/article/meet-the-proxies-how-iran-spreads-its-empire-through-terrorist-militias/
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has said, “In occupied Palestine there is no difference between a soldier and a civilian, for they are all invaders, occupiers, and usurpers of the land.”
Disturbingly, even Israeli children are not considered an exception, as Hezbollah also views them as “occupiers.” Muhammad Raad, a party ideologue, member of its executive committee, and elected by the Iranian legislature as Lebanon’s only representative in the IRGC, stated, “We know the emotions and sympathy associated with the [killing of Israeli] children differ from those associated with adults. But in the end, they are all serving one project….One day this child will become prime minister.”



Differences between Shia and Sunni terrorism

http://gsmcneal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/sunni-and-shia-terrorism-differences-that-matter.pdf
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/12/29-terrorism-lynch 
"First and foremost, Sunni radicals and Shi’a extremists differ in the overall approach and main objectives for their use of terror. The former tend to operate in a continuous, mid‐to‐high intensity manner, seeing war against infidels and apostates as a perennial condition featuring overlapping waves. Outside of an ongoing and seemingly open‐ended campaign against Israel, terrorist attacks by Shi’a groups have by and large featured discrete terror campaigns tethered to state and organizational objectives. Second, Sunni terrorists and Shi’a extremists manifest different patterns for recruiting terrorist operatives and developing terrorist missions. Shi’a terrorists, unlike their Sunni counterparts, enjoy direct state support and for that reason are far more likely to originate from Iranian embassies, consulates and state‐run businesses. Third, despite holding a minority viewpoint within the wider Sunni Islamic community, Sunni extremists, especially Salafi‐Jihadis, rely more extensively on the support of their coreligionist expatriate communities in facilitating terrorist activities. Fourth, while employing similar tactics and methods, Shi’a terrorist groups have shown a much greater propensity to kidnap innocents to barter, while Sunni extremists more frequently abduct to kill. Fifth, Shi’a terror groups exhibit a much higher incidence of targeted assassinations for specific political gain, rather than the high‐casualty killings featured in Sunni terrorism, and particularly of the Salafi‐Jihadist variant. Finally, each sect’s extremists manage publicity and propaganda differently. The Sunni approach to information management tends to feature doctrine and resources geared to take immediate credit and widely amplify a terrorist event. Shi’a terrorists, while not averse to normal media publicity and amplification, by and large take a much lower‐key approach." 

https://www.quora.com/How-are-Sunni-terrorist-groups-different-from-Shia-extremists
"All shiite terrorist groups I can think of at least in the past 35 years have  pledged allegiance to Khomeini. They have one central authority they are ALL loyal to. Secondly, there is NO international Shiite terrorist group. All Shiite terrorist groups have regional ambitions that don't go beyond the theater of battle they are fighting in. Thirdly, all Shiite terrorist groups don't try to provoke problems with their Sunni neighbours for obvious pragmatic reasons (only 10% of Muslims are Twelver Shiites) despite secretly despising them and subversively working to convert Sunnis to Shiism.

Sunni groups have no central authority they all report to. Even bin laden at his height had multiple partners who were killed (like Abdullah Azzam) or sidelined (Zawahiri). Not to mention multiple branches of Al-Qaeda refused his direct orders like Zarqawi in Iraq(which later  became ISIS). Their success frankly comes from their superior financing skills largely through extortion and the heroin trade (also an unknown amount from wealthy donors in the gulf)" 


http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/11/08/Sunni-extremism-vs-Shiite-extremism.html
"In the early eighties these groups were Shiite, namely Hezbollah, that instigated political violence in the name of defending Islam and resisting the Zionist enemy. They were all in fact part of a project to export Khomeini’s Iranian revolution to the rest of the Muslim world. The events in Afghanistan came along and Sunni extremists emerged as the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan, Mujahideen."
....
"Sunni extremism often hurts the Sunni, rather than the Shiite community, unlike Shiite extremist organizations which rarely attack their institutions, communities and people. The reason is that extremist organizations like Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iraq’s Asaib Ahl al-Haq are linked to governments and abide their policies of extremism management. It is impossible to do the same in Sunni communities because terrorist groups there, like al-Qaeda, are against governments and seek their overthrow."



http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-enemy/article/795404 
"Sunni jihadists are certainly scarier now than their Shiite counterparts: Public decapitation with swords and knives is, at least in modern times, more Saudi than Persian, and suicide bombing, which Sunni radicals now relish, has passed into desuetude among Shiites. Even the radical Shiite clergy​​—​​Sunnis don’t really have a clerisy to whom they give their obeisance​​—​​was never particularly enamored of this type of terrorism, even though Arab Shiites in Iraq, Kuwait, and Lebanon were its trailblazers. It’s questionable whether the leaders of the Sunni jihad raging across Syria and Iraq really want to blow themselves up, but certainly the rank-and-file radicals appear more wild than even the shock troops of the Lebanese Hezbollah, who’ve slaughtered Sunni civilians in Syria. Hezbollah’s fighters are more professional and camera-shy when they butcher their enemies."
Compared with Shiite holy warriors, Sunni jihadists, especially in Arab lands, are morally more distant from their fathers’ and grand-fathers’ socially conservative traditions, which despite their severity allowed for furtive sin and hypocrisy. In this sense, modern Sunni jihadists aren’t just stateless; they’re village-less. Their pristine, zealously egalitarian faith has become fluid, ready to be poured into any projectile that radical Sunni leaders have the skill to aim. That is just less true of militant Shiites. Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, has certainly tried to turn Islam into an ideology, a never-ending charge against the United States and Westernization. But the vanguard of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, who have brutally battered the older mores of the faith and the restraining politesse of Persian culture, kill and torture selectively, more carefully now than they had to 30 years ago. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the praetorians of the revolution, who’ve used terrorism at home and abroad as an essential tool of statecraft, still have to, however reluctantly, give deference to clerics."
.....
"Shiites have an advantage over Sunnis in times of trouble because their historic evolution, even after Iran became a powerful Shiite empire in the 16th century, has been at a distance from “those who hold the reins.” In the Islamic Republic, the state and the clergy are not interchangeable. There is a tension​​—​​a constant negotiation​​—​​among clerics about who are the proper arbiters of right and wrong. Sunnis have always been much more closely married to the state; they are more likely to collapse into crises of faith when government gives way or comes to be seen as illegitimate. Both are happening throughout the Arab Middle East."
Why no Shia transnational terrorist?

https://www.quora.com/Why-all-the-terrorist-attacks-carried-by-radical-muslims-in-the-past-two-decades-were-carried-by-Sunni-Muslims-not-Shia-Muslims
"There have been hundreds of those, but not in the West, because:
  1. Petrodollar comes from Arab Gulf, which is mostly Sunni. So Sunnis are way more powerful.
  2. Iran was sanctioned, which makes it harder to support terrorist groups. However, they carried 1992 attack on Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires. ("Credits: Pablo Esteban Aguilar Castro").
  3. If a group of Iranian extremists planned something, their national security would not treat them kindly. Just like Saddam used to do.
  4. Shia sect. is around 20% of Muslims in the world, they faced oppression by Sunnis, and their current priority is to obtain stability. i.e.: their bigger concern is Saudi Arabia and it's Wahabism. At least for the while.
Hundreds of terrorist attacks have been curried by Shia Muslims in Iraq. Thousands of people died in Sunni areas by Shia terrorist groups especially by Peace Companies."


