https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uRu95Fg4r70
21 Jan 2009: Israel, the Jews and the Sunni-Shiite Conflict: A Symposium
Hosted by: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism
https://www.bbc.com/persian/blog-viewpoints-47919664
https://twitter.com/mpargoo/status/1117214198478491648
Exploring #Shia theological books, I have explained in the following article on @bbcpersian that #alaqsa mosque has not been sacred among Shia and imam #Ali has prohibited his followers from visiting it. Read more:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FPALbk2NQjw
https://talisman-gate.com/2016/06/16/weaponizing-history/
Nibras Kazimi's talk on how Sunni and Shia extremists interpret Muslim history
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/shiite-doctrine-iii
Shia Sunni relations since 19th century
https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/961248809731936256
https://youtu.be/EzUYEeP5-Us?t=2m51s
Dec 2017: Allama Jawad Naqvi (#Shia cleric): Just like Yazid, Saudi Crown Prince is also a liberal who has allowed women to drive, play, sing and dance. Just like Yazid, he has declared war on Ayatollah Khamenie, Hussain of our times.
https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/930072474246635520
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=_dZlCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA77#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=_dZlCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA80#v=onepage&q&f=false
Jan 1845: Shia mullahs killed Bahais in Iran but in Ottoman Iraq (1845), they refused to ratify Sunni fatwa calling for execution of Babi emissary (fearing Shias would be next) and asked for his exile or imprisonment #PragmaticTheology. Extract from "The Sunna and Shi'a in History: Division and Ecumenism in the Muslim Middle East", page 77-83, Chapter 'Encounters between Shi'i and Sunni Ulama' by Meir Litvak
https://twitter.com/IranWireEnglish/status/830747034399473664
https://iranwire.com/en/features/4281
All official positions in Iran must be held by "Twelver Shias", others are not Islamic enough:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WmsamadaC1Q
Allama Azhar Haidri: Only Shias will go to heaven
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TfwV5aEs9l8
https://www.facebook.com/AliSharfuddinPK/posts/1509352015799359
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_al-Fadl_Burqa%27i#Beliefs_and_Rulings
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/qom-najaf-tolerance-christianity-iran-iraq.html#ixzz4w3T5xiZw
Abul Fazl Borqei (1908-1993), one of the most famous jurists in Qom who was critical of certain Shiite beliefs, was repeatedly harassed and eventually had to leave Qom.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgiXAN1-2-o
https://twitter.com/ShiaHaqq/status/898730703973691392
More But Sh. Nimr attacked Sunni's Sahaba too. It is double standards that Khamenei/Nasrallah are not against Sh. Nimr.[Nimr invites Sunnis to embrace Shi'ism]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_aimeaCNl-g&feature=youtu.be&t=52m31s
Sayed Hossein Al Qazwini: We have opportunity to expose Sunni refugees in Germany to Shia school before Christian missionaries tempt them and brainwash them to Christianity.
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=_dZlCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA79#v=onepage&q&f=false
1845: Sunni and Shia Ulema in Iraq joins hands to try a Babi emissary Bastami on charges of blasphemy of apostasy. Shias ulema fell short of calling for Bastami's execution.
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=YDzpBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA146&lpg=PA146&dq=shia+cleric+insults&source=bl&ots=sQ73eLdNUP&sig=pj6YQcjfIawI_DGbVRu_5s3LsBo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwia_cqBrJrUAhVoCcAKHRJaCIw4ChDoAQhFMAg#v=onepage&q=shia%20cleric%20insults&f=false
Sunnis are not allowed to build a mosque in Tehran for Friday prayers as this may allow them to gather in big number. Extract from page 145 of the book "The Baloch in Post Islamic Revolution Iran: A Political Study" By Ahmad Reza Taheri
http://www.hudson.org/research/9842-sunnis-and-shiites-between-rapprochement-and-conflict
"While Sunni Islam accepts a certain degree of internal pluralism, embodied in the existence of four schools of jurisprudence, few Sunni scholars have allowed themselves to accord the Shiites the same legitimacy of the other schools of Sunni jurisprudence. They have often been defined as rafida (rejectionists, pl. rawafid) who have “misled” Muslims, though only rarely have they been branded as total heretics or apostates (kufr or murtaddun). Likewise, Shiites, while they have branded their Sunni detractors as Nawasib (sing. Nasibi —enemies of ‘Ali), tend to suffice with differentiating between the Shiite “believers” (mu’minun) or “distinguished” (khassa) and the plebeian (’amma) “Muslims” (muslimun), but do not reject the Islamic legitimacy of the latter. It may be argued that the trauma of the inter-Muslim discord (fitna) which gave birth to the Sunni-Shiite split remained throughout most of Islamic history a barrier against total “heretication” (takfir) of each side by the other."
....
" It seems though that the pan-Islamic goals of the Muslim Brotherhood served to mitigate the more virulent anti-Shiite tendencies. This was not the case, however, of the Wahhabi movement and its attitude toward the Shiites. The official negative attitude towards the Shiites in Saudi Arabia is evident in the various restrictions on Shiite practices in the Kingdom and in the plethora of anti-Shiite literature coming out of official religious circles in Mecca."
"...historically, Shiite animosity towards the Sunni majority of the Muslim world has been much less vehement and widespread than its Sunni correlate and for the most part it has been defensive, aimed at refuting the Sunni charges and defending the Shia against Wahhabi attacks."
http://www.hudson.org/research/9859-the-dilemmas-of-pan-islamic-unity-
The Brotherhood’s origins may in fact be traced back to a Shiite cleric. The Persian activist-intellectual Said Jamal Assadabadi, who is perhaps more widely known today as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, was a key architect of the first wave of religious revivalism that swept across the Sunni world during the latter part of the 19h Century. After migrating to Egypt in 1871, Afghani began spreading his reformist teachings, and influenced a new generation of Egyptian scholars who became passionate advocates of pan-Islamist ideals. Afghani’s most famous disciple, Mohammad Abduh, would become the rector of Cairo’s al-Azhar Seminary and a pioneer of the reformist socio-political approach to interpreting the Quran that underpinned the rise of salafism and its various streams. Later on, one of Abduh’s leading students, Rashid Rida, would take his teacher’s socio-political approach to the Quran in an increasingly more polemical and radical direction, becoming one of the first theoreticians of the Islamic state. Rida’s writings were enormously influential on the thinking of Hassan al-Banna, and by extension, Rida became one of the spiritual godfathers of the Muslim Brotherhood, which until today remains the most influential and the broadest of all Islamist movements.
But the story doesn’t end there. In yet another twist in Muslim history, the Muslim Brotherhood would in turn requite Afghani’s gift to Sunni revivalism by directly stimulating the emergence of a unique form of Shiite Islamism in Iran in the 1950s. Indeed, the Islamic paradigm of pre-revolutionary Iran was profoundly shaped by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as by kindred Sunni movements such as the Indo-Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami and its founder SayyedAbul Aala Maududi.2 In this way, Sunni revivalist ideology helped pave the way for the 1979 Iranian revolution that culminated in Shiite Islamism’s greatest achievement: the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
...
Because of these divergent Islamic paradigms, Quranic exegesis has historically not occupied as significant a place in the traditional curriculum of Shiite seminaries as it has in Sunni seminaries. In fact, for a long time, in the Shiite seminaries of Iran and Iraq, teaching and studying the Quran was not considered a suitable calling and was not prestigious enough for a high-ranking cleric. Quranic exegesis was appropriate to professional preachers, but it was not seen as the highest form of religious practice or scholarship, at least not as reflected in the faqih style of education and discussion that predominated in the Shiite seminary. Indeed, Quranic exegesis was even perceived as being potentially damaging to a Shiite scholar’s religious prestige—a traditionalist view that has persisted into the modern era in important ways. This is one reason why the late Ayatollah Abul Qassem Khoi—one of the most influential of 20th Century Shiite scholars, and the predecessor to Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Sistani at the Najaf seminary—was deeply criticized by the Shiite faithful in the 1960s for publishing the first volume of a Quranic commentary, Al-Bayan fi Tafsir Al-Quran. The outcry over his focus on the Quran led Ayatollah Khoi to decide against publishing the rest of his commentary.4
..... Meanwhile, Shiite Islamism has sought its own resolution to the Sunni-Shiite divide and the dilemmas posed by the contradictions between its identity as a pan-Islamist movement and its actuality as ruling over a predominantly Shiite state. This resolution was found in a ruling elaborated by Ayatollah Khomeini that held that the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader is authorized to overrule what is prescribed by the sharia in favor of the regime’s interests. Khomeini made it clear that in any contradiction between Islamic law and the interests of the regime, the ruling jurist is obligated to prioritize the interest of the regime and to ignore the sharia. Accordingly, the Islamic government remains in an emergency state and considers safeguards to its survival its top priority, above both national and religious laws. On October 27, 2009, in a public speech, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander-in-chief of Revolutionary Guard said, “The Islamic Republic is a divine sacred government whose safeguarding is prior even to performed prayer”—(that is, the defense of the republic has priority over Salat or Namaz, the obligatory Islamic prayers).
http://www.hudson.org/research/9771-a-virulent-ideology-in-mutation-zarqawi-upstages-maqdisi
http://www.hudson.org/research/9908-zarqawi-s-anti-shi-a-legacy-original-or-borrowed
There is a split opinion among jihadists over targeting the Shi’a ruling elite versus the Shi’a laity. Ibn Taymiyya sanctioned the targeting of the Shi’a ruling elite only and marking them for death. Zarqawi, in a response to an admonishment from his former mentor Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, argued that there is no longer a distinction between the elite and the laity since, under a democracy, the lay people of the Shi’a elect their rulers. See Nibras Kazimi, “A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 2 (Washington: Hudson Institute, September 2005): 68.
http://www.hudson.org/research/9885-the-paradoxes-of-shiism
In fact, following the Great Fitna, Sunni jurists professed a willingness to accept, albeit with regret, illegitimate and even despotic rule, if the cost of an alternative form of rule promised to be intra-Muslim disunity and bloodshed. It is partially for this reason that the modern Sunni Islamist movement, which has sought to radically transform the existing order of nation-states in the Muslim world, has felt itself obliged to go outside of the tradition and its traditional leaders—the Sunni jurists—in elaborating and pursuing its political program. (It is also for this reason that the Sunni Islamist movement has sought to revive the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah, the 13th century scholar mentioned earlier who was one of the few medieval jurists to have dissented from elements of classical Sunni political theory to articulate a radical new understanding of Islamic politics.)
By contrast, at least some in the medieval Shiite community appear to have been less repelled than their Sunni counterparts by the prospect of civil war and were willing to undergo its risks. At the same time, however, and as has been indicated, Shiism also developed a quietist analogue that eventually came to be embodied in Twelver Shiism. Shiism—or rather Twelver Shiism—may not be revolutionary, especially in the modern sense. But even that Twelver tradition contained within itself a certain potential for an activist, revolutionary politics.
http://www.hudson.org/research/9850-the-brotherhood-and-the-shiite-question-Hassan al-Banna considered all of Islam’s many sects—except for the Bahais and Qadianis—as belonging to the worldwide Muslim Nation (umma). In this spirit, Banna additionally took part in 1948 in the establishment of the “Association for Rapprochement between the Islamic Legal Schools” (Jamiyyat al-Taqrib bayna al-Madhahib al-Islamiyyah). This organization was designed to bridge the religious divides between Sunnis and Shiites, and due to this organization’s leadership and influence, Shaykh al-Azhar Mahmud Shaltut declared Twelver Shia worship to be valid and recognized it as a legal tradition to be taught in al-Azhar.
......
contacts established between the Egyptian Brotherhood and Navab Safavi, the leader of the “Fadaian-e Islam” organization that carried out a series of assassinations in Iran in the early 1950s in an effort to “purify Islam.” Safavi once was quoted as saying, “Whoever wants to be a real Jafari [Shiite] should join the Muslim Brotherhood.”
.....
The Brotherhood was initially critical of Iraq for launching the war against Iran, but then turned against Tehran when it extended the war in the hopes of toppling the Iraqi regime and occupying Iraqi territories.
......
Ayatollah Khalkhali, the chief of Iran’s revolutionary courts, reportedly referred to the Brotherhood then as “the devil’s brethren.”4 In 1987, Shaykh Said al-Hawa, the prominent Syrian Muslim Brotherhood scholar and leader, published his book Khomeinism: Deviation in Faith and Deviation in Positions. Most recently, relations between the Brotherhood and Iran have become further strained since the Second Gulf War, when the Brotherhood took Iran to task for not coming to Iraq’s aid against the West, and then for supporting the Iraqi Shia uprising against Saddam.5
http://english.aawsat.com/amir-taheri/features/iran-and-the-ikhwan-the-ideological-roots-of-a-partnership
For over a decade, the Islamic Republic had been a major provider of funds for Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood. It had played host to it leaders and provided its military units with weapons and training. For years, Tehran had also provided financial and propaganda support for the Algerian offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1992, documents leaked in Germany showed that Tehran had deposited more than 7 million US dollars in accounts controlled by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).
...
In Britain, for example, Tehran financed the group led by the Pakistani “brother” Kalim Siddiqui, as well as the creation of the so-called “Muslim parliament” in London.
In the 1990s, Tehran also channeled funds to the Turkish branch of the Brotherhood, helping them create the machine needed to win local and then national elections. When Necmettin Erbakan, a Turkish politician linked to the Brotherhood, became prime minister in 1996, Tehran forged a close alliance with his government. Together they held grandiose plans for creating an Islamic G8 to challenge the G7 led by the United States.
The first contacts between the Iranian regime and the Brotherhood had been established in the late 1980s, as the Iran–Iraq War raged. The Islamic Republic’s ambassador to the Vatican, Hadi Khosrowshahi, established contacts with a number of Muslim Brotherhood figures in exile in Europe. The Iranian embassy in the Vatican also launched a publishing business that helped translate and circulate a number of Brotherhood books.
Khosrowshahi, himself a mid-ranking mullah, translated a history of the Brotherhood into Persian, the first complete account of the Egyptian movement’s birth and development. Later, the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations office in Geneva, Cyrus Nasseri, met a number of Egyptian exiles in Switzerland, some related to Hassan Al-Banna, who founded the Brotherhood in 1928. By the early 1990s, Tehran had also established contact with the Tunisian Islamist leader Rachid Ghannouchi of Ennahda and Abbassi Madani, the leader of the FIS. Another bridge to the Brotherhood for Iran was Hassan Al-Turabi, a Sudanese politician who, though not a member of the Brotherhood, had managed to charm them into supporting his quest for power.
The various strands of Islamist radicalism were brought together in April 1991 in the so-called Popular Arab and Islamic Conference, hosted by Turabi in Khartoum. Over 70 organizations from some 50 countries were represented. The gathering was a veritable who’s who of Islamist radicalism, fostered and supported by the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime in Iran. According to Muhammad Mahdavi, at the time a diplomat with the Iranian regime, Tehran contributed 3 million dollars towards the cost of the event.
http://www.dawn.com/news/1183212
Mr Dudoigon came to 20th century Iran where in 1941 a madressah was formed. He argued that one of the reasons for encouraging such madressahs was to use it as a rampart against the Soviet or communist influence. Later, in the 1970s, the Deobandi school of thought was used to counter the Saudi influence as well.
He then focused on a major Baloch Iranian leader Maulana Abdul Aziz Makki of Jamiah Darul Uloom, Zahidan, who had acquired education from the Darul Uloom Deoband. He had great political clout and was a key negotiator for Sunni minority in Iran. He said the Baloch in Iran were disadvantaged due to their demographic smallness (they are two to three per cent of the population) but were vital when it came to the unity of different populations.
Elaborating on the Sunni Iranian Baloch’s significance in Iran’s politics, he said that it was evident from the 2013 Rouhani vote. They were also striving to have a secular approach to things, for example, they observed Ashura. It’s a paradox, he added, that the Deobandi school of thought was playing an important role in secularising political debate in the country.
https://iranwire.com/en/features/4807
Molavi Abdul Hamid is considered the spiritual leader of Iran’s Sunnis. Aged 71, for the past 31 years he has been the principal of Darul Uloom Zahedan, the leading Sunni seminary in Iran. This seminary and the Makki mosque in Zahedan, the capital of Sistan, are the most active Sunni political and religious centers in Iran, welcoming Sunnis from all over the country for study and worship.
In recent years the Iranian regime, goaded on by Shia clergy and hardliners, has made efforts to take control of the management and curriculum at the seminary. For example, on March 17, 2014, the extremist cleric Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi announced: “Shia texts must be promoted among the Sunni so that those who are not too fanatic would find their way to True Religion.”
...
In 2010, Molavi Abdul Hamid was banned from traveling outside Iran/ In early 2013, the religious leader planned to travel to South Africa and Mecca to participate in religious seminars but was not allowed, even though he had recently managed to win the freedom of several Iranian border guards who had been taken hostage by the militant group Jaish al-Adl. In early 2014 he had planned to participate in an international Islamic conference, but discovered he was still banned from traveling abroad.
In fact, there are even travel restrictions on his domestic travel. In early 2016, he told the Center for Human Rights in Iran [Persian link] that he is allowed to travel to Tehran and nowhere else.
http://www.juancole.com/2016/09/declares-iranian-shiites.html
Admittedly, Saudi Arabia’s “Unitarian” form of Islam, founded in the 18th century by Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab and popularly known as “Wahhabism,” is one of the more intolerant strands of the religion. In the past, its adherents excommunicated the sultan of the Ottoman Empire and mounted a rebellion against him (sort of like Protestants excommunicating the Holy Roman Emperor). The Saudi Wahhabi tradition is also peculiar in its patriarchy, oppressing women and declining to even let them drive. (But note that Qatar is also Wahhabi and does not have the same policies, so it isn’t just the religious tradition).
Admittedly, Saudi Arabia’s “Unitarian” form of Islam, founded in the 18th century by Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab and popularly known as “Wahhabism,” is one of the more intolerant strands of the religion. In the past, its adherents excommunicated the sultan of the Ottoman Empire and mounted a rebellion against him (sort of like Protestants excommunicating the Holy Roman Emperor). The Saudi Wahhabi tradition is also peculiar in its patriarchy, oppressing women and declining to even let them drive. (But note that Qatar is also Wahhabi and does not have the same policies, so it isn’t just the religious tradition).
One
of the challenges to what I have called the “Wahhabi myth,” the
stereotyping of Wahhabism as promoting terrorism, is that it isn’t good
social science. Many Sunnis influenced by Wahhabism, the Salafis, check
out of politics and are quietists. The Salafis in Egypt have been a
force in parliamentary politics in the past 5 years. The Saudi citizen
population is probably 20 million, and almost none of them are
terrorists.
From
an outsider’s point of view, Saudi Wahhabism is certainly a much more
intolerant tradition than Sunnis; but there have been intolerant Sunnis
and Sunni movements (e.g. the Almohads).
That
is, Wahhabism is not a static essence but has a history. In the reign
of King Abdullah (r. 2005-2015 but the real ruler from the mid-1990s),
small attempts were made to reform the Wahhabi tradition. That king
founded a university of science and technology that has a mixed-gender
student body. He reached out to the 12% of the population, mainly in the
Eastern Province, who are Shiites, and effected a reconciliation with
some of their previously dissident leaders. These Saudi Shiites were
allowed to become powerful through local elections on municipal councils
in largely Shiite cities such as Qatif. Shiite rituals were allowed in
public in wholly Shiite neighborhoods. At the national level, King
Abdullah appointed two Shiites to his 150-member appointive National
Consultative Council, the embryo of the future Saudi parliament. He
brought the former dissident Shiite cleric Shaikh Safar to Riyadh for a
joint t.v. appearance with a Wahhabi cleric (a first).
In
King Salman’s reign, all these (admittedly minor) forms of ecumenism
have been undone and the kingdom’s rhetoric against Iran and Shiites has
ratcheted up, recalling the old Wahhabi intolerance of the 19th
century. The recent apogee of this turn to intolerance was the execution
of dissident Shiite cleric Shaikh Nimr last winter.
https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/788507608541958145
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=rd-aCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT66&lpg=PT66#v=onepage&q&f=false
Lebanese Shias welcomed Israeli invasion against PLO in 1982. Page 66 of the book "The Shia Revial" by Vali Nasr.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_the_Camps
War of camps in Lebanon between Amal militia and PLO (1985-8)
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=rd-aCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT61&lpg=PT61&dq=shia+sunni+caliphate+conference+1931&source=bl&ots=_HeOtrK2MZ&sig=quWJv4c4Oyl7V1ciiN8UOOMboFc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwirmILQwJLTAhWMDcAKHeJVAxQQ6AEIIjAB#v=onepage&q=shia%20sunni%20caliphate%20conference%201931&f=false
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=rd-aCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT61&lpg=PT61#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=a-QH_CxIFTEC&pg=PA106&lpg=PA106#v=onepage&q&f=false
Shia clerics supporting Sunni movement to preserve Caliphate. Page 106 of the book "The Shia Revial" by Vali Nasr. (page 61 in the updated version)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQBCLuTOuhw
https://twitter.com/Hayder_alKhoei/status/771797641869000704
Najaf tribal sheikhs pledge loyalty to Saddam
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=dFR8AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA145&lpg=PA145#v=onepage&q&f=false
Shia generals in Saddam's army
https://peterharling.com/2006/09/01/the-falluja-syndrome-taking-the-fight-to-the-enemy-that-wasnt/
Undeniably, Falluja has long been renowned for its religious conservatism—it is, after all, nicknamed the city of mosques (Madinat al-Masajid). But this conservatism, overall, remains of a social and cultural character, rather than reflecting a militant bend—and the former regime made sure things stayed that way. Falluja thus bore the brunt of the regime’s repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 60’s and the early 70’s. The first cleric to be assassinated by Saddam Hussein’s henchmen was a Sunni imam, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz al-Badr, who was tortured to death in 1969) Numerous military officers from Falluja were marginalized at this time due to their strong religious beliefs. In the 90’s, the regime strived to contain or even eliminate local agitators belonging to a new salafist trend, including some future insurgent leaders such as ‘Umar Hadid al-Muhammadi or ‘Abdallah al-Janabi. Although one of the regime’s foremost official clerics hailed from Falluja (‘Abdul Latif al-Humayyim), he stood for mainstream Islam, and was instrumental in promoting Saddam Hussein’s “Faith campaign”, a policy designed to neutralize and “nationalize” Islam.
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/40223/US%20Role%20in%20Shaping%20Iraq's%20Media.pdf
The first step taken by al-Iraqia channel was broadcasting the Shiite call of prayer (Oweis 2003) and heavily covering the other Shiite sermons, flagellation events, and Friday prayer speeches, leaving the Arab Sunnis without a voice. But probably the worst decision taken was to publicly air the infamous Shiite insults against the Muslim Caliphs stating: ‘may God curse the first, second and third’ (Wikileaks 2006). Secondly, the channel started highlighting the atrocities of the former Baath regime by covering the crimes committed against the Shiites and Kurds in particular as if Arab Sunnis were not affected by Saddam Hussein’s regime. For example, emphasis was always made on the mass graves in the mainly Shiite south, the 1991 Shiite upraising (Roug 2006), the Anfal campaign, and Halabja attack against the Kurds. Almost all the managers of al-Iraqia TV after dissolving the CPA on June 28 2004 were Shiites. In one of the shootouts between US forces and Shiite armed militias in 2006 where about 16 people were killed, al-Iraqia channel mentioned that ‘unarmed worshippers’ were murdered. ‘Between interviews with Shiite politicians criticizing the Americans, the camera lingered on the dead and the grieving relatives’ (Roug 2006). Yet, IMN and al-Iraqia channel rarely if never mention the 1995 and 1998 Sunni Arab revolts by the Dulaimi tribe in Anbar region, the execution of senior Sunni Baath Party members in 1979, and the arrest and execution of prominent Sunni religious clerics throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
Page 1 The US Influence in Shaping Iraq’s Sectarian Media By: Ahmed K. Al-Rawi, Ph.D. Department of Media and Communication School of History, Culture, and Communication Erasmus University Rotterdam The Netherlands Abstract After the Anglo-American invasion, the US neo-conservative administration established the Iraqi Governing Council in July 2003, which included 25 members selected for their ethnic and religious origins; it was the most obvious sign of the US political separatist strategy. As a result of the new political reality, the Iraqi media was divided into ethno- sectarian lines, resulting from previous policies followed by the US Administration. This paper argues that the US media policy prior and after the US invasion of Iraq played a part in enhancing and encouraging the sectarian divisions in the Iraqi society. This was mainly done by sending biased media messages through the state-run Iraqi Media Network (IMN) and other US-aligned channels and allowing militant voices from different Iraqi sides to wage wars of words without interfering. In fact, the only time US officials interfered is when they are criticized by Iraqi media outlets. This study cites different US government reports, accounts from media practitioners who worked for IMN and other journalists that monitored the Iraqi media. Keywords: sectarian media; Iraqi media; Arab media; US occupation; sectarianism; War on Iraq; information intervention; post- conflict media; media development; partisan media Page 2 2 Introduction: This paper argues that US authorities in Iraq after 2003 assisted in politically and socially dividing the country along sectarian and ethnic lines by their interference in shaping Iraq’s media and the whole political system. Some of the main sources of this paper are taken from the US government reports recently released by the National Security Archive. Media scholars have been arguing about the importance of studying post-conflict media developments especially after the hate speech lessons learnt from former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Cambodia (Price 2000). Assisted by different governments, international media organizations and non-governmental organizations were thought to be responsible for forming independent and professional media organizations post-conflict nations in order to assist in the overall development process. For example, the Department of Media Affairs in Kosovo was created by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in August 1999 that has the ‘responsibility for media regulation, support for independent media, media monitoring, and the development of media standards’ (Palmer 2001, 185). The same plan was meant to be applied in Iraq after the 2003 invasion with the efforts of international media organizations and state interventions. However, as will be illustrated below, the kind of foreign government intervention far exceeded the other efforts, ultimately leading to the failure of independent media projects. After the Anglo-American occupation, the Coalition Provisional Authority decreed that the Iraqi Ministry of Information be dissolved; the decision led to the release of thousands of government workers. Another CPA media regulation followed. Order No. 14 issued on June 10 2003 under the title ‘Prohibited Media Activity’ stated that media organizations are not allowed to publish or broadcast material that: ‘incites violence against any individual or group, including racial, ethnic or religious groups and women; incites civil disorder, rioting or damage to property; incites violence against Coalition Forces or CPA personnel’. However, this order was later applied to safeguard the CPA alone. Don North observed that US forces started to visit the headquarters of Iraqi newspapers that made offences and created great damage to the property. North even went as far as saying: ‘If The Washington Post reported terrorist threats or bin Laden statements in Baghdad today, it would probably be closed down’ (2004). Since the CPA Page 3 3 was in charge of the country and the media sector, it became ‘the judge and jury’ (Reporters Sans Frontières 2010, 3) at the same time. One of the first radio stations closed down by the CPA was Sawt Baghdad (Voice of Baghdad) after only one month from its launch (RSF July 2003). On June 12, 2003 Coalition forces closed down Sada al-Uma (The nation’s echo) newspaper in Najaf stating that it incited violence against coalition troops by inviting the people of Najaf to join the Sunni resistance in Ramadi city in Anbar province (Rohde 2003; Barry 2003). Also, the CPA ordered the closure of Al-Mustaqila (independent) newspaper in July 2003 after publishing an article ‘proclaiming the killing of spies who cooperate with the United States to be a religious duty’ (Freedom House 2004). But probably the worst decision taken by the CPA was closing Muqtada Sadr’s newspaper al-Hawza al-Natiqa al-Sharifa. Sadr’s hard line Shiite movement strongly opposes the occupation. On 28 March, 2003 US forces confiscated the weekly newspaper’s last edition together with the editions of a quarterly journal called al-Mada. The newspaper was accused of fermenting violence against American forces in Iraq, so its office was closed for sixty days. Following the closure of the newspaper, an insurrection erupted in almost all Shiite areas in the country (Rosen 2004a; Rosen 2004b). Price (2007) observes that the CPA saw the media regulations as a ‘military necessity’ (2007, 16) which reflects the fear US officials had from what is known as ‘irresponsible journalism’. However, the CPA’s fast and sometimes violent reaction toward any anti-US media outlet and its inaction toward other channels that incited violence and hatred against fellow Iraqi sects, groups, and religions show that the US administration was only concerned about its own safety and the security of its soldiers. Surely, this careless and one-sided policy encouraged many Iraqi media channels, that were newly established, to be more polarized and extreme in their criticism and attacks against other fellow Iraqis because of the unlimited freedom given to them. Before discussing the details of the US media intervention in Iraq, it is important first to discuss the media impact on audience since the theory is relevant to Iraq’s media context. Theoretical Framework: Page 4 4 According to the agenda-setting theory, people get to understand the world around them and the issues covered through the perspective of the media since ‘citizens deal with a second-hand reality, a reality that is structured by journalists’ report about these events and situations’ (McCombs 2004, 1). In other words, the media sets its own agenda (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Entman, 1989) and shapes certain beliefs (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). If certain issues are continuously repeated in the media, they become more important for the public. ‘The agenda of the news becomes, to a considerable degree, the agenda of the public’ (McCombs 2004, 2). However, when certain issues are related to the people’s core beliefs like their religion and creed, the issues start to have much more importance and influence over the way people behave (McCombs 2004, 138). In this case, the media can have a very effective role in driving the people toward certain actions. For example, during civil wars, the media is known to have assisted in justifying ‘mass violence’ through the ‘constructions of ethnophobia’ or sectarian animosity; the media is used to ‘escalate hatred and spread fear against one another’ and as a ‘centerpiece of the struggle between factions’ (Erni 2005). The other important concept that is relevant to this research is ideology. Thompson (1990) asserts that ideology is a ‘meaning in the service of power’ (7); hence, the official media is part and parcel of political system controlling the country. The media becomes a mere tool to convey the ideology of the ruling political party. Accordingly, the media messages that were sent were loaded with harmful effects. Hall (1985) suggests that journalists working in different media channels are influenced by their own ideology even if they have not noticed or have not acknowledged it as they are ‘inscribed by an ideology to which they do not consciously commit themselves, and which, instead, “writes them”’ (101). Further, van Dijk (1998) stressed that ideologies can distinguish between the different groups in a given society, and they mostly determine how ‘groups and their members view a specific issue or domain of society’ (65). The new political reality drove Iraq to obvious divisions. ‘Quotas are obligatory; power is rigidly contested on sectarian and ethnic lines. Deadlock often ensues, with each community seeing politics as winner-takes-all. It is resolved only when a kingmaker’s pressure finds a last-minute solution’ (Shadid 2010). Indeed, the Iraqi politico-religious had in most cases conflicting agendas and ideologies that played a negative role in further Page 5 5 dividing the different sects and races. Almost all of these parties have had different media channels such as terrestrial or satellite television stations, radio channels, newspapers, magazines, websites, forums, blogs …etc. Accordingly, the media became divided along ethno-sectarian lines, and it created a great deal of confusion, chaos, and risk for all the journalists involved (Al-Qaisi and Jabbar 2010). Many Iraqi journalists became polarized either toward their sect, race, or region in order to seek protection or win the favor of their party or community leaders (Al-Rawi 2010). On the other hand, Iraqi audiences started to consume the media that fits into their religious, ethnic, or political backgrounds which is also the case in America where TV audience is heterogeneous that resides to their preferred political trend (Morris 2007). In other words, the partisan media in Iraq assisted in forming and unifying the ideology of the different segments in the society because it was their main source of information. Before discussing how this phenomenon developed, it is important to understand the media scene before the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. An Overview of Iraq’s Media Before 2003 During Saddam Hussein’s rule, the Iraqi media was completely state-controlled as it is mostly the case in today’s Arab world (UNDP 2009, 65). Social and moral values and norms were all dictated to the public via the mass media. Though media censorship was one of the strictest in the region, some Iraqi journalists were able to publicly voice their criticism against the government, but they would usually face a severe punishment mostly imprisonment and a possible consequent torture. Reporters Sans Frontières described Hussein as a ‘predator of press freedom’ who managed the Iraqi media with ‘an iron fist and has given them the single mission of relaying his propaganda’ (2002, 3 & 1). Despite all the limitations faced by Iraqi journalists and the media shortcomings, the Iraqi media did not witness the sectarian rhetoric that is so prevalent today. If there was any breach, the punishment varied based on the case itself, but it ranged from imprisonment of less than seven years to payment of a fine. Saddam Hussein’s government was very adamant and serious about applying the rules above. Page 6 6 These strict rules entailed that journalists should be very careful when they write. Terms like ‘Shiites’ or ‘Sunnis’ were never used in the media. Also, the surnames of Iraqi officers and officials were mostly not revealed so that their sect or race would not be known (Bengio 1985, 13 & 14). In fact, Saddam Hussein was aware of the sensitivity which accompanies the issue of sectarianism especially that Iran waged a fierce propaganda campaign during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) to win Iraqi Shiites by its side. Hence, Shiite political parties and the flagellation ceremonies were banned, but the Iraqi government used to air speeches by famous Shiite clerics during certain religious events in order to address more Iraqis. On the other hand, Saddam Hussein’s government prohibited Sunni fundamental movements like the Saudi backed Wahabism, Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood. Many official books were published and TV shows aired to counter extreme religious propaganda coming from abroad. As for the Kurds, the Iraqi government stood against the Kurdish race chauvinism, fearing the instability and disunity that may be ensued in the country. However, there were many Kurdish language publications, and the language itself was taught in some high schools in Baghdad unlike the case in neighboring countries where Kurdish language was banned. In fact, Saddam Hussein’s aim was to establish a secular political system that is the only guarantee to secure a unified Iraq and to avoid religious or ethnic rifts that would cost him lives, efforts, and money. However, when the US invasion occurred in 2003, Iraqis were amazed to openly read about and listen to the words ‘Shiite’ or ‘Sunni’ mentioned; this was the new media reality that they faced. Since the media scene is a direct reflection of the political reality in Iraq, it is important to discuss the political developments after the US invasion. The New Political Scene When the US Army invaded Iraq, there was no clear planning for what comes after the end of military operations. This fact led the country into chaos. First, the looting occurred which was mostly sanctioned by the US Army that only shielded the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and ignored to protect the rest of Iraq’s infrastructure such as the other ministries, universities, libraries, and museums (Baker, Ismael, and Ismael 2010). But what was striking is the way the US Administration tried to rule the country and create a political Page 7 7 system that would ultimately segregate the society. It theoretically divided the country into groups, sects, and ethnicities following the divide and rule strategy. The formation of the Iraqi Governing Council was the first step. Afterward, the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 came which was co-written by American experts (Wong 2005); the Constitution opened the door for the idea of federalism and a possible future division especially for the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south. After the 2010 elections and the way the Shiite led government of