Madrassas: The Potential for Violence in Pakistan

http://alhassanain.org/english/?com=book&id=1103

According to A.H. Nayyar, ‘The madrasahs have, not surprisingly, become a source of hate-filled propaganda against other Sects and the sectarian divide has become sharper and more violent’ (Nayyar 1998: 243). However, it appears that there was much more acrimonious theological debate among the Shias and Sunnis and among the Sunnis themselves during British rule than is common nowadays. The militancy in sectarian conflicts cannot be attributed to the teaching in the madrasas, though, of course, the awareness of divergent beliefs does create the potential for a negative bias against people of other beliefs.
They were also very bitter as the Deobandi–Barelwi munazaras of 1928 collected in Futuhat-i Nu’maniyya (Nu’mani n.d) illustrate. Moreover, the pioneers of the sects and sub-sects did indulge in refuting each other’s beliefs. For instance Ahmed Riza Khan, (1856–1921), the pioneer of the Barelwi school, wrote a series of fatwas (fatwa=religious decree) against Sir Sayyid of Aligarh, the Shias, the Ahl-i Hadith, the Deobandis and the Nadwat al-Ulama in 1896. These were published as Fatawa al-Haramain bi-Rajf Nadwat al-Main (1900) (Sanyal 1996: 203). The Barelwis, in turn, were refuted by their rivals. The followers of the main debaters sometimes exchanged invective and even came to blows but never turned to terrorism as witnessed in Pakistan’s recent history. 
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Recently published courses list no book on the maslak for the Deobandis. The Barelwis mention ‘comparative religions’ but no specific text. The Ahl- i Hadith retain almost the same optional courses as before. The Shia madrasas list books on beliefs which include comparative religions in which, of course, Shia beliefs are taught as the only true ones. Polemical pamphlets claiming that there are conspiracies against the Shias are available. Incidentally such pamphlets, warning about alleged Shia deviations from the correct interpretations of the faith, are also in circulation among Sunni madrasas and religious organizations.

 

http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/madrassas-the-potential-for-violence-in-pakistan/
"it appears that there was much more acrimonious theological debate among the Shias and Sunnis and among the Sunnis themselves during British rule than is common nowadays. The militancy in sectarian conflicts cannot be attributed to the teaching in the madrassas though, of course, the awareness of divergent beliefs does create the potential for negative bias against people of other beliefs.

They were also very bitter as the Deobandi-Barelvi munazras of 1928 collected in Futoohat-e-Nomania (Nomani n.d) illustrate. Moreover, the pioneers of the sects and sub-sects did indulge in refuting each other’s beliefs. For instance Ahmed Raza Khan, (1856-1921) the pioneer of the Barelvi school, wrote a series of fatawa (plural of fatwa = religious decree) against Sir Sayyid of Aligarh, the Shi’is, the ahl-i-Hadith, the Deobandis and the Nadwat ul-‘Ulama in 1896. These were published as Fatawa al-Haramain bi-Rajf Nadwat al-Main (1900) (Sanyal 1996: 203). The Barelvis, in turn, were refuted by their rivals. The followers of the main debaters sometimes exchanged invectives and even came to blows but never turned to terrorism as witnessed in Pakistan’s recent history."

"The Iranian revolution of 1979, the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the late eighties and later the rise of the Taliban convinced the Pakistani ulema that Islam could be a power in its own right. In short, the ulema were drifting from conservatism to revivalism and activism. Surely the Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith ulema were more consciously revivalist as were the Shia ulema but, on the whole, the character of Islam, as preached in Pakistan, has undergone a tremendous change. As it happens even the Barelvi sub-sect, with the second-largest madrassa board in the country, is not entirely peaceful. The ICG report of 2007 says that the ‘Faizan-e-Madina chain’ of madrassas is ‘certainly militant in its approach.’ But adds that much of their hostility is directed ‘more towards the Deobandis and Ahle Hadith than Shias’ (ICG 2007: 11)."