Fire in Cinema Rex Abadan (19 August, 1978)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cinema_Rex_fire
https://twitter.com/SAMRIReports/status/1163344366213246982
http://kayhan.london/fa/1396/05/28/revolutionary-arson-19th-august-1978-470-burnt-alive
http://www.cinemarexabadan.com/assets/cinema_rex_aabadan_english.pdf
Years after the event, Ayatollah Tehrani, now considered an opposition figure, reveals that, when he was the head of the judiciary in Khuzestan province, he studied the file  of  Cinema  Rex. There,  he  noticed  that a group of four clerics in Qom who were responsible for coordinating the progress of the revolution had ordered the cinema to be burned in the hope that people in that oil-rich corner of the country would join the revolution.

https://twitter.com/BabakTaghvaee/status/1031141018006155265
Thread of Takbalizadeh

https://www.iranrights.org/memorial/story/-8094/hossein-takbalizadeh
Less than a month after the fire at Cinema Rex, Mr. Khomeini, who was in France at the time, stated this concerning attacks on cinemas and banks: “The Shah’s cinema is a center for prostitution and training of little misguided people; the Moslem people considers such centers contrary to the interests of the country, and considers them apt for destruction even without any orders issued by the clergy. Of course, the [fire] at the Abadan cinema was done at the hands of the Shah’s cronies so that the ‘great fear’ that the Shah had claimed his opposition promises, could become reality.” (Sahifeh Imam, Volume 3, 1989, date of the interview: September 14, 1978).



https://thefreeiranian.org/uncategorized/cinema-rex-forty-years-on-remembering-some-of-the-earliest-victims-of-the-khomeiniist-reign-of-terror
Another piece of the puzzle was given by one of the men who delivered the incendiary chemicals to Takbehalizadeh and his comrades, Hossein Boroujerdi. In his book (Farsi link), “Behind the Islamic Revolution,” Boroujerdi claimed that Khamenei himself, using the alias Hajji Abdollah, was the man who ordered a cinema in Abadan to be attacked.



https://www.rferl.org/a/1193213.html
August 20 -- Journalist Ali-Reza Nourizadeh, former Information Minister Daryoush Homayoun and Colonel Ardeshir Bayat revisit the 1978 Cinema Rex fire in Abadan, originally blamed on the Shah's intelligence service but later revealed as the work of supporters of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini [article in Persian].

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/12/staging-mousavis-arrest.html
Dec 13, 2009: Grand Ayatollah Yousef Sanei, one of the most ardent supporters of the Green Movement, said that, "Those who have hit a wall [in their crackdown on the people] now draw from their investment in Imam. They burn his posters and then say that others have done it. But true students never do that. We know the history. We know about setting fire on Cinema Rex in Abadan [in southern Iran] and Jame' Mosque in Kerman [in south central Iran]."



https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-new-look-at-the-shah-his-fall-and-how-it-continues-to-shake-the-world/2016/08/26/f3c4251c-49ed-11e6-bdb9-701687974517_story.html
In the year before the victory of the revolution, the Islamists burned hundreds of private businesses, including cinemas, Cooper writes. The most brutal attack came in August 1978, when 430 men, women and children were burned to death at Rex Cinema in the southern city of Abadan — the worst arson since World War II. The inferno was intended “to destabilize and panic Iranian society,” Cooper argues. It also successfully fanned the flames of hostility toward the shah across the country. The culprit, Cooper writes, based on evidence in the 2013 book “Days of God” by James Buchan, was Hossein Takbalizadeh, an Islamist linked to a local Khomeini underground cell who was eventually tried and convicted of murder by an Iranian court after the revolution.




Foiled terrorist attempts

http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/analysis-iran-and-hezbollah-s-terror-escalation-against-israel-1.452953
July 22, 2012: "Tension rising between Israel, Hezbollah following Bulgaria attack
Report: Israel fears Iranian terror attack at London 2012 Olympics
Hezbollah, not Iran, might be Israel's biggest worry this summer
The Bulgaria terrorist attack: News and analysis by Haaretz writers and commentators
Iran repeating its terrorist pattern in Africa
Iran's Revolutionary Guard behind attack on Israeli embassy car in New Delhi, says India Police
Out of Iran, into Africa: Hezbollah's scramble for Africa
Hamas political bureau urges Hezbollah to leave Syria and focus on Israel
......

Israeli sources calculate that over the past year there had been 20 terrorist attacks or attempts abroad in which Iranians and/or Hezbollah operatives have been involved directly.
The Iranian/Hezbollah foiled or failed attacks took place in what could be defined as “soft countries” in Asia and Africa, countries where the intelligence and law enforcement agencies are not sufficiently professionally trained to challenge this kind of threat, and where the Iranian and Hezbollah activities are in any event low priority for the local security forces. Additionally, some of the attacks have been aimed at “soft targets” like Israeli tourists or local Jewish facilities where the level of security may be even lower.

Moreover, the Tehran regime apparently has calculated, based on past experience, that the governments of these countries will react leniently and that Tehran will pay only a minimal political price. And indeed, no country where these recent attacks occurred has openly accused the Tehran government of involvement, and no country has taken open and strong diplomatic measures against Iran.

In this respect, the experience of the failed 1994 Bangkok embassy bombing is illustrative: The Iranian citizen involved was sentenced to death by a Thai court – and released after serving four years in jail after Iran applied heavy pressure. So far there has been no serious Thai diplomatic response to Iran regarding this year's attack, despite the clear involvement of seven or eight Iranian citizens in two planned terror attempts against Israelis this year.