Al-Maliki monopolized power, Sunnis in the center also demanded an autonomous region similar to Kurdistan in order to protect themselves and avoid injustice and inequality (Zurutuza 2012). In other words, the various calls for creating federal regions in the country have become a clear manifestation of the sectarian and ethnic divide that inflicted the country after 2003. Indeed the United States government ‘created institutions based on sectarianism in its reconstruction of Iraq’ (The Saban Center for Middle East Policy 2007). Further, several American politicians were in favor of dividing Iraq into three separate states. For example, Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, suggested a complete division after the beginning of the war. The Fund for Peace propagated a ‘managed partition’ in the same year (Baker 2003/2007). Also, the current US Vice President Joe Biden, and the then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for a ‘soft partition’ of Iraq in 2006 (Joseph and O’Hanlon 2007). During Biden’s visit to Iraq as Vice President in July 2009, some Iraqi politicians feared the dire consequences of his old proposal of dividing the country into Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite parts. For instance, the Sunni Arab politician, Osama Nujaifi, said that Biden’s proposal would have driven the country into ‘bloodshed and wars between the sects over borders and resources, to the persecution of minorities and all kinds of problems’ (Sly 2009). The various politico-religious parties played a damaging role in polarizing Iraqis which has been directly reflected in their different partisan media channels. As a result of the US policy, Iraqis became more attached to their sect and ethnic origins. Ismael and Fuller (2009) and Visser (2007/2008) argue that the US administration intended to weaken and control Iraq by manufacturing sectarianism and encouraging schisms. Furthermore, the threat of al-Qaeda and its alike-groups against Iraqi Shiites on one hand and the Mahdi Army and Badr Brigades’ Death Squads against Sunnis on the Page 8 8 other hand deepened the sectarian divisions. But the culmination of this tension between the two major sects in Iraq occurred after the bombing of the holy Shiite shrine in Samara on February 22, 2006. At this stage, the US army did not play its expected role in claming down the situation since it merely observed from afar. The award-winning journalist, Nir Rosen, depicted this gloomy picture about the situation in Iraq in late 2006 during which ‘the Americans were merely one more militia among the many, watching, occasionally intervening, and in the end only making things worse (2006). It is correct to mention here that the differences between the Iraqi sects and races were in existence long before the US presence. However, Saddam Hussein’s secular state hindered any efforts to incite violence or make schisms between the different sects and religions, as discussed earlier. Anthony Shadid rightly says that the US occupation has not created these differences, ‘but facilitated all of it, giving space to the region's worst impulses’ (Shadid 2009). After February 2006, the internal conflict in Iraq reached a level that can be termed as civil war. It entailed ‘the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements’ (National Intelligence Estimate 2007, 7). Again, the Iraqi media, which is the product of this new political reality, played a role in widening the sectarian rift as will be discussed below. Indeed, the American inaction toward the conflict was a direct reason behind the escalation of violence. This was also accompanied by a complete carelessness from the Iraqi government led by two Shiite Prime Ministers who both belonged to Dawah Party: Ibrahim al-Ja’afri and then Nouri al-Maliki from May 2006. The obvious reason behind the Iraqi government’s failure to act was the fact that it took its popular support from the Mahdi Army and other militant Shiite groups. After President Bush’s refusal to have al- Ja’afari as a PM, al-Maliki was selected, but he was also criticized by the US administration for his weakness to confront Muqtada Sadr and disband his armed militia that was responsible for the majority of sectarian killing and civilian displacement (Beehner 2006). Colonel Mansoor, the founding director of the US Army and Marine Corps' counterinsurgency center, reveals that it was only when General David Petraeus became the commander of US forces in Iraq in January 2007 that a change in policy occurred. Page 9 9 ‘The strategy emphasized protecting Iraqi civilians instead of simply killing bad guys’. This change meant a 30,000 soldiers increase known as the US forces ‘surge’. After agreeing to form the anti-Qaeda Sahwa (Awakening) forces largely from the members of the Sunni insurgency and the break up of Shiite militias, the violence started to ebb (Levinson 2010). Before the surge, the US Army was only focused on fighting insurgents and other suspects who might attack American soldiers. For example, the spokesperson of the Iraqi Army, General Qassim Atta, revealed in 2009 that an insurgent called Yasser al-Takhi, who belonged to Jaish (Army) Mohammed group, was caught and confessed to killing and raping the Iraqi female correspondent Atwar Bahjat who worked for Al- Arabiya TV channel. al-Takhi was twice arrested by US forces in Iraq in October 2003 and by the end of 2006. However, he was released in both cases because ‘the Americans only investigated him for attacks against them’, according to Atta (Agence France-Presse 2009). In brief, the US Army had a role in facilitating the tension and hatred between the two sects by its inaction, negligence, and carelessness. Before further elaborating on the post-2003 media scene, we need to discuss the US media plan for Iraq in early 2003. The Rapid Reaction Media Team Long before the US invasion, the US government was involved in propaganda activities against Iraq in order to topple the Baath regime. A great deal of money was channeled through the media outlets of some Iraqi opposition groups such as Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Accord and Ahmed al-Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress. These propaganda activities intensified with the approach of the war. Amid the preparation to wage a war on Iraq and change its political system, Bush’s neo-conservative administration established the Office of Special Plans (OSP) as part of the Department of Defense in October 2002. The OSP was originally created by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to ‘shape public opinion and American policy toward Iraq’ (United States Department of Defence, Inspector General 2007, 3). It was also partly responsible for forming a new face for the Iraqi media together with the Pentagon’s Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Office, specialized in psychological warfare (Lobe 2007; Battle 2007). As a result of the work of the two Page 10 10 Pentagon’s bodies, the ‘Rapid Reaction Media Team’ (RRMT) was formed in mid- January 2003 before the invasion. Working under Wolfowitz was Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, who became in charge of the plans of post-war Iraq including the ‘White Paper’ project. In fact, Feith’s involvement in Iraq goes back to the 1990s. Together with other analysts, he wrote a report entitled ‘Clean Break’ in 1996 for Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, in which he mentioned the need to topple Saddam Hussein’s government and divide the Arab world in order to serve the interests of Israel (Borger 2003). They also mentioned that post-Saddam Iraq might be plagued by the rise of sectarianism leading to a possible political division of the country. Clearly, the policy of divide and rule was on the back of those analysts head when they wrote their report (Zunes 2006). In his autobiography, Feith admits that he pointed out the possibility of ‘Some serious problems’ such as ‘sectarian violence, power vacuum’. In another context, he clearly mentions that ‘We warned about rioting, looting, sectarian fights…’ (Feith 2009, 275 & 363); however, little if no action was taken by the US administration to prevent the looting and sectarian fight. Later, the RRMT formed the nucleus of the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) whose establishment was supervised by the Media Development Department in the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid (ORHA), led by Bob Reilly (NSA September 2006). Reilly, the director of Voice of America, was known to be an ‘outspoken right- wing ideologue’ who worked in the 1980s as a ‘propagandist in the White House for the Nicaraguan contras’ (Dauenhauer and Lobe 2003). Noteworthy, the US government has a long history in interfering in the Republic of Nicaragua’s media (see Norsworthy 1994). The director of ORHA reported directly to Douglas Feith ‘receiving very broad policy goals, objectives, and policy direction’ (Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General 2004, 1). The RRMT’s main task was to initiate a ‘“quick start bridge” between Saddam Hussein’s state-controlled media network and a longer term “Iraqi Free Media” network in post Saddam era’ (United States Department of Defense 2003, 1). With an initial budget of $49 million, the media project was greatly significant because it set out the whole strategy on the ground. For instance, the document suggests different themes for broadcasting such as: ‘De-Baathification program’, ‘Recent history telling (e.g. “Uncle Saddam,” History channel’s “Saddam’s Bomb Maker,” “Killing Fields”’; Page 11 11 ‘Environmental (Marshlands re-hydration’; ‘Restarting the Oil’; ‘War Criminals/Truth Commission’. These themes were later recurrent on the official Iraqi TV, al-Iraqia. In addition, Programs were proposed to be executed by RRMT such as: ‘Political prisoners and atrocity interviews’; ‘Saddam’s palaces and opulence’; WMD disarmament’ (ibid., 3). Again, these shows were made into documentaries repeatedly shown on different Iraqi state-aligned TV channels. Also, the document states the need to ‘[i]dentify/vet US/UK/Iraqi “media experts team”’ such as Siyamend Othman; Hussein Sinjari’ (ibid., 2). In 20 April 2004, the US Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) appointed the former Kurd as the CEO of the Iraqi National Communications and Media Commission (NCMC) which became the first Iraqi media regulatory body (CPA Press Release, 2004). In fact, the ‘White Paper’ was written by two US agencies that were directly involved in propaganda for the US government. For example, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), which works closely with the CIA, was assigned by the Pentagon to form a ‘government in exile’, including five Iraqis to run the new media channels (Chatterjee 2004). In fact, Douglas Feith himself was a former SAIC vice-president. SAIC had close connections with Ahmed Al-Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress, who was the main source of Iraq’s WMDs myths (Alexander 2004). Later, SAIC’s corporate vice president for Strategic Assessment and Development, Christopher Ryan Henry, also worked for the Pentagon as Deputy Under Secretary of Defence serving with Feith (Dauenhauer and Lobe 2003). At one stage, SAIC hired David Kay, Iraq’s weapons inspector, as its vice president; Kay, who was commissioned by the CIA to head Iraq’s weapons program, urged the US administration to wage a war against Saddam Hussein because of the alleged WMDs (Chatterjee 2004). SAIC received $108.2 million to run IMN, including a TV and radio station and Al-Sabah newspaper (Haner 2004). After the 2003 invasion, the most prominent Iraqi exiles who worked for IMN were: Shameem Rassam (herself an SAIC subcontractor) (Barker 2008, 120), George Mansour, Alaa Fa’ik, Ahmed Al-Rikabi, and Isam Al- Khafaji. Indeed, the Iraqi media was designed as a tool used to strengthen the US control over the country and to increase the public acceptance of its actions despite the pretence that IMN was planned to be an independent media body. The document, for instance, mentions the need to have a ‘“hand-selected”’ ‘US-trained Iraqi media teams Page 12 12 immediately in-place to portray a new Iraq (by Iraqis for Iraqis) with hopes for a prosperous, democratic future, will have a profound psychological and political impact on the Iraqi people’ (United States Department of Defense 2003, 1). Those Iraqi media experts are supposed to work as the cover or ‘(“the face”) for the USG [United States Government]/coalition sponsored information effort’ (ibid, 2). This technique was later literally followed by the US Army on the ground as shown below. Most importantly, RRMT highlighted the importance of devising a divided Iraqi media that represents the three major parts in the Iraqi society: Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Though the report claims that the Iraqi media has to work on ‘stabiliz[ing] Iraq (especially preventing the trifurcation of Iraq after hostilities)’ (ibid.), there is an indication that the US government wanted to stress the ‘internal divisions’ in the Iraqi society (Battle 2007). For instance, the document proposes printing an Iraqi newspaper ‘with section for…Shia news, Kurd news, and Sunni news’ (United States Department of Defense 2003, 2). Indeed, this policy foreshadows the events that followed during which the Iraqi media became characterized by its ethno-sectarian orientations. The US Army and Iraq’s Media When the US Army invaded Iraq, it started to study how to penetrate into the newly established Iraqi media in order to guarantee that ‘friendly’ channels cover its activities. US PSYOP officers DeCarvalho, Kivett, and Lindsey mentioned that an Iraqi media section was formed by their department to monitor the media, send press releases, and establish good relations with more than a dozen Iraqi media outlets (2007, 91). Following the ‘White Paper’ project, they revealed that the best way to address the Iraqi public was to make Iraqis themselves speak on behalf of the US government since ‘putting an Iraqi face on the story; an Iraqi reporter talking to fellow Iraqis has a much greater effect on the psyche than if a coalition reporter told the story’ (2007, 92). It is important to note here that the US Army supported Iraqi media channels that covered its activities in a favorable manner and vice versa, which is part of its communication strategy. However, it has certainly harmed other media outlets that sought to remain distant. In this regard, an Iraqi independent TV journalist called, Abdel-Hakim (pseudonym), revealed the Page 13 13 difficulties faced by his colleagues, saying that ‘U.S. forces often tell such journalists they are not allowed to cover certain events’, but ‘if they insist, they have been known to be arrested or killed’. If a journalist is killed, ‘“the U.S. military spokesman says they were killed by accident”’. On the other hand, ‘journalists working for television stations directly supported by coalition forces have been given permission to cover the same events’ (Allen 2006). Furthermore, Colonel Thomas M. Cioppa (2009) mentions that the US Army in Iraq used the Strategic Communication Approach which entails ‘monitoring, measuring, analyzing, and assessing’ (27) media messages in order to understand the Iraqi and Pan- Arab media in relation to the events taking place in the country. Cioppa claims that the aim behind their project is to ‘promote Iraqi security, political and economic progress, refute inaccurate and misleading reporting, and develop Government of Iraq (GoI) strategic communication capability to do the same, in order to minimize the effects of sectarianism and advance political reconciliation in Iraq’ (27). However, it is not clear how the Strategic Communication Approach tried to ‘minimize’ the effect of sectarianism as the emphasis is on how the Iraqi and Arab media depict US forces and how to establish timely and effective contacts with these channels. There is no reference to stories or reports that promote unity among Iraqis. Instead, Cioppa defines ‘good news’ stories (32) as those related to ‘progress and stability’ in the country, which is directly connected to the US presence. On the other hand, news reports in 2005 revealed that the US ‘Information Operations Task Force’ with the help of a US contractor, Lincoln Group, were engaged in ‘planting’ ‘storyboards’ in the Iraqi press. Iraqi journalists who expressed their willingness to help the US military were paid $400 to $500 on a monthly basis to write favorable articles in the Iraqi media. More than 1000 articles were planted in several Iraqi newspapers like Al-Mutamar, Al-Mada, and Addustour. These newspapers agreed to publish the articles in return for money paid by the US contractor, ranging from $40 to $2,000. IMN’s TV channel, Al-Iraqia, aired anti-violence advertisements which were sponsored by this media group, too (Mazzetti and Daragahi 2005). The aim of this ‘dubious scheme’ was to ‘burnish the image of the US mission in Iraq’, ‘trumpet the work of the U.S. and Iraqi troops, denounce insurgents and tout U.S.-led efforts to rebuild Page 14 14 the country’ (Mazzetti and Daragahi 2005; Gerth 2005; White and Graham 2005, A01). However, the Pentagon did not regard these activities as illegal as they targeted a foreign audience. According to the US Army, the term ‘merchandising’ is introduced which allows a PSYOP’s officer to give gifts to journalists and others in order to polish the image of the Army. ‘The best way of disseminating a message might be to print it on a matchbox, a toy, a novelty, or a trinket. A soccer ball marked “Gift of the United States” and given to a schoolboy might get the message of American friendship across more effectively than any conventional medium’ (US Army Field Manual 1994, 9-9). Despite the harsh criticism from different media organizations, US government media efforts continued and greatly expanded in 2008. With a budget of $300 million, the project was supposed to run for three years to ‘produce undercover news stories, entertainment programmes and public service advertisements for Iraqi media in an effort to “engage and inspire” the local population to support United States policy’. The contractors involved in these ‘media services’ are: SOSi, Lincoln Group, MPRI and Leonie Industries which are supposed to plant ‘30- and 60-minute broadcast documentary and entertainment series’ in different Iraqi TV channels (Young and Pincus 2008, A01). Most importantly, the storyboards were classified in a pattern that resembles the ‘White Paper’ project; for example, each story ‘had a target audience, “Iraq General” or “Shi'ia,” with a dominant ‘theme like “Anti-intimidation” or “Success and Legitimacy of the ISF” (Gerth 2005). To sum up, the US government carried the banner of media freedom and democracy and hailed the new regime that it brought to Iraq, but it worked in the opposite direction serving and protecting its own interests. In this regard, al-Qazwini affirms that the US authorities followed ‘their own agenda, paying lip service to the concept of a proper public broadcasting system, while doing what they feel is good for the Coalition, not for the Iraqi people’ (2004). The Establishment of IMN As mentioned earlier, the CPA established the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) as was planned in the ‘White Paper’ project. However, very few Iraqis were involved in the planning process that went afterward mainly due to the deteriorating security condition. Page 15 15 As for the Iraqi Governing Council members who work from the fortified Green Zone, they were mostly busy with their ‘own survival and succession’ and lacked the motive and interest to discuss the future of Iraq’s media (Price 2007, 15). Originally, IMN was supposed to replace the Ministry of Information in order to become a public service media outlet like the BBC and PBS. In April 10, 2003 IMN’s radio aired its first programs and in May 13, Al-Iraqia TV channel started broadcasting with the help of 350 Iraqis; some of them came with the US forces (Dauenhauer and Lobe 2003). Indeed, IMN was manipulated and fully controlled from the beginning of its establishment by the CPA which used to dictate policies to be followed such as dropping ‘the readings from the Koran’ and the ‘“vox-pop” man-in-the-street interviews (usually critical of the US invasion)’. Censorship reached a level when Hiru Khan, the wife of the current Kurdish President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, was told to review the TV broadcast before airing it (Jayasekera 2003). The UK government also provided technical support, programs, and documentaries to help build IMN. Amongst its activities was its insistence to air a one-hour daily program called ‘Toward Freedom’ despite the objection of some IMN media staff (North 2003). Many IMN staff members felt disillusioned as a result of such overt interference. For instance, Don North worked for IMN for almost three months as a senior TV advisor and trainer. After leaving Iraq, he revealed how IMN became ‘an irrelevant mouthpiece for Coalition Provisional Authority propaganda’ due to its ‘managed news and mediocre programs’ (North 2003). IMN original goal was to be ‘an information conduit’; instead, it became ‘just rubber-stamp flacking for the C.P.A.’ (Opel 2003) because US authorities could not ‘resist controlling the message’ (Democracy Now 2004). Furthermore, North claimed that the CPA made IMN a replica of the Voice of America, indirectly suggesting the influence of Reilly. As a result, IMN’s credibility was destroyed because of CPA’s ‘incompetence and indifference’ (Opel 2003). In his speech in the US Congress in February 2005, North revealed that several US officials stressed that ‘we were running a public diplomacy operation’ via IMN which was given a ‘laundry list of CPA activities to cover’ (Margasak, 2005). Ahmed al-Rikabi who said the first words on Iraqi airwaves on the 9 th of April 2003, sensed the grave task IMN had, saying: ‘We have a big responsibility. If you put the wrong message out, do things without feeling responsibility, your program might lead Page 16 16 to civil war. You have to be careful, balanced’ (McCaul 2003). Also, Jalal al-Mashta, who first worked as an editor in chief of Adnan al-Pachachi’s newspaper, al-Nahdha, was nominated as IMN’s head in May 2004, but he resigned after six months due to the lack of support and the CPA’s influence over IMN (Haner 2004). Due to the presence of a Shiite majority who were mostly aligned to political parties (Levinson 2006), al-Iraqia TV channel started to show signs of bias. Al-Rikabi pointed out that IMN one-sided policy would only lead the country toward anarchy: ‘The people of Iraq, including the Sunni Muslims, are not about to turn against their liberators, but they are being incited to do so. These channels contribute to tension within Iraq. You need television at their level’ (Oweis 2003). Salih al-Mutlaq, a Sunni politician, agrees with al-Rikabi and adds that beside the prevalent political reasons IMN has become ‘another factor that is helping to turn Iraqi society into a sectarian society’ (Levinson 2006). The first step taken by al-Iraqia channel was broadcasting the Shiite call of prayer (Oweis 2003) and heavily covering the other Shiite sermons, flagellation events, and Friday prayer speeches, leaving the Arab Sunnis without a voice. But probably the worst decision taken was to publicly air the infamous Shiite insults against the Muslim Caliphs stating: ‘may God curse the first, second and third’ (Wikileaks 2006). Secondly, the channel started highlighting the atrocities of the former Baath regime by covering the crimes committed against the Shiites and Kurds in particular as if Arab Sunnis were not affected by Saddam Hussein’s regime. For example, emphasis was always made on the mass graves in the mainly Shiite south, the 1991 Shiite upraising (Roug 2006), the Anfal campaign, and Halabja attack against the Kurds. Almost all the managers of al-Iraqia TV after dissolving the CPA on June 28 2004 were Shiites. In one of the shootouts between US forces and Shiite armed militias in 2006 where about 16 people were killed, al-Iraqia channel mentioned that ‘unarmed worshippers’ were murdered. ‘Between interviews with Shiite politicians criticizing the Americans, the camera lingered on the dead and the grieving relatives’ (Roug 2006). Yet, IMN and al-Iraqia channel rarely if never mention the 1995 and 1998 Sunni Arab revolts by the Dulaimi tribe in Anbar region, the execution of senior Sunni Baath Party members in 1979, and the arrest and execution of prominent Sunni religious clerics throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
Also, IMN began to air a controversial program called ‘Terrorism in the Grip of Justice’. The programme involves interviews with ‘terrorists’ captured by US forces and Iraqi security personnel shown on TV to confess their crimes without being tried by a judge or legal court. The UK Telegraph.co.uk described the ‘intelligence successes’ in Iraq by citing this show (2005). There were clear signs of torture seen on the interviewees’ faces who sometimes had difficulty talking. In addition, the majority of suspects shown are Sunni insurgents including some Arab fighters, but no Shiite militiamen from the Death Squads, Mahdi Army or Badr Brigade were interviewed though many were involved in sectarian killings and kidnappings. The program, which was aired at 9 pm, Iraq’s television prime time, presented recurrent themes involving the implication of Al-Jazeera channel as a source of inspiration for those ‘terrorists’ in conducting their acts or the accusation of Syrian intelligence to be behind the insurgency in Iraq (Stalinsky 2005). There is no coincidence that these two themes were also what the US authorities used to cite to explain the source of violence in the country (Murphy and Saffar 2005, A18). In other words, there was an indication that most of these televised confessions were actually orchestrated to serve US and Iraqi official stances. Further, ‘Terrorism in the Grip of Justice’ was hailed by some Iraqi Shiite politician as evidence that the Interior Ministry headed by the infamous Islamic Supreme Council’s senior member, Bayan Jabr Solagh, was able to perform its duties.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/shiite-cleric-militias-iraq-fears.html
23 Jul 2013: "Despite the long history of Shiite clerics attempting to influence politics in their communities, it is only in the past few decades that Shiites have witnessed clerics leading militias. The Iranian Fada’iyan-e Islam movement can be considered the first. This movement was led by a young cleric named Navab Safavi, and it targeted intellectual, religious and political figures who opposed its views. One of the movement's most well-known victims was Ahmad Kasravi, an Iranian historian and linguist. Following the Iranian revolution, Safavi was transformed into a symbolic hero, leading many Shiite revolutionary groups to emulate him. Furthermore, the jihadist Muslim Brotherhood movements had a general influence on revolutionary Shiite parties."
The Islamic Dawa party is the first example of an Iraqi Shiite party that has ties with Shiite religious figures. The party engaged in military actions against the former regime, which sometimes resulted in civilian deaths. In 2003, the Mahdi Army was established.
http://www.rferl.org/a/1342850.html
15 Oct 2001: Ayatollah Mohammad Emami-Kashani, who serves in the Assembly of Experts, said during the 12 October Tehran Friday prayer sermon that Washington has three objectives in attacking Afghanistan. First of all, Washington wants to appease the American public. Secondly, "America is trying to dominate the Middle East." Further, he warned, "Attacking powerless, innocent and oppressed people will strengthen the branches of terrorism and will create more terrorists." So why should the U.S. not lead the fight against terrorism, Emami-Kashani asked. Because "Terror means creating fear," and "America is creating fear through its actions around the world, by its use of Zionism as an instrument, and by its support for Zionism." After the crowd finished chanting "Down With America," the prayer leader continued. He said that, "The American government is a legitimate government elected by the vote of the people -- even though it is a terrorist. A terrorist cannot uproot terrorism."
Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Fazel-Movahedi-Lankarani, who is a Source of Emulation, said that, "A government has put itself in charge of fighting terrorism, which is itself the biggest terrorist, and has nothing else to do in the world than that [terrorism]. Today, America claims that any country that is not with it is with others. This is a logic used by terrorists." He continued, state television reported on 9 October, "After Israel, the Taliban constitute the second illegitimate offspring of America." The Qom Theological Lecturers Association and the High Council of Managers of the Qom Seminary issued a joint statement condemning the U.S. and British attacks against "Afghanistan and its Muslim people," state television reported on 9 October.
The two religious bodies called on all seminarians and lecturers to participate in a 10 October sit-in at the Fayzieh seminary and to "declare their opposition to the inhumane action of America." At the sit-in, about 2,000 participants chanted "Death to America" and "Death to Israel." ...
An angry mob attacked the Pakistani consulate in the southwestern town of Zahedan on 12 October and chanted "Death to Pakistan" and "Death to America." The crowd was protesting against Islamabad's support for the anti-Taliban air strikes. Security forces brought the crowd under control, according to Reuters.
Hundreds of thousands of people across Iran condemned the air strikes against Afghanistan on 12 October, and they simultaneously indicated their solidarity with the Palestinian people. Demonstrators in Tehran chanted "Down with America" and "America, Britain, down with your conspiracies" as they marched through the city. They then issued a resolution condemning terrorism and called for an end to the military action. The resolution also said that the U.S. should abandon leadership of the antiterrorism coalition: "America does not have the right to lead the antiterrorism campaign because of its support for the Israeli state terrorism." The Council for Coordination of Islamic Publicity's invitation to the rallies was broadcast by state radio: "...people of Iran are hereby invited to...express decisive support for the stance adopted by the esteemed leader, His Eminence Ayatollah Khamenei, and to show sympathy with the deprived and homeless people of Afghanistan, and to condemn America's attacks on that country."
Some 500 students held an all-night vigil in front of the UN headquarters in Tehran on 11 October to protest the air strikes. The conservative youth chanted "Death to America, Death to Israel," before going home.
The University Basij organized an anti-U.S. rally in Tehran on 2 October. The security forces stopped another rally scheduled for the same day that was to show sympathy with the American people.
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1070232.html
July 31, 2006: The statements by al-Zawahiri and Nasrallah highlight rival discourses -- that of jihad, a global project to remake the world; and that of resistance, a regional project against a specific enemy. Jihad attracts adherents through the sweep and ambition of its aims, yet remains beholden to its violent means and narrow, exclusionary vision, as demonstrated by the sectarian carnage in Iraq. Resistance offers greater inclusion and flexibility, yet seems capable of displaying those qualities only during the conflict with an external enemy, as demonstrated by the contentious domestic political experiences of both Hizballah and various Palestinian factions.
Jihad and resistance have formed tactical alliances, perhaps most successfully during the struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, but the tension between the two has a long history. In 1978, Israeli forces briefly invaded Lebanon up to the Litani River to push back Palestinian militant groups. Mustafa Hamid, an Egyptian Islamist who would go on to join Al-Qaeda in the 1990s, volunteered to fight in what he hoped would be a jihad in southern Lebanon.
In a 1994 memoir, he recounted his disappointment when he found not jihad, but resistance: "I had imagined that in Lebanon I would find a strong Islamic presence.... Yet I did not find Islam or jihad, let alone the Muslim Brotherhood. All I found was armed struggle." He soon departed.
In the wake of 9/11 and Al-Qaeda's rise to prominence, jihad eclipsed resistance as a political discourse in the global imagination, although it never garnered mass support in the part of the world where it has tried hardest to succeed.
In a 1994 memoir, he recounted his disappointment when he found not jihad, but resistance: "I had imagined that in Lebanon I would find a strong Islamic presence.... Yet I did not find Islam or jihad, let alone the Muslim Brotherhood. All I found was armed struggle." He soon departed.
In the wake of 9/11 and Al-Qaeda's rise to prominence, jihad eclipsed resistance as a political discourse in the global imagination, although it never garnered mass support in the part of the world where it has tried hardest to succeed.
Now, with reports pointing to growing sympathy for Hizballah in the Arab world, resistance appears to be enjoying a resurgence. Arab regimes have exploited both discourses for their own purposes -- sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly -- yet have moved quickly to suppress them whenever they threatened to upset the status quo.
Jihad and resistance both thrive on conflict. The current violence in Lebanon could produce a tactical alliance -- which is likely to prove fragile and fleeting -- or heightened competition. Both outcomes are full of destabilizing intangibles.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Hamza_Zubeidi
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-04-22-war-main_x.htm
22 Apr 2003: One of Saddam Hussein's most-feared lieutenants was in U.S. hands Tuesday, while hundreds of thousands of Shiite Muslims crowded two holy cities in a fervent pilgrimage that had been banned for decades under Saddam.
...
Al-Zubaydi was known as Saddam's "Shiite Thug"
for his role in Iraq's bloody suppression of the Shiite Muslim uprising
of 1991. Tens of thousands of people died in the revolt. Iraqi
opposition groups have also accused al-Zubaydi of the 1999 assassination
of a top Shiite cleric.
A former prime minister, al-Zubaydi was No. 18 —
the queen of spades — in the U.S. military's 55-card deck of most-wanted
regime figures.
Al-Zubaydi was considered one of the most brutal
figures in the regime and was listed in a U.S. State Department report
titled "Iraq: Crimes Against Humanity, Leaders as Executioners." A
Shiite himself, he was once featured in an Iraqi videotape brutalizing
Shiite dissidents.
http://www.twf.org/News/Y2005/0325-Shia.html
To that end, I must set out the following facts, and they are just a few of many, many more that could be cited.
a.. In the time of the rule of the Baath Party, Staff General Sa'di Tu'mah al-Jabburi, a Shi'i was appointed minister of defense of Iraq.
a.. The first Shi'i to be appointed chief of staff of the Iraqi Army - Lieutenant General 'Abd al-Wahid Shannan Al Ribat - was named to that post in the time of the rule of the Baath.
a.. The person who held the post of Iraqi Foreign Minister the longest was Shi'i and that took place in the time the Baath ruled the country. Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi had that honor. Then the post was held throughout the 1990s by Muhammad Sa'id as-Sahhaf, and he was also Shi'i.
a.. The person who was in charge of Iraqi oil production the longest in the period of Baath Party rule was Shi'i - Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi - who was Minister of Petroleum some of that time and supervised the Ministry of Petroleum through his chairmanship of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers.
a.. The first time in the history of Iraq that Shi'i individuals held the post of Minister of Petroleum in succession was during the rule of the Baath. They were: Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi, Qasim Ahmad Taqi, 'Isam al-Chelebi (the cousin of Ahmad Chelebi). Thus, in fact Shi'ah occupied the post of Minister of Petroleum more than any other group in the history of Iraq and of the Baath. Working in responsible posts in the Ministry of Petroleum were Fadil al-Chelebi (a nephew of Ahmad Chelebi); Dr. 'Abd al-Amir al-Anbari, a Shi'i; Ramzi Salman, a Shi'i who was the Chairman of the Petroleum Marketing Board Sumo - the body responsible for Iraqi oil exports.
a.. The longest period during which Shi'ah held the post of Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq was in the period of Baath rule, the individual governors being Dr. 'Abd al-Hasan Zalzalah and Tariq at-Takmah Ji. This had never happened in any earlier era in the country.
a.. It was under the Baath that for the first time in the history of the Iraqi state, a Shi'i person held the post of Director of Public Security in Iraq. That individual was Nazim Kazzar. His assistant in that post was 'Ali Rida Bawah, who was a Shi'i of Kurdish background.
a.. The top official responsible for investigating crimes by members of the Da'wah Party, which functioned as an agency of Iran and set off bombs inside Iraq during the 1980s and 1990s, the man who put an end to the sabotage wrecked by that party was himself Shi'i - Security Colonel 'Ali al-Khaqani, a native of the Shi'i holy city of an-Najaf. This is something that no one, including Husayn ash-Shahrastani, can deny.
a.. The Presidenccy of the Revolutionary Court specially formed to deal with the cases of plots was held by two Shi'ah, namely Hadi 'Ali Watut and Muslim al-Jabburi.
a.. It was under the Baath that two Shi'ah served as Prime Minister of Iraq. They were Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi and Muhammad Hamzah az-Zubaydi.
a.. The man who held the post of Speaker of the National Assembly the longest was Shi'i - Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi.
a.. More than 60 percent of the general directors of state companies in the military industries were Shi'ah. More than 70 percent of the advanced engineering and technical cadres in the military industries were Shi'ah.
a.. Most of the specialists and scientists in the Atomic Energy Organization were Shi'i, among them Diya' Ja'far, Husayn Isma'il al-Bahadili, and Husayn ash-Shahrastani.
a.. The Deputy Chairman of the Military Industrial Board for Technical Affairs, Dr. Nizar al-Qusayr, the most important person on the Board because it was he who was in charge of all production development projects, was also Shi'i.
a.. More than 60 percent of the general directors in the Iraqi state sector and their technical and scientific cadres who held high official posts and positions in that sector were Shi'i.
a.. The person who held the position of general director in the Iraqi state sector the longest since the foundation of the state sector and until the US invasion was Shi'i - namely Midhat al-Hashimi, the General Director of the Public Company for Automobiles.
a.. All the general directors for the educational departments in the provinces in Iraq's central and southern area were Shi'i throughout the entire period of Baath Party rule.
a.. More than 60 percent of Baath Party members were Shi'i. The middle-ranking cadres in the Baath Party were more than 70 percent Shi'i. They were the foundation of the Party's organizational and formational structure, and it was they who undertook organizational and mass work in the Party.
a.. During the time of the Iran-Iraq War the Commander of Iraqi Artillery was Staff Major General Hamid al-Ward, a Shi'i. The Commander of the Armored Forces was Staff Major General Sabih 'Umran at-Tarafah, a Shi'i. The General Secretary of the Ministry of Defense - that is, the number-two man in the ministry after the Minister of Defense himself - was Staff Major General Sa'd al-Maliki, a Shi'i. Then later there was Staff Major General Jiyad al-Imarah, a Shi'i. The Commander of the 3rd Division, Lieutenant General Sa'di Tu'mah al-Jabburi was a Shi'i. The Director of Administration of Political Guidance was 'Abd al-Jabbar Muhsin al-Lami, a Shi'i. The Commander of the Border Troops was Staff Lieutenant General 'Ali Muhammad Shallal, a Shi'i. This is to say nothing of the large number of brigade generals, sectional commanders, army officers, and military advisers who were Shi'i.
a.. Ten men served as Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations during the period of Baath Party Rule. Of them, four were Shi'i, namely:
1.. Talib Shabib,
2.. Dr. 'Abd al-Amir al-Anbari - who held the post the longest and occupied the position twice.
3.. Muhammad Sadiq al-Mashat,
4.. Sa'id al-Musawi.
...
a.. The two Representatives of Iraq to UNESCO were both Shi'i:
1.. 'Aziz al-Hajj, a Shi'i of Kurdish origin, and
2.. Dr. 'Abd al-Amir al-Anbari, a Shi'i.
a.. The last editor-in-chief of the Baath Party's official newspaper, ath-Thawrah, was Sami Mahdi, who is a Shi'i of Iranian descent.
a.. The Information Adviser to President Saddam Hussein was 'Abd al-Jabbar Muhsin, a Shi'i.
a.. The main adviser to President Saddam Hussein for Baath Party affairs was Muhsin Radi Salman, a Shi'i.
a.. President Saddam Hussein's aide throughout the 1970s, 1980s and until the beginning of the 1990s was Sabah Mirzah Mahmud, a Shi'i of Kurdish background. In addition the President's Secretary for Press Affairs was Sabah Salman, also a Shi'i.
a.. Dozens of Iraq's ambassadors were Shi'ah, a few - by no means all - examples being 'Aqdah al-Bayyati, Widad 'Ajjam, Muhammad al-'Amili, 'Adnan Malik, Sa'id al-Musawi, 'Abd al-Husayn al-Jamali, Rahim al-Katal, Sahib as-Samawi, Hassan as-Saffar, Bassam Kabbah, Sa'd Qasim Hammudi, Salah Nuri as-Samarmad, 'Ali Muhammad al-Mashshat, and many more.
...
a.. All the singers and songwriters who sang of the Baath Party and of love for the leader in the period of Baath Party rule were Shi'ah.
a.. All the popular poets who wrote long poems in honor of the Baath Party and the President in the period of Baath Party rule were Shi'ah.