"Another factor which must be taken into account is Khalid Ahmed’s thesis that the madrassas create a rejectionist world view. In his own words:
The danger from madrassa is not its ability to train for terrorism and teach violence, but in its ability to isolate its pupils completely from society representing existential Islam and indoctrinate them with rejectionism. A graduate from a madrassa is more likely to be persuaded to activate himself in the achievement of an ‘exclusive’ shariah than a pupil drawn from a normal state-owned institution (Ahmed 2006: 64)."

"Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey claimed that they examined the educational backgrounds of 75 terrorists behind some of the most significant recent terrorist attacks against westerners. They found that a majority of them were college-educated, often in technical subjects like engineering, About 53 percent of the terrorists had been to college while ‘only 52 percent Americans had been to college’ (New York Times 15 March 2005). This also seems to be true about the angry young British Muslims who struck on 7 July 2005 as well as the cadres of the Jama’t-i-Islami in Pakistan who support fighting in Kashmir though most of them come from the state education system and not the madrassas. Moreover,  Sohail Abbas, a psychologist who interviewed jihadis who were incarcerated in Pakistani jails after having been jailed and then deported to Pakistan from Afghanistan where they had gone to fight the United States in defence of the Taliban in 2001, corroborates the same finding. He says: ‘What we can say is that 232 jihadis out of the 319 in the Haripur group had attended school for at least five years or more. That means that most of the jihadis were in fact educated and that too in the mainstream education system (Abbas 2006: 84). In the Haripur group only 22.3 per cent had attended the madrasssa while in the Peshawar group, out of 198, only 70 (35.5 per cent) had been to the madrassa. But even in the latter case most (61.2 per cent) had attended only for one to three months. (Abbas 2006: 90-91). In short, mainstream education is no guarantee of preventing a person from joining militant groups. In this context the influence of Islamists, whether out of the peer group, family or teachers, is crucial.

Roy further points out that de-territorialized Muslims in western countries, being overwhelmed by the dominant culture around them, fall back upon the Islamic identity. They are not guided by traditional texts or the ulema; they find their own meanings from the fundamental texts of the faith (the Qur’an and the hadith). Their neo-colonial reaction to the injustice of the world order, the irresistible globalization which seems to inundate all civilizations under the banner of Micky Mouse, is to lash out in fury against western targets and elites in Muslim countries who support western policies. They use the idiom of Islam but the anger which motivates them comes from a sense of being cheated. There are, of course, pegs to hang this anger on: Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran – the list can go on. But essentially Muslim militancy is a reaction to western injustice, violence and a history of exploitation and domination over Muslims. This can only be reversed by genuinely reversing western militant policies and a more equitable distribution of global wealth."


http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153383

The administrators everywhere claim they do not teach their students to hate other sects, but interviews with teachers and students amply prove that the madrasas play a key role in moulding the sectarian identities of their graduates. Most of them do not hesitate from pronouncing their sectarian beliefs publicly. Umer Bin Abdul Aziz, the administrator of an Ahl-e-Hadith madrasa in Peshawar, does not mince his words when he debunks many Barelvi beliefs even in his casual conversations. He also appears to be vehemently opposed to the beliefs of Shias.

In Barelvi madrasas, too, feelings towards the members of other sects are of distrust if not outright hostility. Muhammad Saad Junaidi, a 19-year-old student at Peshawar’s main Barelvi madrasa, Jamia Junaidiyah Ghafooriyah, does not deem it right to offer prayers led by an imam who belongs to another sect.

Syed Jawad Hadi, administrator of Jamiatus Shaheed Arif Hussain Lil-Maarif al-Islamia, acknowledges that the way the Shia madrasas implement Dars-e-Nizami curriculum is quite flawed. Precious little is taught about the lives of the first three Muslim caliphs in the Shia seminaries, he admits. “It’s not the right thing. Their services to Islam should also be taught about in the Shia madrasas.”

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Even outside Pakistan, religious education remains mostly sectarian — most obviously in places such as Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, one internationally renowned institution of religious learning, Cairo’s historic Al-Azhar University, has focused on developing critical faculties among its graduates rather than cramming them with controversial histories and even more controversial interpretations of religious texts. “I did not find any sectarian bias in the curriculum at Al-Azhar where people from 114 different nationalities and belonging to different sects study together,” says Khalid Raza, who is pursuing a degree there after graduating from a Barelvi madrasa in Peshawar.