Indian reaction to the February 13 bombing of an Israeli diplomatic car has been lukewarm at best. A foreign ministry spokesman in New Delhi said that India “will seek the cooperation of the Iranian authorities in bringing those involved in this dastardly attack to justice.” And though the defense relationship between New Delhi and Jerusalem has flourished in recent years, India, the Islamic Republic's second-biggest oil customer (after China) rushed to buy more Iranian oil, and paid in gold. There were even demonstrations in India after the arrest of Syed Mohammed Ahmad Kazmi, the local journalist accused of involvement in the terror plot."


http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/146178/iran-uses-terror-as-deterrence?all=1
For every operation that, say, kills five Israeli tourists in a Bulgarian resort town, there are a dozen botched plots, like the operation in Thailand where an Iranian agent blew off his own legs with a hand grenade.
..... the vast majority of Iranian projects come up empty, like the plan to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States
......
In 2007, four men planned to blow up fuel tanks and the fuel pipeline under New York’s JFK airport—and sought financial and logistical help from Iran to carry out their plot.
 .....
“The JFK operation isn’t that well known,” explains Levitt, “because it’s a plot that didn’t happen.” Kadir was on his way to meet Rabbani and other officials when he was arrested boarding a plane in Trinidad en route to Iran via Venezuela. He and his three co-conspirators were all found guilty, with three of them, includingKadir, getting life sentences.


http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-saudi-envoy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
Oct 11, 2011: The United States on Tuesday accused Iranian officials of plotting to murder Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States in a bizarre scheme involving an Iranian-American used-car salesman who believed he was hiring assassins from a Mexican drug cartel for $1.5 million. 
........
Iran’s last lethal operation on American soil, he said, was in 1980, when a critic of the Islamic government was murdered at his Bethesda, Md., home.
Mr. Nafisi said it was conceivable that elements of the Revolutionary Guards might have concocted the plot without top-level approval, perhaps to prevent reconciliation between Iran and the United States. 
But Iran’s Islamic government has a long history of attempts to eliminate enemies living overseas, said Roya Hakakian, author of “Assassins of the Turquoise Palace,” a book on the murder of four Iranians in a Berlin restaurant in 1992. A German court found that the murders were approved at the highest levels of the Iranian government. 
The gunman in the Berlin killings was also accused of plotting to kill the Saudi ambassador to Sweden, Ms. Hakakian said. 
 

1980s: The prime decade of Shia terrorism


http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1734315.stm
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/10/13/8294871-the-last-alleged-iranian-assassination-plot-on-us-soil-was-a-success
22 July 1980: An American convert killed Iranian dissident Ali Akbar Tabatabai in US and fled to Iran.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OEiWzEdh2OU
http://eng.majalla.com/2016/08/article55250775/hezbollah-designated-terrorist-organizationthree-decades-late
Hezbollah’s 1985 manifesto[1] very clearly pledged loyalty to then Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini , and urged the creation of a greater Islamic State governed by Imam Khomeini, in keeping with his idea of wilayat al-faqih (authority of the jurist-theologian).


 ===============
Kuwait 17

http://www.weeklystandard.com/29-years-later-echoes-of-kuwait-17/article/666451
Dec 13, 2012: "Twenty-nine years ago yesterday, December 12, 1983, Hezbollah and operatives of the Iranian-backed Iraqi Shiite group Da’wa carried out a series of seven coordinated bombings in Kuwait, killing six people and wounding nearly ninety more. The targets included the American and French embassies, the Kuwait airport, the grounds of the Raytheon Corporation, a Kuwait National Petroleum Company oil rig, and a government-owned power station. An attack outside a post office was thwarted.
The bombings shocked Kuwaiti officials, but the damage could have been much worse had the bombs been properly wired. As it happened, faulty engineering prevented three quarters of the explosives planted at the American embassy compound from detonating, saving many lives. Shoddy planning also reduced the destructiveness of the attacks: a truck carrying two hundred gas cylinders primed to explode at the National Petroleum Company site went off 150 yards from a refinery and just a few yards shy of a pile of flammable chemicals. More adept operational planning might also have resulted in the destruction of Kuwait’s primary water-desalination plant, located within the premises, leaving the desert nation nearly devoid of fresh water.
In these attacks, senior Hezbollah operatives, joined by their Iraqi compatriots, acted in the explicit service of Iran, rather than in the group’s immediate interests. Three years after the attacks, the CIA assessed in a since declassified report that while Iran’s support for terrorism was meant to further its national interest, including dissuading Kuwait from supporting Iraq militarily in the Iran-Iraq War, this support also stemmed from the clerical regime’s perception “that it has a religious duty to export its Islamic revolution and to wage, by whatever means, a constant struggle against the perceived oppressor states.” The Kuwait bombings were the first in a long chain of such attacks."
Ultimately, seventeen convicted terrorists were jailed in Kuwait—the Kuwait 17 as they came to be called—including several Hezbollah members. Over the following years, Hezbollah would carry out many more attacks, at home and abroad, seeking the release of members jailed for the bombings.....
One of those convicted—and sentenced to death—was Mustapha Badreddine, Imad Mughniyeh’s brother-in-law and cousin, who was in Kuwait under the Christian-sounding cover name Fuad Saab. When a Kuwaiti court sentenced Badreddine to death in March 1984, Hezbollah threatened to kill some of its hostages if the sentence were carried out (it was not). The abduction of the CIA’s station chief in Beirut, William Buckley, that same month, as well as several other kidnappings in the second half of 1984, are believed to have been a direct response to the arrest and sentencing of the Kuwait 17 bombers. Discussing prospects for the release of U.S. hostages, a CIA memo noted that “Mughniyeh has always linked the fate of his American hostages to release of 17 Shia terrorists in Kuwait, and we have no indication he has altered this demand.”
Badreddine was still alive in 1991, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and emptied the country's prisons. After he escaped to the Iranian embassy in Kuwait, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reportedly facilitated his travel to Iran and eventual return to Lebanon."

===================

http://www.juancole.com/2006/07/congress-expects-islamic-dawa-to.html
The Associated Press
September 21, 1986, Sunday
Underground Iraqi Group Threatens French Hostages
BEIRUT, Lebanon
An Iraqi opposition group warned Sunday that French hostages in Lebanon will suffer if two Iraqis deported from France last February are not allowed to return to Paris soon. The statement was issued by the Beirut-based regional office of the Dawa Party, which is made up of Iraqi Shiite Moslems and supports mainly Shiite Iran in its 6-year-old war with Iraq. Iraq’s government is made up mainly of Sunni Moslems. France deported the two students, Fawzi Hamzeh and Hassan Kheireddin, reported to be Dawa members, along with 11 other Middle Easterners after a series of terrorist bombings. The pro-Iranian Islamic Jihad organization, which has close ties with Dawa, said in March that it killed French hostage Michel Seurat in retaliation for the deportation. His body was not found . . .
and this:
The Associated Press
December 27, 1986, Saturday
Five Groups Claim Responsibility; Iraq Accuses Iran
BYLINE: By HAFEZ ABDEL-GHAFFAR
DATELINE: DHAHRAN, Saudi Arabia
BODY:
Five groups in Lebanon claimed responsibility for the attempted hijacking of an Iraqi jet, but conflicting accounts remained of what happened before the jetliner crashed, killing at least 62 people. Iraqi Airways flight 163 was en route to Amman, Jordan, from Baghdad, Iraq, on Christmas Day when it crash landed in northern Saudi Arabia. The death toll was thought to be the highest in a hijacking or attempted hijacking in the history of air piracy . . . Another an anonymous caller to a Western news agency claimed responsibility on behalf of Islamic Jihad, or Islamic Holy War, a fundamentalist Shiite Moslem faction loyal to Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini . . . He told a Western news agency the hijackers acted in cooperation with the Dawa party of pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiites. The caller demanded the release of two hijackers he said were arrested after the crash.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A7xJxBuegG4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_bD79iJqAU4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CdSTWST7h90
A documentary on Iran's child soldiers during Iran-Iraq war.