One of the most tragicomic features of the present time is the fact that those Baath Party members who turned against the Baath and threw themselves into the arms of the American CIA and collaborated with them in their aggression against Iraq and their occupation of the country were Shi'ah, and it is they who today weep and wail about the "oppression" of the Shi'ah in the time of the Baath in which they held positions. But those people are not true children of Iraq, whether they be Shi'i or anything else. They are nothing but scum, a gang of hired stooges who promote the plans of the occupation for their petty aims.
Among them, for example, are:
Iyyad 'Allawi, a Shi'i who was a member of a Baath Party Section,
Tahir al-Baka', a Shi'i who was a member of a Baath Party Section,
Rasim al-'Awwadi, a Shi'i who was a member of a Baath Party Branch,
Hazim ash-Sha'lan, a Shi'i who was a member of a Baath Party Base,
Dawud al-Basri, a Shi'i who writes in the newspapers was a high-ranking official in the Iraqi Embassy in Kuwait,
Zuhayr Kazim 'Abbud, a Shi'i who was a member of a Baath Party Division,
Mundhir al-Fadl, a Shi'i who was a member of a Baath Party Division,
Brigadier General Sa'd al-'Ubaydi, a Shi'i who was a member of a Baath Party Section,
Falih Hassun ad-Darraji, a Shi'i who was a member of a Baath Party Section,
Hashim al-'Aqqabi, a Shi'i who was an active member of the Saddam Branch organizations,
Hasan al-'Alawi, a Shi'i who was a member of a Baath Party Division.
Amir al-Hilw, a journalist and general director in the Ministry of Information was a member of a Baath Party Division (the al-Muthanna Division, the area of Zayunah in Baghdad).
'Abd al-Karim al-Muhammadawi, a Staff Sergeant who deserted from the Iraqi military, a Shi'i who was a high-ranking aide in the organizations of the ar-Rafidayn military Section in the Baath Party Military Branch in Dhi Qar Province.
'Abd al-Wahid al-Hasawnah, a Shi'i member of a Baath Party Section, but also a leading member of the "Accord Movment" led by the criminal Iyyad 'Allawi.
http://www.rferl.org/content/Irans_Conservatives_Have_Their_Nobel_Winner/1377995.html
Feb 2, 2009: Iran's conservatives have a new hero: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who, following his spat with Israeli President Shimon Peres over the Gaza crisis last week, walked out of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
Iran's president, ministers, the parliament speaker and other deputies, and clerics in the holy city of Qom are all full of praise for the Turkish PM. And, of course, Basiji students demonstrated with flowers in front of the Turkish Embassy and chanted slogans such as "Erdogan, Erdogan, we support you."
Iran, the main backer of the Palestinians' Hamas group, which controls the Gaza Strip, does not recognize Israel.
"Courageous," "valuable," "a model for the head of all Muslim countries," and "epic" are among the words that Iranian officials have used to describe Erdogan's angry outburst.
Some of the most spectacular praise came from Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi, who said that Erdogan deserves a Nobel Peace Prize. Shirazi said Erdogan's action paved the way for the prevention of another war.
This reaction is interesting, because in the past some Iranian hard-liners have dismissed the Nobel Peace Prize as Western and worthless. And Iran's only Nobel Peace Prize winner, Shirin Ebadi, has been under increasing state pressure.
http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/07/shia-centric-state-building-and-sunni-rejection-in-post-2003-iraq-pub-62408
Feb 2, 2009: Iran's conservatives have a new hero: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who, following his spat with Israeli President Shimon Peres over the Gaza crisis last week, walked out of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
Iran's president, ministers, the parliament speaker and other deputies, and clerics in the holy city of Qom are all full of praise for the Turkish PM. And, of course, Basiji students demonstrated with flowers in front of the Turkish Embassy and chanted slogans such as "Erdogan, Erdogan, we support you."
Iran, the main backer of the Palestinians' Hamas group, which controls the Gaza Strip, does not recognize Israel.
"Courageous," "valuable," "a model for the head of all Muslim countries," and "epic" are among the words that Iranian officials have used to describe Erdogan's angry outburst.
Some of the most spectacular praise came from Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi, who said that Erdogan deserves a Nobel Peace Prize. Shirazi said Erdogan's action paved the way for the prevention of another war.
This reaction is interesting, because in the past some Iranian hard-liners have dismissed the Nobel Peace Prize as Western and worthless. And Iran's only Nobel Peace Prize winner, Shirin Ebadi, has been under increasing state pressure.
http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/07/shia-centric-state-building-and-sunni-rejection-in-post-2003-iraq-pub-62408
However,
Iraq did not travel a clear downward path between 2003 and 2014.
There were moments when Shia-centric state building and Sunni
rejection seemed to be in retreat and hopes were raised that the
cycle could be broken. The most promising period was 2008 to 2010:
violence was declining, sectarian politics were in clear
retreat, militia
and insurgent networks had been crippled, and many were optimistic
that post-2003 Iraqi politics had come of age. But
whatever glimmer of hope existed began to fade during the
controversial parliamentary election of 2010 in which Nouri al-Maliki
lost the ballot but retained power. His disastrous second term as
prime minister from 2010 to 2014 saw the retrenchment of identity
politics, the deepening of Sunni alienation from the state, the
reinvigoration of militant networks—partly aided by the spiraling
and heavily sect-coded conflict in neighboring Syria—and ultimately
the return of civil war.
http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=20121214&page=2
General Beg leans to Iran: In 1985, Deobandis got into the act, creating Sipah Sahaba in Jhang (Punjab). In 1986, Saudi Arabia funded Rabita Alam Islami head of Nadva tul-Ulama madrassa of Lucknow in India, Manzur Numani, to compile apostatising fatwas against the Shia. All the Deobandi madrassas of Pakistan, led by Jamia Banuria and Jamia Ashrafia, sent fatwas of takfeer against the Shia to him to be complied in a book and later distributed in Pakistan.
In 1988, two incidents exacerbated the sectarian war: massacre of Shia in Gilgit and the murder of Shia top leader Ariful Hussaini in Peshawar. At this point, without a green signal from Zia, Beg got together with Dr AQ Khan to sell Iran nuclear technology crucial to building an Iranian bomb. Dr Khan was already into selling his wares globally. Iran was the first country to receive centrifuges from him. According to IAEA, he made the sale to Iran of all the required elements in 1987 in Dubai, collecting payment in Swiss Francs. Zia did not know. He did know either that Beg too had got into the act.
Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007, p.166, states: Nawaz Sharif's finance minister Ishaq Dar disclosed that 'Beg came back from Tehran with an offer of $5 billion in return for nuclear know-how, but Sharif rejected the offer'.
http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=20121214&page=2
General Beg leans to Iran: In 1985, Deobandis got into the act, creating Sipah Sahaba in Jhang (Punjab). In 1986, Saudi Arabia funded Rabita Alam Islami head of Nadva tul-Ulama madrassa of Lucknow in India, Manzur Numani, to compile apostatising fatwas against the Shia. All the Deobandi madrassas of Pakistan, led by Jamia Banuria and Jamia Ashrafia, sent fatwas of takfeer against the Shia to him to be complied in a book and later distributed in Pakistan.
In 1988, two incidents exacerbated the sectarian war: massacre of Shia in Gilgit and the murder of Shia top leader Ariful Hussaini in Peshawar. At this point, without a green signal from Zia, Beg got together with Dr AQ Khan to sell Iran nuclear technology crucial to building an Iranian bomb. Dr Khan was already into selling his wares globally. Iran was the first country to receive centrifuges from him. According to IAEA, he made the sale to Iran of all the required elements in 1987 in Dubai, collecting payment in Swiss Francs. Zia did not know. He did know either that Beg too had got into the act.
Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007, p.166, states: Nawaz Sharif's finance minister Ishaq Dar disclosed that 'Beg came back from Tehran with an offer of $5 billion in return for nuclear know-how, but Sharif rejected the offer'.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/sworn-frenemies-sunni-shiite-conflict-and-cooperation
30 May 2013: Indeed, only a year prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Syria, intellectuals from Hamas -- essentially the Palestinian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood -- embarked on an effort to surmount the ideological barriers impeding Sunni-Shiite ties. In 2010, Hamas foreign minister Ahmed Yousef penned and distributed a booklet titled "The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Revolution in Iran," which sought to reconcile the visions of Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of Iran's 1979 revolt. The treatise highlighted Tehran and the Brotherhood's mutual admiration for the architect of the modern jihadist movement, Sayyed Qutb, as well as their common goal of establishing a supra-Islamic state based on sharia. "There is no escape from overcoming the conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites," Yousef wrote; "these conflicts do not amount to a religious contradiction."
.....
When Iran's President Ahmadinejad visited Cairo in February, he was greeted by shoe-throwing protestors enraged by Tehran's unwavering support for the Assad regime. Then, during a meeting at the preeminent Sunni seminary al-Azhar, clerics publicly criticized Iran for meddling in Bahrain and encouraging Shiite proselytizing in Egypt. More recently, on March 15, Egyptian Salafists held a large demonstration in Tahrir Square denouncing "normalization" with Iran and Shia Islam, and threatening to "escalate the matter" if the Brotherhood persisted in developing the relationship.
......
Although anti-American/Israeli ideology has historically provided much of the impetus for cooperation between Sunni and Shiite fundamentalists, an equally important driver has been -- and will continue to be -- good old-fashioned pragmatism. For Tehran in particular, cultivating Sunnis is both a strategic hedge and a vehicle for promoting Islamic revolution.
Consider that during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s -- a time when Iran was forming Hizballah amid growing regional Sunni-Shiite tensions -- Tehran also supported the Lebanese Sunni militia Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami. That decision was spurred in part by a clear coincidence of interest: based in the Sunni stronghold of Tripoli, the militia sought to unify Sunnis and Shiites with an eye toward reestablishing the type of supra-Islamic state that ended with the fall of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, Tehran hoped to broaden its client network in Lebanon beyond Shiites.
Iranian domestic concerns are a factor as well. Today, Sunnis comprise 10 percent of the country's population and are the fastest-growing constituency in Iran, bearing an estimated seven children per family compared to the Shiite average of less than two. The regime no doubt views Iranian Sunnis as a long-term demographic threat, one it may have to proactively counter via a grand sectarian reconciliation.
http://www.mei.edu/content/article/iran%E2%80%99s-uneasy-relationship-its-sunni-minorities
To monitor activities of Sunni groups and prevent Wahhabi-Salafi proselytization, the Iranian government established a council in 2008 to better control schools for religious teaching of Sunnis. The bylaws of the council placed representatives of Iran’s supreme leader in charge of administrating Sunni schools. Sunni members of parliament described the bylaws, including its first article, as discriminatory government interference in Sunni religious affairs.
..........
Authorities have allowed a number of prayer houses for the nearly one million Sunnis in Tehran, but no mosque. Unlike a mosque, a prayer house has no imam, no management, no budget, and does not include religious instruction beyond prayer. It is simply a space for prayer without the administrative and other hallmarks of a religious institution. This is in contrast to Iranian Christians and Jews who have churches and synagogues under the management of their religious institutions. Prayer houses have also suffered repeated attacks. In 2015, one prayer house was destroyed in Tehran, according to the religious-conservative Shabestan News Agency, for “promoting some extremist thinking.”
......
Hawza ʻElmiyya in the city of Qom—a seminary where Shiite Muslim clerics are trained—has provided special education for thousands of people around the country. They aim to raise awareness and promote a critical approach to “Wahhabism, Baha’ism, Sufism, fake mysticism, Christianity, and Zoroastrian.” The latter two faiths are legal in Iran, but have been lumped in with the others in an effort to strengthen the footing of the dominant Shiite faith.
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2014/10/10/dividing-lines-sectarianism-in-iraq
There never was “Sunni rule” in Iraq - those in power, from the Hashemites through Abd al-Karim Qasim to Saddam, did not present themselves as representatives of the Sunnis, but rather as secularists. The Shia were participants in political life even if their religious authorities in Najaf kept their distance. They were the backbone of nationalist and leftist parties in Iraq, helping to form the Baath party itself.The first two cells of the Baath party were formed in Shia areas, with Naim Haddad forming a group in Nasiriyah and Sadoun Hammadi – known as the first Baathist in Iraq – doing the same in Najaf. When the first regional leadership of the party was formed in 1953 most were Shia, including Secretary-General Fuad al-Rikabi and co-founder Jafar Hammoudi.
The Shia were not banned from assuming senior positions even in Saddam’s regime. Sadoun Hammadi and Mohammed Hamza Zubeidi held high positions in government. Shia soldiers also managed to reach the highest echelons of the military, even though, when it was set up in the 1920s, the community was originally not enthusiastic about joining. Commander-in-chief Sadi Tumah al-Jabouri eventually became minister of defence under Saddam.Today’s Shia parties use incoherent arguments to demonstrate the sectarianism of Saddam’s regime. They say that he killed many Shia clerics. He did kill Shia clerics, but only those who rebelled against his leadership. He did not touch Shia not opposed to him. The ban on some Shia rituals such as tatbir - striking oneself with swords in acts of self-flagellation most often seen during the time of Ashura - was not aimed at Shia Islam, indeed, the Lebanese Shia movement Hizbollah has also banned the ritual. It was banned because the regime was convinced that these practices were “uncivilised”. Saddam likewise outlawed the Rifai Sufi custom of beating their stomachs with swords.The suppression of the 1991 uprising did not target the Shia for being Shia. It was the Shia Baath party militias in Amara, Nasiriyah and Basra who put down the uprising, as there was no time to send for fighters from Sunni areas. In Karbala, more than half the soldiers who put down the uprising were themselves Shia.
http://fikraforum.org/?p=9612#.V3fJdo4Symw
The two groups are also driven by similar motivations. Both the Islamic State and the Islamic Republic, according to their respective supporters’ histories, are the penultimate chapters in the unfolding of the apocalyptic sequence. Each is expecting a millenarian savior figure, the Mahdi, agreeing on the name, role, and place in history, but diverging on the details of this apocalyptic figure. The Mahdi of the Islamic Republic is popularly thought to already be in periodic contact with the Supreme Guide to provide guidance in anticipation of the End Days. His archenemy, al-Sufyani, is widely believed to have already appeared in Syria, as predicted. Al-Yamani, an aid to al-Mahdi, is also rumored to have been found in Lebanon. These may or may not be the convictions of Iran’s clerics. Nor has the official Iranian government confirmed or denied these rumors. Nevertheless, they are part of the millenarian lore, invoked to mobilize Iraqi, Lebanese, and other Shiite youth to epic battles away from their homelands.
The Islamic State, on the other hand, has not yet declared the advent of the Mahdi. Nevertheless, its officially propagated exegesis is categorical in placing its rule as the “Truthful Promise of God.” ISIS controls Dabiq and al-A‘maq, localities expected to be central in the unfolding of the apocalypse. The global Sunni youth is thus summoned to join the millenarian state in Syria.
These two millenarian projects are each honing their individual definitions of the epochal enemy. Over the course of the previous century, Islamic millenarian readings had adjusted the weight of the traditions to elevate a monolithic collective of “Jews” to a primordial enmity. Both Republic and State have faithfully preserved this image, now supplemented by hatred for the United States. However, each of the two millenarian readings has also incrementally positioned the other—rebranded with pejorative designations to strip away “Muslimhood”—as the main focus of disparagement, laying the grounds for perpetual confrontation.
This shouldn’t be solace for those who may believe that an intra-Muslim feud would sap away the potential for Muslim aggressiveness externally. In addition to the suffering that this feud invariably produces in local communities, which through migration extends to the global community, the historical record demonstrates that accumulated hate and anger is easily redirected at new targets.
The situation is not susceptible to indifference, containment, or management. Still, these approaches, which may yield temporary relief at best, are certainly more effective than what some have explicitly or implicitly advocated in the wake of the P5+1 agreement: a strategic reliance on Iran to stabilize the region and positioning Iranian-backed Shiite radicalism as a manageable political expression versus an unbound and out of control Sunni radicalism. Failing to understand the causality that ties the two radical manifestations is tantamount to attempting to extinguish the fire of the Islamic State using Islamic Republic gasoline.
http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context/j1iy
According to the Islamic State, the worst enemies of Islam are the enemies within. The group argues that focusing on the far enemy (the West) and ignoring the near enemy (Muslim enemies in the region, especially Shia) is ineffective. Under the Islamic State’s vision, the far enemy will be dragged into the region as Osama bin Laden planned, but by attacking the near enemy.
......
For
al-Qaeda, such a focus on Shia would distract from the fight against the
West. Furthermore, mainstream Sunni clergy reject a genocidal attitude
toward the Shia public. Al-Qaeda’s central leadership has admonished the
Islamic State (and its earlier incarnations) against attacking Shia
civilians. Bin Laden reportedly favored an alliance between Shia and
Sunni groups that would position them to jointly attack the West.38
Read more at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context/j1iy
Read more at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context/j1iy
For
al-Qaeda, such a focus on Shia would distract from the fight against the
West. Furthermore, mainstream Sunni clergy reject a genocidal attitude
toward the Shia public. Al-Qaeda’s central leadership has admonished the
Islamic State (and its earlier incarnations) against attacking Shia
civilians. Bin Laden reportedly favored an alliance between Shia and
Sunni groups that would position them to jointly attack the West.38
Read more at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context/j1iy
For al-Qaeda, such a focus on Shia would distract from the fight against the West. Furthermore, mainstream Sunni clergy reject a genocidal attitude toward the Shia public. Al-Qaeda’s central leadership has admonished the Islamic State (and its earlier incarnations) against attacking Shia civilians. Bin Laden reportedly favored an alliance between Shia and Sunni groups that would position them to jointly attack the West.Read more at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context/j1iy
According to a letter published by the U.S. State Department, al-Zarqawi urged bin Laden to focus on Shia. He wrote: “If you agree with us on [targeting Shia] . . . we will be your readied soldiers. . . . If things appear otherwise to you, we are brothers, and the disagreement will not spoil [our] friendship."
The Islamic State’s current leaders have criticized al-Qaeda’s mellow, as they call it, stance toward Shia, and in May 2014, Islamic State spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani said that al-Qaeda was deliberately avoiding confrontation with Iran and Shia.
In September 2013, current al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri addressed al-Qaeda’s position on Shia in a letter that became public in 2015. He cited religious and practical reasons for the Islamic State to steer clear of targeting the Shia public and places of worship. Referencing Ibn Taymiyyah, he wrote that “such acts affect the protected blood of women, children, and noncombatant Shia public, who are protected because they are excused for their ignorance [of true religious doctrine, unlike Shia clerics]. This is the consensus of the Sunni toward the Shia public and ignorant followers.”
http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/reports/1000000512-apostasy-in-the-islamic-republic-of-iran.html
Some senior Shi’a clerics such as Ayatollah Sadeq Rohani believe that denying the infallibility of the Shi’a Imams qualifies as apostasy.[20] Applying this view, a Shi’a Muslim who decides to become a Sunni could potentially be charged with apostasy. This view is not shared by all Shi’a jurists.[21]
Some senior Shi’a clerics such as Ayatollah Sadeq Rohani believe that denying the infallibility of the Shi’a Imams qualifies as apostasy.[20] Applying this view, a Shi’a Muslim who decides to become a Sunni could potentially be charged with apostasy. This view is not shared by all Shi’a jurists.[21]
Some jurists hold that even having doubts about Islamic principles could be grounds for apostasy.[22] For instance, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, an influential Iranian cleric, has stated that having doubts over the concept of amr bi ma’ruf,
or commanding others to good deeds, could lead one to become an
apostate because doubting this principle is tantamount to denying the
essence of Islam.[23]
http://www.theedgemarkets.com/my/article/against-grain-sectarianism-greatest-challenge-contemporary-islam
In 1984, the Fatwa Committee of the National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs (Jakim) stated that two Shi’ite schools of thought — the Ja‘fari and Zaidi — were acceptable in Malaysia. This pluralistic attitude was short-lived when this decision was revoked in 1996.
.....
Although the Ibadhis, neither Sunnis nor Shi’ites, make up about 75% of the population, Oman is probably the one country that allows the greatest harmony between Sunnis and Shi’ites, both of which are minority sects.
Aisha Al-Kharusi, in her study titled The Sunni-Shia Divide and the Modern Middle East (Master of Science thesis, Nanyang Technological University, 2013/2014) notes that Sunni and Shi’ite minorities are not only respected but are integrated into the highest positions in both the private and public sectors. What is remarkable and so unique about Oman is that all the “different Muslim denominations pray side by side, with generally no denominational labels assigned to the mosques across the Sultanate”.
During World War I and the subsequent British mandate, the Shia ulama were very active in urging pro-nationalistic and anti-British actions. When the British invaded Iraq (then called Mesopotamia) during World War I, the ulama declared a holy war and actively solicited tribesmen to join forces in an effort to repel the British. Despite some initially heavy fighting, the British eventually succeeded in occupying all of Iraq and took control of it after the war. The ulama remained very active in opposing the British. In 1919, the principal Shia mujtahid, Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, issued a religious decree (fatwa) stating that "none but Muslims have any right to rule over Muslims"; this was followed by other ulama calling for an independent Arab government ruled by a descendant of the Prophet.43There were also joint Shia-Sunni political activities. The increasing unrest led to a tribal revolt in 1920.
....
The fighting was marked by extreme brutality on both sides. Although most attention in the West was directed toward the atrocities committed by the government forces, the rebels also committed their share of atrocities. They killed virtually any Ba'ath Party official they could find, and also massacred the families and relatives of government officials.12 The rebels' actions reached such an extreme that a senior Iraqi cleric associated with the opposition issued a fatwa (religious decree) calling for more humane treatment of prisoners and the end of unnecessary killings.13 Government forces were equally (if not more) brutal than the rebels. There were numerous reports of mass hangings of suspected rebels and atrocities against both insurgents and civilians.14 Generally, no quarter was given by either side.
.....
One key issue marked the rebellion. Despite earlier (and later) moves toward unifying the Iraqi opposition, the Shia leadership and insurgents during the uprising raised exclusively Shia goals. The most common slogan heard during the rebellion was "Jafari (Shia) Rule." Moreover, when the SCIRI finally did begin to try to exert leadership over the course of the insurgency (well after its beginning), the military command issued orders that "all Iraqi armed forces should submit to and obey [SCIRI] orders . . . no ideas except the rightful Islamic ones should be disseminated . . . "21 Combined with widespread executions of both minor Ba'ath officials and suspected collaborators, the Shia calls for a Shia government isolated them from potential collaboration with non-Shias. More importantly, the lack of effective planning and leadership precluded the spread of insurgent activity to Baghdad. Although some small-scale unrest among the Shia areas of Baghdad was reported, it was easily contained by the regime.
.....
In March 1980, the government issued a decree making it a capital offense to be a member of al-Dawah.81 From 1974 to 1985, at least 50 clerics were executed by the government, with several others in exile being assassinated.82 The most prominent and significant execution was that of Baqir al-Sadr in 1980. The total number of executions and those Shia killed in disturbances against the government is very inexact, with estimates between 1,000 and 30,000.83
....
At the same time, however, the regime began pumping considerable money into religious accounts for refurbishing shrines and mosques, and increased funding for pilgrims. The government also expanded funding for such projects as electrification and health care for Shia areas. Political concessions also were made to the Shia. In June 1982, a party congress elected a new regional command for the Ba'ath Party. The new members were mostly Shia, and gave Shia at least a plurality on the regional command. It must be noted, however, that these new members were not seated on the Regional Command Council, the actual decision-making organ of the Iraqi regime.88 Likewise, in the 1980 and 1984 elections, the regime guaranteed that at least 40 percent of those elected to the National Assembly would be Shia and that the Speaker would be a Shia.89 Unsurprisingly, the National Assembly has virtually no real power.
For
al-Qaeda, such a focus on Shia would distract from the fight against the
West. Furthermore, mainstream Sunni clergy reject a genocidal attitude
toward the Shia public. Al-Qaeda’s central leadership has admonished the
Islamic State (and its earlier incarnations) against attacking Shia
civilians. Bin Laden reportedly favored an alliance between Shia and
Sunni groups that would position them to jointly attac
Read more at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context/j1iy
Read more at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context/j1iy
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/12/20/sectarian-twitter-wars-sunni-shia-conflict-and-cooperation-in-digital-age/in6n
Sectarian Twitter wars
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43148/Nasr_Regional_Implications_2004.pdf?sequence=4
The Shi‘a number around 130 million people globally, some 10 percent of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims. The overwhelming majority of Shi‘a (approximately 120 million) live in the area between Lebanon and Pakistan, where they constitute the majority population in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan; the single-largest community in Lebanon; and sizeable minorities in various Gulf emirates, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (as well as in neighboring countries such as India and Tajikistan and in East Africa). In the arc stretching from Pakistan to Lebanon, the number of Shi‘a matches that of Sunnis; in the Gulf region, the Shi‘a clearly predominate.
....
with Tehran’s blessing, Pakistani Shi‘a rejected their government’s much-publicized Islamic laws of 1979 as “Sunni” and were able to gain exemption from the laws, which led many more Pakistanis to declare themselves Shi‘a. Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini actively supported Pakistani Shi‘a demands, openly threatening Pakistan’s Gen. Zia ul-Haq that, if his military regime “mistreated [the Shi‘a, Khomeini] would deal with Zia as he had dealt with the Shah.” In India, after continued disturbances between the Shi‘a and Sunnis in Lucknow beginning in the late 1980s, the Shi‘a community sided with the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in provincial and national elections in the 1990s, breaking with the larger Muslim community to protect its own specific interests.
....
Iran’s sectarian posturing was not limited to mobilizing Shi‘a minorities. Khomeini issued a ruling (fatwa) declaring the ruling Alawi sect in Syria, which is an offshoot of Shi‘ism and viewed by the majority of Sunnis and the Shi‘a as not Islamic, to be within the pale of Islam. The fatwa gave the regime of Alawi Hafiz al-Asad, whose base of power rested in Syria’s minority Alawi community, legitimacy at a time when it was under pressure by the Muslim Brotherhood. More significantly, Tehran refused to support the Muslim Brotherhood when Asad’s regime brutally suppressed the group’s uprising in the city of Hama in 1982. The Tehran-Damascus axis was part of Iran’s Shi‘a expansionist agenda.
....
Revolutionary Iran failed to alter the balance of power between the Shi‘a and Sunnis across the region and ultimately gave up trying to do so. By the end of the 1980s, with the exception of Hizballah in Lebanon, all other Iranian-backed Shi‘a political drives for power in the Gulf, Afghanistan, and Pakistan had come to naught, while Iran’s military drive to unseat Saddam Hussein’s regime had ended in defeat. Sunni domination of the region had survived the challenge of the Iranian revolution.
http://republicsumer.blogspot.co.uk/2016/05/since-execution-of-shaykh-nimr-baqir-al.html?m=1
by the middle decades of the tenth century (around 300 years
after the death of the Prophet) the intellectual landscape of the Muslim
community saw the emergence of somewhat distinct and demarcated theological
creeds, canonised legal traditions, organised rituals, and communal liturgies
that were akin – but far from identical - to the major theological groupings of
today, of which the Shiʿas and the Sunnis are the most prominent.
The early
and probably most significant formulation of Sunnism as an organised,
demarcated, and creedal theological tradition was put together by Abu al-Hasan
al-Ashʿari, who died in 936, almost exactly three centuries after the
succession crisis. Even the earliest creedal statements – attributed to Abu
Hanifa (d. 767), an early Muslim jurist – supposedly date back to a period over
200 years after the succession crisis. By the same token, the earliest Shiʿi
theological alignments and creedal statements we know of today are traced back
to such theologians as Hisham al-Hakam (d. 796) and his peers, who hailed from
the southern regions of Iraq and who, perhaps to the surprise of many today,
were ethnic Arabs.
Thus, the
two creeds did not emerge immediately after the death of the Prophet. Instead,
they represent the culmination of centuries of vibrant intellectual creativity,
interactions, and cross-pollinations. Insofar as their contemporary
theological, political, and social identity is concerned, the Shiʿism and
Sunnism of today are at the very least products tendencies that date back to
the period between the 1300s and 1800s AD. This marked a period when, more than
ever before, politics was wed to theology, religion became an instrument of
state ideologies, and theologians and jurists functioned as legitimisers of
hegemonic and expansionist powers. If the media commentariat insist on
interpreting the Saudi-Iran rivalry through a sectarian lens, then it is not
‘ancient’ Islam they should look at, but the more recent historical rivalry
between the politicised Shiʿism of such modern powers as the Safavids (r.
1501-1722) and dominion-seeking and state-serving Sunnism of such imperial
entities as the Ottmans (r. 1299-1923).
https://en.qantara.de/content/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-and-iran-rapprochement-between-sunnis-and-shiites
"While the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Iran do not have strong organizational ties, the Brotherhood has had a major impact on Islamic revivalism in Iran, a movement that sought to promote Islam not just as a religion but as an ideology governing all aspects of political, economic, and social life. Mujtaba Mirlowhi, known as Navvab Safavi, (1924-1955) was a young Iranian cleric who created the Society of Islam Devotees (SID) in the early 1940s and played a major role in connecting Shiite fundamentalism to Islamic fundamentalist movements in other countries. Like the founding fathers of Islamic revivalism in Egypt, SID believed that in order to fight the supremacy of the West, Muslims have to combat sectarianism, put the Shiite-Sunni conflict aside, and create a united Muslim front.
In 1954, at the invitation of Sayyed Qutb, then secretary of the Islamic summit and main intellectual of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Navvad Safavi travelled to Jordan and Egypt to meet its leaders. Under their influence, he became more attracted to the Palestinian cause. Before that time, there were few references to the Palestinian problem in Iranian society among clerics or lay (leftist) intellectuals and activists. After his return to Iran, he started a Palestinian campaign and collected promises from five thousand volunteers to deploy to the Palestinian territories to fight the Jews.
Perhaps even more important, in his short autobiography, Iran's current supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei describes becoming interested in political activities after he met Navvad Safavi in Mashhad, Iran. Before Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution, Khamenei translated two books by Sayyed Qutb, Al-Mustaqbal li hadha al-Din (The Future of this Religion) and Al-Islam wa Mushkelat al-Hadharah (Islam and the Problems of Civilization)."
........
"The Fatimid period left a lasting impression on Egyptians, and vestiges of the country's long-ago Shiite rulers are still seen in Egyptian openness to Shiite practices and traditions, a receptiveness not found anywhere else in the Sunni world. Egyptians still respect the symbols, icons, and sacred places of that period; for example, Egyptians believe that Hussain, the third Shiite Imam, and his family are buried in Cairo, not in Karbala, Iraq. For Sunni Egyptians the tombs of Hussain, Sayyeda Zainab (his sister), and Assayeda Sakina (his daughter) are the most sacred places in the world after Mecca and Medina. Also like their Shiite coreligionists, Sunnis in Cairo perform Ashura (the Shiite commemoration of the death of Hussain) each year. Furthermore, in nineteenth-century Egypt, the Persian language was accepted as a language of literature and science, reflected in the Persian-language newspapers available at the time."
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/WhoRulesIran.pdf
the establishment of a nondenominational theological university in Tehran at which the feqh (Islamic jurisprudence) of the Sunni sects would also be taught—remains unfulfilled. The reason for the Society for Reconciliation's lack of success thus far has been not only its lack of funds but also, according to well-informed sources, the efforts of its competitor, the Assembly for the People, to hinder it.
Indeed, the Assembly for the People, founded in May 1990 in Tehran, is far more powerful than the Society for Reconciliation. The Assembly for the People, which was led until 1999 by Hojjatoleslam 'Ali al-Taskhiri and later by 'Ali Akbar Velayati, has two main goals: According to al-Taskhiri, it attempts to attain nezarat kardan (supremacy) over all Islamic groups active in the areas of culture, propaganda, economics, society, and politics via peaceful propaganda and persuasion, and to implement the Iranian claim to leadership over all Shi'i communities in the world. Indeed, al-Taskhiri insists that Iran's Shi'is have a legitimate, historical right to exert political and intellectual-religious leadership over Muslims worldwide. But in view of the hostility of the West toward the Muslim world—which affects Sunnis and Shi'is alike—the realization of such a claim has had to be postponed indefinitely....
.....
In 1994, violent demonstrations and bombings occurred in Zahedan and Mashhad—the provincial capitals of Baluchistan and Khorasan, respectively—after the city government destroyed the Sunni Faiz Mosque in Mashhad the previous year. Although Khorasan probably has a Sunni majority, the shrine of the Eighth Imam, 'Ali Musa al-Reza, is in Mashhad and as many as eight million Shi'i pilgrims visit Imam Reza's tomb annually; the provincial capital is therefore Iran's most important pilgrimage city as well as the country's second largest city. In the riots and street battles that followed the destruction of the Sunni mosque in Mashhad, the Iranian security forces arrested more than five hundred Sunni activists in Zahedan.
On June 20, 1994, several months after the regime quelled the riots, a bomb exploded in one of the prayer courts at the Imam Reza mausoleum, killing at least twenty-six people. The Iranian government immediately accused the MEK of masterminding the attack and shortly thereafter presented the public with a number of supposed perpetrators, though the MEK denied any involvement in the bombing. About a month after the attack, an unknown Sunni group calling itself al-haraka al-islamiya al-iraniya (the Iranian Islamic Movement) claimed responsibility for the Mashhad attack as well as for an attack against the Makki Mosque in Zahedan in February 1994.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afshar_Operation
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/11/dispatches-afghanistans-afshar-agonies-remembered
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/afghanistan0605/index.htm
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/afghanistan0605/4.htm
April 1992-March 1993: the fighting between Jamiat and Hezb-e Islami, along with the clashes between Ittihad and Wahdat and later conflicts between Wahdat and Jamiat, led to tens of thousands civilian deaths and injuries, and caused hundreds of thousands to flee Kabul for safer areas.
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/ajpreport_20050718.pdf
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/casting-shadows-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity-1978-2001
Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001. Afghan warlords war crimes.
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2001/11/cm-n16.html
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/bombay-times/Northern-Alliance-commanders-write-their-names-in-blood/articleshow/744741461.cms
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/572759/posts
For those murdered in Kabul, the devastated Afghan capital, before the Taliban came to power in 1996, the moment of execution was unimaginably horrific.
In a macabre ritual known as "dead men dancing", victims' heads were chopped off. Petrol was then pumped into their necks and set alight as the blood spurted out and the bodies jerked about in their death throes.
In Afghanistan, rape, mutilation and torture have been rife over the past decade. The skinning alive of victims has been a particular favourite of warring groups, along with the roasting of prisoners in containers left in the desert sun.
The Afghan warlord whose perverted mind dreamt up the "dead man dancing" routine was Abdul Ali Mazari, a leader of the Hazaras, Afghanistan's Persian-speaking ethnic minority. Mazari headed a group called Hizb-i-Wahdat, which is now a key part of the Northern Alliance, the loose confederation of militias that is the spearhead in Afghanistan of America's and Britain's war on terrorism.
Although Mazari is dead - captured and thrown out of a helicopter by the Taliban, according to one authoritative report - many of his followers who committed atrocities are alive. They are fighting with America's allies to topple the Taliban regime.
Despite concern that the human rights record of the Alliance is almost as bad as the Taliban's, America has developed a close relationship with its commanders from the northern ethnic minorities.
Over the next few days American special forces will try to ensure that the violent end to Taliban rule in Mazar-i-Sharif, the scene of many past atrocities, does not pave the way for retaliation by Alliance forces against local Pashtun civilians. But they may find themselves on the doorstep of murder once again.