===========
Mecca bombing (July 1989)

http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/12/world/saudi-arabia-accused-by-iran-of-planting-bombs-in-mecca.html 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1989/Iran-Accuses-Saudis-of-Mecca-Bombing/id-8fff23030f040a5377cf6c9eb65abf4b 
July 9, 1989: Iran accused Saudi Arabia on Tuesday of planting the bombs that killed one person and wounded 16 near Islam's holiest shrine during the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.
Moslems condemned the bombings Monday near the Grand Mosque, but no Arab nation openly accused Iran of involvement.
A previously unknown group calling itself the ''Angry Arab Generation'' claimed responsibility and said in statement delivered to a Western news agency office in Beirut, Lebanon: ''We ... consider that this is merely a warning to the pigs, rulers of the Arab peninsula.
''Our action comes within the framework of a final warning for the treacherous Saud (royal) family, in case they persist in their treachery. We shall settle our accounts with them directly, by killing them,'' said the statement, typewritten in Arabic.
The group also claimed responsibility for an explosion in nearby Jiddah. Saudi media had not reported an explosion in that city.
Tehran earlier said the explosions in Mecca were intended to discredit Iran, which is boycotting the pilgrimage, or hajj, because of a feud with Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia, target of an almost daily barrage of propaganda by Iran's leaders and media in recent weeks, limited its reaction to saying: ''This criminal perpetration at a sacred spot is regrettable.''
In Washington, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said the United States was ''appalled'' by the bombings.
The Saudis have repeatedly accused Iranian zealots of causing trouble during the hajj and broke relations with Iran in April 1988, citing subversion and terrorism.
The dead man was identified as Taleb Khan Gamallah of Pakistan. The injured were four Saudis, three Pakistanis, five Bangladeshis, two Egyptians, a Turk and a British citizen of Bangladeshi origin.
Saudi security officials said the casualties were mostly pilgrims and that two were in critical condition. They said several suspects were being interrogated.
Hussein Musavi, prime minister of Iran, described the two explosions at 10 p.m. Monday as an effort ''by the Saudi regime to create a climate of suppression and repression,'' said Tehran's official Islamic Republic News Agency, monitored in Nicosia, Cyprus.
A statement from the Iranian Foreign Ministry urged pilgrims in Mecca to protest the bombings, which it blamed on ''the United States and its agents in the region,'' a reference to pro-Western Saudi Arabia.


http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1989/09/22/page/20/article/saudi-arabia-beheads-16-kuwaitis-for-planting-bombs
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/09/21/Saudis-execute-16-for-Mecca-bombings/8384622353600/
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/22/world/saudi-arabia-beheads-16-kuwaitis-linked-to-pro-iranian-terrorism.html
Sep 21, 1989: Saudi Arabia beheaded 16 Kuwaiti Shiites by sword in public today in the Islamic holy city of Mecca in connection with bombings and other terrorism during the annual Muslim pilgrimage in July.
The condemned men were all Shiite Muslims of Iranian and Saudi origin. They were accused of having smuggled explosives and weapons and found guilty of placing bombs near the Great Mosque of Mecca. Saudi Arabia said they had also planned other acts of terrorism in Saudi Arabia during the pilgrimage season on the orders of Iran.
The Saudi Interior Ministry announcement said the man accused of being ringleader of the group, a 22-year-old Shiite Muslim teacher, had confessed that the acts of sabotage were ordered by the Iranian Government. He was quoted in confessions as saying the members of his terrorist cell were trained by Iranian diplomats based in Kuwait.
The confessions were broadcast tonight on Saudi television.
Saudi Arabia said the explosives had been delivered to the terrorists in Kuwait by the Iranian Embassy.

http://articles.latimes.com/1991-04-20/news/mn-241_1_human-rights 
http://articles.latimes.com/1991-04-12/news/mn-277_1_saudi-arabia 
April 12, 1991: KUWAIT CITY — Four Shiite Muslims who had been imprisoned in Saudi Arabia in connection with a 1989 bombing in Mecca have been unexpectedly released by Saudi authorities in a dramatic illustration of changing political relationships in the Persian Gulf.

http://www.tobymatthiesen.com/wp/allgemein/hizbullah-al-hijaz/?print=1 
After the Hajj Incident in 1987, “many supporters of the Islamic Republic among the Shi’a were willing to pursue military means to retaliate against the Saudi regime.” In August 1987, an explosion occurred at a petroleum facilty in Ra’s al-Ju’ayma. Although the government claimed that it was an accident, it was later ascribed to Hizbullah al-Hijaz. In March 1988, the Sadaf petrochemical plant in Jubayl was bombed, an incident for which Hizbullah al-Hijaz claimed responsibility. A Hizbullah cell with four members from Tarut had carried out the attack. One of them had been an employee at Sadaf, while another, al-Khatim, had fought with Hizbullah in Lebanon and had received military training. Several bombs also detonated at the Ra’s Tanura refinery and one allegedly failed to explode in Ra’s al-Ju’ayma. Widespread arrests occurred, and when the security forces confronted three members of Hizbullah al-Hijaz, several Saudi policemen were killed and injured. These three and another member of the cell were later publicly executed. The execution of the four was enabled by a fatwa from the Council of the Assembly of Senior ‘Ulama’ (Majlis Hay’a Kibar al-‘Ulama’) allowing the execution of dissidents convicted of “sabotage.” The IRO argued that the bombings were a response to Saudi assistance to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War and that, while it did not claim responsibility for them, bombings were a natural continuation of the opposition’s activities. In response, Tajamu’ ‘Ulama’ al-Hijaz issued one of its first public statements, entitled “the execution of four fighters (mujahidin) in the Arabian Peninsula” and so did Hizbullah al-Hijaz. In addition, Ayatollah Montazeri condemned the execution while the Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a statement denying any links to the executed.
....
Two groups, the Soldiers of Justice (Jund al-Haqq) and the Holy War Organization in the Hijaz, claimed responsibility from Beirut for an assassination in Bangkok in January 1989. The Holy War Organization in the Hijaz claimed that the killing was revenge for the execution of four of its members in Saudi Arabia, and Risalat al-Haramayn reported that an October 1988 killing in Ankara was also in retaliation for the executions in Saudi Arabia. Some sources assert that this was a new front organization made up of Lebanese and Saudi Shi’ites with links to Palestinian groups and factions inside Iran that were opposed to an Iranian rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. These two groups, probably related to the military wing of Hizbullah al-Hijaz, claimed responsibility – or were blamed – for the assassination of a Saudi diplomats in Ankara in October 1988 and in 1989, of wounding a Saudi diplomat in Karachi in December 1988 in addition to several bomb attacks in Riyadh in 1985 and in 1989.
=================== 