The key figure is General Abdul Rashid Dostum, the hard-drinking ethnic Uzbek warlord who used to lead a ferocious militia and who has, at one time or another, allied himself with everybody, including the Taliban, and then betrayed them.
Dostum, whose infantry terrorised numerous villages in the early 1990s, is said to import peacocks from France for his garden and surrounds himself with an eclectic crew. His Washington representative, Homayun Naderi, drives a red sports car with tiger-skin seats during visits to Afghanistan, which remains littered with the carcasses of old tanks left behind after the Soviet occupation.
Naderi's uncle, Jaffar, an anti-Taliban commander, is reputed to warm up for battle by listening to the heavy metal music of AC/DC, saying: "Hells's Bells really gets me in the mood."
Jaffar was expelled from an English public school for striking a teacher, and joined a Harley Davidson gang in America before returning home.
Dostum himself is remembered for once punishing a soldier in Mazar-i-Sharif for stealing by crushing his body under a tank.
"General Dostum has a particularly wretched record across the board," said Sidney Jones, the Asian director of the respected New York-based organisation Human Rights Watch.
In May 1997, Uzbek and Hazara soldiers belonging to the Alliance killed 2,000 Taliban prisoners of war at Mazar-i-Sharif. The killing was carried out by General Abdul Malik, who had been Dostum's second-in-command until he turned on him and drove him from the city. Some of the prisoners were thrown down wells that were then blasted with grenades. At least 1,250 died in sealed containers.
Dostum's forces are also remembered for raping women and girls in Kabul, cutting off their breasts and tying their toes behind their heads.
The Americans might be wise to steer clear of another Alliance commander - General Rahim Dewana, or "crazy Rahim". Human rights groups are investigating reports that his troops rampaged through villages, burning houses and executing civilians two years ago in Sangcharak.
Likewise, the troops of Baba Jallandhar, a senior figure in the Panjshir valley, have been blamed for massacring Taliban prisoners during the retreat from Kabul in 1996. Their bodies were mutilated by the Hazaras, who hacked off noses and ears and stuck heads on poles as a warning to the Taliban.
Since September 11, President George W Bush has presented the conflict in Afghanistan in stark terms of good and evil. But as Washington backs the Alliance against the Taliban, the almost medieval cruelty of America's new allies may come back to haunt him.
Many of the commanders involved are senior Alliance figures, and are likely to feature in any future western-sponsored government. There is the added danger that giving the Alliance control over the majority Taliban could lead to a vicious civil war.
The Alliance supposedly supports the government ousted by the Taliban from Kabul in 1996, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, an Islamic cleric. Rabbani is the Alliance's political leader, has a seat at the United Nations and is now the recipient of American help to fight the Taliban.
The role that Rabbani's government played in supporting Osama Bin Laden may prove an embarrassment to Washington: it was this government that was in power when bin Laden first settled in Afghanistan in early 1996.
The Americans should also be aware that the warlords who make up the Alliance are among the key players in the heroin trade. A UN survey showed that 83% of the opium produced over the past year in Afghanistan came from Badakhshan province, which is controlled by the Northern Alliance.
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=mpuEQ3aufTEC&pg=PA75&lpg=PA75#v=onepage&q&f=false
http://www.rawa.org/rawa/mobile.php/2012/04/27/let-us-cut-off-the-claws-of-the-28th-and-27th-april-criminals-from-the-fate-of-our-country.html
http://www.rawa.org/rawa/2012/04/27/let-us-cut-off-the-claws-of-the-28th-and-27th-april-criminals-from-the-fate-of-our-country.html
Iran’s stooges Mazari, Khalili, Mohaqiq, Anwari and others hammered nails into the skulls of innocent people, demonstrated “dance of the dead” (a ritualistic killing where a person’s throat was slightly slit and hot oil was poured on the cut, the wriggling of the body was called the ‘dance’) and displayed other shameful practices of Akhundi-styled crimes.
http://www.rawa.org/reports.html
On April first 1995 when Kartaseh, Kartechar, Kabul University, Teachers Training Center, Abniceena Hospital in Kabul fall to the hands of "government", two mass graves out of tens were discovered in the campus of Medical Faculty. Many people of Kabul visited these graves. In the first grave, bodies of countless men and women were placed. They were taken into captivity by Hezb-e-Wahdat and buried alive. It was a horrible scene, the headless and folded bodies of men and women were reminding certain memories of Hitler’s era. In the second grave there was a box, two meters long one meter wide and 80 centimeters high in which 8 bodies were placed. There heads and feet were chopped.
...
On April 12,1995, a truck belonging to Hezb-i-Wahdat and carrying 12 sealed barrels was making its way from the Taimani area of Kabul to Dasht-i-Barchi in the west of the city. The barrels were sealed tight but each one had a hole bored on top. The truck was stopped for a routine check at a check-point. A piteous voice rose beseechingly from one of the barrels, "Water, for God’s sake, water. I’m dying of thirst." This voice was followed by other voices moaningly crying for help from the other barrels. The guard who at first took fright called others for help. The driver and four other Hezb-i-Wahdat men took to their heels but were soon overtaken and arrested by the guards at the checkpoint. They were handed over to the so-called Security Ministry, but further details and follow-up information is not available.
http://www.afghan-web.com/bios/yest/mazari.html
Mazari claimed that Hazaras formed 25 percent of the population of Afghanistan, and that Hezb-i Wahdat was their representative. He demanded the one fourth of the cabinet seats be given to his party. When Burhanuddin Rabbani, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, refused to give the Ministry of National Security to a nominee of that party, Khuday Dad Hazar, Mazari became extremely angry and pledged to topple Rabbani's government.
Mazari who had formed an alliance with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Dostum against the Rabbani government, began to negotiate with the Taliban as soon as Hekmatyar retreated from Kabul. He tried hard to avoid military confrontation with the Taliban, and hoped that the war between the Taliban and the Rabbani government would provide him with an opportunity for survival. Soon, Mazari invited the Taliban to occupy the frontline positions held by his fighters. Things turned sour when the Taliban started to disarm Mazari's men as soon they reached West Kabul. This resulted in clashes between the Taliban and followers of Mazari. Exploiting the situation, Rabbani's forces attacked and defeated both Wahdat and the Taliban.
Mazari was captured by the Taliban on March 12, and was taken to Charasyab, the Taliban base 25 kilometers south of Kabul. A Western journalist photographed Mazari with tied hands and feet. On March 13 1995, Mazari along with nine of his followers were murdered by the Taliban.
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/kabul-protests-who-are-hazara-why-do-isis-taliban-hate-them-1528243
1998 massacre of 2,000 civilians, most of them Hazara, in the northern city of Mazar-I Sharif, raised in a Human Rights Watch report to the UN in 2008. The massacre was said to be retaliation for the 1997 killing of 2,000 Taliban prisoners by a Hazara and ethnic Uzbek fighters.
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/afghan/Afrepor0-01.htm#P81_13959
In May 1997 the Taliban launched another offensive on Mazar-i Sharif. This time, they received support from Dostum's second-in-command, Gen. Malik Pahlawan, who apparently believed he had struck a deal to share power with the Taliban and ousted Dostum in a coup.7 When the Taliban reneged on the agreement and began disarming local forces, resistance broke out first in Hazara neighborhoods, and the Taliban found themselves trapped in a city that had turned murderous on them. Hundreds of Taliban were attacked in the streets and killed, and at least 2,000 taken prisoner, only to be summarily executed and their bodies dumped in wells or taken to remote desert sites and left lying in the open. Most analysts appear to agree that General Malik was responsible for many of the summary executions of the Taliban prisoners. However, a large number of Taliban forces were reportedly gunned down in the streets by the Hazara Hizb-i Wahdat. Malik fled to Iran, and Dostum returned. Driven back after a subsequent attack on Mazar in September 1997, retreating Taliban troops who may have included Balkh Pashtuns massacred Hazara civilians in Qizalabad, south of the city on the road to Herat.
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-01.htm
In October 1998 a breakaway faction of Hizb-i Wahdat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan), led by Hujjat-al-Islam Sayyid Muhammad Akbari, sided with the Taliban. Akbari is a non-Hazara Shi'a from the Qizilbash ethnic group, with religious training in Iran.
...
In January 1995 the Taliban advanced on Kabul, squeezing Hikmatyar between their forces and the ISA forces of Defense Minister Massoud.45 In February, Hikmatyar abandoned his position at Charasyab and left behind significant stores of weapons. Under an apparent agreement with Massoud, who was preoccupied with fighting Hizb-i Wahdat, the Taliban occupied the base at Charasyab. A massive assault by Massoud against Hizb-i Wahdat then drove its leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, to strike a deal with the Taliban. But after a faction of Hizb-i Wahdat joined with Massoud instead, Massoud launched a full-scale assault on the Taliban, driving them out of Charasyab.46
....
One form of torture used by the Hizb-i Wahdat commanders in Bamian involved tying detainees inside gunnysacks along with dead bodies. In a notorious incident in Kabul in 1994 that amounts to a war crime, a Harakat commander executed and decapitated five Pashtun prisoners on the eve of cease-fire negotiations with a Pashtun commander. Human Rights Watch e-mail communication with a human rights researcher in Islamabad, May 2001
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghanistan/afghan101-02.htm
Most of Hazarajat, which had been governed by various factions of the Shia party Hizb-i Wahdat since 1989, fell to the Taliban in September 1998 after a crippling year-long blockade. Despite the apprehensions of many local residents, the transition involved far fewer civilian casualties than had been the case in Mazar-i Sharif. Some observers attributed this to an alliance that was forged with the Taliban by Hujjat-al-Islam Sayyid Mohammad Akbari, a Hizb-i Wahdat faction leader, shortly after the Taliban seized Bamiyan, the major city in Hazarajat and the capital of a district and province of the same name. The Taliban subsequently withdrew most non-local forces from several districts of Hazarajat, leaving them under the nominal control of Akbari appointees or other Shia commanders. Bamiyan, Yakaolang, and a few other districts were directly administered by the Taliban.
....
After Hizb-i Wahdat and Harakat-i Islami forces took control of Yakaolang, troops led by Harakat-i Islami Commander Moalim Aziz of Topchi village, in central Bamiyan, entered a local hospital and summarily executed a wounded nineteen-year-old Taliban soldier who was receiving treatment there. The Taliban soldier was identified as Amanullah, son of Ubaidullah, of Maroof district, in Kandahar province. Aziz then established his base in the hospital, which his troops looted of equipment and medicines. Although local staff hid some of the equipment in their houses, when the Taliban retook the area they looted all the remaining heavy equipment remaining in the hospital, as well as a six-month supply of medicines in the central store. Interview with witness, Kabul, January 2001.
http://www.rawa.org/yakw-r.htm
Jan 2001: The first clash took place at the Gum Aab. General Khadim and Hayat (Khalqi) lost the battle to Khalili, but the fighting continued both sides moved towards Yakaolang. After some clashes the forces of Khalili entered Yakaolang on 2nd of January. Six days later Khalili and Co. gathered the people of different villages and a man known by the name of Khuda Dad Urfani, who introduced himself as the welfare minister of the government of Rabbani, gave a speech in which he said: "This time we will not act like in the past. We will not sell lice (fighters of Hezb-e-Wahdat were used to block the roads in areas under their control and forcibly sell their lice on passengers and get huge amount of money from them); will not show the dance of the death (one of the brutal crimes committed by Hezb-e-Wahdat was to chop off the head of their victims and then put boiled oil on it to stop the bleeding and then they enjoy the movements of the victims till he breaths his last. They were calling it "Dance of the death". There are many reports of this wild act by them), we will not sell opium to the fronts. We have read these things in Payam-e-Zan and it is shameful for us to record what went before once again in the books of history".
http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/general/gray-zone-dominates-afghan-iran-relations-1.416378
11 May 2001: At the same time, Tehran has also demanded that Afghanistan's aproximately 10 to 12 per cent Shia population are given 33 per cent representation in any future political setup. It has provided humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan's southern belt which has been under Iranian influence, giving shelter to around two million Afghan refugees in strictly managed refugee camps.
And not hesitated to beam into Afghanistan from Mashad, Zahidan and Tehran what the Taliban leadership maintains is "propaganda against us wanting to change our people's thinking which amounts to intervention in our internal affairs."
The Taliban regime has repeatedly been blamed for victimising the Shias. The 1998 massacre of Hazaras in Mazar-i-Sharif was put down to Taliban anti-Shiaism although a year earlier the Taliban were butchered by a Uzbek commander and the pro-Iran Wahdat group after Taliban's accord with the Uzbek commander collapsed. The Taliban are quick to recall the presence of a Shia cleric Ustaad Mohammad Akbari, who controls, with Taliban consent, five districts in the Bamiyan province.
The paradox of the Iranian policy is manifestly evident in the central role that Iran plays in Afghanistan's expanding trade activity. Border markets operate between the two. Daily approximately 120-150 containers and 300-400 vehicles are cleared at Islam Qilla which are shipped from Bandar Abbas. Oil in huge drums is imported into Afghanistan. Besides, Japanese and Korean goods are imported for Afghanistan and find their way mostly into the Pakistan's main shopping centres, Iranian goods too have flooded Afghan markets.
Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and even areas close to Pakistan borders like Jalalabad see Iranian goods like plastic utensils, canned food, canned drinks and juices, shoes, soaps, detergents and food items being sold in the bazaars. Although Chaman, the Pakistani town, is closer to Kandahar than the closest Iranian town, it is mostly Iranian goods that are being sold in the markets. According to the trade-conscious Taliban leaders "the Iranians create no trouble for our traders and the Afghans find the Iranian goods better in price and in quality."
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342839.html
30 July 2001: About 78 members of parliament called on President Mohammad Khatami to select some Sunnis as members of the new cabinet that he is expected to name after his inauguration, "Iran" reported on 16 July.
.....
Not only does Tehran remain without a Sunni mosque, but after the 1978-1979 revolution Sunni mosques in Mashhad, Salmas, and Shahinzadeh were destroyed, and those in Shiraz, Orumieh, Sanadaj, Saqqez, and Miyandoab were closed.
.....
During the 27 June parliamentary session, Marivan representative Abdullah Sohrabi was outspoken about the difficulties faced by Sunnis and their expectations of the government. Criticizing the discrimination Kurds encounter, Sohrabi reminded the reformist legislature about the Kurds' extensive participation in the recent presidential election and also their participation in the war against Iraq. Sohrabi said a television series called "Nest of Satan" was particularly insulting, and he demanded implementation of the constitutional articles that recognize minority rights.
.....
In the midst of these outspoken calls for recognition of Sunnis' rights, other measures that would increase state control over the Sunnis are underway. In late June parliament began consideration of a proposal to exempt Sunni clerics from military service, while in mid-June it had considered a proposal to restrict Sunni clerics to military service in Sunni regions. But under these proposals, determination of a Sunni cleric's educational qualifications would be in the hands of the Endowments and Charitable Affairs Organization, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1571927.stm
30 Sep 2001: All six members of parliament from Iran's Kurdish minority have resigned in protest at what they regard as neglect and discrimination by the government.
They said they had not been consulted over the appointment of a new provincial governor.
......
The deputies said they had put forward the name of two Sunni candidates, but had been ignored.
When the reformist parliament wanted to include Sunni MPs in their leadership in 2001, the ayatollahs objected because (according to them) Iran is a Shi'ite country and Sunnis should not hold any leadership role in it.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3084821.stm
21 July 2003: In their letter, the Sunni MPs asked why no Sunni Muslims are appointed as ministers, provincial governors, ambassadors or to other high positions.
They also criticised the authorities for not allowing a mosque to be built in Tehran for the Sunni Muslim community. They said it was disgraceful for Iran's Islamic government that followers of Sunni Islam in the capital should go to foreign embassies for prayers.
The 18 MPs who represent Iran's Kurds, Baluchis and other Sunni Muslims, also said that the government should stop appointing Shia clerics to run religious institutions in Sunni areas.
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342747.html
2003: Eighteen parliamentarians representing mainly Sunni constituencies of Kurds and Baluchis wrote an open letter in late July, complaining about the lack of Sunnis in high government posts, criticizing the appointment of Shia clerics to administer Sunni religious facilities, and bemoaning the absence of a Sunni mosque in Tehran, BBC analyst Sadeq Saba reported on 21 July.
Three sources of emulation issued responses to this letter that were reproduced in the 23 July issue of "Yas-i No." Only one of the three, Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri-Najafabadi, sounded slightly sympathetic, agreeing that the government should not interfere with Sunni mosques and seminaries. Grand Ayatollah Hussein Nuri-Hamedani suggested a personal meeting.
Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem-Shirazi's response, however, provided little hope. He said that Sunnis are better off now than they were under the monarchy. He advised the Sunnis to relax about the absence of a Sunni mosque in Tehran: "when we go to Mecca and Medina we pray in the mosques with the Sunni brothers and feel no discomfort; indeed this is a sign of our unity." He accused Sunnis of not practicing birth control and of actually trying to change the population's mix. He added that Sunnis buy Shia Muslims' land and property in Sistan va Baluchistan Province. Furthermore, according to the ayatollah, the Sunnis send money to Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf so they can propagandize against Shia Muslims.
Jalal Jalalizadeh was one of the parliamentarians who spoke during the 3 August meeting with Khatami. He wrote in a 23 July commentary in the "Yas-i No" newspaper that the responses by the sources of emulation show that some of them do not agree with the slogan "Iran for all Iranians." Jalalizadeh said Iranian Sunnis preserve law and order but do not receive social justice, and the media ignore them.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/29/the-dangerous-drug-funded-secret-war-between-iran-and-pakistan.html
29 Dec 2014: On Sept. 9, those jihadists detonated a massive car bomb at an Iranian military base near the border, clearing a path for 70 fighters to stream in. According to a statement from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, reinforcements had to be helicoptered to the scene to end a three-and-a-half-hour gun battle, and the fighters fled across the border into Pakistan. A few weeks later, the militants carried out a series of raids on border posts, killing five Iranian policemen. The attacks were the latest in a long campaign of roadside explosions, suicide bombings at mosques, and gun attacks on security posts that have killed more than 600 Iranians, mostly civilians, since 2005.
.......
Under the shah, Iranian Baluch children were banned from wearing shalwar kameez to school, and Baluchi language publications were blacklisted. After the Iranian Revolution, discrimination took on a sectarian flavor. Riots broke out in 1994, after Iranian authorities replaced a Sunni mosque in Mashad with a development project. Within a few years, Iran had jailed or driven from the country more than 60 Sunni clerics. Many of those clerics were welcomed into Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, where some now regularly appear on Arabic television networks, blasting the Shiite regime in Tehran. By the late 1990s, some Iranian Baluch had turned to militancy, couching their insurgency in a narrative of Sunnis fighting religious and ethnic discrimination at the hands of a Shiite theocracy.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/08/international/middleeast/sunnishiite-cooperation-grows-worrying-us-officials.html
8 April 2004: According to several militia members, many Shiite fighters are streaming into Falluja to help Sunni insurgents defend their city against a punishing Marine assault. Groups of young men with guns are taking buses from Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad to the outskirts of Falluja and then slipping past Marine checkpoints to join the battle.
"We have orders from our leader to fight as one," said Nimaa Fakir, a 27-year-old teacher and foot soldier in the Mahdi Army, a Shiite militia. "We want to increase the fighting, increase the killing and drive the Americans out. To do this, we must combine forces."
https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/occupation/2004/1115gap.htm
15 Nov 2004:
Sermons at Sunni mosques in the Baghdad area urged worshippers to refrain from "joyous manifestations" during the Ramadan holiday in a show of solidarity with Fallujah's people. While Sunni clerics are urging an election boycott, Shiite preachers have been telling their congregations it would be sinful not to vote. Shiites are estimated to comprise about 60 percent of Iraq's nearly 26 million people and believe their numbers will guarantee a Shiite-led government.
Most leading Shiite clerics did not take a public stand over the attack on Fallujah, raising the danger of further widening the gulf between the two communities at a time when Sunni Arabs are worried about the loss of prestige to rival Shiites and Kurds. Al-Sumaidaei blamed the most influential Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, for not condemning the Fallujah attack. "We didn't hear from them at all," al-Sumaidaei said. "I assume they are either satisfied or they are afraid. However, when there were attacks on Shiite cities, the Sunni clerics in Iraq immediately condemned them. What about the Shiites?"
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian terror mastermind responsible for many car bombings and beheadings in Iraq, also has accused Kurds and Shiites in the Iraqi military of abandoning their religion. In an audiotape posted on Islamic Web sites recently, al-Zarqawi accused al-Sistani of having blessed the Fallujah assault, calling him "the infidel's imam." Al-Sistani has issued no public statement on the Fallujah attack, but an aide in Karbala, Afdhal al-Mousawi, dismissed such criticism, asking whether the Shiites had been responsible for "the terrorists taking shelter in Fallujah."
Al-Mousawi said the assault on Fallujah was inevitable "to free the city of its kidnappers." He also said the attack on Fallujah paled in comparison to the suffering of the Shiites under Saddam Hussein, who was a Sunni. "Well, Shiites were slaughtered over the past 40 years in the security headquarters and now they are slaughtered in the streets by the remains of the former Baathist regime," he said.
During a sermon Friday in Najaf, Sadr Eldin al-Qabanji of the Shiite Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq said curbing terrorism in Fallujah was necessary to protect Iraqis. He warned that terrorists were targeting Shiites in several Iraqi towns. Mohammed Hussein Abbas, 40, a Shiite from Karbala, said the attack on Fallujah was God's punishment for the role played by that city under the Saddam regime. "Remember during the former regime, the security forces and the government officials all came from Fallujah," he said. "The Fallujah residents are the sons of Saddam who were torturing us."
http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/11/200849143649376547.html
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FL10Ak02.html
10 Dec 2004: Our Baghdad sources say that in Sunni mosques all over Iraq, the recurrent theme is the denunciation of Shi'ite clerics who have "sold out" Islam. Compare it with Karbala provincial Governor Sa'ad Safouk al-Masoudi, who recently said Fallujah was "a punishment from God" because the locals helped Saddam's armies destroy the Shi'ite uprising in Karbala in 1991. Al-Masoudi explicitly said that "the election doesn't depend on the Sunnis".
It certainly does not: it depends on Sistani. Sistani and his circle have learned key lessons from history. When Iraq was fighting British colonialism in 1920, the vanguard of the armed resistance was Shi'ite. So the British installed the Sunnis in power - where they have remained ever since. Now the Shi'ites know that the best course of action is to co-exist with the occupier/invader, form a powerful political coalition in weeks of private negotiations uniting radicals and moderates, get their hands on power, and then tell the invader to leave. This explains Sistani's silence over Fallujah, and the Shi'ite zeal on holding elections by all means. But definitely this does not mean that Sistani is a collaborator.
For the immediate future of Iraq, as crucial as the Sunni-Shi'ite power play will be the interaction between Iraqi nationalists on both sides. Sunnis were very much aware that Muqtada denounced the Fallujah offensive, and Sistani did not - or did, very mildly, and too late.
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/sunnis-come-aid-shia
21 Feb 2005: Dozens of trucks and pickups, with banners declaring them "Aid from Fallujah to the mujahideen brothers in Najaf", paraded down the highway, escorted by two Fallujan police cars.
This August 14 convoy, bearing food and medicine collected in the Sunni insurgent-controlled city of Fallujah and destined for Shia Mahdi Army fighters in Najaf, was the latest in a display of unity between anti-Coalition fighters from the two branches of Islam.
http://bostonreview.net/rosen-anatomy-civil-war
8 Nov
2006: Among Muqtada’s followers it is common to hear that the
American army has come to kill the Mahdi. In a September 2006 sermon in
Kufa, Muqtada told his followers that the Pentagon had a large file on
the Mahdi and would greet his return with their military. But I was
often assured that the Mahdi would kill all the Americans, and all the
Jews, too, for good measure.
....
[In
2003] For the next nine months Muqtada continued to test the limits of
American tolerance, sometimes virtually declaring war on them, then
retreating and welcoming them as friends. In a sermon he praised the
September 11 attacks and condemned the Interim Governing Council and all
its actions. In March 2004 the Americans closed his newspaper, al
Hawza, which they accused of calling for violence, arrested an
influential associate of his, and issued an arrest warrant for him as
well.
...
In
fact, the Mustafa Husseiniya’s Sheikh Safaa was at the center of an
organized campaign against Sunnis in Shaab, which was one of the first
parts of Baghdad where Sunnis were the victims of assassinations and
cleansing by Shia militias. Here, in the Baghdad neighborhood with the
second-largest Mahdi Army presence, the civil war began in earnest in
early 2005.
But
it all started in the last months of 2004. Shias had fought alongside
Sunnis in April in the first battle of Fallujah, but by November, when a
second battle between Americans and insurgents destroyed the Sunni city
of Fallujah, some Shias were beginning to think that the Fallujans got
what they deserved for harboring Zarqawi and his killing force. The
near-daily insurgent attacks against Iraqi policemen and soldiers had
taken on a sectarian tone, because these forces were mostly composed of
poor Shia men; Sunnis avoided joining. And as Shias grew indifferent to
Fallujans’ suffering, Sunnis became resentful, and some turned
murderous. Sunni militias started targeting Shias as Shias, not as
forces of the occupation.
....
Shia attacks on Sunnis would become better organized after January 2005, when Sheikh Haitham al Ansari was assassinated.
...
Sectarian
violence even extended to the American prisons in Iraq, and prisoners
segregated themselves. Sheikh Muayad al Khazaraji, a Shia who had been
imprisoned by Americans for stockpiling weapons in his mosque, told
another Sadrist cleric, “After I was in the jail I knew who is my enemy
and who is not. The Americans are not my enemy. The Americans have
interests, and anybody who wants to block the way of Americans from
obtaining those interests becomes their enemy and they destroy him. Be
away from their road and they will not touch you. Our enemies are the
Wahhabis.”
....
On
February 22, 2006, a bomb destroyed the Shia Askari shrine in Samarra.
In the days that followed, over 1,300 bodies were found in Baghdad, most
of them Sunni. Once these figures were revealed, the ministry of the
interior—whose forces were likely responsible for most of these
deaths—asked the Shia-controlled ministry of health to cover up the
numbers. Shias took over dozens of Sunni mosques and renamed them after
the Samarra shrine.
Sunni
television stations such as Baghdad TV, controlled by the Iraqi Islamic
Party, showed only Sunni victims of the retaliatory attacks. Shia
television stations, such as al Furat and al Iraqiya, focused on the
damaged shrine and on the Shia victims. Al Furat was even more
aggressive, encouraging Shias to “stand up for their rights.” On a Shia
radio station’s talk show, one caller announced that those responsible
for the attack were Abu Bakr, Omar, and Othman, the three first caliphs
whom Sunnis venerate and whom Shias reject as usurpers of the position
that rightfully belonged to Imam Ali, the prophet Muhammad’s cousin and
son-in-law.
...
Iraq’s
Shias believe that Abu Hanifa was a treacherous student of Imam Kadhim
who participated in his killing. They have a tradition of spitting in
the direction of the shrine when they pass by it. Sayyid Hassan Naji al
Musawi, a close ally of Muqtada’s in Baghdad and a commander of the
Mahdi Army, once confided to me that Abu Hanifa was an “ibn zina,” or
“son of adultery,” and that “a dog is buried there.” Salafis, whose
numbers in Adhamiya had grown in the 1990s, also despised the mosque
because of the Salafi rejection of all shrines and tombs.
http://www.hudson.org/research/10544-a-sectarian-awakening-reinventing-sunni-identity-in-iraq-after-2003
It is by no means the earliest example of sectarian violence after 2003 but perhaps the first spectacular sectarian attack came less than a year after regime change in March 2004 when Ashura processions were attacked in Karbala and Kadhimiya killing approximately 180 people. In early 2004 there were already reports of Shia drivers being killed on the highways running through the western provinces. See Nir Rosen, "Radicals in the Ashes of Democracy," Asia Times Online, July 2004. Conversely, well-placed sources and eyewitnesses have consistently reported that Shia death squads were targeting selected Ba’athists almost immediately after regime change – something that was read as the beginning of sectarian cleansing. There are also documented cases of Sunni mosques being taken over by Shia forces in Shia majority areas soon after regime change.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/52_the_next_iraqi_war_sectarianism_and_civil_conflict
Feb 2006: For a year and a half, from August 2003 until February 2005, such attacks met with barely a response from most Shiites, except deepening ange r and calls for revenge. The only ones accused of meting out revenge from the outset were members of the Badr Organisation, allegedly responsible for the assassination of former regime officials and suspected Baath party me mbers, in addition to suspected insurgents, but for a long time these actions did not reach critical mass.
.......
Muqtada Sadr has had broad appeal among Sunni Arabs because of his strong nationalist, anti-occupation stand, his apparent opposition to federalism, and his open solidarity with Sunnis during times of crisis, for example, the November 2004 U.S. assault on Falluja. [ The Sadrists also celebrated the feast marking the end of Ramadan in 2005, the Eid al-Fitr, on the date set by Saudi Arabia rather than Iran in a show of solidarity with the Sunnis.] Sadr’s office also pointedly reminded Iraqis that residents of the predominantly Adhamiya neighbourhood of Baghdad had gone out of their way, during the Kadhemiya bridge disaster in August 2005, to rescue (Shiite) victims from the river, showing that “Sunnis and Shiites are brothers”. Yet altercations between Sadrists and Sunni Arabs have occurred, probably because many Sadrists see Sunni Arabs as Baathists and terrorists. The fact that Sadr’s movement is so inchoate may have led to armed attacks on Sunni Arabs regardless of Muqtada’s official stance.
.....
[After January 2005 elections] Iraqis witnessed a steep rise in killings of Sunnis that could not be explained by the fight against insurgents alone. Carried out during curfew hours in the dead of night and reportedly involving armed men dressed in police or military uniforms arriving in cars bearing state emblems, raids in predominantly Sunni towns or neighbourhoods appeared to cast a wide net. Those seized later turned up in detention centres11 or, with a disturbing frequency, in the morgue after having been found – hands tied behind their backs, blindfolded, teeth broken, shot – in a ditch or river. These raids prompted suspicions that they were carried out by Badr members operating under government identity and targeted the Sunni community rather than any particular insurgent group or criminal gang.
....
According to Tareq al-Hashemi, secretary general of the (Sunni) Iraqi Islamic Party, some 55 pilots were killed in the six months before September 2005: “There is a sense of revenge. They have a list of former pilots in Saddam’s regime, and they are looking for them. It is part of a strategic Iranian plan to push the Sunnis out”. Crisis Group interview, Baghdad, 5 September 2005. The assassinations are attributed specifically to SCIRI, a group that was established in and financed and armed by Iran, and that fought on the Iranian side during the Iran-Iraq war in an effort to put an end to the Baathist regime. Some reports suggest that the victims also include Shiite pilots not sympathetic to Iran. If true, the killings may be part of an Iranian effort to create a pro-Iranian Iraqi air force, one unlikely to attack Iran, as happened in September 1980.
http://www.jafariyanews.com/2k6_news/june/12mohri_verdict.htm
12 June 2006:
Chief of Kuwait Shia Ulema Society Ayatullah Seyed Muhammad Baqer Al-Mohri has issued a verdict in which he termed haram (illegal) any donation, even of a penny, for Hamas that is supporter of terrorists.
His edict came after the stance and grief of Hamas movement on killing of Al-Qaeda terror network chief in Iraq Abu-Musab Az-Zarqawi.
"Illegal, illegal, illegal that a noble Muslim gives even a penny to this movement, a supporter of terrorists in Iraq and a backer of brutal massacres that happen in Iraq, Jordan and other places," he said.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/55_iraq_s_muqtada_al_sadr_spoiler_or_stabiliser.pdf
July 2006: [Paul Bremer's book "My days in Iraq" pp. 190-91.] [In late 2003]“He’d taken to wearing a white burial cloth instead of a dark imam’s robe, a symbol that he welcomed martyrdom. Equally disturbing, Muqtada was collaborating with a radical Sunni cleric, Ahmed al-Kubaisi, and was bussing Sunni extremists from the Sunni triangle to the south to augment his small militia….Mike warned that if Muqtada won another standoff with the Coalition, it would greatly enhance his still small following among the Shia. Then we would be faced with a second insurgency, a rebellion not by Baathists and jihadis, but by fanatical Shiites”.
....
After several months of low-intensity conflict, far more serious incidents occurred in March 2004. A violent Sadrist raid against a gypsy (al-Kawliya) village, anti-American assaults in the south, and, above all, Muqtada’s sermon describing the 11 September attacks as “a miracle and a blessing from God” alarmed the coalition. Occurring at a time when the political process was threatened by both an expanding insurgency and Sistani’s objections to the U.S.- sponsored political process, these events prompted a coalition show of force. On 28 March, a Sadrist newspaper that had reprinted the controversial sermon was forcibly shut down.
.....
Several Sadrists known for their proinsurgency sympathies are under intense pressure from a more and more anti-Sunni rank-and-file to change their stance. Muqtada himself has maintained his calls for national unity, even in the wake of particularly vicious attacks against Shiite civilians and even as attacks have triggered large-scale Sadrist reprisals. But the February 2006 Samarra incident appears to have been a turning point. Since then, violence has reached alarming proportions as Sadrists invoke religious arguments to wage indiscriminate attacks against so-called takfiriyin and Baathists.
“We don’t need orders to do this because we have a very clear fatwa on this matter: ‘it is permissible to kill al-nawasib, those who hate the Twelver Shiite Imams’. Besides, we always interrogate suspects and execute them only upon determining they really are the killers or the kidnappers”. Crisis Group interview, Jaysh al-Mahdi commander, Baghdad, March 2006. Other commanders made the same point: “We don’t need to ask Muqtada because there is a very clear fatwa that authorises the execution of nawasib. All we need to do is read Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr’s chapter on jihad”. Crisis Group interview, Jaysh al-Mahdi commander, Baghdad, March 2006.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/04/world/middleeast/04muslims.html?pagewanted=print
4 Aug 2006: In Saudi Arabia, puritanical Wahhabi Muslims lace their writings with suggestions that being a Christian or a Jew is far preferable to being Shiite — often referred to as rejectionist, for rejecting the true faith. And they often disparage the Shiite practice of takiya, or sanctioned lying about beliefs, an insurance policy developed during repeated Sunni inquisitions.
One prominent Saudi cleric, Abdullah bin Jibreen, just reissued a fatwa accusing Shiite groups like Hezbollah of habitually betraying Sunnis. “It is not appropriate to support this rejectionist party and to fall under its authority, and it is not appropriate to pray for their victory and control,” the fatwa read in part.
......
The Shiites were last ascendant from the 10th to the 12th century. During much of that period a Shiite dynasty ruled Egypt and a large swath of the region, including the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Saladin, the commander who captured Jerusalem from the Crusaders in 1187, overthrew the dynasty. So the comparisons now springing up between Sheik Nasrallah and Saladin are anathema to Shiites.
......
Egypt’s grand mufti, Sheik Ali Gomaa, the country’s highest religious authority, issued a statement supporting Hezbollah, while Sheik Youssef Qaradawi, whose program on Al Jazeera makes him one of the Arab world’s most influential clerics, defined supporting the guerrillas as a “religious duty.”
The Muslim Brotherhood, the Sunni Islamist group founded in Egypt, has been particularly outspoken. Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh, a member of its guidance office, said that the United States had invaded Iraq to divide Muslims and that it was better to support a Hezbollah-Iranian agenda than an “American-Zionist” one.