Mass executions in Iran (1980s)


http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/irans-srebrenica-how-ayatollah-khomeini-sanctioned-the-deaths-of-20000-enemies-of-the-state-8485984.html
The horrors visited on tens of thousands of Iranians in the years after the Islamic revolution were spelled out as the Iran Tribunal published its final judgment. Described as “a great achievement... a miracle,” by one of the survivors, the Tribunal found that during the 1980s the Islamic Republic was guilty of the murder of between 15,000 and 20,000 political prisoners.


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/1321090/Khomeini-fatwa-led-to-killing-of-30000-in-Iran.html
CHILDREN as young as 13 were hanged from cranes, six at a time, in a barbaric two-month purge of Iran's prisons on the direct orders of Ayatollah Khomeini, according to a new book by his former deputy.
More than 30,000 political prisoners were executed in the 1988 massacre - a far larger number than previously suspected. Secret documents smuggled out of Iran reveal that, because of the large numbers of necks to be broken, prisoners were loaded onto forklift trucks in groups of six and hanged from cranes in half-hourly intervals.
Gruesome details are contained in the memoirs of Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri.


http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/ayatollah-sadeq-khalkhali-37544.html
After the establishment in 1979 of a fundamentalist Islamic republic in Iran under the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian army occupied three Kurdish-Iranian towns for supporting the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, condemned by Khomeini as "un- Islamic". The hardline cleric Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali set up his Islamic revolutionary court to weed out "counter-revolutionaries" in the town of Saghez.
Learning that a Kurdish defendant who was born in Orumiyeh had lost a hand to a grenade explosion during the Tehran uprising, Khalkhali asked what he was doing in Saghez.
"I am a guest at a social get- together, your honour," replied the defendant.
"That fits together very well," Khalkhali said candidly, "Born in Orumiyeh, participated in the Tehran uprising, executed in Saghez. Kill him! Next!"
The next defendant was charged with being the son of a usurer.
"What does my father's crime have to do with me?" protested the defendant.
"Usury is haram - sin," thundered Khalkhali, "and so is the seed of usury. Kill him! Next."
Twenty-four other Kurds were tried that day by Khalkhali. All were executed.
The scene was typical of Khalkhali's Islamic revolutionary court, where he acted as a prosecutor, judge and jury. The trials went on for just under two years, earning him titles like "the hanging judge" or the "butcher of the revolution". Two thousand members of the Shah's regime were executed in 1979 alone, by Khalkhali's own admission in his 1999 memoirs. Twenty years on, he remained unrepentant. "I would do exactly the same again," he said, when reminded how defendants had been given little chance to speak or get a lawyer to challenge evidence, if any were presented. "If they were guilty, they will go to hell and if they were innocent, they will go to heaven."


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1447921/Ayatollah-Sadeq-Khalkhali.html
Khalkhali acted as prosecutor, judge and jury in his own cases, regarding his rulings as "the judgment and conscience of 35 million people". He developed a new judicial concept called "obvious guilt" - whereby the accused is presumed guilty if his or her "crimes" were "very clear" prior to the trial.
Stories of his cruelty were legion. One of his first victims was Amir-Abbas Hoveida, the Shah's prime minister for eight years. After sentence had been passed, pleas for clemency poured in from all over the world and it was said that Khalkhali was told by telephone to stay the execution. Khalkhali replied that he would go and see what was happening. He then went to Hoveida and either shot him himself or instructed a minion to do the deed. "I'm sorry," he told the person at the other end of the telephone, "the sentence has aleady been carried out."
Some of Khalkhali's victims were no more than children. When a 14-year-old boy he had had executed turned out to be innocent, Khalkhali remarked that the child was not on his conscience because he had "sent him to heaven". His critics maintained that in his early life Khalkhali had spent time in a mental institution for torturing cats; it was said that strangling cats remained one of his favourite pastimes.
The months after the 1979 Iranian revolution saw the execution of many ministers, army officers and others with connections, however tenuous, with the Shah. "Those who fought with God on earth or with his prophets, or who spread corruption on earth must be killed, and hanged when they are killed, to show their bodies to the people," Khalkhali proclaimed.
Many of Khalkhali's victims were Iranian Kurds, on whom Ayatollah Khomeini had declared a holy war in August 1979. At the height of the terror, up to 60 Kurds a day were being sentenced to death by Khalkhali's itinerant kangaroo court.
......
When the French newspaper Le Figaro asked him whether he should face trial for crimes against humanity, he replied: "No. It is not possible. If I had acted wrongly, Imam Khomeini would have told [me]. I only did what he asked me to do." But he added: "If my victims were to come back on earth, I would execute them again, without exceptions."
Khalkhali's macabre sense of humour was brought home to the West in April 1980 when the bodies of American servicemen killed in an unsuccessful attempt to rescue the American embassy hostages in Tehran were discovered in the remote desert region where their helicopter had crashed. Khalkhali, who travelled to the site to supervise the recovery of the bodies, was reported to have commented, "I'm sorry I didn't find them alive".
Later he presided over a press conference held in the backyard of the embassy, at which the bodies were displayed to the world's press. Few events of the past 50 years - with the exception of the September 11 bombings - angered the American public so much as the spectacle of Khalkhali gloatingly ordering the bags containing the dismembered limbs of the dead servicemen to be split open so that the blackened remains could be picked over and photographed. The grisly footage from Tehran was repeated over and over again until American audiences had caught every snide gesture and touch of degradation Khalkhali could bring to the scene.