“Which one is more dangerous to the Muslim world?” he said in an interview, before attacking “the regimes who tremble before Iran. They are weak and tattered regimes who don’t acknowledge the will of their people.”
When pressed, though, a vague ambivalence emerges. “Iran would be at the end of our list of enemies, even though it’s not an enemy,” he said. “Let’s combat the American danger on the region before we ‘compete’ with Iran.”
http://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/236305
Qatar donated $300 million to Hezbollah-controlled towns for post-2006 war reconstruction.
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/uncategorized/israel-hatred-helped-ruin-syria/
2006: And though its Iranian patron made cash payments to families left homeless, Tehran’s money went primarily toward rebuilding Hezbollah’s arsenal.
So who actually cleaned up the mess left by Hezbollah’s war? “With all due respect to Tehran, most of the rebuilding efforts were shouldered by wealthy Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, which donated hundreds of millions of dollars,” reporter Jack Khoury wrote in Haaretz this week. “Qatar alone donated more than $300 million and took charge of rebuilding houses in the 30 hardest-hit communities.” And those houses weren’t just rebuilt; they were made even bigger and better than before.
The Sunni Arab states didn’t shell out lavish reconstruction aid because of any fondness for Shi’ite Hezbollah or its Shi’ite Iranian patron. In fact, the Saudis openly condemned Hezbollah for starting the war. Nor were they motivated mainly by compassion, as evidenced by the cold shoulder they have given victims of the far greater devastation wrought by Syria’s civil war (the Gulf States are notorious for refusing to accept Syrian refugees).
Rather, given the Arab world’s loathing for Israel, these countries felt they simply couldn’t afford to appear unsupportive of “Israel’s victims”–especially since Hezbollah, despite starting an unnecessary war that wreaked havoc on its own population, had become an Arab hero for doing so. Consequently, they joined forces to rebuild Lebanon.
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/haji-mohammad-mohaqeq-hazara-leader-dogged-brutality-claims
1 Sep 2006: The Kabul daily newspaper Farda recently published a cartoon showing Mohaqeq at a podium saying that if elected, he would not only bring democracy to the country but also restore such practices as "making the dead dance" and "nailing". The cartoon is a reference to the "dance of the dead", where enemy soldiers were decapitated and their necks sealed up so that their headless bodies moved about while still standing. "Nailing" involved pinning enemy combatants to a wall using nails.
Both practices were reportedly a speciality of Hizb-e-Wahdat troops, although other factions such as Jamiat-e-Islami and General Abdul Rashid Dostum's forces have also been accused of great brutality during the years of fighting in the capital. Mohaqeq says the cartoon is an insult to the Hazara people, and an example of the ethnic hatred directed against them. "It is against all the Hazara," he said. "They only [used] me as symbol," he said, denying that he had any part in atrocities.During a press conference early last month, Mohaqeq said he was not responsible for the deaths of thousands of people in the Karte-i-Say district of Kabul, who died between 1992 and 1996. His denial came despite a widely-viewed video documentary made when he was commander of the Hizb-e-Wahdat forces that controlled the district at the time.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/world/middleeast/17christians.html?pagewanted=print
17 Oct 2006: Oddly, before the pope’s comments, as sectarian violence has escalated in Baghdad in the past year, some said the situation might have actually improved for Christians as Muslim militants turned their attention on one another.
Canon Andrew White, the Anglican vicar of Baghdad, who lives in Britain but visits Iraq frequently, said his driver was kidnapped recently but was promptly released after his Sunni Arab captors discovered he was a Christian. He said his captors apologized by saying, “We thought he was Shiite.”
“It must be the only occasion when being a Christian actually helped in this country,” he said.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/13/iraq-middleeast
13 Jan 2007: He was more despondent than angry. "We Sunni are to blame," he said. "In my area some ignorant al-Qaida guys have been kidnapping poor Shia farmers, killing them and throwing their bodies in the river. I told them: 'This is not jihad. You can't kill all the Shia! This is wrong! The Shia militias are like rabid dogs - why provoke them?' "
Then he said: "I am trying to talk to the Americans. I want to give them assurances that no one will attack them in our area if they stop the Shia militias from coming."
This man who had spent the last three years fighting the Americans was now willing to talk to them, not because he wanted to make peace but because he saw the Americans as the lesser of two evils. He was wrestling with the same dilemma as many Sunni insurgent leaders, beginning to doubt the wisdom of their alliance with al-Qaida extremists.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E07E3D7113FF93AA35751C0A9619C8B63
9 Feb 2007: And in what appeared to be a rare case of cross-sectarian solidarity, the police in Diyala Province said a family of 25 Shiites -- moving from a Sunni area after receiving death threats -- was saved from death on Thursday when their Sunni neighbors repelled an insurgent ambush. Iraqi security forces were called in to help, and continued the battle, killing six gunmen.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/13/iraq-middleeast
13 Jan 2007: He was more despondent than angry. "We Sunni are to blame," he said. "In my area some ignorant al-Qaida guys have been kidnapping poor Shia farmers, killing them and throwing their bodies in the river. I told them: 'This is not jihad. You can't kill all the Shia! This is wrong! The Shia militias are like rabid dogs - why provoke them?' "
Then he said: "I am trying to talk to the Americans. I want to give them assurances that no one will attack them in our area if they stop the Shia militias from coming."
This man who had spent the last three years fighting the Americans was now willing to talk to them, not because he wanted to make peace but because he saw the Americans as the lesser of two evils. He was wrestling with the same dilemma as many Sunni insurgent leaders, beginning to doubt the wisdom of their alliance with al-Qaida extremists.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E07E3D7113FF93AA35751C0A9619C8B63
9 Feb 2007: And in what appeared to be a rare case of cross-sectarian solidarity, the police in Diyala Province said a family of 25 Shiites -- moving from a Sunni area after receiving death threats -- was saved from death on Thursday when their Sunni neighbors repelled an insurgent ambush. Iraqi security forces were called in to help, and continued the battle, killing six gunmen.
http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1428.htm
http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/1428.htm
1 Apr 2007:
Sayyed Yusef Tabatabai Nejad in a Friday Sermon at Esfahan: Sunnis, Christians, Jews, and Polytheists Should Convert to the Shiite Faith
Following are excerpts from a Friday sermon delivered at Esfahan by Sayyed Yusef Tabatabai Nejad, which aired on Esfahan TV on April 1, 2007:
Sayyed Yusef Tabatabai Nejad:
My dear brothers, ultimately we believe that the true religion is the
religion of the Prophet of Islam, which is conveyed by those selected by
God, by the Imams, and by the [descendents of] the Prophet's family.
[...]
We
do not want this true [Shiite] faith to belong to us alone. It is our
duty and one of the tenets of our belief that this religion should
spread throughout the world. In other words, the world in its entirety
and all the people should live according to the faith of the Prophet's
family. This is our belief. We don't want it to be restricted to us
alone. After all, we are not racist. We want all of mankind to live
according to the faith of the Prophet's family, the faith of Ali.
A
Koranic verse makes the same promise: "It is He who sent His Messenger
with guidance and the religion of truth, that He might cause it to
prevail over all religions, although the polytheists may be averse." In
other words, this religion must prevail over all religions, even if the
infidels dislike it.
[...]
What
does it mean that we want to promote the faith of the Prophet's family?
It means all people should live according to the faith of the Prophet's
family. It means we must instill this faith in all mankind.
[...]
I
believe we must start with our brothers, the Sunnis – I say this loud
and clear – then we should continue with the Christians, who are closer
to Islam, and eventually, the Jews should also become Muslim. The
polytheists should become Muslim too. They have no alternative.
https://www.tni.org/en/archives/act/16652
10 April 2007:
Posters of al-Sistani and other top clerics peer down from the buildings of most government agencies. Shiite red, green and black banners flutter from Baghdad rooftops, mosques and street lights. The public rhetoric of many Shiite politicians has become increasingly sectarian as Shiite-Sunni violence continues to push the two communities further apart. A banner mourning one of Shiism's most beloved saints, Imam Hussein, greets passengers arriving at Baghdad International Airport. Yet, the trappings of Shiite power can make the disappointment worse for Shiites who expected to reap benefits from Iraq's new politics. Sami Kareem, a 26-year-old clerk from Basra, says he is fed up. "When the regime was toppled and our Shiite people came to power, we expected things to be much better," he said. "But nothing happened. Every one is fighting for power and money." Another Shiite, Baghdad security guard Ali Hussein, said Shiite empowerment has done little to improve his life, and those of his wife and two children. "We Shiites now want a government that realizes our dreams even if it's not Shiite. People are so frustrated that some are even saying that Shiites cannot rule," he said. Allawi, the Iraqi historian, believes the way out of Iraq's current predicament lies in Shiite-Sunni harmony. Toward this goal, he has made a contribution. He just published a book, "Omar and Shiism," that attempts to exonerate the name of Omar, a 7th century successor of the Prophet Muhammad who has for centuries been maligned by Shiites. Shiites believe the 7th century caliph usurped the leadership of Islam's young state. It may seem an obscure historical dispute. But Allawi's point is that such issues have repercussions in today's Iraq, where many Shiite clerics have left their seminaries to enter politics. "When you are in the Hawza (Shiite seminary), you can say whatever you want and no one outside will ever know," he explained. "You can insult Omar in the Hawza and your listeners will be happy, but when you are outside, you are dealing with an Arab world that's 90 percent Sunni."
http://www.rferl.org/content/iran_shiite_regime_seeks_to_control_sunni_seminaries/24295121.html
12 August 2011: The Shi'ite clerical regime of Iran appears to be intensifying its repression of the country's Sunnis under the guise of "reorganizing" their seminaries.
....In spite of Khamenei's talk of inter-Muslim unity and the "brotherhood" of Shi'a and Sunnis, those Sunni clerics who do not toe the line of the Shi'ite regime are harassed or denounced as Wahhabis, or adherents of the ultraorthodox school of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia.
In a recent stage-managed demonstration in Zahedan, demonstrators chanted: "Death to Wahhabis, Death to Molavi [Abdul Hamid] Wahhabi."
https://www.tni.org/en/archives/act/16652
10 April 2007:
Posters of al-Sistani and other top clerics peer down from the buildings of most government agencies. Shiite red, green and black banners flutter from Baghdad rooftops, mosques and street lights. The public rhetoric of many Shiite politicians has become increasingly sectarian as Shiite-Sunni violence continues to push the two communities further apart. A banner mourning one of Shiism's most beloved saints, Imam Hussein, greets passengers arriving at Baghdad International Airport. Yet, the trappings of Shiite power can make the disappointment worse for Shiites who expected to reap benefits from Iraq's new politics. Sami Kareem, a 26-year-old clerk from Basra, says he is fed up. "When the regime was toppled and our Shiite people came to power, we expected things to be much better," he said. "But nothing happened. Every one is fighting for power and money." Another Shiite, Baghdad security guard Ali Hussein, said Shiite empowerment has done little to improve his life, and those of his wife and two children. "We Shiites now want a government that realizes our dreams even if it's not Shiite. People are so frustrated that some are even saying that Shiites cannot rule," he said. Allawi, the Iraqi historian, believes the way out of Iraq's current predicament lies in Shiite-Sunni harmony. Toward this goal, he has made a contribution. He just published a book, "Omar and Shiism," that attempts to exonerate the name of Omar, a 7th century successor of the Prophet Muhammad who has for centuries been maligned by Shiites. Shiites believe the 7th century caliph usurped the leadership of Islam's young state. It may seem an obscure historical dispute. But Allawi's point is that such issues have repercussions in today's Iraq, where many Shiite clerics have left their seminaries to enter politics. "When you are in the Hawza (Shiite seminary), you can say whatever you want and no one outside will ever know," he explained. "You can insult Omar in the Hawza and your listeners will be happy, but when you are outside, you are dealing with an Arab world that's 90 percent Sunni."
http://www.rferl.org/content/iran_shiite_regime_seeks_to_control_sunni_seminaries/24295121.html
12 August 2011: The Shi'ite clerical regime of Iran appears to be intensifying its repression of the country's Sunnis under the guise of "reorganizing" their seminaries.
....In spite of Khamenei's talk of inter-Muslim unity and the "brotherhood" of Shi'a and Sunnis, those Sunni clerics who do not toe the line of the Shi'ite regime are harassed or denounced as Wahhabis, or adherents of the ultraorthodox school of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia.
In a recent stage-managed demonstration in Zahedan, demonstrators chanted: "Death to Wahhabis, Death to Molavi [Abdul Hamid] Wahhabi."
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/31/iran-forbids-sunni-eid-prayers
31 August 2011: Sunni Muslims in Tehran have been banned from congregating at prayers marking the end of Ramadan.
Iran, a Shia country, ordered its Sunni minority not to hold separate prayers in Tehran for Eid al-Fitr, the Muslim festival that brings the month of fasting to an end. They were instead asked to have a Shia imam leading their prayers – something that is against their religious beliefs.
Hundreds of security police were deployed in the capital to prevent Sunni worshippers from entering houses they rent for religious ceremonies.
In recent decades, Iranian authorities have refused Sunnis permission to build their own mosques in Tehran. There is currently no Sunni mosque in the capital, despite there being several churches and synagogues for much smaller Christian and Jewish populations.
http://islamtimes.org/ur/doc/interview/107450/
Oct 2011:
اس موقع پر ایک منظر کو میں نہیں بھول سکتا۔ مہمانوں کی دوسری صف میں پانچویں یا چھٹی کرسی پر مولانا سمیع الحق بیٹھے تھے۔ تو آغا سید علی خامنہ ای نے جب خطاب ختم کیا ہے تو مولانا سمیع الحق، جنہیں جسمانی ضعف کے باعث سہارے کی ضرورت بھی پڑتی ہے، وہ تیزی سے اُٹھے اور محافظوں کے روکنے کی پروا نہ کرتے ہُوئے سٹیج سے نیچے اُترے، سیّد علی خامنہ ای تک بے اختیاری و وارفتگی کے عالم میں پہنچے اور آپ کے ہاتھ کا، داڑھی کا بوسہ لیا۔ یہ وہ اثر تھا جس نے پورے ماحول کو اپنے اثر میں لے رکھا تھا۔ ان کے وجود سے نورانی شعاعیں نکلتی ہیں، جو قبول کرنے والے ہوتے ہیں وہ قبول کرتے ہیں جو نہیں کرتے، و ہ تو رسول صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم اور مولا علی ع کے ہاتھ بھی چوم رہے ہوتے ہیں، لیکن ان کی شعاعیں ان کی دل کو پاک نہیں کرتیں۔
...
پاکستان سے جو زعماء گئے تھے ان میں قاضی حسین احمد، مولانا سمیع الحق، مولانا عرفان الحق (مولانا سمیع الحق کے بھتیجے اور داماد)، اعجاز الحق، نور الحق قادری، عبدالغفور حیدری وغیرہ شامل ہیں۔
عبدالغفور حیدری کا مقالہ ایکسپریس میں چھپا بھی ہے۔ اسی طرح یہ بات بھی خاص طور پر نوٹ کرنے کی ہے کہ مولانا سمیع الحق نے عربی میں خطاب کیا اور اس میں حضرت خامنہ ای کے لیے لفظ ’’اِمام‘‘ استعمال کیا، یہ اسی ہمہ گیر اثر کا نتیجہ ہے۔ ان کے علاوہ اپنے جو تھے راجہ ناصر، امین شہیدی، شفقت شیرازی، سینیٹر عباس کمیلی، آغا مرتضےٰ پویا موجود تھے۔
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rXF5KJeBDok
http://islamtimes.org/ur/doc/interview/127953/
اسلام ٹائمز: حالیہ دورہ ایران میں آپکی کن کن شخصیات سے ملاقات ہوئی۔؟
مولانا سمیع الحق: ملاقاتیں ہوتی رہتی ہیں، رہبر صاحب علی خامنہ ای سے ملاقات ہوئی، حزب اللہ اور حماس کے لوگوں سے ملاقات ہوئی، اس کے علاوہ مقتدا الصدر کے ساتھ کھانا کھایا، عمارالحکیم بھی موجود تھے۔ ملی یکجہتی کونسل کے وقت مُتفقہ طور پر۔
اسلام ٹائمز: کیا آپ ایرانی علماء اور پاکستانی شیعہ علماء کو اپنے مدرسے میں آنے کی دعوت دیں گے، اگر وہ آنا چاہیں تو آپ ان کو خوش آمدید کہیں گے۔؟ مولانا سمیع الحق: ہمارے مدرسے میں اگر شیعہ علماء آنا چاہیں تو خوش آمدید کہیں گے، ہمارے ہاں تو انگریز اور امریکی آتے ہیں، تو ان علماء کو کیوں نہیں خوش آمدید کہیں گے، وہ تو ہمارے بھائی ہیں۔ پاکستانی شیعہ علماء اس ملک کا حصہ ہیں، ایسے مت سوچیں، میری اپنی ذات تک کوشش ہوتی ہے کسی کو دور مت کریں، عملاً بھی میں نے کوشش کی ہے۔ رہبر صاحب کے نمائندہِ خاص آیت اللہ تسخیری ہمارے ہاں آ چکے ہیں، ایرانی سفیر ماشاءاللہ شاکری سے متعدد نشستیں ہوتی رہی ہیں، ایرانی قونصلیٹ متعدد مرتبہ ہماری طرف آ چکا ہے، میں خود بھی مختلف پروگراموں میں کئی دفعہ ایران جا چکا ہوں۔
http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/hamas-brutally-assaults-shi-ite-worshippers-in-gaza-1.407688
17 Jan 2012: Armed Hamas men broke into a gathering of some 30 Shi'ite worshippers in the Gaza Strip last Friday and brutally attacked them, Haaretz has learned.
......
The Hamas-run government is convinced that Iran is expanding its influence in Gaza by means of Islamic Jihad.
Gazan sources told Haaretz that Islamic Jihad now contains a group of converts to Shia Islam. The group is led by Iyad al-Hosni, also a convert, who was ousted from Islamic Jihad but recently reinstated, probably under Iranian pressure: Islamic Jihad's leadership visited Iran two months ago, and afterward, al-Hosni was appointed a senior officer in its military wing.
Some of the men arrested on Friday issued a statement on Sunday urging Iran to stop funding Hamas due to its persecution of Shi'ites.
Tehran has already reduced its support for Hamas, among other things because Hamas has refused to support embattled Syrian President Bashar Assad.
Becoming Shi'ite is a growing trend in the Gaza Strip: Hundreds of Sunnis, both Islamic Jihad activists and ordinary people, are known to have converted.
http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/society/3005/
8 Mar 2012: Iraqi students drop out due to sectarian lessons
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/shias-dominate-sunnis-in-the-new-iraq-1.1269416
https://twitter.com/IranRights_org/status/1182305534541783041
https://www.iranrights.org/memorial/story/-7321/bahram-ahmadi
30 Dec 2012: Bahram Ahmadi, 20-year-old Sunni Kurd, executed on charges of waging "war against God".Bahram was 17 when he was arrested for waging "war against God." He met his lawyer 30 min before his trial. He was 20 when he was hanged.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/view-india-shouldnt-follow-us-narrative-on-iran/articleshow/73131106.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
It was during his visit to Srinagar on June 4, 2012, to observe the death anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini. Agitated Yasin Malik, chairman, JKLF, accused Iran of having changed its philosophy of Islamic revolution to support the “oppressed” people. No less aghast were Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhat and Maulana Abbas Ansari, the other separatist leaders present at the function.
http://en.abna24.com/420252/print.html
http://en.rasanews.ir/detail/News/259/-100
18 May 2013: On his jurisprudence courses held in the Grand mosque of Qom, Grand Ayatollah Vahid Khorasani mentioned the excommunicator Wahhabists’ crime and exhumation of Hojr ibn Adi and said: “Blasphemy and atheism destroyed the holy grave of this grand companion of holy prophet in Damascus hand in hand”.He added: “Ibn al-Athir quotes that once Ayesha asked Muawiyah with bitterness about the reason behind killing of Hojr ibn Adi. “O Mother of believers! I killed him for the interest of Islam” said Muawiyah. “You killed someone” said Ayesha “about whom the prophet once said: “Hojr and his followers will be killed by [a group of people] who are Muslim and worshipers of God and [in result] all from heaven will get angry””
The grand Ayatollah indicated that Wahhabism is a blasphemy under the cover of Islam and atheism with the face of faith and wondered: “Is the Saudi Wahhabism capable of taking responsibility of such action?”“Why such grave should be demolished unlike the Fatwa of Abu-Hanifa, Malek, Shafei and Ibn-Hanbal” he said.
The grand Ayatollah then stressed out that blasphemy and atheism are hand in hand to pressure Shiite and said: “The one whose grave got desecrated was someone whose Du’a would never remain unanswered according to Ibn al-Athir”.
Ayatollah Vahid Khorasani also mentioned the holiness of the Rajab month and the first Friday night of it which is the night of wishes and insisted: “Pray for the Syrian and Bahraini Muslims in the Night of wishes so God rid them out of atheists and infidels. This is the duty of all of us”.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/world/middleeast/sunni-shiite-violence-flares-in-mideast-in-wake-of-syria-war.html
http://www.rferl.org/content/iran-mobile-sunni-insult/25054744.html
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23403654
July 22, 2013: Authorities in Iran have indicted the main mobile network operator, Irancell, on charges of insulting Sunni Muslims in an SMS competition.
Irancell was strongly criticised by Iran's Sunni community over the contest, which allegedly insulted the Sunni's revered Calipha, Omar.
....
The company, a religious cultural organisation, has since apologised for the ''unintentional" mistake.
The company reportedly asked subscribers: ''Which judge was deceived by the Devil during the time of [the first Shia Imam] Imam Ali?'' The second choice offered was Omar.
In the indictment, Irancell has been accused of ''violating unity between Shia and Sunnis''.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/09/iran-lift-restrictions-sunni-worship
9 Nov 2013: During the early morning hours of October 16, 2013, dozens of uniformed and plain-clothes security agents surrounded Sadeghiyeh Mosque in northwest Tehran, one of the largest and most important Sunni prayer sites in Tehran province, and prevented Sunni worshipers from entering the building to mark Eid-e Ghorban, the Feast of Sacrifice, a Sunni worshipper and former member of parliament told Human Rights Watch. Sunni activists also reported that security forces prevented worshipers from entering another prayer site, in Saadatabad, in northern Tehran. Worshipers in other parts of the capital apparently entered prayer sites freely and worshiped without hindrance.
https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2013/11/112319/30-thousand-moroccans-converted-to-shia-islam-in-belgium-mp/
14 Nov 2013:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/iranian-sunnis-complain-discrimination-2014397125688907.htmlhttp://islamtimes.org/ur/doc/interview/107450/
Oct 2011:
اس موقع پر ایک منظر کو میں نہیں بھول سکتا۔ مہمانوں کی دوسری صف میں پانچویں یا چھٹی کرسی پر مولانا سمیع الحق بیٹھے تھے۔ تو آغا سید علی خامنہ ای نے جب خطاب ختم کیا ہے تو مولانا سمیع الحق، جنہیں جسمانی ضعف کے باعث سہارے کی ضرورت بھی پڑتی ہے، وہ تیزی سے اُٹھے اور محافظوں کے روکنے کی پروا نہ کرتے ہُوئے سٹیج سے نیچے اُترے، سیّد علی خامنہ ای تک بے اختیاری و وارفتگی کے عالم میں پہنچے اور آپ کے ہاتھ کا، داڑھی کا بوسہ لیا۔ یہ وہ اثر تھا جس نے پورے ماحول کو اپنے اثر میں لے رکھا تھا۔ ان کے وجود سے نورانی شعاعیں نکلتی ہیں، جو قبول کرنے والے ہوتے ہیں وہ قبول کرتے ہیں جو نہیں کرتے، و ہ تو رسول صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم اور مولا علی ع کے ہاتھ بھی چوم رہے ہوتے ہیں، لیکن ان کی شعاعیں ان کی دل کو پاک نہیں کرتیں۔
...
پاکستان سے جو زعماء گئے تھے ان میں قاضی حسین احمد، مولانا سمیع الحق، مولانا عرفان الحق (مولانا سمیع الحق کے بھتیجے اور داماد)، اعجاز الحق، نور الحق قادری، عبدالغفور حیدری وغیرہ شامل ہیں۔
عبدالغفور حیدری کا مقالہ ایکسپریس میں چھپا بھی ہے۔ اسی طرح یہ بات بھی خاص طور پر نوٹ کرنے کی ہے کہ مولانا سمیع الحق نے عربی میں خطاب کیا اور اس میں حضرت خامنہ ای کے لیے لفظ ’’اِمام‘‘ استعمال کیا، یہ اسی ہمہ گیر اثر کا نتیجہ ہے۔ ان کے علاوہ اپنے جو تھے راجہ ناصر، امین شہیدی، شفقت شیرازی، سینیٹر عباس کمیلی، آغا مرتضےٰ پویا موجود تھے۔
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rXF5KJeBDok
http://islamtimes.org/ur/doc/interview/127953/
اسلام ٹائمز: حالیہ دورہ ایران میں آپکی کن کن شخصیات سے ملاقات ہوئی۔؟
مولانا سمیع الحق: ملاقاتیں ہوتی رہتی ہیں، رہبر صاحب علی خامنہ ای سے ملاقات ہوئی، حزب اللہ اور حماس کے لوگوں سے ملاقات ہوئی، اس کے علاوہ مقتدا الصدر کے ساتھ کھانا کھایا، عمارالحکیم بھی موجود تھے۔ ملی یکجہتی کونسل کے وقت مُتفقہ طور پر۔
اسلام ٹائمز: کیا آپ ایرانی علماء اور پاکستانی شیعہ علماء کو اپنے مدرسے میں آنے کی دعوت دیں گے، اگر وہ آنا چاہیں تو آپ ان کو خوش آمدید کہیں گے۔؟ مولانا سمیع الحق: ہمارے مدرسے میں اگر شیعہ علماء آنا چاہیں تو خوش آمدید کہیں گے، ہمارے ہاں تو انگریز اور امریکی آتے ہیں، تو ان علماء کو کیوں نہیں خوش آمدید کہیں گے، وہ تو ہمارے بھائی ہیں۔ پاکستانی شیعہ علماء اس ملک کا حصہ ہیں، ایسے مت سوچیں، میری اپنی ذات تک کوشش ہوتی ہے کسی کو دور مت کریں، عملاً بھی میں نے کوشش کی ہے۔ رہبر صاحب کے نمائندہِ خاص آیت اللہ تسخیری ہمارے ہاں آ چکے ہیں، ایرانی سفیر ماشاءاللہ شاکری سے متعدد نشستیں ہوتی رہی ہیں، ایرانی قونصلیٹ متعدد مرتبہ ہماری طرف آ چکا ہے، میں خود بھی مختلف پروگراموں میں کئی دفعہ ایران جا چکا ہوں۔
http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/hamas-brutally-assaults-shi-ite-worshippers-in-gaza-1.407688
17 Jan 2012: Armed Hamas men broke into a gathering of some 30 Shi'ite worshippers in the Gaza Strip last Friday and brutally attacked them, Haaretz has learned.
......
The Hamas-run government is convinced that Iran is expanding its influence in Gaza by means of Islamic Jihad.
Gazan sources told Haaretz that Islamic Jihad now contains a group of converts to Shia Islam. The group is led by Iyad al-Hosni, also a convert, who was ousted from Islamic Jihad but recently reinstated, probably under Iranian pressure: Islamic Jihad's leadership visited Iran two months ago, and afterward, al-Hosni was appointed a senior officer in its military wing.
Some of the men arrested on Friday issued a statement on Sunday urging Iran to stop funding Hamas due to its persecution of Shi'ites.
Tehran has already reduced its support for Hamas, among other things because Hamas has refused to support embattled Syrian President Bashar Assad.
Becoming Shi'ite is a growing trend in the Gaza Strip: Hundreds of Sunnis, both Islamic Jihad activists and ordinary people, are known to have converted.
http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/society/3005/
8 Mar 2012: Iraqi students drop out due to sectarian lessons
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/shias-dominate-sunnis-in-the-new-iraq-1.1269416
3 Apr 2012: Baghdad now has the appearance of an exclusively Shia city, with streets and bridges renamed after the sect's saints and its green, black and red banners flying almost everywhere; giant posters of Shia saints tower over major squares.
Flaunting Shia strength in Baghdad, a city of about seven million, is apparently a priority for the sect's clerical leadership.
"I always say that one Shia from Baghdad is worth five Shias like me from Najaf," Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the nation's most revered Shia cleric, was quoted as telling Shias who visited him at his home in Najaf, a city south of Baghdad.
"You are the majority and your enemies are trying to reduce your numbers," al-Sistani said, according to one of the 30 men who attended the seven-minute meeting last November. "Go out and perform your rituals."
The men took al-Sistani's words to heart and swung into action when the next religious occasion arrived in January -- the Arbaeen, which marks the passing of 40 days after the seventh century martyrdom of Imam Hussein, a much revered saint. The district known for its well-to-do professionals and businessmen took on a religious ambiance of the kind found in Baghdad's poor Shia areas or those hosting religious shrines.
Residents practised the ritual of self-flagellation on the streets, hoisted hundreds of Shia banners on trees and lamp posts and served meat and rice from tents pitched on street corners.
In the Baghdad district of Azamiyah, for years a bastion of Sunni resistance to Shia domination, the government is ignoring repeated demands by Sunni residents to remove Ali al-Saadi, a Shia who heads the local council. They also want to replace Hadi al-Jubouri, another Shia who is the district's mayor. Both men were appointed by the U.S. military authorities in July 2003, when the Sunni insurgency against the American occupation was starting.
Stalling tactics
Among other injustices, the Sunnis say, are Health Ministry officials who stonewall them when they seek help locating the remains of loved ones killed during the sectarian violence of the last decade and that, unlike Shia living in the district, they are not allowed to keep a firearm at home for self-defence.
Sunnis who apply for government jobs also complain of stalling tactics.
And in the educational sector, Higher Education Minister Ali al-Adeeb, a close al-Maliki ally, is accused of implementing sectarian policies thinly concealed behind his goal of purging members of Saddam Hussein's now-outlawed Baath Party from academic institutions.
https://twitter.com/IranRights_org/status/1182305534541783041
https://www.iranrights.org/memorial/story/-7321/bahram-ahmadi
30 Dec 2012: Bahram Ahmadi, 20-year-old Sunni Kurd, executed on charges of waging "war against God".Bahram was 17 when he was arrested for waging "war against God." He met his lawyer 30 min before his trial. He was 20 when he was hanged.
Charges
Based on the available information, Mr. Ahmadi and his co-defendants were accused of “waging war against God,” through “links to Salafi mini-groups” and “propaganda against the regime, through participating in ideological and political classes, possessing, selling, and buying books and CDs of speeches related to Sunni beliefs.” (Letter to Ban Ki-moon, September 2012 - ABF research)
...
...
In his own defense, Mr. Ahmadi explained that he became active in promoting his religious beliefs “after two clerics, Bijan Daneshmand and Juybari, gravely insulted the mother of believers [Ayesheh] ... and other companions of the prophet and insulted Sunni beliefs and sanctities … . We have been in prison for the past four years and [the authorities] have convicted us, instead of putting those clerics on trial for their insults.”
My [real] charges, Mr. Ahmadi says, are “defending the dignity and honor of the Mother of the faithfuls [Ayesheh], Islam's Khalifs, and the companions of the prophet, defending God's oneness [unity], and opposing anyone who would deny God's oneness.” According to an informed source, Mr. Ahmadi believed that Iran’s leaders are not real Muslims. He thought that by claiming to represent the twelve Imam, the Islamic Republic’s Spiritual Leader is placing himself as an associate of God. The authorities considered his efforts to raise awareness on this issue to be “waging war against God.”
4 Jun 2012: At times, they even suggest that Shia leaders remain part of India’s democratic process. In fact, Seyed Mehdi Nabizadeh, Iranian Ambassador to India, astounded all separatist leaders sharing dais with him, when he completely ignored the Kashmir issue, while highlighting importance of India-Iran relations and how the two countries were moving together.
It was during his visit to Srinagar on June 4, 2012, to observe the death anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini. Agitated Yasin Malik, chairman, JKLF, accused Iran of having changed its philosophy of Islamic revolution to support the “oppressed” people. No less aghast were Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhat and Maulana Abbas Ansari, the other separatist leaders present at the function.
http://en.abna24.com/420252/print.html
http://en.rasanews.ir/detail/News/259/-100
18 May 2013: On his jurisprudence courses held in the Grand mosque of Qom, Grand Ayatollah Vahid Khorasani mentioned the excommunicator Wahhabists’ crime and exhumation of Hojr ibn Adi and said: “Blasphemy and atheism destroyed the holy grave of this grand companion of holy prophet in Damascus hand in hand”.He added: “Ibn al-Athir quotes that once Ayesha asked Muawiyah with bitterness about the reason behind killing of Hojr ibn Adi. “O Mother of believers! I killed him for the interest of Islam” said Muawiyah. “You killed someone” said Ayesha “about whom the prophet once said: “Hojr and his followers will be killed by [a group of people] who are Muslim and worshipers of God and [in result] all from heaven will get angry””
The grand Ayatollah indicated that Wahhabism is a blasphemy under the cover of Islam and atheism with the face of faith and wondered: “Is the Saudi Wahhabism capable of taking responsibility of such action?”“Why such grave should be demolished unlike the Fatwa of Abu-Hanifa, Malek, Shafei and Ibn-Hanbal” he said.
The grand Ayatollah then stressed out that blasphemy and atheism are hand in hand to pressure Shiite and said: “The one whose grave got desecrated was someone whose Du’a would never remain unanswered according to Ibn al-Athir”.
Ayatollah Vahid Khorasani also mentioned the holiness of the Rajab month and the first Friday night of it which is the night of wishes and insisted: “Pray for the Syrian and Bahraini Muslims in the Night of wishes so God rid them out of atheists and infidels. This is the duty of all of us”.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/world/middleeast/sunni-shiite-violence-flares-in-mideast-in-wake-of-syria-war.html
1 June 2013: Many
devout Shiites have also come to view the Syrian civil war as the
fulfillment of a Shiite prophecy that presages the end of time: a
devil-like figure, Sufyani, raises an army in Syria and marches on Iraq
to kill Shiites. Abu Ali, a student in Najaf, Iraq, said that his
colleagues believe the leader of Qatar, a chief backer of Syria’s Sunni
rebels, is Sufyani. They are flocking to Syria “to protect Islam,” he
said.
Days
after pro-government militias killed scores of civilians last month in
the Sunni village of Bayda near the Syrian coast, one Sunni resident
declared in an interview: “Starting today, I am sectarian. I am
sectarian! I don’t want ‘peaceful’ anymore.” Composing himself, he
added, “Sister, forgive me for talking this way.”
http://ur.abna24.com/service/iraq/archive/2013/07/07/437840/story.html
7 July 2013:
نجف اشرف کے امام جمعہ حجت الاسلام سید صدرالدین قبانچی نے اس ھفتہ نماز جمعہ کے خطبہ میں جو امام بارگاہ فاطمیہ کبری میں منعقد ہوا محمد مرسی کو حکومت سے ہٹائے جانے پر اظھار مسرت کیا اور کہا: مصر میں رونما ہونے والے حالات عربی اور اسلامی تاریخ کا بزرگ واقعہ ہیں، محمد مرسی کو تخت حکومت سے ہٹایا جانا کوئی فوجی بغاوت نہیں تھی، بلکہ لاکھوں انسانوں کے جزبات کی تکمیل تھی ۔حجت الاسلام قبانچی نے مزید کہا: مصر حکومت قبائلی حکومت میں بدل چکی تھی جسے قبائل پرستی کی سزا ملی ، اور افسوس اس مدت میں الازھر بھی ناعادلانہ طور سے سلفی وھابیوں کے شانہ بشانہ رہا ۔انہوں نے امام خمینی(ره) کو ستمگر حکومتوں کے خلاف قیام کا موسس جانا اور کہا: انقلابی ائڈیل جس نے ایران میں شاہ ایران کا تختہ پلٹ دیا، حسنی مبارک، قذافی، بن علی اور عبداللہ صالح کی حکومتوں کا بھی تختہ پلٹ کر رکھ دیا ، یہ ائڈیل اور اسوہ اسلام اور انبیاء کا بنایا ہوا ہے امریکی ائڈیل نہیں ہے ۔نجف کے امام جمعہ نے مزید کہا: اگر یہ امریکی ائڈیل ہے تو امریکا درحال حاضر قطر، عربستان سعودی، بحرین اور دیگرعلاقہ کے پسماندہ نظام کو بھی برطرف کردے ۔انہوں نے شیخ حسن شحاتہ کی شھادت پر محمد مرسی کی خاموشی کو شدید تنقید کا نشانہ بنایا اور کہا: شیخ حسن شحاتہ چونکہ اہلبیت کے چاہنے والوں میں سے تھے محمد مرسی نے اپ کی شھادت کی تعزیت نہیں دیا جبکہ یقینا اگر کوئی عیسائی مارا گیا ہوتا تو عالم میں الازھر اور مرسی کے آہ و نالہ صدائیں گونج رہی ہوتیں
http://ur.abna24.com/service/iraq/archive/2013/07/07/437840/story.html
7 July 2013:
نجف اشرف کے امام جمعہ حجت الاسلام سید صدرالدین قبانچی نے اس ھفتہ نماز جمعہ کے خطبہ میں جو امام بارگاہ فاطمیہ کبری میں منعقد ہوا محمد مرسی کو حکومت سے ہٹائے جانے پر اظھار مسرت کیا اور کہا: مصر میں رونما ہونے والے حالات عربی اور اسلامی تاریخ کا بزرگ واقعہ ہیں، محمد مرسی کو تخت حکومت سے ہٹایا جانا کوئی فوجی بغاوت نہیں تھی، بلکہ لاکھوں انسانوں کے جزبات کی تکمیل تھی ۔حجت الاسلام قبانچی نے مزید کہا: مصر حکومت قبائلی حکومت میں بدل چکی تھی جسے قبائل پرستی کی سزا ملی ، اور افسوس اس مدت میں الازھر بھی ناعادلانہ طور سے سلفی وھابیوں کے شانہ بشانہ رہا ۔انہوں نے امام خمینی(ره) کو ستمگر حکومتوں کے خلاف قیام کا موسس جانا اور کہا: انقلابی ائڈیل جس نے ایران میں شاہ ایران کا تختہ پلٹ دیا، حسنی مبارک، قذافی، بن علی اور عبداللہ صالح کی حکومتوں کا بھی تختہ پلٹ کر رکھ دیا ، یہ ائڈیل اور اسوہ اسلام اور انبیاء کا بنایا ہوا ہے امریکی ائڈیل نہیں ہے ۔نجف کے امام جمعہ نے مزید کہا: اگر یہ امریکی ائڈیل ہے تو امریکا درحال حاضر قطر، عربستان سعودی، بحرین اور دیگرعلاقہ کے پسماندہ نظام کو بھی برطرف کردے ۔انہوں نے شیخ حسن شحاتہ کی شھادت پر محمد مرسی کی خاموشی کو شدید تنقید کا نشانہ بنایا اور کہا: شیخ حسن شحاتہ چونکہ اہلبیت کے چاہنے والوں میں سے تھے محمد مرسی نے اپ کی شھادت کی تعزیت نہیں دیا جبکہ یقینا اگر کوئی عیسائی مارا گیا ہوتا تو عالم میں الازھر اور مرسی کے آہ و نالہ صدائیں گونج رہی ہوتیں
http://www.rferl.org/content/iran-mobile-sunni-insult/25054744.html
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23403654
July 22, 2013: Authorities in Iran have indicted the main mobile network operator, Irancell, on charges of insulting Sunni Muslims in an SMS competition.
Irancell was strongly criticised by Iran's Sunni community over the contest, which allegedly insulted the Sunni's revered Calipha, Omar.
....
The company, a religious cultural organisation, has since apologised for the ''unintentional" mistake.
The company reportedly asked subscribers: ''Which judge was deceived by the Devil during the time of [the first Shia Imam] Imam Ali?'' The second choice offered was Omar.
In the indictment, Irancell has been accused of ''violating unity between Shia and Sunnis''.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/09/iran-lift-restrictions-sunni-worship
9 Nov 2013: During the early morning hours of October 16, 2013, dozens of uniformed and plain-clothes security agents surrounded Sadeghiyeh Mosque in northwest Tehran, one of the largest and most important Sunni prayer sites in Tehran province, and prevented Sunni worshipers from entering the building to mark Eid-e Ghorban, the Feast of Sacrifice, a Sunni worshipper and former member of parliament told Human Rights Watch. Sunni activists also reported that security forces prevented worshipers from entering another prayer site, in Saadatabad, in northern Tehran. Worshipers in other parts of the capital apparently entered prayer sites freely and worshiped without hindrance.
https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2013/11/112319/30-thousand-moroccans-converted-to-shia-islam-in-belgium-mp/
14 Nov 2013:
Casablanca- Khaled Alboukraei , a member of the parliament affiliated with PJD, said he has data that indicate there is a number of thirty thousand Moroccans who are converted to Shia Islam in Belgium alone.
Mr. Alboukraei has recently made the statement during a special meeting devoted to discussions about the budget of Habous and Islamic affairs ministry, according to Alyaoum 24.
The ruling party’s affiliate, who paid a visit to Brussels a few days ago, highlighted that foreign missionaries target second and third generations of Moroccan expatriates.
On the other hand, Nezha Elouafi, MP, said she encountered several cases of Moroccan girls in Germany. “They embraced Shia Islam, wore the Niqab, and they believed that generally every object and action is prohibited while referring to a German Sheikh of Tunisian origin,” she added.
In response to the increasing number of Moroccans who become Shia in Europe, Nezha Elouafi who is also a specialist in migration issues suggested that the country should follow Turkey’s footsteps by means of training Imams to serve the Moroccan community living abroad. “What is happening on the other side (Europe) might threaten one of the country’s tenets, which is Maliki Sunni Islam, ” she noted.
9 March 2014: Iran's Sunnis are also underrepresented on Islamic TV programmes. Iranian Sunnis' public letter to Khamenei stated: "After Iran's Islamic revolution, Sunnis are not allowed to broadcast and express their opinion... even in one TV programme or one provincial media centre. Instead, national media have been free to desecrate... and offend Sunni Muslims."
The presence of radical Sunni groups has increased the government's pressure on Iranian Sunnis. In recent years, armed Sunni groups have launched attacks within Iran's borders. In response to an attack by radical groups last summer, the Iranian government executed 16 Sunni rebels and declared that the action was in response to terrorist attacks. In February, a hardline Sunni group called Jaish-e-Adl took five Iranian soldiers hostage in the border area in Sistan and Baluchistan province.
http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/3409/
27 March 2014: The Iraqi Ministry of Education recently decided that certificates given to Shiite Muslim students completing their religious instruction would be considered equivalent to the certificates gained by students who completed the ordinary school curriculum. The decision was made last month and applies only to those students taking religious instruction at institutions run by the Shiite Muslim Endowment. It does not apply to Sunni Muslim religious studies.
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920403000166
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-prophecy-insight-idUSBREA3013420140401
1 April 2014: many Shi'ites from Lebanon, Iraq and Iran are drawn to the war because they believe it paves the way for the return of Imam Mahdi - a descendent of the Prophet who vanished 1,000 years ago and who will re-emerge at a time of war to establish global Islamic rule before the end of the world.
According to Shi'ite tradition, an early sign of his return came with the 1979 Iranian revolution, which set up an Islamic state to provide fighters for an army led by the Mahdi to wage war in Syria after sweeping through the Middle East.
"This Islamic Revolution, based on the narratives that we have received from the prophet and imams, is the prelude to the appearance of the Mahdi," Iranian cleric and parliamentarian Ruhollah Hosseinian said last year.
He cited comments by an eighth century Shi'ite imam who said another sign of the Mahdi's return would be a battle involving warriors fighting under a yellow banner - the color associated with Lebanon's pro-Assad Hezbollah militia.
"As Imam Sadeq has stated, when the (forces) with yellow flags fight anti-Shi'ites in Damascus and Iranian forces join them, this is a prelude and a sign of the coming of his holiness," Hosseinian was quoted as saying by Fars news agency.
.......
Murtada, a 27-year-old Lebanese Shi'ite who regularly goes to Syria to battle against the rebels, says he is not fighting for Assad, but for the Mahdi, also known as the Imam.
"Even if I am martyred now, when he appears I will be reborn to fight among his army, I will be his soldier," he told Reuters in Lebanon.
Murtada, who has fought in Damascus and in the decisive battle last year for the border town of Qusair, leaves his wife and two children when he goes to fight in Syria: "Nothing is more precious than the Imam, even my family. It is our duty."
Syria's civil war built upon sectarian conflicts elsewhere, especially in Iraq and Lebanon, leading to a growing sense across the region that all those power struggles in individual countries were part of a titanic battle for the future.
Abbas, a 24-year-old Iraqi Shi'ite fighter, said he knew he was living in the era of the Mahdi's return when the United States and Britain invaded Iraq in 2003.
"That was the first sign and then everything else followed," he told Reuters from Baghdad, where he said was resting before heading to Syria for a fourth time.
"I was waiting for the day when I will fight in Syria. Thank God he chose me to be one of the Imam's soldiers."
Abu Hsaasan, a 65 year old pensioner from south Lebanon, said he once thought the prophecies of the end of days would take centuries to come about.
"Things are moving fast. I never thought that I would be living the days of the Imam. Now, with every passing day I am more and more convinced that it is only a matter of few years before he appears."
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/world/middleeast/a-reignited-war-drives-iraqis-out-in-huge-numbers.html?smid=tw-share
28 June 2014: Mr. Ahmed, reflecting a widely held belief in this country’s Sunni population, said in defiance of the facts that his sect is a majority in Iraq. In many ways, Iraq’s Sunnis have never accepted the new political order that came after the American invasion, which forced out the Sunni-dominated government of Saddam Hussein and led, through democratic elections, to Shiite domination.
For a new leader of Iraq, he said, “We would accept a Kurd, a Christian or even a Jew.”
But not, he said, a Shiite.
“They consider us infidels,” he said. “And we consider them infidels.”
http://www.iranpressnews.com/english/source/175214.html
https://www.en-hrana.org/another-sunni-convert-arrested-ahwaz
24 Jul 2014:
The Iranian security forces arrested yet another Ahwazi Sunni convert in the Khuzestan province on Thursday, with at least ten other Sunni converts arrested in the area within the last fortnight.
According to the report of Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), 35-year old Saeed Haydari, who recently converted from Shi’ism to Sunni Islam, was arrested on 24 July 2014 at his home in the town of Taleghani (Al-Kora) in Mahshahr city, Khuzestan.
....
At least ten Sunni converts have been arrested in the last fortnight alone, with three arrested after openly preaching Sunni beliefs and a further seven arrested after holding congregational Sunni Taraweeh prayers.
More than 6000 books mocking Sunni beliefs were also distributed in Ahwaz on Monday, with information printed on the book indicating that they were published on the behalf of the Iranian government.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3a246c0a-86d7-11e4-8a51-00144feabdc0.html#axzz47EjXDZrT
1 Jan 2015: Although Iran’s constitution guarantees equal job opportunities and freedom of (recognised) religion for all Iranians, the country’s Sunni say they are deprived of their rights because they are unable to choose their own clerics, have no mosque for the hundreds of thousands of Sunni in the capital and are obliged to follow the Shia religious calendar, which differs from the Sunni calendar and makes it difficult to hold some religious ceremonies.
....
The Islamic regime in Tehran has little tolerance of Sunni campaigns for more rights. An estimated 100 Sunni are in jail for protesting and about half face the death penalty.
The Islamic regime in Tehran has little tolerance of Sunni campaigns for more rights. An estimated 100 Sunni are in jail for protesting and about half face the death penalty.
Even moderate politicians have been unable to change this policy. The centrist government of Hassan Rouhani, who enjoyed large support from Sunni areas in the 2013 election, was unable to appoint a Sunni governor in Kurdistan despite promising in his election campaign to do so.
When Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, the oil minister, a Shia Kurd, appointed Emad Hosseini, a Sunni Kurd, as his deputy for engineering, eyebrows were raised in the holy city of Qom where the senior Shia clergy live.
The appointment is seen as too little by many Sunni Kurds who believe the Islamic regime mistrusts them more for their religion than their ethnicity.
http://www.dawn.com/news/1170136
17 March 2015: On March 7, gunmen stormed a Sufi mosque in Kabul, killing at least six people in an attack on the mystic order of Muslims that is seen as heretical by hardline Sunni factions.
And in late February, a group of 30 people from the Hazara minority group who were travelling by bus through southern Zabul province of Afghanistan were snatched by gunmen after returning from Iran. The Taliban, who are waging an insurgency against the government of Kabul, distanced themselves from both incidents, which are more commonplace across the border in Pakistan.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-islamic-state-idUSKBN0MI03N20150322
http://www.dawn.com/news/1171213
22 March 2015: Even by Afghanistan's standards of often-shifting alliances, a recent meeting between ethnic Hazara elders and local commanders of the Taliban insurgents who have persecuted them for years was extraordinary.
The Hazaras - a largely Shia minority killed in the thousands during the Taliban's hard-line Sunni Islamist rule of the 1990s - came to their old enemies seeking protection against what they deemed an even greater threat: masked men operating in the area calling themselves “Daesh”, a term for the self-style Islamic State in the region.
In a sign of changing times, the Taliban commanders agreed to help, said Abdul Khaliq Yaqubi, one of the elders at the meeting held in the eastern province of Ghazni.
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-hazara-afghan-306092272
And some Hazaras have begun to mend ties with the Taliban as a result of the growing risk of IS. In the western province of Ghazni, a group of Hazara elders approached the Taliban for protection in 2015. The Taliban agreed.
Mohammad Akbari, the only Hazara leader to cooperate with the Taliban in the 1990s, goes as far to say that his community must “finish the war with the Taliban and then work with them to finish IS” – but this stance remains an unpopular one with many members of the community.
Last November, the bodies of seven Hazaras - including women and a nine-year-old girl - were found beheaded by IS. The Taliban intervened, hunted down and killed the those believed to be behind the attack - but the move has failed to win hearts and minds.
The Taliban and IS oppose one another, but the general public does not see much difference between them, and at protests following the deaths, demonstrators cried chants against IS and the Taliban alike.
In this climate, Iran’s alleged support for the Taliban has not gone down well.
“Hazaras cannot accept this, even if it is just for countering IS,” Amiri from Mohaqiq’s party said. Amiri said proof of Iranian support for the Taliban would change the party’s relationship with Iran.
https://en.qantara.de/content/sunni-shia-relations-irans-futile-bid-for-ecumenism-within-islam
14 Oct 2015: "Tensions between Sunnis and Shias, Riyadh and Tehran, are more pronounced now than they have been in a long time. Yet at the same time, Iran sees itself not as a Shia but as an Islamic republic. Since its founding in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has regarded itself as the champion of a new order for all Muslims. Even though the zeal for exporting armed revolution has long since given way to pragmatic nationalist politics, Iran still sees itself as a defender of Muslims against imperialism – all Muslims, that is; not just the Shias.
.......
Moreover, many Sunnis – not entirely without justification – see Iran's advocacy of Islamic ecumenism as a showcase policy consisting of nothing more than public declarations of intent. As far as they are concerned, it serves primarily to help Iran break out of its isolation. Another reason why the commitment to ecumenism rings hollow for many Sunnis is that the Iranian constitution of 1979 establishes the Islam of the Shia Jafari school of thought as the state religion. The Sunni minority in Iran is accordingly scarcely represented in politics and systematically discriminated against in religious matters.
Moreover, although commitment to ecumenism is official policy in Iran, it is by no means supported by all Shia clerics. Even though no Shia would ever declare a Sunni to be an infidel, the orthodox clergy in Qom harbours serious reservations about a rapprochement with the Sunnis. While the Sunni Sheikh al-Azhar Mahmud Shaltut placed the Jafari school of thought on an equal footing with the four Sunni schools in a ground-breaking step in 1959, a corresponding fatwa has yet to be issued by Shia clerics.
Another problem with the Iranian policy of ecumenism is that it explicitly excludes Wahhabis. The Majma'-e taqrib is not only critical, but overtly hostile to the Islamic denomination that prevails in Saudi Arabia. Many Iranians see Wahhabis as sectarians who sow discord among Muslims and as unsophisticated desert-dwellers who have reverted to the days of pre-Islamic ignorance. They are also accused of allying with the imperialists and ceding Palestine to the Zionists."
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2014/nea/238454.htm
14 Oct 2015: There were reports of arrests and harassment of Sunnis. The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (ICHRI) cited activist reports that authorities in Ahvaz arrested 20 Arab-Iranians February 26 for converting from Shia Islam to Sunni Islam, arresting them in a house raid without a warrant and then detaining them in an MOIS office. Mohammad Kayvan Karimi, Amjad Salehi, and Omid Payvand were sentenced to death May 4 on charges of “enmity against God through spreading propaganda against the system.” According to Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), the three were active in preaching Sunni Islam.
...
According to HRANA, authorities arrested Saeed Haydari, a recent Sunni convert from Shia Islam, on July 24 at his home in Khuzestan, reportedly for reasons related to his religious activities and his conversion to Sunni Islam.
http://martinkramer.org/sandbox/reader/archives/khomeinis-messengers-in-mecca/
Khomeini declared that the Saudi rulers, “these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back,” and announced that Mecca was in the hands of “a band of heretics.”32 Once more, the Saudis were transformed into what the speaker of the parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, called “Wahhabi hooligans.” Rafsanjani recalled the nineteenth-century Wahhabi massacres (of Shi‘ites) in Najaf and Karbala, the Wahhabi destruction of Islamic monuments in Medina (venerated by Shi‘ites), and the Wahhabi burning of libraries (containing Shi‘ite works). The Wahhabis “will commit any kind of crime. I ask you to pay more attention to the history of that evil clique so that you can see what kind of creatures they have been in the course of their history.”33 This represented a deliberate attempt to fuel a present crisis with the memory of past sectarian hatreds.
....
The following month, Iran convened an “International Congress on Safeguarding the Sanctity and Security of the Great Mosque,” under the auspices of the ministry of Islamic guidance and the foreign ministry. Rafsanjani, in addressing the three hundred participants from 36 countries, called for the “liberation” of Mecca and the establishment of an “Islamic International” which would govern Mecca as a free city.37 Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri, at the time Khomeini’s successor-designate, met with the foreign guests and denounced the Saudis as “a bunch of English agents from Najd who have no respect either for the House of God or for the pilgrims who are the guests of God.” Just as Jerusalem would be liberated from the “claws of usurping Israel,” Mecca and Medina would be liberated from the “claws of Al Sa‘ud.”38 A Sunni cleric at the conference apparently took the analogy still further, denouncing the Saudis as Jews. An Iranian conferee clarified the point: Iran did not label the Saudis Jews, but “even if we do not agree that you are Jews, your deeds are worse than those of the Jews. What you did to Muslims in the House of God has never been done to Muslims by the Jews.”39 The insinuation that the Saudis were Jews—the worst possible libel—echoed an old piece of Shi‘ite bigotry that attributed Jewish origins to the Saudi ruling family.40 The Tehran resolutions were repeated by Iranian-inspired seminars on the pilgrimage that subsequently met in Beirut and Lahore. The Saudis also convened supporting conferences elsewhere, most notably in London, where Saudi clients declared support for the use of force in quelling Iranian “sedition.”41
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/sunni-muslims-living-fear-iran-state-sponsored-persecution-ramps-1484673
January 22, 2015: In everyday life, Sunni Islam is tolerated up to a point. But whenever it gains converts or influence, the state cracks down - particularly in the ethnic minority Kurdish, Arab and Baluch regions of Iran.
Last November, two Sunni prisoners of conscience from Iran's Baluch minority were executed. According to the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), 22-year old Vahid Shah Bakhsh and 23-year old Mahmoud Shah Bakhsh were hanged on charges of 'Moharabeh [enmity against God] and acting against national security'.
Both men had been subjected to severe torture at the Ministry of Intelligence Detention Centre in Zahedan. There are serious doubts about the evidence against them and the fairness of their trial. That same month the Supreme Court of Iran confirmed the 33-year jail term imposed on an Iraqi Sunni Muslim, Marivan Abdolkarim Reza, who was found guilty on similarly vague charges.
Also last November, 16 Sunni converts from Iran's Ahwazi Arab minority were arrested during a Qur'an class in Ahwaz city, according to HRANA. Meanwhile, the International Campaign for Sunni Prisoners in Iran (ICSPI) reports: "The pro-Shia Iranian government has been alarmed by the rise of Sunni Islam among the Ahwazi Arabs in the traditionally Shia-majority Khuzestan province.
"At least 10 Sunni converts were arrested in July 2014, with three arrested after preaching Sunni beliefs and seven arrested after holding congregational Sunni Taraweeh prayers during Ramadan." More than 20 Sunni converts were arrested last February at a Qur'an and Arabic language study meeting in Koye Alawi in Ahwaz city. The ICSPI adds that, "only a month ago, a further two Muslims from Iran's Ahwazi Arab minority, who had preached Sunni beliefs after converting from Shi'ism, were charged with 'causing corruption on earth', a charge which carries the death penalty.
https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2012/01/letter-sunni-mps/
Article 115 states, “The president must be among religious and political figures and have the following qualifications for elections: Iranian descent, Iranian citizenship, be a wise manager, have a good record and be trustworthy and pious, be faithful and a believer in the principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a member of the official religion of the country.” Since Article 12 of the Iranian Constitution defines the official religion of Iran to be Ethna Ashari (Twelver Shiism), Sunnis are prohibited from becoming candidates in the presidential elections.
http://masaratiraq.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/vol-5-E.pdf
2015:
Grossly biased versions of historical events in school textbooks and other educational materials as well as the celebration of historical events that exacerbate tensions between groups and peoples, between minorities and the majority, or between certain religious or ethnic groups.
An example of this was the performance of a play at the al-Mustansiriya University about the killing of Fatima al-Zahra (the daughter of Prophet Muhammad and the wife of Imam Ali, the fourth caliph of Islam revered in Shia’s beliefs) by the second Caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab, a respected figure in Sunni belief. Such a one-sided interpretation of an historical event may exacerbate sectarian tensions and threaten societal peace.
In a sectarian scene, the second caliph kills Fatima al-Zahra. The play was attended by the dean of the Tourism Department, al-Ghad Press
http://islamtimes.org/ur/doc/news/437796/
Feb 6, 2015:
صاحبزادہ ابوالخیر زبیر کا اس موقع پر کہنا تھا کہ امام خمینی نے ایک مسلمان حکمران کی شان کو ظاہر کرتے ہوئے رشدی ملعون کے خلاف فتویٰ جاری کیا، لیکن آج کے حکمران یہود و ہنود کی غلامی میں اس قدر محو ہیں کہ آقائے نامدار صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم کی شان میں گستاخیاں کی جا رہی ہیں لیکن وہ ٹس سے مس نہیں ہو رہے۔ انقلاب اسلامی ایران نے اسلام کے اندر ایک نئی روح پھونکی، انقلاب اسلامی جمہوری ایران ایک عظیم الشان انقلاب تھا جس کے پورے خطے بلکہ پوری دنیا پر اثرات مرتب ہوئے ہیں، پورا عالم کفر اس انقلاب کے خلاف صف آرا ہوا اور اسے ناکام کرنے کی کوشش کی گئی، لیکن کافروں کو ناکامی ہوئی اور انقلاب ان چھتیس سالوں میں بڑھتا ہی چلا جا رہا ہے، رکاوٹوں کے باوجود انقلاب کی بدولت ایران کا ملک ترقی کی منازل طے کرتا چلا جا رہا ہے، اسی انقلاب کا صدقہ اور برکتیں ہیں کہ اسلامی جمہوریہ ایران ترقی کی منازل طے کر رہا ہے۔
http://www.rasanews.ir/detail/news/258211/2005
1 May 2015:
نماینده ولی فقیه در آذربایجان غربی:
دولت عربستان از دایره مسلمانی خارج است
Representative of the Supreme Leader in West Azerbaijan:
The Saudi government is out of the Muslim circle
خبرگزاری رسا ـ نماینده ولی فقیه در آذربایجان غربی گفت: دولت آل سعود با ادامه دادن تجاوزات خود به مردم یمن در ماه حرام الهی، ثابت کرد که هیچ پایبندی به دستورات الهی ندارد و از دایره دین اسلام خارج است.
به گزارش خبرنگار خبرگزاری رسا در ارومیه، حجتالاسلام والمسلمین سید مهدی قریشی، نماینده ولی فقیه در آذربایجان غربی در خطبههای این هفته نماز جمعه با اشاره به وقاهت و بیشرمی دولت آل سعود در ادامه تهاجماتش به مردم بیدفاع یمن، اظهار داشت: عربستان با ادامه دادن حملات خود نشان داد که به هیچ یک از دستورات دین اسلام پایبند نیست و بویی از مسلمانی نبرده است.
Rasa News Agency, the representative of the supreme leader in West Azerbaijan, said that the Al Saud government, while continuing its aggression against the Yemeni people during the Sacred Month, proved that it has no adherence to divine orders and is outside the circle of Islam.
According to the correspondent of Rasa News Agency in Urumia, Hojatoleslam Islam and Sayyid Mehdi Qureshi, the representative of the Wali Faqih in Western Azerbaijan, in the sermons of this week's Friday prayers, pointing to the fate of the Saudi government and its attacks on the Yemeni defenseless people, said: The attacks showed that they did not adhere to any of the laws of Islam and did not smell like Muslims.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2015/may/22/taliban-delegation-official-visit-tehran-iran-isis
22 May 2015: a delegation of Taliban, led by Mohammad Tayyab Agha, visited Iran on Monday and held talks with Iranian leaders. While officials in Tehran denied the visit, Iranian newspapers and Taliban confirmed that the delegation was comprised of Taliban members from their political bureau in Qatar. A Taliban statement said that the delegation discussed a number of issues with Iranian officials, including the current situation in Afghanistan, regional and Islamic world issues, and the condition of Afghan refugees in Iran.
Monday’s visit was not the first time a Taliban delegation has visited Iran. They have already been to the country twice. Two years ago, they even attended an Islamic “vigilance” conference hosted by Iran, according to state media reports.
.....
When five civilians were reportedly kidnapped and killed in a central
region of the country on 17 April, the local officials blamed the
Taliban for the killing. However, a Taliban statement rejected the claim
a day later, saying the Kabul administration and “certain media” were
stoking sectarian violence. It said the Taliban militants on the ground
had tried to find and rescue “our Hazara countrymen,” but they were
killed before they succeeded.
Additionally, when 31 Hazara passengers were kidnapped on
Kabul-Kandahar highway earlier this year (19 were released in an
apparent prisoner swap later) the Taliban vehemently denied being behind
the abduction. A Taliban statement last month even said that their
militants diverted a convoy of Hazaras to protect them from crossfire
between their fighters and government forces in the southern region.Although it is difficult to prove that the recent spate of attacks against Hazaras and Shia are the work of Isis associates or Taliban splinter groups operating without the orders of their leadership, the Taliban’s public positions on the events are noteworthy.
In past months, the Taliban appears to be softening its formerly hostile position towards both Iran and Shia minorities.
When a Saudi Arabia-led coalition began airstrikes against the Houthis, an Iran-backed Shia group in Yemen, in late March, most Sunni Islamic states, including the Afghan government, supported the operation. Hezi Islami, an insurgent group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that has separately waged war against the Kabul administration, not only supported intervention, but showed readiness to send fighters in support of the Saudi-led operation. However, despite Saudi Arabia being one of the three countries that formally recognized the Taliban regime in 1990s, the Taliban has yet to declare its official position regarding the war in Yemen.
25 June 2015:
دولت عربستان از دایره اسلام خارج شده است
خبرگزاری رسا ـ حجت الاسلام اصغری حسامیه به جنایات عربستان در یمن اشاره کرد و گفت: عربستان به دو دلیل واضح و روشن در مسأله یمن، یعنی حمله در ماه حرام و همپیمانی با یهود از دایره اسلام خارج است.
به گزارش خبرنگار خبرگزاری رسا در زاهدان، حجت الاسلام علیرضا اصغری حسامیه، استاد حوزه و دانشگاه، امشب در جلسه تفسیر جزء هشتم قرآن کریم که در مسجد المهدی زاهدان برگزار شد، گفت: آیات ابتدایی جزء هشتم که از آیه 111 سوره مبارکه انعام آغاز میشود، بیانگر بهانهگیری و درخواست مشرکان از پیامبر است.
The Saudi government has left the Islamic circle
Raja News Agency Hojatoleslam Asghari Hesamieh referred to the Saudi crimes in Yemen and said: Saudi Arabia is out of circle of Islam for two obvious reasons in Yemen, namely the attack in the holy month and alliance with the Jews.
According to the correspondent of Rasa News Agency in Zahedan, Hojjatoleslam Alireza Asghari Hassamieh, professor of the hawza and university, said at the eighth Quranic commentary session of the Holy Quran, which was held at the al-Mahdi mosque of Zahedan, said: "The first verses of the eighth verse, beginning with verse 111 of Mobarakeh Surah , Expresses the exaggeration and request of the polytheists to the Prophet.
.....
وی به جنایات عربستان در یمن اشاره و عنوان کرد: دولت عربستان به عنوان دولتی که مطیع وهابیت بوده و فقه وهابیت را که شیعهکشی را امری واجب میشمارد در این کشور حاکم میداند، چگونه شیعیان را مشرک میداند؟ عربستان به دو دلیل واضح و روشن که در مسأله یمن ثابت شد، از دایره اسلام خارج است اولا اینکه در ماه رجب که ماه حرام است، دست از جنگ نکشید حتی قاتلان امام حسین(ع) مدام به فرماندهان خود تذکر میدادند که در ماه حرام خونی ریخته نشود اما سردمداران بنیامیه مانند آل سعود کنونی به احکام الهی عمل نمیکردند.
He pointed to Saudi crimes in Yemen, saying that the Saudi government is subordinate to the Wahhabis and Wahhabi jurisprudence consideres it obligatory to finish Shias in this country, how does the Shiites stand as polytheists? Saudi Arabia, for two obvious reasons, as proved to be in the Yemeni cause, is outside the Islamic circle. Firstly, in the month of Rajab, which is the sacred month, they do not stop the war. Even the murderers of Imam Hussein (AS) constantly reminded their commanders that in the month of haram Blood was not poured out, but the rulers of the Banu Ummaya, like the current Al-Saud, did not act in divine ordinances.
استاد حوزه و دانشگاه دومین علت مشرکبودن رژیم آل سعود را همپیمانی با یهود دانست و گفت: خداوند در آیه 121 سوره انعام میفرماید اگر مسلمانی در عمل خود مطیع غیرمسلمان شد، مشرک است آیا عربستان که با دستور و همراهی آمریکا و اسرائیل به یمن حمله کرد، مشرک نیست؟ چگونه شیعیان را به دلیل توسل به ائمه مشرک میداند؟
The professor of the hawza and the university said the second cause of Saudis being polytheists is their alliance with the Jews and said: Allah, in verse 121 of Surah al-Anam, states that if a Muslim becomes submissive to a non-Muslim, he is a polytheist. Is Saudi who attacked Yemen with command and co-operation with the United States and Israel, not a polytheist? How come Shiites wh make Imams their wasila are polytheist?
وی تصریح کرد: خداوند در آیه 137 سوره انعام انسانها را از قتل اولاد برحذر میدارد در دوران جاهلی کشتن فرزندان برای مردم به سه دلیلِ مشکلات اقتصادی، مایه ننگ بودن فرزندان دختر و تقرب به بتها زینت شمرده میشد خداوند این افراد را مشرک مینامد دولت عربستان که اینگونه دست به کشتار زنان و کودکان یمنی میزند، مشرک است.
He argued that in verse 137, Allah warns people of killing children. In the era of ignorance, the killing of children for the people was considered for three reasons because of the economic problems, the disgrace of the daughters and to please the idols. God calls these people polytheist. The Saudi government in the the way it is killing Yemeni women and children, is polytheist.
http://observers.france24.com/en/20150806-iran-islam-mosque-shia-sunni-religion
6 Aug 2015: "In 1997, Iran’s last official census recorded about five million Sunnis. The number has grown since then: today, an estimated one million Sunni Muslims live in Tehran province alone. There are 47,291 Shiite mosques and 10,344 Sunni mosques in Iran, according to official statistics. Many of these mosques on the official record are tiny spaces serving small villages. However, there are no Sunni mosques at all in Iran’s large cities. For decades, Tehran’s Sunni minority has sought to build a mosque but authorities have always prevented the construction. The Pahlavi dynasty, which ruled Iran from 1925 to 1979, refused to grant the Sunnis building permission. During the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomenai originally promised to let them build a mosque. However, after he took power, he changed his mind. Post-revolution, Shiite clergy gained power under the Shah’s rule and Tehran’s Sunnis lost hope of building a mosque. Deprived of a mosque, Tehran’s Sunni minority use quasi-secret worship rooms to gather and pray. According to our Observers, there are about four or five such worship rooms scattered throughout different neighbourhoods. However, Iranian authorities closed some of them on Thursday, July 29, though it was impossible to confirm how many were shut. Tehran municipal officials went even further when they went to the large worship room in the Pounak neighbourhood, the only such space in the west of Tehran. Authorities, backed by security officials, systematically destroyed the room, knocking down walls and reducing much of the space to rubble. Outcry after the destruction was widespread. Iranians—including both Shiites and Sunnis, people from different political parties and both political and human rights activists— have also openly criticized the government action. Grand Molavai Abodlhamid, Iran’s most prominent Sunni mufti, wrote a letter about it to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini and President Hasan Rouhani. Neither has reacted to the incident or responded to Abodlhamid’s letter. "
http://observers.france24.com/en/20151111-taliban-murder-women-children-hazara
11 Nov 2015: Mullah Akhtar, for his part, has an agreement with the Hazaras on the basis that they share a common enemy. Thanks to that agreement, his fighters can be treated in hospitals run by Hazaras in central and eastern Afghanistan.
After the seven hostages were executed, Mullah Akhtar's fighters claimed to have killed seven men who were purportedly behind the murder of the Hazara captives. It's as if they were trying to go on a charm offensive for ethnic Hazaras. But according to my local sources, the seven were just followers of Dadullah, and not necessarily the killers.
Even in Afghanistan, violence rarely reaches this level. When the Taliban were in power [1996-2001], women were never forced to get out of cars and buses at checkpoints or taken hostage. It was considered dishonorable to capture a woman, but now..."
http://en.iranwire.com/features/6987/
Dec 22, 2015:
The Laws of Iran vs. the Laws of ISIS
Blasphemy
According to the Islamic Penal Code of ISIS, the punishment for blasphemy against (or insulting) God, the Prophet Mohammad and Islam is death. The punishment for adultery for a married adulterer/adulteress is stoning, and for an unmarried adulterer/adulteress, it is 100 lashes and one year in exile. Punishment for sodomy (or male homosexuality) is death. The punishments for qazf (false accusation of sexual offences) and for drinking alcohol is 80 lashes.