http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/reports/3158-deadly-fatwa-iran-s-1988-prison-massacre.html#2
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1988_executions_of_Iranian_political_prisoners 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khavaran_cemetery 
Khavaran cemetery is an irregular unmarked cemetery located in southeast Tehran. The graves in the cemetery do not have any marking on them. The Islamic Republic of Iran does not allow the families of the dead to mourn in the cemetery and the identity of those who were buried in the cemetery is unknown to their relatives.[1] Khavaran initially was a traditional burial ground for religious minorities, "on the grounds that they were apostates and must not contaminate the resting place of Muslims. 


http://www.rferl.org/content/Iran_Anniversary_Political_Prisoners/1194912.html 
August 29, 2008: This time, however, the officials did not allow the gathering to take place, and in the preceding days, police raided a house where the families of some victims were gathered.
"The pretext for the execution of religious and non-religious political prisoners in the summer of 1988 was quite different," Aslani says. "Those with religious affiliations who were mostly from the Mujahedin-e-Khalq organization went to the gallows as Mohareb [combatants with God], whereas the leftists were executed as apostates. I was in the Gohardasht prison when the Death Commission came there and [commission member] Mr. Nayeri's question was: are you a Muslim or a Marxist? The destiny of those who answered they were Marxist was predetermined."


https://en.iranwire.com/features/7383/
https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2016/aug/11/hossein-ali-montazeri-audio-file-calls-for-inquiry-1988-massacre-iran-political-prisoners?CMP=share_btn_tw 
August 10, 2016: The publication for the first time in Iran of an audio recording from nearly three decades ago has reopened old wounds from the darkest period in the Islamic Republic.
In the summer of 1988, thousands of leftists and supporters of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) organisation were executed in a massacre of political prisoners. In the pre-internet age, the incident was subject to a media blackout in Iran and received scant attention abroad, unlike other acts of carnage that rank alongside it, such as Srebrenica.
....
A fatwa issued by Khomeini in 1988 ordered the execution of apostates who refused to recant. Thousands of prisoners were brought before committees and asked whether they renounced their political affiliation, if they were Muslims, whether they prayed and if they believed in the Islamic Republic. Some were also asked if they were prepared to walk through Iraqi minefields, according to the audio file. 
Those who gave a negative answer in questioning that lasted a few minutes were put to death. Many were buried in a piece of unmarked land in the Khavaran cemetery near Tehran. Every year, as families gather to commemorate the deaths, riot police block their way.

Assassinations Abroad


http://www.geocities.ws/hammihanirani/assasinations.html
1. In July 1980, Shapour Bakhtiar escapes an assassination attempt in Paris, France. A French policeman and a neighbor are killed and one policeman is seriously injured.
2. In July 1980, Ali Tabatabai is killed in Washington D.C., United States.
3. In 1981, Shahriar Shafigh is killed in Paris, France.
4. In January 1982, Shahrokh Missaghi is killed in Manila, Philippines.
6. In June 1982, Shahram Mirani is fatally wounded in India.
7. In August 1982, Ahmad Zol-Anvar is fatally wounded in Karachi, Pakistan.
8. In September 1982, Abdolamir Rahdar is killed in India.
9. In 1982, Colonel Ahmad Hamed is killed in Istanbul, Turkey.
10. In February 1983, Esfandiar Rahimi is killed in Manila, Philippines.
11. In February 1984, Gholam-Ali Oveissi and his brother, Gholam-Hossein, are killed in Paris, France.
12. In August 1985, Behrouz Shahverdilou is killed in Istanbul, Turkey.
13. In December 1985, Hadi Aziz-Moradi is killed in Istanbul, Turkey.
14. In August 1986, Bijan Fazeli is killed in London, Great Britain.
15. In December 1986, Vali Mohammad Van is killed in Pakistan.
16. In January 1987, Ali-Akbar Mohammadi is killed in Hamburg, Germany.
17. In May 1987, Hamid Reza Chitgar disappears in Vienna, Austria and is found assassinated in July.
18. In July 1987, Faramarz-Aghaï and Ali-Reza Pourshafizadeh are killed and twenty-three persons are wounded in residences of Iranian refugees Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan.
19. In July 1987, Amir-Hossein Amir-Parviz is seriously wounded by the explosion of a bomb placed in his car in London, England.
20. In July 1987, Mohammad-Hassan Mansouri is shot dead in his house Istanbul, Turkey.
21. In August 1987, Ahmad Moradi-Talebi is killed in Geneva, Switzerland.
22. In October 1987, Mohammad-Ali Tavakoli-Nabavi and his youngest son, Noureddin, are killed in Wembley, Great Britain.
23. In October 1987, Abol-Hassan Modjtahed-Zadeh is kidnapped in Istanbul, Turkey.
24. In December 1988, an Iranian refugee is assassinated in front of the headquarters of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Karachi, Pakistan.
25. In June 1989, Ataollah Bay Ahmadi is killed in the Emirate of Dubai.
26. In July 1989, Abdol-Rahman Ghassemlou and Abdollah Ghaderi and Fazel Rassoul are killed in Vienna, Austria.
27. In August 1989, Gholam Keshavarz is killed in Cyprus.
28. In September 1989, Sadigh Kamangar is assassinated in the north of Iraq.
29. In September 1989, Hossein Keshavarz, victim of a terrorist attempt, is paralyzed for life.
30. In February 1990, Hadj Baloutch-Khan is killed by a terrorist commando in Pakistan.
31. In Mars 1990, Hossein Mir-Abedini is wounded by an armed commando in the airport of Istanbul, Turkey.
32. In April 1990, Kazem Radjavi is killed in Coppet, Switzerland.
33. In July 1990, Ali Kashefpour is kidnapped and killed in Turkey.
34. In September 1990, Efat Ghazi is killed in Sweden by a bomb intended for her husband.
35. In October 1990, Cyrus Elahi is killed in Paris, France.
36. In April 1991, Abdol-Rahman Boroumand is killed in Paris, France.
39. In July 1991, Ahad Agha is killed in Suleimanya, iraq.
40. In August 1991, Shapour Bakhtiar and Soroush Katibeh are killed in Suresnes, France.
41. In September 1991, Saïd Yazdan-Panah is fatally wounded in iraq.
42. In December 1991, Massoud Rajavi escapes a terrorist attempt in Baghdad, iraq.
43. In January 1992, Kamran Hedayati is wounded opening a letter bomb in Vastros, Sweden. He looses his sight and his hands.
44. In May 1992, Shapour Firouzi is killed in Iraq.
45. In July 1992, Kamran Mansour-Moghadam is killed in Suleymania, Iraq.
46. In August 1992, Fereydoun Farokhzad is killed in Bonn, Germany.
47. In September 1992, Sadegh Sharafkandi, Fatah Abdoli, Homayoun Ardalan and Nouri Dehkordi are killed in Berlin, Germany.
49. In February 1993, the fundamentalist terrorists in Turkey admit to have kidnapped and killed Ali-Akbar Ghorbani who had disappeared in June 1992 in Turkey.
50. In March 1993, Mohammad-Hossein Naghdi is killed in Rome, Italy.
51. In June 1993, Mohammad-Hassan Arbab is killed in Karachi, Pakistan
52. In October 1993, Turkish fundamentalists admit having tortured and killed for Iranian officials, Abbas Gholizadeh who was kidnapped in Istanbul, Turkey in December 1992.
54. In January, 1994, Taha Kermanj is killed in Corum, Turkey.
55. In August 1994, Ghafour Hamzei'i is killed in Baghdad, iraq.
56. In February 1996, Zahra Rajabi and Ali Moradi were killed in Istanbul, Turkey.
57. In March 1996, Ali Mollazadeh was killed in Karachi, Pakistan.
58. In May 1996, Reza Mazlouman ( Kourosh Aryamanesh) was killed in Paris, France.


Chain Murders of Iran (1988-1998)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chain_murders_of_Iran
http://www.iran-bulletin.org/political_commentary/chain_murders.html
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/akbar-ganji/the-crisis-of-trust-in-th_b_6209216.html
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/144/the-chain-murders-of-iran
Dec 17, 2008: Ganji wrote also book “’Alijenab Sorkhpoosh va ’Alijenaban Khakestari” (His Red-Robed Highness and the Grey Eminence) on the subject. His Red-Robed Highness referred to Former President Rafsanjani, currently Chairman of the Assembly of Experts, whereas the Grey Eminence was Ali Fallahian, former Minister of Intelligence and currently serving as Khamenei’s security advisor, both identified as the men behind the chain murders. Fallahian was also involed in the bombing of the Jewish center in Argentina in 1994.
In the book, Ganji also reveals that Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejeyi, now Minister of Intelligence under Ahmadinejad’s presidency, was involved in the assassinations.
In April 2000, Ganji participated in a conference in Germany on the future of reforms in Iran, organised by the Heinrich-Boll Foundation. The meeting provoked outrage in conservative circles in Iran. Ganji’s participation in the conference was the pretext to send him to trial in Tehran, charging him of taking part in it.
Appearing before an Islamic Revolution court, Ganji took the opportunity to denounce publically Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s spiritual mentor, for having encouraged the assassinations by ruling that apostates and those who question Islam’s principles could be executed without a court order.
Ganji served in Tehran’s Evin Prison from 2001 to 2006. However, while in jail, Ganji wrote a letter saying that Khamenei should leave his post, because of his responsibility to the chain murders. Furthermore, Reformist supporters became disillusioned, as Khatami proved incapable and not willing of advancing any reform agenda.


http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/475e4e250.pdf
The body of Ahmad Mir-Alai,  writer and translator  was  found  in  an  alley.  He  reportedly  died  of  a  heart  attack.  Ghaffar  Hosseini,  poet  and  translator,  was  found  bloody  and  dead  in  his  home.  His  death  too  was  blamed  on  a  heart  attack.  Ghazaleh  Alizadeh,  a  renowned  story  writer,  was  found  dead  a  long  way  from  her  home. She allegedly committed suicide. Ebrahim Zalzadeh, a publisher, was kidnapped after  publishing  and  defending  the  manifesto.  His  mutilated  body  was  found  in  a  wasteland.  Chilling to note is that in her book  Iran Awakening , Shirin Ebadi writes  of one the popular  methods of assassination used at this time - targets were injected with potassium to produce  seemingly natural heart attacks.


http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/01/the-chain-murders-killing-dissidents-and-intellectuals-1988-1998.html#ixzz4AM1IRKuQ
Jan 6, 2011: "January 6 is the 11th anniversary of the statement by Iran's Ministry of Intelligence in which it admitted that its agents had killed several dissidents and intellectuals in what became known as the Chain Murders. Although the hardliners tried to restrict the subsequent investigation to only four killings, the scope of the Chain Murders was much broader."


Bosnia civil war (1993)


http://en.abna24.com/cultural/archive/2010/11/18/213557/story.html
According to the reporter of Navideshahed; the documentary film about the life of “Martyr Rasoul Heydari” has been made and produced by “Revayat - e Fat’h” Institution. This documentary film will be broadcast from Channel One of TV today (Saturday, November 6th 2010) and tomorrow (Sunday, November 7th, 2010).
......

Concurrent with the aggression of the racist Serbian to the Bosnian Muslim people, Rasoul went to Bosnia as the diplomat of Islamic Republic of Iran. Finally and after years of jihad and fight in the way of truth, Rasoul Heydari was captured by the Serbian forces on “Eyd - e Ghadir” [An Islamic celebration day] of 1993. He was passing over a road at that time. Then he was martyred by the Serbian forces on that day. He was 32 years old at that time. Rasoul Heydari has three children.



Khobar Towers bombing (1996)

https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/945177544097189888
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=UgoxCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA181#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=UgoxCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA201#v=onepage&q&f=false
FBI got direct access to the suspects detained in Saudi Arabia in 2000. Chapter 7 of "Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God" By Matthew Levitt provides details of Khobar Towers bombing investigation



Love-hate between Iran and Al-qaeda

http://dissenter-rationalist.blogspot.com/2015/12/modernity-and-fundamentalism.html 



Love-hate between Iran and Taliban


Murder of Lebanese politicians & journalists (2005-2008)

http://www.ifex.org/lebanon/2007/06/04/u_n_tribunal_offers_chance_for/
http://aljazeeraalarabiamodwana.blogspot.co.uk/2015/11/christian-and-sunni-politicians-and.html
Assassinations of Christian and Sunni politicians in Lebanon


http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/06/26/who-really-killed-a-playboy-terrorist.html
Being hunted also didn’t blunt Badreddine terrorist ambitions, and in 2005, he proved that while he might be off the radar, he was not out of the picture. Working with top Hezbollah commanders, Badreddine orchestrated the assassination of Rafic Hariri, the ex-prime minister of Lebanon and one of the country’s most well known politicians and business leaders. Hariri’s convoy was hit by a massive bomb hidden inside a parked car near the St. George Hotel in Beirut. It was a classic Badreddine operation. 
“Hariri was one of the best-guarded people in the world, with his security protocol formulated by experts from Germany and the United States,” Bergman writes. “Badreddine’s success in killing Hariri (together with 21 other people) had once again proven that apart from Mughniyah [his cousin and brother-in-law], he was the best operative in the organization.”     


http://yalibnan.com/2012/10/25/geagea-iran-syria-hired-hezbollah-to-kill-hassan/ 
http://yalibnan.com/2012/10/28/hassans-widow-refuses-condolences-of-iranian-envoy/ 
http://spon.de/adNfG 
Oct 19, 2012: Assassination of Wissam Hassan, Sunni intelligence chief of Lebanon