Apostasy, Spying, and Banditry
The punishment for apostasy is death — the same punishment handed down for the crime of “spying for the unbelievers” and for “banditry” or highway robbery. If an individual is found guilty of banditry, and that banditry has involved theft and results in murder, the guilty party will face death by crucifixion; if he or she is found guilty of banditry that has only involved murder and not theft, the punishment is death, though it is not clear how the punishment will be carried out; if the banditry only involves theft but does not result in murder, the punishment is amputation of the right hand and the left leg; and if the banditry causes terror or fear in the public, the punishment is exile.
All of the above crimes and punishments are also part of the Hudud section of Iran’s Penal Code.
According to Article 262 and 263 of Iran's code, the punishment for insulting the prophet, any of the imams of Islam or Fatima, the prophet’s daughter, is death by hanging.
Iran’s Penal Code also sets out the punishment for adultery: Stoning for a married adulterer/adulteress and 100 lashes for an unmarried adulterer/adulteress. The punishment is stepped up to execution in cases where adultery occurs between blood relatives forbidden to marry. If a stepmother and stepchild engage in adultery, the male stepson will be sentenced to death, as will a non-Muslim man who engages in adultery with a Muslim woman. And if adultery takes place through coercion (ie rape),the rapist will be sentenced to death.
As with the ISIS code, homosexuality is forbidden under Iran’s penal code. But unlike the ISIS code, which stipulates that both people taking part in homosexual acts should be condemned to death, Iran’s code differentiates between the “passive” party and the “active” party engaging in homosexual activity. Under Iran’s Islamic law, the passive person is punished with death, while the active person receives 100 lashes as punishment. This punishment changes when the active individual is married, or if sodomy is carried out by force. In those cases, the punishment is death.
The differentiation between the two types of punishments possibly stems from Iran’s patriarchal culture, which allows for more severe punishment for the person who has been seen to not have maintained his so-called masculinity and conformed to a submissive role.
When it comes to qazf (false accusation of sexual offences) and drinking alcohol, under Iran’s Islamic code, the punishment is 80 lashes.
Under Iran’s penal code, theft is sometimes considered a Hadd crime, which, as under ISIS’ code, results in severe punishments, such as the amputation of limbs and the death penalty; in some cases, it is considered to be a Tazir crime, which results in a less severe punishment, such as imprisonment or flogging. In order for a theft to be considered a Hadd crime, it must meet certain criteria, including that the property in question should have been kept in an appropriate secure place (for example, jewelry should be kept in a secure, locked box, and if a thief breaks into this box, the crime is considered to be a Hadd crime); the value of the stolen property should not be less than a certain weight (4.5 Nokhod [a traditional unit of weight] of coined gold [equal to 0.87 g]); and the thief should not be the father of the owner of the property.
In Iran, the punishment for theft classified as a Hadd crime is amputation of the right hand for the first offence, amputation of the left foot for the second offence, life imprisonment for the third offence, and the death penalty for the fourth offence.
Unlike ISIS’ code, Iran’s penal code does not specifically address the crime of apostasy. However, in cases of Hudud crimes not mentioned in the penal code, like apostasy, Article 220 states that judges are required to abide by Article 167 of the constitution —meaning that they must hand down judgments based on authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwas if a codified law does not exist for that crime. Since, according to many fatwas, the punishment for apostasy is death, judges can legally hand down death sentences for apostasy. However, even though in the past various converts (including Yousef Nadarkhani, Saeed Abedini and Behrouz Sadequi Khanjani) have been prosecuted under the charge of apostasy, by the time many of these cases came to completion, the charges had changed: Instead of apostasy, these religious converts ended up being charged with security-related charges. Espionage, one of the most frequently used security-related charges, can come with a prison sentence of up to 10 years. If a member of the military is found guilty of espionage, he or she can face execution. So it would seem that, unlike ISIS, the Iranian government is reluctant to acknowledge — and even tries to hide — the fact that it punishes its people for changing their religion.
Article 279 of Iran’s Penal Code defines Moharebeh as “drawing a weapon on the life, property or chastity of people or to cause terror as it creates the atmosphere of insecurity.” Article 281 considers three groups to be mohareb, or people who commit moharebeh: Bandits, thieves, and smugglers who resort to weapons and disrupt public security or the security of the roads.
In Iran, the punishment for Moharebeh is one of the following: execution, crucifixion, amputation of the right hand and the left leg, and banishment.
Seizure of Property
ISIS regularly confiscates property belonging to people living in the cities it conquers. These confiscations form part of ISIS’ revenue. After raiding museums and ancient cities, ISIS sells antiques seized there on the black market. On various occasions, ISIS also demands taxes. For example, an individual may be required to pay taxes if his beard is too long or too short, if he is in possession of a forbidden item, or if he does not possess proper documentation.
Authorities in Iran also regularly confiscate property. The main mandate of the Executive Committee of the Imam Khomeini's Order (a committee established in 1989 by the order of the Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini) is to identify and confiscate the property of individuals with connections to the political system in place before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. However, in practice, the committee not only confiscates the assets and holdings of individuals linked to the previous regime, it also confiscates assets and holdings belonging to Jewish people and to Iranians who have moved abroad.
Property seizure in Iran can also be carried out in line with various codes laid out in the constitution. According to Article 49 of the constitution, “The government has the responsibility of confiscating all wealth accumulated through usury, usurpation, bribery, embezzlement, theft, gambling, misuse of endowments, misuse of government contracts and transactions, the sale of uncultivated lands and other resources subject to public ownership, the operation of centers of corruption, and other illicit means and sources, and restoring it to its legitimate owner; and if no such owner can be identified, it must be entrusted to the public treasury.” This provision has mainly been used to carry out punishment against people with links to the pre-revolution regime.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/iran-sunnis-saudi/422877/
6 Jan 2016: First, a brief history lesson: How did Iran become Shia? Until the 16th century, Persia was mostly Sunni. At the turn of that century, the Safavid dynasty conquered much of what is now Iran and made Shiism the official religion. The conversion was accompanied by a massive crackdown on Sunnis, so that over time much of the population became Shia. Today, most of the Sunnis who remain are mostly from minority ethnic groups—Arabs, Turkmen, Kurds, Baluch—rather than Persians. That makes some discrimination based on religion difficult to separate from ethnic discrimination, according to the U.S. State Department. Many of these Sunnis also live in remote, impoverished areas, making it difficult to tell whether poor government services are a result of sectarian discrimination or not.
The state of religious freedom in Iran is not good—Freedom House ranks it “not free,” with nearly the lowest rating, in its annual report. (That’s still enough to best Saudi Arabia, which Freedom Houses places in the “worst of the worst.”) In addition to Sunnis, there are several smaller non-Muslims groups, notably Bahais, Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians. Compared to them, Sunnis have greater legal protections. Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence are officially recognized in the constitution as sources of family law and religious education. Sunnis can serve in the parliament, though they’re not afforded the few reserved seats given to other religious minorities.
In practice, however, the status of Sunnis appears more precarious. As of the end of 2015, the State Department said there were hundreds of religious minorities, including Sunnis, imprisoned. Sunnis complain that though there are an estimated 1 million of them in Tehran, there are no Sunni mosques in the capital. In addition, the State Department noted in its most recent annual religious-freedom report that religious readers had said Sunni literature and teachings were banned in public schools, and new construction of Sunni mosques and schools was banned.
"There were reports of arrests and harassment of Sunnis. The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (ICHRI) cited activist reports that authorities in Ahvaz arrested 20 Arab-Iranians February 26 for converting from Shia Islam to Sunni Islam, arresting them in a house raid without a warrant and then detaining them in an MOIS office. Mohammad Kayvan Karimi, Amjad Salehi, and Omid Payvand were sentenced to death May 4 on charges of “enmity against God through spreading propaganda against the system.” According to Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), the three were active in preaching Sunni Islam."
In addition, Iranian Sunnis reported raids on worship sites, and being prevented from celebrating Eid al-Adha in 2014. Last summer, clandestine worship spaces for Sunnis in Tehran were reportedly destroyed.
4 Feb 2016: Although growing Qatari-Iranian ties fueled tension between Doha and other GCC members, it was logical for Qatar to pursue an increasingly cooperative relationship with Tehran, given the emirate’s strategic interests and ambitions. A troubled history of distrustful relations with the Saudis, entailing border disputes and Riyadh’s alleged interference in Doha’s palace politics throughout the 1990s, prompted the Qataris to prioritize autonomy from Riyadh’s geopolitical orbit.
Deeper relations with Iran have been a means of achieving this independence. Qatar’s small Shiite minority, which has historically maintained positive relations with the Sunni majority, has never succumbed to significant Iranian influence. Accordingly, officials in Doha, unlike their counterparts in Riyadh and Manama, have never felt too threatened by a possible Iranian-inspired Shiite revolution in Qatar.
In contrast to other GCC states, Qatar has often viewed Iran as part of the solution to regional security dilemmas. For example, in 2010, Doha signed a bilateral agreement with Tehran “to combat terrorism and promote security cooperation.” Four years earlier, Qatar was the only UN Security Council member to vote against Resolution 1696, which called on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program.
Strong economic bonds with Iran factor significantly in Doha’s strategic calculations. Sharing North Dome/South Pars (the world’s largest natural gas field) with Iran, the Qatari leadership is motivated to address problems in Arab-Iranian relations using dialogue rather than hostility. Unquestionably, a military conflict in the Gulf involving Iran could threaten both Doha and Tehran’s development of North Dome/South Pars. Thus, it was unsurprising that soon after the the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany and Tehran reached their watershed nuclear agreement, Qatar’s foreign minister welcomed it and declared that the deal will make the Middle East safer.
www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/02/11/466290011/the-precarious-existence-of-irans-sunni-muslims
11 Feb 2016: When Shiite mosques issue their five calls to prayer every day, they're amplified through loudspeakers and echo down every street. But the Sunni man who sings the call to prayer for this mosque does it indoors, so few people hear.
This worship space is so obscure that some foreign news articles have stated as fact that there is no Sunni mosque in Tehran at all.
......Babaei says the administration of Iran's former president tried to shut down this worship space. Hassan Rouhani, the current president, is publicly more tolerant — but the State Department says Iranian Sunnis have been imprisoned for their beliefs. And news reports have said at least one Sunni place of worship in Tehran was shut down last year.
https://twitter.com/AmirTaheri4/status/707954011949948928 10
March 2016: #Ayatollah Alam Al-Hoda: Secularism was introduced by #Omar
(2nd Caliph) against #Ali (4th Caliph) who opposed separating faith and
politics
https://hra-news.org/en/sunni-mosques-kurdistan-deprived-determining-imams
21 April 2016: According to the Religious Affairs Office in Kurdistan province, the trustees of mosques have no right to Dismissal and Employment of the prayers or hold Koran classes without the approval of the Great Islamic Center. The Great Islamic Center deals with Sunni people’s religious affairs and is a governmental institution that operates under the supervision of representatives of the Supreme Leader.
http://www.clarionproject.org/news/iran-may-execute-30-sunni-clerics-endangering-security
May 1, 2016: A campaign called Defense of Political Prisoners in Iran published a list that includes the name of 30 Sunni preachers that Iran has threatened to execute.
As reported by Al Arabiya, the preachers are part of a larger group of 200 Sunni political prisoners including other preachers and students of religious science accused of endangering national security and preaching against the regime. Most of the prisoners are Iranian Kurds.
The 30 threatened with execution are held in the Rajai Shahr prison in Karaj, the fourth largest city in Iran.
One of the most prominent preachers, Shahram Ahmadi, was arrested seven years ago for the crimes of taking part in political and religious classes and selling books with religious content. He was arrested with his brother Chamid who was executed in March 2015 at the age of 17.
Chamid, together with five other inmates who were also executed, was accused of taking part in the assassination of a Sunni cleric who was close the regime. Amnesty International as well as other human-rights groups say the five were involved in peaceful, religious activities that included organizing classes of religious studies in Sunni mosques in the Kurdish regions of Iran.
Relatives of those executed say no charges were brought against the five for the first four years following their arrests. The group was never brought to a court during that time.
Some of the preachers said they were severely tortured during an entire year of interrogations and held in solitary confinement in an Iranian intelligence facility in the city of Sanandaj in the center of the Kurdish province.
http://www.thearabweekly.com/?id=4989
May 8, 2016: Raja News, one of the mouthpieces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), disclosed in a December 28th, 2015, report on the Nabavioun Brigade that the Sunni population in Sistan-Baluchestan considered the war in Syria a “slaughter of fellow Muslims”.
That opinion, said Raja News, changed after the “martyrdom” of the three Sunni Iranian volunteers to Syria. But the Sunni boycott of “martyr” burials in Sistan-Baluchestan suggests otherwise.
https://hra-news.org/en/mohammad-akrami-pour-sentenced-15-years-prison
May 11, 2016: According to the report of Human Rights Activists News Agency in Iran (HRANA), Mohammad Akrami Pour, son of Mashallah, Sunni prisoner in Rajae Shahr prison in Karaj who had been arrested on November 28, 2013, was sentenced to 15 years in prison after 29 months of uncertainty by branch 28 of Tehran’s revolutionary court.
The trial headed by judge Mogheyseh had been held unlawfully and without the defendant’s attorney. “Muharebeh” and “propaganda against the system” were raised as his charges and “conversion from Shi’ism to Sunnism” and “propagating Sunni religion” as the examples of these charges.
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21698440-there-one-god-yet-different-forms-islam-are-fighting-their-own-version?fsrc=scn/tw/te/pe/ed/thenewstrife
May 16, 2016: Shias are given to emotional commemorations of the martyrdom of Ali and Hussein, including public self-flagellation. They are often accused of revelling in al-madhlumiya, or “victimhood”. These days, though, it is often Sunni Arabs who feel and behave like the underdogs. Though they make up the majority of Muslim Arabs, Sunnis often feel disenfranchised in the Arab heartland—sidelined by the Shia majority in Iraq, under murderous attack by the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria (dominated by Alawites, an offshoot of Shiism), intimidated in Lebanon by Hizbullah (a powerful Shia militia), and dispersed and occupied by Israel in Palestine. In Yemen, they have been ejected from power by Houthi fighters, issued from the Zaydis.
International brigades of Sunnis and Shias now confront each other in Syria. Those fighting for Mr Assad include Shia recruits from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, led by Hizbullah and senior officers of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Against these stand two broad groups: the jihadists of Islamic State, made up of volunteers from many countries, and looser alliances of Syrian Sunni rebel groups supported to varying degrees by neighbouring Sunni states, mainly Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Jordan. Suicide-bombings, the poor man’s guided missile, were first adopted by proto-Hizbullah in 1983; they were copied by Palestinian Islamists and are now a favourite tactic of Sunni jihadists.
Islam is more than ever the cause for which everyone claims to be fighting. But which Islam? Eugene Rogan of Oxford University argues that the fate of the Arab world will be determined by the contest between three versions of Islam: the Muslim Brotherhood and salafi-jihadism (both Sunni) and the Shia doctrine of the “rule of the jurisprudent”.
http://urdu.alarabiya.net/ur/middle-east/2016/05/31/%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B4%DB%81%D8%AF-%D8%B4%DB%81%D8%B1-%D9%85%DB%8C%DA%BA-%D8%A7%DB%81%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%AA-%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DA%A9%D9%84%D9%88%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AC%D8%AF-%D8%A8%DA%BE%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%AF-.html
May 31, 2016: Sunni mosque closed down in Mashad, Iran.
https://hra-news.org/en/information-bagher-gholami-since-arrested-march-6th
June 3, 2016: HRANA News Agency – Bagher Gholami (Naami) Arab citizen who had converted from Shi’ism to Sunnism and had been active to promote that, has been in the Ministry of Intelligence detention in Ahvaz since March 6th. There is no information about his fate so far.
........
This religious activist had been already arrested and imprisonment several rimes. Mr. Gholami was in detention of Intelligence office on February 17, 2011. He spent 13 months imprisonment from July 26, 2012 on. He also, experienced more than 5 months imprisonment, from December 17, 2013 on.
The Ahwazi citizen has been arrested for his present case by Ministry of Intelligence agents, on March 6, 2016.
.....
In his previous case, Mr. Gholami was charged with “propaganda against the Islamic Republic of Iran and blasphemy by converting from Shiism and tendency to Sunnism through establishing groups and communities in different areas of the city of Ahvaz and holding domestic meetings to read Quran, prayers and celebrating religious festivals at the same time with Arab countries” and was sentenced by Branch 2 of the Revolutionary Court in Ahwaz, presided by Judge Seyed Mohammad Bagher Mousavi, and endured his sentence.
http://en.rasanews.ir/detail/News/422564/1
July 23, 2016: Ayatollah Mohammad-Javad Fazel-Lankarani said that by studying the events happening in the Muslim world, we will realize that they are being planned by the enemies of Islam and added that the imperial powers initially founded the Wahhabi ideology, which is not just opposed to the Shi’a school of thought or even Sunni Islam, but rather this ideology has been formed to oppose the basis of Islam.
The head of Qom’s Centre for the Jurisprudence of the Pure Imams said: “Years ago, when the great scholars told us that the Wahhabis seek to destroy Makkah and even the Ka’bah, it was not believable but given the current actions of this group, this issue is well understandable to us today.”
He stated that that the current expression of Wahhabism is the ISIL terrorist group which is only the latest form of the Wahhabi ideology and when they are finished with this model, the enemies will create another model. “Today, Muslims must be more awake than ever before and observe the plans of the enemies of Islam because this group seeks to destroy Islam,” he warned.
Ayatollah Fazel-Lankarani stated that school of the Ahlul-Bayt is one-hundred percent compatible with the Quran and that not even one narration from the Ahlul-Bayt can be found which contradicts the Quran. “The extent that the Ahlul-Bayt cited their explanations based on the Quran cannot be found in any of the books or sermons of any Sunni leader,” he said.
His Eminence said a Shi’a preacher must have heartfelt faith that the truth of the Quran exists in the school of the Ahlul-Bayt. The only miracle that remains from the Prophet Muhammad is the Quran and Shi’as proudly say that they have become familiar with the Quran through our Ahlul-Bayt.
The Iranian scholar explained that Shi’as are not saying anything based on partiality or bias but rather based on undeniable documentation, we say reflecting and contemplating on the Quran is only from the Ahlul-Bayt.
Ayatollah Fazel-Lankarani added if the Sunnis bring all their Quranic commentaries to the table, we will see that all of these interpretations are all eisegesis or interpretations which express the interpreter’s own ideas or biases rather than the meaning of the text.
“Unfortunately, this incorrect understanding of the Quran has created all the deviations among Wahhabis, who’s interpretations are based on harshness and a literal understanding of the Quran and not on the culture of the Ahul-Bayt,” he said.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/takfiris-in-tehran-the-sectarian-face-of-iranian-counterterrorism
June 24, 2016: Ironically, revolutionary Islam is the ideological basis for the Iranian regime itself, which shares the takfiri belief in establishing rigid Islamic governance. But "takfiri" is nevertheless a loaded word capable of mobilizing the Shiite masses against Salafists and Wahhabis by highlighting the sectarian elements of their identity and appealing to primordial religious sentiments. It also allows the regime to equate the most violent Salafist groups with Wahhabism in general, and therefore with Saudi Arabia, the birthplace and foremost exporter of that brand of Islam. Indeed, Tehran constantly depicts the Saudi government as the main supporter and funder of violent Islamist entities, especially IS. This takfiri approach to anti-Saudi propaganda allows the regime to portray its tensions with Riyadh less as a political/economic rivalry between two countries than as a deeper conflict based on perennial sectarian differences.
.......
when officials affiliated with Rouhani have made similar claims, hardliners have been quick to attack them. On December 20, 2015, former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani "revealed" that three takfiris had crossed Iran's eastern borders to carry out bombing plots against a Friday prayer gathering in Tehran, the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, and the Masoumeh Shrine. In response, Hossein Zolfaqari, the interior minster's security deputy, called the claims inaccurate, while other hardliners accused Rafsanjani of spreading false reports to tarnish the Intelligence Ministry and weaken the Supreme Leader. They also argued that he was using such reports for various selfish reasons: namely, to deflect attention from his close relations with the Saudi royal family, to show that Iran's security and military decisionmaking has been suffering since those portfolios were taken away from him, and to exact revenge for his son's imprisonment on financial corruption charges.
http://english.aawsat.com/2016/07/article55354034/iranian-security-prohibits-sunnis-performing-eid-prayers-tehran
July 6, 2016: Member of Iran’s Parliament Mahmoud Sadeghi was quoted by IRNA news agency as saying that 18 parliamentarians had presented a warning to Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli after the closure of a Sunni mosque in Eslamshahr, west of Tehran.
Sadeghi said that the 18 parliamentarians had presented the letter to the interior minister, based on Article 12 of the Iranian Constitution, while IRNA reported that Parliament did not read the letter for lack of time.
Sadeghi said: “These violations contradict the Shi’ite-Sunni unity that is always stressed by the supreme leader.”
Iran’s Human Rights Agency Hrana quoted informed sources as saying that the Iranian security forces had raided a mosque northwest of Tehran, on the eve of Eid Al-Fitr and had prevented worshippers from performing their religious duties.
The agency reported that security personnel wearing civilian uniforms had attacked worshippers and had prevented them from entering the mosque. According to witnesses, the security personnel had also arrested a number of worshippers before releasing them in fear of creating popular disturbances in the area.
Sadeghi also said that the authorities had prevented worshippers from attending other Sunni mosques, including the TehranPars Mosque, north the capital.
Meanwhile, security tension returned on Wednesday to Baluchistan in southeast Iran, a week following battles between the Iranian security forces and local opposition groups, while Baluchistan’s “Army of Justice” had announced causing casualties in the ranks of the Revolutionary Guards.
Iranian news agencies quoted Police Spokesman Saeed Montazer al-Mahdi as saying that four IRGC border guards were killed during battles on the borders with Baluchistan Province.
Al-Mahdi said “the armed men entered the Pakistani territories after exchanging fire with Iranian security personnel,” Mehr news agency reported.
However, head of the Public Relations department at Baluchistan’s Army of Justice movement, Ibrahim Azizi, told Asharq Al-Awsat in a telephone call that the movement had killed seven IRGC soldiers in an ambush near the Iranian border, and asserted hitting two Iranian military vehicles.
Azizi said the movement would later broadcast a video showing Wednesday’s fighting with the Iranian Guards.
http://www.rferl.org/content/qishloq-ovozi-uzbekistan-militants-disarray-recruitment/27858308.html
July 14, 2016: The IMU was thought to have ceased to exist as of the end of 2015.
Its most recent leader, Usman Ghazi, declared an oath of allegiance to IS in the summer of 2015 and late last year led a large group of his fighters from their sanctuary in Pakistan's tribal region to the Zabul Province in southeastern Afghanistan to join a Taliban splinter group under Mansur Dadullah that was loyal to IS. The traditional Taliban of then-leader Mullah Mansur joined with local ethnic Hazara forces that had suffered at the hands of the IMU, and together they annihilated the IMU in battles in late October and early November. Nearly all the approximately 200 fighters, including Ghazi, were killed.
http://www.clarionproject.org/news/iran-tricks-families-newly-executed-prisoners
August 4, 2016: Families of at least 20 inmates in an Iranian prison showed up at the prison after being called to say goodbye to their loved ones. Instead, they found out that all the prisoners had already been hanged, with some already hastily buried.
The rest of the families were told to pick up the bodies in the prison morgue.
Iran, a Shiite-majority country, had accused the prisoners who were all Sunnis (including some foreigners) and accused of various crimes including several murders, bombings and robberies as well as undermining national security. Some were accused of participating in attacks by a Takfiri-Salafist group called “Monotheism and Jihad,” which Iranian intelligence authorities said were responsible for 24 armed attacks which killed 21 people over the course of two years.
Families and rights groups charge that the prisoners did not receive fair trials and their convictions were based on forced confessions under torture.
Among the prisoners was a Kurdish man, Shahram Ahmadi, 28, who was accused of “enmity against God.” He was reportedly wounded at the time of his arrest and tortured for 43 months while being kept in solitary confinement.
http://daily.urdupoint.com/livenews/2016-08-15/news-703525.html
http://sunnionline.us/english/2016/08/15/6350/
15 August 2016:
a popular actor and producer in Iran insulted Talha, Zobair and Abu-Mousa Ash’ari in a comedy show.
The official website of the Sunni community in Iran (sunnionline.us) reported, Mehran Modiri, the producer and host of a popular comedy TV show insulted the companions. “Dorehami” is a telecast program aired every night in Nasim TV channel.
Thousands of Iranian Sunni members in the social websites and communicating apps expressed their anger asking the authorities of IRIB (the state-run TV and radio channels) to stop broadcasting such programs.
20 Sunni members of the Iranian Majlis (parliament) have objected the incident in a written admonition. It was broadcast by the official radio channel of the parliament yesterday, Sunday 14th August, 2016.
The Iranian Sunni parliamentarians asked the authorities of IRIB and the ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance to notice the issue.
Ali Motahhari, the Deputy Speaker of the Majlis and Mohammad Qaseem Osmani, the only Sunni member of the executive board of the Iranian parliament also objected the insulting issue.
The officials of the state TV and radio and the producers of the program have not issued any reaction yet.
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21708263-once-islamic-state-defeated-what-will-iraqs-angry-sunnis-do-next-day
Oct 8, 2016:
http://daily.urdupoint.com/livenews/2016-08-15/news-703525.html
http://sunnionline.us/english/2016/08/15/6350/
15 August 2016:
a popular actor and producer in Iran insulted Talha, Zobair and Abu-Mousa Ash’ari in a comedy show.
The official website of the Sunni community in Iran (sunnionline.us) reported, Mehran Modiri, the producer and host of a popular comedy TV show insulted the companions. “Dorehami” is a telecast program aired every night in Nasim TV channel.
Thousands of Iranian Sunni members in the social websites and communicating apps expressed their anger asking the authorities of IRIB (the state-run TV and radio channels) to stop broadcasting such programs.
20 Sunni members of the Iranian Majlis (parliament) have objected the incident in a written admonition. It was broadcast by the official radio channel of the parliament yesterday, Sunday 14th August, 2016.
The Iranian Sunni parliamentarians asked the authorities of IRIB and the ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance to notice the issue.
Ali Motahhari, the Deputy Speaker of the Majlis and Mohammad Qaseem Osmani, the only Sunni member of the executive board of the Iranian parliament also objected the insulting issue.
The officials of the state TV and radio and the producers of the program have not issued any reaction yet.
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21708263-once-islamic-state-defeated-what-will-iraqs-angry-sunnis-do-next-day
Oct 8, 2016:
A PROMINENT Sunni preacher is describing how the demise of Islamic State could herald a new era of Sunni-Shia reconciliation, when a Shia soldier at the checkpoint outside his home town of Samara interrupts his musings. “Your people blew up our shrines,” he says, ordering the sheikh, Salah al-Taha, out of the car. Left to wait in the sun for a couple of hours while a commanding officer is roused from his rest, the sheikh’s resentment returns. Samarra, 125km (80 miles) north of Baghdad, is no longer his own, he says. Shia militias have taken over the old city, and chased out its Sunni inhabitants.
In place of Samarra’s past easy symbiosis—where Sunnis thrived from running hotels and restaurants for Shia pilgrims—the city is now divided in two. A seething outer new town of displaced Sunnis surrounds an inner pockmarked ghost-town manned by a conglomerate of Shia militias. Its centrepiece is the gold-plated dome over the shrine of the 10th and 11th Shia imams (rulers), which jihadists blew up in 2006. The shrine has been restored with even more glitter. The rare Sunni crossing its threshold still offers a prayer, but the Sunnis who once tended the shrine have been dismissed. Sunni couples no longer make the routine stop at its ornate inlaid doors on their wedding day. “We want freedom from military occupation,” says a Sunni local councillor.
...
The
numbers are uncertain, but of Iraq’s perhaps 7m Sunni Arabs, some
2.5m are displaced, many of them now in Iraqi Kurdistan where they
have to renew permits every four months, as if in a foreign land.
Some 1.5m have left Iraq altogether. A drive through the length of
Iraq is like visiting the dead cities ancient Rome left behind in
Syria. “I can’t go home,” complains Saleem Jabouri, who as
speaker of parliament is Iraq’s most senior Sunni Arab official.
The Shia militias ruling his home town in Diyala province, he says,
won’t give him a permit. Relatives languish in secret prisons. His
local Sunni mosque has become a Shia one.
...
While
Shia politicians accept devolution of services, like health and
electricity, they bridle at provincial governors being allowed to
raise their own security forces which might challenge the militias’
presence. “It will spur another sectarian civil war until Iraq
falls apart,” says a militia leader. Still, led by Italy’s
Carabinieri, the coalition is training 900 policemen every three
months. After a local police force took shape in Tikrit, 95% of the
population has returned. A tribal sheikh in Anbar is negotiating
deployment of a force which could reopen the Baghdad highway to
Jordan, part-funded by tolls.
9
Dec 2016: Friday sermon by #Ayatollah Soleimani:We don't ask #Sunnis
to become Sh'iites, only to follow our "Supreme Guide" and
say:Death to #America!
http://en.rasanews.ir/detail/News/426776/1
25 Jan 2017:
“If the definition of Islam is too flexible, they will perceive that they are correct and that the Shi’ah school of thought is false,” he noted.
https://twitter.com/AmirTaheri4/status/825014001201410048
27 Jan 2017: Islamic Security Minister #Ayatollah Alavi today:Propagating #Islam as such isn't enough;#Shiism must be taught as the true form of Islam.
https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/961248809731936256
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EzUYEeP5-Us&feature=youtu.be&t=2m51s
29 Dec 2017: Allama Jawad Naqvi (#Shia cleric): Just like Yazid, Saudi Crown Prince is also a liberal who has allowed women to drive, play, sing and dance. Just like Yazid, he has declared war on Ayatollah Khamenie, Hussain of our times.
http://en.rasanews.ir/detail/News/426776/1
25 Jan 2017:
Ayatollah Nouri-Hamadani emphasized on the lack of flexibility in the definition of pure Islam and stated that care must be taken that the definition of Islam and Shi’ism is not too flexible because pure Islam exists in the school of the Ahlul-Bayt and has been explained by the late Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei.
“If the definition of Islam is too flexible, they will perceive that they are correct and that the Shi’ah school of thought is false,” he noted.
https://twitter.com/AmirTaheri4/status/825014001201410048
27 Jan 2017: Islamic Security Minister #Ayatollah Alavi today:Propagating #Islam as such isn't enough;#Shiism must be taught as the true form of Islam.
https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/961248809731936256
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EzUYEeP5-Us&feature=youtu.be&t=2m51s
29 Dec 2017: Allama Jawad Naqvi (#Shia cleric): Just like Yazid, Saudi Crown Prince is also a liberal who has allowed women to drive, play, sing and dance. Just like Yazid, he has declared war on Ayatollah Khamenie, Hussain of our times.
https://www.academia.edu/24780777/Sunnite-Shiite_Polemics_in_Norway
Finally, bearing in mind that various agents of intolerance often borrow narratives from each other, it is striking that the propagators of contemporary Western anti-Sunnite rhetoric recycle Islamophobic prejudices against Muslims. For example, based on the assertion that “all terrorists are Muslims”, one of DiN’s followers posted a diagram on Facebook that characterizes “all Muslim terrorists as Sunnis”.
....
However, this explanation should not distort the fact that many “moderate” Sunnite activists claimed that the demonstration came across as addressing only Shiite victimhood. For instance, one Sunnite activist requested a condemnation of the “Shiite treatment of the Sunnis after the fall of Saddam Hussein” in Iraq (Private Facebook profile). Another Sunnite activist emphasized “the double standards in condemning IS without denouncing (Bashar al-) Assad’s killing and raping” in Syria (Private Facebook profile). With regard to the Norwegian situation, he pointed out that the “media did not interrogate the Hizbollah linked Shiite imam with a single critical question” (Private Facebook profile). Finally, it is noteworthy that a third Sunnite activist referred to an article published by Hege Storhaug (1962-), Norway’s most profiled anti-Islamic activist, to support his own concerns about the Shiites “representing Islam” in Norway. In addition to relating Storhaug’s warnings about the Shiite protesters’ supposed loyalty to Khomeinism, the Sunnite activist added that the Shiites in question “curse our mother Aishah, make takfir on the sahaba, support the genocide on Syrian Sunnis and [have] thus been partly responsible for the establishment of the IS” (Private Facebook profile).
http://www.shiachat.com/forum/topic/234980023-who-is-making-takfir-sunni-or-shia/
[Extract from the book "Misbah al fuqaha" by Ayatollah Abul Kasim al-Khoei] what’s means by momin is whoever believed in Allah
and his prophet (sallalahu alayhi wa ala alihi wa salam) and the
hereafter and the twelve imams (a) : first one is Ali ibn abi taleb (as)
and the last is the awaited alqaeim alhujja may Allah hasten his return. And may Allah make us of his supporters and helpers and whover denies anyone of them then it’s permissable to back-bite him for many reasons:
First reason : It’s well-established in the narrations and supplications and ziarat the permissibility of cursing the opponents and the duty of dissociating with them and insulting them extensively and attacking them :which means backbiting them because they are from the people of innovation and doubt.
More than that there’s no doubt about their disbelief(kofr) because denying wilayat and imams even one of them
and the belief in khilafat of others and belief in fairytales like predestination and so on leads to kofr and zandaqah,
and the proof for that is the mutawatir akhbar about the kofr of rejectors of wilayat and those who hold be;iefs as mentioned earlier and similar misguidances …."
http://www.shiachat.com/forum/topic/235024240-are-sunni-kafir/?page=1
"From Al-Kafi
مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدٍ عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ الْحَكَمِ عَنْ سُفْيَانَ بْنِ السِّمْطِ قَالَ: سَأَلَ رَجُلٌ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ ع عَنِ الْإِسْلَامِ وَ الْإِيمَانِ مَا الْفَرْقُ بَيْنَهُمَا فَلَمْ يُجِبْهُ ثُمَّ سَأَلَهُ فَلَمْ يُجِبْهُ ثُمَّ الْتَقَيَا فِي الطَّرِيقِ وَ قَدْ أَزِفَ مِنَ الرَّجُلِ الرَّحِيلُ فَقَالَ لَهُ أَبُو عَبْدِ اللَّهِ ع كَأَنَّهُ قَدْ أَزِفَ مِنْكَ رَحِيلٌ فَقَالَ نَعَمْ فَقَالَ فَالْقَنِي فِي الْبَيْتِ فَلَقِيَهُ فَسَأَلَهُ عَنِ الْإِسْلَامِ وَ الْإِيمَانِ مَا الْفَرْقُ بَيْنَهُمَا فَقَالَ- الْإِسْلَامُ هُوَ الظَّاهِرُ الَّذِي عَلَيْهِ النَّاسُ شَهَادَةُ أَنْ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ وَحْدَهُ لَا شَرِيكَ لَهُ وَ أَنَّ مُحَمَّداً عَبْدُهُ وَ رَسُولُهُ وَ إِقَامُ الصَّلَاةِ وَ إِيتَاءُ الزَّكَاةِ وَ حِجُّ الْبَيْتِ وَ صِيَامُ شَهْرِ رَمَضَانَ فَهَذَا الْإِسْلَامُ وَ قَالَ الْإِيمَانُ مَعْرِفَةُ هَذَا الْأَمْرِ مَعَ هَذَا فَإِنْ أَقَرَّ بِهَا وَ لَمْ يَعْرِفْ هَذَا الْأَمْرَ كَانَ مُسْلِماً وَ كَانَ ضَالّاا.