Iran's Silent Soldier 

Qaseem Suleimani - Hameed Gul of Iran.
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander?currentPage=all
"Suleimani’s campaign against the United States crossed the Sunni-Shiite divide, which he has always been willing to set aside for a larger purpose. Iraqi and Western officials told me that, early in the war, Suleimani encouraged the head of intelligence for the Assad regime to facilitate the movement of Sunni extremists through Syria to fight the Americans. In many cases, Al Qaeda was also allowed a degree of freedom in Iran as well. Crocker told me that in May, 2003, the Americans received intelligence that Al Qaeda fighters in Iran were preparing an attack on Western targets in Saudi Arabia. Crocker was alarmed. “They were there, under Iranian protection, planning operations,” he said. He flew to Geneva and passed a warning to the Iranians, but to no avail; militants bombed three residential compounds in Riyadh, killing thirty-five people, including nine Americans.
As it turned out, the Iranian strategy of abetting Sunni extremists backfired horrendously: shortly after the occupation began, the same extremists began attacking Shiite civilians and the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government. It was a preview of the civil war to come. “Welcome to the Middle East,” the Western diplomat in Baghdad told me. “Suleimani wanted to bleed the Americans, so he invited in the jihadis, and things got out of control.”


http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9490878/Irans-supreme-leader-orders-fresh-terror-attacks-on-West.html

August 22, 2012: "Mr Khamenei responded by issuing a directive to Qassem Suleimani, the Quds Force commander, to intensify attacks against the West and its allies around the world. The Quds Force has recently been implicated in a series of terror attacks against Western targets. Last year U.S. officials implicated the organisation in a failed assassination attempt against the Saudi Arabian ambassador to Washington. It was also implicated in three bomb attacks against Israeli diplomats in February, planning to attack the Eurovision song contest in Azerbaijan while two Iranians were arrested in Kenya last month for possessing explosives. Intelligence officials believe the recent spate of Iranian attacks has been carried out by the Quds Force's Unit 400, which runs special overseas operations."


Indoctrination of Iranian schoolchildren


http://www.rferl.org/content/Commentary_How_Schoolchildren_Are_Brainwashed_In_Iran/2054304.html
May 27, 2010: General Jokar told the Fars news agency last October that 36,000 schoolchildren were killed and 2,853 injured during the war, while 2,433 were taken prisoner. The exceptionally high ratio of dead to wounded (in a conventional war between professional armies the number of wounded is higher than the number of those killed) reflects the children's lack of military training: they were used as cannon fodder in human-wave attacks launched by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps against the Iraqi forces. 

In order to promote and glorify the spirit of martyrdom in line with the law enacted by the Majlis, October 30 is celebrated as Student Basij Day.

It was on that day in 1980, during the battle for the southern port of Khorramshahr at the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, that 13-year-old Hossein Fahmideh pulled the pin out of a grenade and leaped clutching it under an advancing Iraqi tank, killing himself and disabling the tank. Islamic republic founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini declared Fahmideh a hero, and a monument to him was later erected on the outskirts of Tehran. That monument has since become a place of pilgrimage for schoolchildren.

Discussing the importance of observing Islamic standards in kindergartens, Welfare and Social Security Minister Sadeq Mahsouli, himself a former Revolutionary Guard commander, said last month that "children should be educated in such a way that when they reach the age of 13, they will be able to imitate Hossein Fahmideh."


Iran's role in Syrian civil war

http://dissenter-rationalist.blogspot.co.uk/2017/05/irans-war-in-syria.html



Shia militants in Iraq

http://dissenter-rationalist.blogspot.co.uk/2016/05/shia-militancy-in-iraq.html


Houthi rebels in Yemen

http://tribune.com.pk/story/838877/yemens-last-jews-eye-exodus-after-militia-takeover/ http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-jews-idUSKBN0LJ0QB20150215 
Feb 20, 2009: "A few worried families are all that remain of Yemen's ancient Jewish community, and they too may soon flee after a Shi'ite Muslim militia seized power in the strife-torn country this month. 
Harassment by the Houthi movement - whose motto is "Death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam" - caused Jews in recent years to largely quit the northern highlands they shared with Yemen's Shi'ites for millennia.
But political feuds in which the Jews played no part escalated last September into an armed Houthi plunge into the capital Sanaa, the community's main refuge from which some now contemplate a final exodus. Around six Yemeni Jews from the same family arrived in Israel on Friday, members of the community told Reuters."
http://forward.com/news/122780/caught-in-strife-yemen-s-jews-cling-fiercely-to/#ixzz44Kyge0oX 
Jan 6, 2010: "When an on-air reporter mentions the name of the rebel leader — the recently killed Abdul Malik al-Houthi — al-Marhabi spits.


“Dog,” he mutters under his breath.
Al-Marhabi has reason to dislike al-Houthi: In January 2007, Shi’ite rebels loyal to al-Houthi forced al-Marhabi and his entire community to flee their homes in the north of Yemen, near the Saudi border, under cover of darkness. Taking with them only what they could carry on their backs, the Jews of Sa’ada left their mud brick homes in that ancient walled desert city to take up residence in Yemen’s capital as wards of the government.
.....
In fact, Al Qaeda, a militant Sunni group, counts Shi’ite Muslims like al-Houthi among those they hate. But the al-Houthi rebellion has been no less devastating for the Sa’ada Jews for all that.
 

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/world/middleeast/persecution-defines-life-for-yemens-few-jews.html?_r=0
Feb 19, 2015: " Yemeni Jews, like those in other Arab countries, have suffered wave after wave of persecution. Originally many of them lived in Saada Province in the north, which was predominantly Zaydi, members of an offshoot of Shiite Islam that historically were anti-Semitic. The Houthis, whose base is in Saada, embedded that attitude in their slogan, “Death to America, death to Israel, damnation to the Jews.”
The Houthis fought a succession of wars with the central government beginning in 2004, and in 2007, a Houthi representative in Saada gave Jews there an ultimatum: Leave in 10 days or face attack. Yemen’s president then, Mr. Saleh, though a Zaydi himself, became a champion of the Jews from Saada. At government expense, Mr. Saleh relocated them to a gated community in Sana next to the American Embassy."


Attack in India


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Cops-name-Iran-military-arm-for-attack-on-Israeli-diplomat/articleshow/15263013.cms

July 30, 2012: "Alleging that an Iranian state agency was involved in the February 13 bomb attack on an Israeli diplomat in the capital, the Delhi Police has concluded that the suspects were members of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, a branch of the nation's military."