Imam al-Sadiq (as) said: Islam is the apparent level that the Shahadatayn, and salah and zaka, and hajj and siyam this is Islam, but Iman is the belief in Imama, whoever accepts the former and rejects the latter is muslim but a deviant one.
source: the third volume of al-Kafi, Chapter of belief and disbelief, section on: Islam protects the blood but reward is for Iman, Hadith 4
Sunnis are either misguided (laymen)
Or munafiq (their leaders)
Not Kafir. Kufr means apparent rejection of Allah and His Prophet (sa).
However nifaq is worse than Kufr, but it does not exclude a munafiq from apparent Islam."
http://en.rasanews.ir/detail/News/427063/1
7 Feb 2017:
The Iranian cleric said that the crimes of ibn Taymiyyah are much greater than Daesh and Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab, who inflicted this false thought and crime on humanity, laid the foundations of these crimes.
“If religion is deviated, it can result in bloodshed and Islam will also be described as terrorism,” he noted.
Ayatollah Fazel-Lankarani said added that when Muslims witness the crimes of Takfiri groups, they must realize that the Infallible Imams are essential to guide religion because today, deviant Salafis and Daesh are the result of deprivation from the pure teachings of the Infallible Imams.
“It’s important to know that apart from the school of the Ahlul-Bayt, there is no Islam,” he said.
http://en.rasanews.ir/detail/News/427135/1
7 Feb 2017:
He outlined the approaches in the Islamic system and said that three approaches in the Islamic system have been established and there is one approach in Sunni thought and two approaches in Shi’ah thought.
The researcher and professor in the Islamic Seminary of Qom pointed out that today, Sunnis have chosen the modern model of democracy and based on certain principles and religious components, they have established a system, which although it has deviated from many Islamic principles, the reason for their deviation is that in the conflict between the principles of efficiency and legitimacy, they have chosen efficiency.
Hujjat al-Islam Izdehi added that in the Shi’ah religious system, two approaches to constitutional order and democracy have been proposed and there have been various discussions about the constitutional system. “The late Ayatollah Mohammad-Hoseyn Naini didn’t consider this system favourable and considered the provisions of this system as secondary provisions,” he noted.
He stated that Imam Khomeini was the regenerator of the system of religious democracy and added that elections, a parliament and other organs of a religious democratic system were established in Iran on the basis of Islamic principles.
His Eminence noted that reference upon the early life of the Prophet Muhammad was the most important principle of Imam Khomeini in the creation of a religious democracy in Iran which is based on a fusion of religious democracy and Wilayat al-Faqih and isn’t based on the Western model but rather it is based on the Quran, narrations and life of the Ahlul-Bayt.
http://www.najaf.org/english/book/20/7.htm
"in Islam there is a term called "dharûriy, pl. dharûriyyãt" which refers to those issues that are essential parts of our religion. The "dharûriyyãt" are divided into two: "dharûriyyãt ad-dín - the essential parts of the Islamic faith" and "dharûriyyãt al-madhhab - the essential parts of the Shí'a sect". It is a common view of our scholars that whoever rejects one of the dharûriyyãt ad-dín, then he is no longer considered a member of the Islamic faith; and whoever rejects one of the dharûriyyãt al-madhhab, then he is no longer considered a member of the Shí'a Ithnã-'Ashari sect.
What is the status of the belief in the wilãyat of the Ahlul Bayt: is it one of the dharûriyyãt or not? While discussing the status of the Muslims who are not Shí'a, Ayatullãh al-Khu'i has defined wilãyat (in the sense of love for the Ahlul Bayt) as one of the dharûriyyãt ad-dín, and wilãyat (in the sense of khilãfat and political leadership) as one of the dharûriyyãt al-madhhab. The late Ayatullah says:
"The dimension of wilãyat that is essential [for dín] is the wilãyat
in the meaning of love and devotion, and they [the Sunnis] do not deny
it in this sense rather they actually express their love for the Ahlul
Bayt (a.s.)...
"Of course, the wilãyat in the meaning of succession (khilãfat) is one of the essential parts of the madhhab [of Shí'ism], but not from the essential parts of the dín."[127]
So according to Ayatullah al-Khu'i, the wilãyat and imãmate in the meaning of succession (khilãfat) is an essential part (dharûriy) of Shí'ism; anyone who rejects this dimension of the wilãyat would not be considered as a Shí'a. He would still be a Muslim but not a Shí'a."
First reason : It’s well-established in the narrations and supplications and ziarat the permissibility of cursing the opponents and the duty of dissociating with them and insulting them extensively and attacking them :which means backbiting them because they are from the people of innovation and doubt.
More than that there’s no doubt about their disbelief(kofr) because denying wilayat and imams even one of them
and the belief in khilafat of others and belief in fairytales like predestination and so on leads to kofr and zandaqah,
and the proof for that is the mutawatir akhbar about the kofr of rejectors of wilayat and those who hold be;iefs as mentioned earlier and similar misguidances …."
http://www.shiachat.com/forum/topic/235024240-are-sunni-kafir/?page=1
"From Al-Kafi
مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدٍ عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ الْحَكَمِ عَنْ سُفْيَانَ بْنِ السِّمْطِ قَالَ: سَأَلَ رَجُلٌ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ ع عَنِ الْإِسْلَامِ وَ الْإِيمَانِ مَا الْفَرْقُ بَيْنَهُمَا فَلَمْ يُجِبْهُ ثُمَّ سَأَلَهُ فَلَمْ يُجِبْهُ ثُمَّ الْتَقَيَا فِي الطَّرِيقِ وَ قَدْ أَزِفَ مِنَ الرَّجُلِ الرَّحِيلُ فَقَالَ لَهُ أَبُو عَبْدِ اللَّهِ ع كَأَنَّهُ قَدْ أَزِفَ مِنْكَ رَحِيلٌ فَقَالَ نَعَمْ فَقَالَ فَالْقَنِي فِي الْبَيْتِ فَلَقِيَهُ فَسَأَلَهُ عَنِ الْإِسْلَامِ وَ الْإِيمَانِ مَا الْفَرْقُ بَيْنَهُمَا فَقَالَ- الْإِسْلَامُ هُوَ الظَّاهِرُ الَّذِي عَلَيْهِ النَّاسُ شَهَادَةُ أَنْ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ وَحْدَهُ لَا شَرِيكَ لَهُ وَ أَنَّ مُحَمَّداً عَبْدُهُ وَ رَسُولُهُ وَ إِقَامُ الصَّلَاةِ وَ إِيتَاءُ الزَّكَاةِ وَ حِجُّ الْبَيْتِ وَ صِيَامُ شَهْرِ رَمَضَانَ فَهَذَا الْإِسْلَامُ وَ قَالَ الْإِيمَانُ مَعْرِفَةُ هَذَا الْأَمْرِ مَعَ هَذَا فَإِنْ أَقَرَّ بِهَا وَ لَمْ يَعْرِفْ هَذَا الْأَمْرَ كَانَ مُسْلِماً وَ كَانَ ضَالّاا.
Imam al-Sadiq (as) said: Islam is the apparent level that the Shahadatayn, and salah and zaka, and hajj and siyam this is Islam, but Iman is the belief in Imama, whoever accepts the former and rejects the latter is muslim but a deviant one.
source: the third volume of al-Kafi, Chapter of belief and disbelief, section on: Islam protects the blood but reward is for Iman, Hadith 4
I don't know how to find the english translation in the chaotic text you provide, but the original arabic is here:
it is the hadith number 1508.
Nifaq and Kufr and Dalaal(misguidance) are different.Sunnis are either misguided (laymen)
Or munafiq (their leaders)
Not Kafir. Kufr means apparent rejection of Allah and His Prophet (sa).
However nifaq is worse than Kufr, but it does not exclude a munafiq from apparent Islam."
http://en.rasanews.ir/detail/News/427063/1
7 Feb 2017:
He
said that the origin of the current crimes committed by the Daesh
Takfiri group is due to the acts of treachery and heresy carried out by
certain Sunni scholars, including the attacks against Shi’ah beliefs and
the Imams by ibn Taymiyyah.
The Iranian cleric said that the crimes of ibn Taymiyyah are much greater than Daesh and Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab, who inflicted this false thought and crime on humanity, laid the foundations of these crimes.
“If religion is deviated, it can result in bloodshed and Islam will also be described as terrorism,” he noted.
Ayatollah Fazel-Lankarani said added that when Muslims witness the crimes of Takfiri groups, they must realize that the Infallible Imams are essential to guide religion because today, deviant Salafis and Daesh are the result of deprivation from the pure teachings of the Infallible Imams.
....
“It’s important to know that apart from the school of the Ahlul-Bayt, there is no Islam,” he said.
http://en.rasanews.ir/detail/News/427135/1
7 Feb 2017:
Hujjat al-Islam Izdehi said that the question today is whether, due to the situation of the world today, should Islam turn toward Western democracy or look toward Islamic principles and the rule of the Prophet.
He outlined the approaches in the Islamic system and said that three approaches in the Islamic system have been established and there is one approach in Sunni thought and two approaches in Shi’ah thought.
The researcher and professor in the Islamic Seminary of Qom pointed out that today, Sunnis have chosen the modern model of democracy and based on certain principles and religious components, they have established a system, which although it has deviated from many Islamic principles, the reason for their deviation is that in the conflict between the principles of efficiency and legitimacy, they have chosen efficiency.
Hujjat al-Islam Izdehi added that in the Shi’ah religious system, two approaches to constitutional order and democracy have been proposed and there have been various discussions about the constitutional system. “The late Ayatollah Mohammad-Hoseyn Naini didn’t consider this system favourable and considered the provisions of this system as secondary provisions,” he noted.
He stated that Imam Khomeini was the regenerator of the system of religious democracy and added that elections, a parliament and other organs of a religious democratic system were established in Iran on the basis of Islamic principles.
His Eminence noted that reference upon the early life of the Prophet Muhammad was the most important principle of Imam Khomeini in the creation of a religious democracy in Iran which is based on a fusion of religious democracy and Wilayat al-Faqih and isn’t based on the Western model but rather it is based on the Quran, narrations and life of the Ahlul-Bayt.
http://www.najaf.org/english/book/20/7.htm
"in Islam there is a term called "dharûriy, pl. dharûriyyãt" which refers to those issues that are essential parts of our religion. The "dharûriyyãt" are divided into two: "dharûriyyãt ad-dín - the essential parts of the Islamic faith" and "dharûriyyãt al-madhhab - the essential parts of the Shí'a sect". It is a common view of our scholars that whoever rejects one of the dharûriyyãt ad-dín, then he is no longer considered a member of the Islamic faith; and whoever rejects one of the dharûriyyãt al-madhhab, then he is no longer considered a member of the Shí'a Ithnã-'Ashari sect.
What is the status of the belief in the wilãyat of the Ahlul Bayt: is it one of the dharûriyyãt or not? While discussing the status of the Muslims who are not Shí'a, Ayatullãh al-Khu'i has defined wilãyat (in the sense of love for the Ahlul Bayt) as one of the dharûriyyãt ad-dín, and wilãyat (in the sense of khilãfat and political leadership) as one of the dharûriyyãt al-madhhab. The late Ayatullah says:
"Of course, the wilãyat in the meaning of succession (khilãfat) is one of the essential parts of the madhhab [of Shí'ism], but not from the essential parts of the dín."[127]
http://www.al-islam.org/node/23661
Nahjul Balagha - Chapter 6
پیغمبر اکرم صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم کا ارشاد ہے کہ.
جو شخص اپنے دور حیات کے امام کو نہ پہچانے اور دنیا سے اٹھ جائے ,اس کی موت کفر و ضلالت کی موت ہے .
ابن ابی الحدید نے بھی اس ذات سے کہ جس سے ناواقفیت و جہالت عذر مسمو ع نہیں بن سکتی حضرت کی ذات کو مراد لیا ہے اور ان کی اطاعت کا اعتراف اور منکر امامت کے غیر ناجی ہونے کا اقرار کرتے ہوئے تحریر کیا ہے کہ:
جو شخص حضرت علی علیہ السلام کی امامت سے جاہل اور اس کی صحت و لزوم کا منکر ہووہ ہمارے اصحاب کے نزدیک ہمیشہ کے لیے جہنمی ہے.نہ اسے نماز فائدہ دے سکتی ہے نہ روزہ .کیونکہ معرفت امامت ان بنیادی اصولوں میں شمار ہوتی ہے جو دین کے مسلمہ ارکان ہیں .البتہ ہم آپ کی امامت کے منکر کو کافر کے نام سے نہیں پکارتے بلکہ اسے فاسق خارجی اور بے دین وغیرہ کے ناموں سے یاد کرتے ہیں اور شیعہ ایسے شخص کو کافر سے تعبیر کرتے ہیں ,اور یہی ہمارے اصحاب اور ان میں فرق ہے .مگر صرف لفظی فرق ہے کوئی واقعی اور معنوی فرق نہیں ہے.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xd6NAl5-DBU
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lZYu79ezIis
http://www.shiachat.com/forum/topic/235046958-sheikh-khorasani-dig-up-abu-bakr-and-umar/
https://twitter.com/AmirTaheri4/status/836193588472123392
27 Feb 2017: QOM-#Ayatollah Vahid #Khorassani: Every #Muslim must regard the destruction of the tombs of {Caliphs) #Abubakar and #Omar as his duty
http://en.rasanews.ir/detail/News/427851/1
5 March 2017:
Speaking during his advanced jurisprudence class at Qom’s Grand Mosque on Saturday morning, Grand Ayatollah Hoseyn Vahid-Khorasani dismissed the rumours that have been recently spread against him and said that the material covered in his classes are for the scholars and not for the laypeople.
“The distortion of this content will lead to the curse of God upon the distorters. May God curse all those who distort the words from their context and that which we haven’t said which they attribute to us,” he said.
The renowned teacher in the Islamic Seminary of Qom referred to the rumour and said, “We didn’t say that it’s obligatory to exhume the graves of those two [Abu Bakr and Umar] but rather this is the result of Abu Bakr’s remarks wherein the first caliph said, ‘The Apostle of God said, ‘We leave no inheritance, what we leave behind us charity.’”
Ayatollah Vahid-Khorasani explained his previously mentioned statement, saying, “In our discussion of the apparent proofs, it was proven that any statement which conforms to it or it clearly associated with it is proof and contains arguments and logic.”
He said that in this regard, the result of the statement of Abu Bakr against Lady Fatimah al-Zahra in regard to Fadak is that charity is the right of all Muslims and all believers of the house of the Prophet Muhammad are subject to this charity and that the right to protest in regard to burial of these two figures next to the Prophet Muhammad exists.
Ayatollah Vahid-Khorasani then referred to the debate of usurped property and said, “Here the question arises whether the burial of these two figures in that specific place (from the time of the Prophet until the Day of Judgement), was performed with the permission of all Muslims or was such permission not given? There is nothing between affirmation and negation. There was no such permission from all Muslims, thus they have the right to request their rights.”
http://sunnionline.us/urdu/2017/03/9143/
7 Mar 2017:
اہل سنت ایران کی آفیشل ویب سائٹ (www.sunnionline.us) کی رپورٹ کے مطابق، گزشتہ ہفتے کے پہلے روز ایک قدامت پسند اور سخت گیر موقف رکھنے والے قومی اخبار ’وطن امروز‘ نے تمام حدوں کو پار کرتے ہوئے جلیل القدر صحابی حضرت ابوموسی اشعری رضی اللہ عنہ کو ’منافق بن کافر‘ کہہ دیا اور اس مذموم اور گھٹیا لفظ کو فرنٹ پیج پر سرخی لگادیا۔
سخت ردعمل ظاہر کرتے ہوئے محمد قسیم عثمانی نے مجلس شورا (پارلیمنٹ) کے اجلاس میں مذکورہ اخبار کی سخت مذمت کی اور وزیر نشریات کو اس حوالے سے نوٹس دیا۔ محمدقسیم عثمانی رکن پارلیمنٹ اور اس کی مجلس قائمہ کے رکن بھی ہیں۔
ایران کے طول و عرض میں مختلف دینی و سماجی شخصیات نے ردعمل ظاہر کرتے ہوئے اپنے بیانات میں اس گستاخ اخبار کی بندش اور ٹرائل کا مطالبہ کیا۔ مولانا عبدالحمید، مولانا عبدالصمد ساداتی، مولانا عبدالرحمن چابہاری، مولانا فضل الرحمن کوہی، ڈاکٹر جلال جلالی زادہ، ماموستا حسن امینی اور بعض سنی ارکان پارلیمنٹ سمیت متعدد شخصیات نے اس گستاخانہ سرخی پر سخت تنقید کی۔
دریں اثنا، اسی روز ’نود‘ نامی سپورٹس اخبار نے ایک اصلاح پسند رہ نما اور سینئر دانشور سے ایک ایسی بات نقل کی جو ام المومنین عائشہ صدیقہ رضی اللہ عنہا کی شان میں گستاخی کے مترادف تھی۔ بعد میں ڈاکٹر زیبا کلام نے بیان شائع کرتے ہوئے دارالعلوم زاہدان کے ایک استاذ کے خط کے جواب میں ایران کی سنی برادری سے معافی مانگی۔
دوسری جانب مشہد میں سرکاری سرپرستی میں منعقد ہونے والے اجتماع برائے نماز جمعہ میں بھی خلفائے راشدین رضی اللہ عنہم کی شان میں گستاخی کی گئی۔ تین مارچ کو حاضرین سے خطاب کرتے ہوئے مشہد سے منتخب رکن پارلیمان ’جواد کریمی قدوسی‘ نے دریدہ دہنی کا ارتکاب کیا۔
قدوسی جو قدامت پسندوں کے قریب سمجھے جاتے ہیں نے اپنے بیان میں سابق صدر ہاشمی کو آیت اللہ خمینی کے مزار میں دفنانے پر تنقید کے دوران انہیں خلفائے راشدین سے تشبیہ دی ہے جن میں شیخین رضی اللہ عنہما نبی کریم ﷺ کے آغوش میں روضہ انور میں مدفون ہیں۔
مذکورہ گستاخ شخص نے خلفائے ثلاثہ کو کنایے میں “انحراف کی اساس” یاد کیا ہے۔
http://www.al-khoei.us/fatawa1/index.php?id=361
السؤال : وهل يجوز سب أهل البدع والريب ، ومباهتتهم والوقيعة فيهم ؟
الجواب : إذا ترتب ردع منكر على تلك ، فلا بأس
"Question: Is it permitted to insult the people of Innovations and Doubts, as well as slander and abuse them?
Answer: If that results in pushing back of Evil, then there is no problem in it".
https://sonsofsunnah.com/2013/01/19/omar-koshan-9th-rabi-the-celebration-of-omars-ra-death-a-shia-majoosi-fetish/
Historic celebration of Omar Koshan festival in Iran
Mokhtar Houshmand, a Kurdish civil rights activist, states that three factors may have contributed to the rise of Salafism in Kurdish regions in late 1990s: the Taliban coming to power in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda moving into Afghanistan, and the rise of the Kurdish Salafist group Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Since they strictly reject the concept of the nation, Salafist Kurds are fundamentally at odds with civil society activists, organizations that promote statehood, and supporters of an independent Kurdistan. In fact, Salafists have fought against NGOs involved in the regional issues of Kurdistan and also attacked Sunni religious leaders. In this way, the Salafists proved themselves a useful tool for the Iranian authorities to crush both leftists and Kurdish nationalists.
Some of the most useful information about the instrumental use of Salafists inside Iran comes from a memoir by Bahman Ahmadi Amuee. A prominent journalist and economic analyst arrested in 2009 and released in 2014, Amuee spent 10 months of his sentence in the same cell as several al-Qaeda prisoners and Salafist Kurds. He describes them as mostly rural youth with low literacy, a poorly informed understanding of the Qoran, and little interest in reading any books. Their only intellectual pride was to have memorized parts of verses from the Qoran.
Low literacy and poverty provide the perfect breeding ground for al-Qaeda and its vast financial resources. Some of these youths, Amuee writes, used al-Qaeda funds to study at Pakistani madrassas where they were even further immersed in extremist thinking.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/04/khulafa-mosque-baghdad-sunni-sectarian.html#ixzz4f4csH0vb
April 2017:
On April 4, the Sunni Endowment Diwan revealed that the minaret of the historic Khulafa Mosque, built in A.D. 900, could collapse due to water leaking into its foundation. It also warned that this historical monument in Baghdad could fall apart. The 35-meter-high (115-foot) minaret, which is surrounded by markets and urban buildings, has started to lean over.Given its location in Shorja, one of the busiest markets in Baghdad, in particular at al-Jamhouriya Street, the mosque has been damaged by pollution. In addition, Sunni historical monuments are often neglected due to sectarian issues.
On April 14, a field report blamed the governing Shiite parties who have adopted ideologies against such landmarks since 2003, after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s (Sunni) regime. This was manifested by the destruction of statues and monuments, such as the statue of the founder of Baghdad, Abu Jafar al-Mansur, in 2012, whom Shiites see as an unjust ruler.
It seems that sectarian neglect has become a phenomenon that has reached other areas, as well. For instance, on March 12, 2007, a newspaper report referred to the neglect of the Sharabiya school in Wasit, which was built in A.D. 1234, because its founder was Iraqi Gov. Hajjaj al-Thaqafi, who is considered by Iraqi Shiites to have been a tyrant. This is why officials neither gave the school much attention nor did they allocate funds for this historical edifice.
https://twitter.com/AmirTaheri4/status/851391058239946753
10 April 2017: TEHRAN- 52 #Sunni Muslim activists jailed in #Evin Prison grouped together in "re-education section" to have "theological errors" corrected.
https://twitter.com/AmirTaheri4/status/855023319208382464
19 April 2017: TEHRAN- #Sunni prisoners in #Evin forced to shave beards because regime regards style as close to #ISIS beards.Iranian style beards allowed.
https://twitter.com/AmirTaheri4/status/856109953148473345
23 April 2017: TEHRAN- 53 intellectuals in letter to #Khamenei protest that, once again,no Iranian #Sunni is allowed to stand as presidential candidate.
http://islamtimes.org/ur/doc/news/633495/
http://www.urdu.shiitenews.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=46939:2017-05-05-10-30-52&Itemid=229
5 May 2017:
جو قوتوں پاکستان کو کمزور کرنا چاہتی ہیں، انہیں بہت جلد اپنے انجام سے دوچار ہونا پڑیگا، علامہ ناصر عباس جعفری
ایم ڈبلیو ایم کا 21 مئی کو نشتر پارک کراچی میں استحکام پاکستان و امام مہدی (ع) کانفرنس منعقد کرنیکا اعلان
امام برحق کیخلاف بات کرنا احادیث نبوی ﷺ کو صریحاََ جھٹلانے کے مترادف اور توہین رسالت ہے، ایسے شخص کا دین اسلام سے کوئی تعلق نہیں
http://ur.rasanews.ir/detail/News/428255/1
26 May 2017:
مدرسین
حوزہ علمیہ قم کونسل کے رکن آیت الله نجم الدین طبسی نے افریقا کے سنی
عالم دین سے ملاقات میں اسلامی معاشرے کی موجودہ مشکلات کی بنیاد عصر حاضر
کے خوارج اور نواصب کا وجود بتایا اور کہا: حتی سنی علمائے کرام بھی
وہابیوں کو ناصبی اور حرمین شریفین پر قبضہ جمانے والا بتاتے ہیں ۔
انہوں نے مزید کہا: وہابی تمام مسلمانوں کے مخالف ہیں ، انہیں اپنے سوا کسی دین و مذھب کے ماننے والوں پر اعتبار نہیں رہے ۔
مدرسین
حوزہ علمیہ قم کونسل کے رکن نے یہ بیان کرتے ہوئے کہ وہابی اسرائیل کے لئے
امنیت فراہم کرنے میں کوشاں ہیں کہا: وہابیوں نے مختلف اسلامی ممالک از
جملہ لیبیا، بحرین، یمن ، شام اور عراق کو برباد کردیا ، مگر اسرائیل پر
ایک بھی گولہ نہیں مارا ، یہ اس بات کا بیان گر ہے کہ اسلام دشمن ملک
اسرائیل سے ان کے گہرے رابطے اور تعلقات ہیں ۔
انہوں ںے تاکید کی کہ ملت اسلامیہ کو وہابیوں کے پنجے سے آزاد کرانا علمائے دین کا وظیفہ ہے ۔
آیت
الله طبسی نے اپنے سفر حج اور عمرہ کی جانب اشارہ کرتے ہوئے کہا: حج پر
جانے والے حاجی ہر سال وہابیوں کے ہاتھوں سعودیہ میں بعض اسلامی آثار منھم
کئے جانے کے شاھد ہیں ، انہوں کبھی حضرت خدیجہ (ع) کا گھر توڑا تو کبھی
مومنین کی قبریں زمین بوس کردیں ، مگر اس کے خلاف قصر کعب ابن اشرف الیهودی
جیسے یھودیوں کے آثار اب بھی باقی ہیں ۔
انہوں
نے مزید کہا: اگر ہم طول تاریخ میں آل سعود حکمراں کے اقدامات پر تحقیق
کرنا چاہیں تو ہمیں یہ نتیجہ ملے گا مکہ پر اسلام کے دعویدار آل سعود کے
بجائے یہودیوں کی حکومت رہی ہے ، عصر حاضر کے حالات بھی کچھ ایسے ہی ہیں
کیوں کہ یہودی اسلامی آثار کو مٹانے کے درپہ ہیں کہ جسے آل سعود جامہ عمل
پہنا رہے ہیں ۔
مدرسین
حوزہ علمیہ قم کونسل کے رکن نے بیان کیا: ماضی میں حرمین شریفین میں مختلف
سنی مذاھب شافعی، حنبلی، مالکی اور حنفیوں کے علماء کی علمی مسند موجود
تھی مگر آج فقط وہابیوں کو اپنی تبلیغ کا حق ہے ۔
انہوں
نے اسلامی سربراہوں اور امریکا کے صدر جمھوریہ ڈونلڈ ٹرمپ کی شرکت میں
منعقد ہونے والی ریاض کانفرنس کی جانب اشارہ کیا اور کہا: آل سعود نے ایسے
حالات میں امریکا کے صدر جمھوریہ ڈونلڈ ٹرمپ اور اس کے گھرانے کو کروڑوں
ڈالر کا تحفہ پیش کیا کہ افریقا اور یمن کے مسلمان بھوک سے جاں بحق ہو رہے
ہیں ۔
آیت
الله طبسی نے کہا: تاریخ شواھد اس بات کے بیان گر ہیں کہ وہابیت کا موسس
مروان ابن حکم ہے ، اس نے لوگوں کو قبر رسول اکرم (ص) کی زیارت سے منع کیا
تھا اور آج حرمین شریفین غصب ہوگیا ، غصب کرنے والے بظاھر مسلمان ہیں مگر
باطنی طور سے خوارج اور ناصبی مزاج ہیں ۔
انہوں
ںے مزید کہا: وہابی سلفی نہیں ہیں بلکہ شیطان پرست ہیں ، کیوں کہ اگر
موجودہ وہابیوں کے عقائد صحیح ہوں تو گذشتہ مسلمان تمام کے تمام کافر ہیں
اور اگر ماضی کے بزرگان کا عقیدہ صحیح ہو موجودہ وہابی کافر ہیں ، کہ سچ یہ
ہے کہ ماضی کے بزرگان کا عقیدہ صحیح ہے اور موجود وہابی غلط راستے پر
گامزن ہیں ۔
https://twitter.com/Khaaasteh/status/879393618217324544
26 June 2017: Sunni #Afghan immigrants in #Tehran allowed to hold congregational #EidulFitr prayers for first time
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/09/iran-tehran-sunni-mosque-prayer-space-pounak.html
Sep 2017: Iranian government insists Tehran has 9 Sunni mosques. Sunni leaders say these are merely rented prayer rooms and property owners can evict them anytime
http://en.hawzahnews.com/detail/News/350193
11 Oct 2017:
Ayatollah Boroujerdi added, “Wahhabism is a false sect that is condemned in Islam and Wahhabis aim to spread their dangerous thoughts in countries like Russia, therefore it is necessary to be very careful about the issue of Wahhabism influence.”
25 Oct 2017: Lebanese Shia scholar Ayatollah Ali Kurani said the move is a new Saudi attempt at distorting Islam and propagating Wahhabi views.
Stressing that efforts for promoting the Prophetic Hadiths is praiseworthy in itself, the cleric said the Saudi monarch’s move, however, is ceremonial and meant to deceive the public.
The policies and actions of the Saudi regime have no resemblance to the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH) Sunnah, he said.
Ayatollah Kurani added that behind the Saudi king’s order are Wahhabi Muftis who claim only what Wahhabis narrate from the Prophet (PBUH) is authentic and other sources are not reliable.
He called on followers of different Islamic schools of thought to be vigilant in the face of Wahhabis’ attempts to propagate their ideology.
The cleric described Wahhabism as the brainchild of Britain and a deviated cult, stressing that it has nothing to do with Sunni Islam.
http://ur.rasanews.ir/detail/news/430550/4
26 Oct 2017:
استاد حضرت آیت الله حسین مظاهری نے شہر اصفہان کے مسجد امیر المومنین علیہ السلام میں منعقدہ تفسیر کے درس میں بیان کیا : کوئی بھی خداوند عالم کے بہشت کی توصیف نہیں کر سکتا ہے ۔
انہوں نے سورہ مبارکہ بقرہ کی ایک سو ساٹھویں آیت کہ جس میں فرمایا «إِنَّ الَّذِینَ کَفَرُوا وَمَاتُوا وَهُمْ کُفَّارٌ أُولَئِکَ عَلَیْهِمْ لَعْنَةُ اللَّهِ وَالْمَلائِکَةِ وَالنَّاسِ أَجْمَعِینَ» کی وضاحت کرتے ہوئے کہا : شیعوں کے درمیان مشہور یہ ہے کہ بہشت صرف شیعوں کے لئے مخصوص ہے اور غیر شیعہ بہشت میں نہیں جائے نگے کیوں کہ بغیر ولایت اہل بیت علیہم السلام عبادت کا کوئی فائدہ نہیں ہے ۔
حضرت آیت الله حسین مظاهری نے امیرالمومنین علی ابن ابی طالب علیہ السلام کی ولایت کی اہمیت کی طرف اشارہ کرتے ہوئے بیان کیا : غدیر کے روز امیرالمومنین علی ابن ابی طالب علیہ السلام کے ولایت کا اعلان ہونے سے پہلے خداوند عالم نے پیغمبر اکرم صلی اللہ علیہ و آلہ وسلم سے خطاب کر کے فرمایا : اگر علی (ع) کا تعارف نہیں کرایا تو اپنے رسالت کو انجام نہیں دیا ہے ؛ دین اسلام میں امیرالمومنین علی ابن ابی طالب علیہ السلام کی ولایت شامل ہونے سے دین کامل و خداوند عالم اس دین سے راضی ہوا ۔
حوزہ علمیہ اصفہان کے سربراہ نے بیان کیا : خداند عالم کا بہشت بہت وسیع ہے ؛ بہشت کی بی نہایت عظمت کو مد نظر رکھا جائے تو بہت سے لوگوں کو جنت میں جانا چاہیئے لیکن اس تفسیر کے مطابق جو نتیجہ سامنے آتا ہے کہ صرف شیعہ ہی بہشت میں جائے نگے ، ظاہرا ان دونوں میں تناقض پایا جاتا ہے کہ کیوں خداوند عالم کا بہشت اس قدر وسیع ہے اور اس وسعت کے مقابلہ میں دنیا میں شیعوں کی آبادی بہت کم ہے ۔
حوزہ علمیہ میں اخلاق کے استاد نے جواب دیا : قاعدہ لطف کے مطابق ، عالمی صلح پیدا ہونا چاہیئے اور سب ولایت اهل بیت (ع) کے تحت کامل انصاف کے مستحق قرار پائے نگے ؛ پیغمبر اکرم صلی اللہ علیہ و آلہ وسلم ایک روایت میں فرماتے ہیں : حضرت آدم علیہ السلام کی خلقت سے لے کر امام زمانہ عج کے ظہور تک کا زمانہ رجعت کے لئے مقدمہ ہے ۔
حوزہ علمیہ اصفہان کے سربراہ نے بیان کیا : رجعت کے زمانہ میں اہل بیت علیہم السلام کی حکومت ہزاروں سال تک قائم رہے گی ؛ آیت اکمال دین کو متحقق ہونا چاہیئے ورنہ انسان کا خلقت بغیر مقصد کے ہوگا ؛ اس روایت کے مطابق امام زمانہ (عج) رجعت کے زمانہ میں حضرت زهرا (س) کے فرماندہ کل ہیں ۔
حوزہ علمہ میں اخلاق کے استاد نے بیان کیا : امام زمانہ (عج) کی انصاف حکومت کے زمانہ میں معاشرے سے زیادہ تر گناہ ختم ہو جائے گی ، اس زمانہ میں تمام معاشرہ ایک ساتھ خداوند عالم کی عبادت کرے نگے ، اس زمانہ میں شیعہ نسل وسیع پیمانہ پر ہونگے ۔
http://en.shabestan.ir/detail/News/45035
http://ur.shabestan.ir/detail/News/69961
26 Oct 2017:
خبررساں
ایجنسی شبستان کی رپورٹ کے مطابق آیت اللہ ڈاکٹر محسن حیدری نے شہر اہواز
میں 12ویں قرآنی مقابلوں کی اختتامی تقریب میں مساجد میں قائم قرآن
سینٹرز کی کارکردگی کی طرف اشارہ کرتے ہوئے کہا ان سینٹرز نے جوانوں اور
نوجوانوں کی تربیت میں عمدہ کردار ادا کیا ہے۔
شہر اہواز کے عارضی امام جمعہ نے کہا قرآن کریم سمندر ہے کہ جس میں نجات دینے والی کشتی کے بغیر نہیں تیر سکتے۔
انہوں نے کہا ہم اہل بیت(ع) کے بغیر قرآن کی حقیقت کو درک نہیں کرسکتے۔
انہوں
نے کہا اہل بیت(ع) کو چھوڑ کر صرف قرآن سے تمسک کرنے والے سوائے شرک، کفر
اور گمراہی کے کچھ نہیں حاصل کرسکتے کیونکہ انہوں نے اہل بیت(ع) کو چھوڑ
کر صرف قرآن کریم سے تمسک کیا ہے۔
انہوں نے کہا اس قسم کے افراد موجودہ دور میں داعش کی صورت میں ہیں۔
http://ur.rasanews.ir/detail/news/431754/4
11 Nov 2011:
حضرت فاطمہ زهرا سلام اللہ علیھا کے بغیر اسلام ، سقیفائی اسلام ہے
حجت
الاسلام علی پناه نے بیان کیا: خداوند متعال کی جانب سے نعمت ولایت پر ہم
پر احسان جتانے کی بنیاد اور علت یہ ہے کہ اگر ائمہ ھدی نہ ہوتے ، ہدایت کے
ان چراغوں کی تخلیق نہ ہوتی تو نہ کوئی خدا کی بندگی کر پاتا اور نہ کوئی
عبودیت کی منزل تک پہونچ پاتا ۔
انہوں
نے اس بات کی جانب اشارہ کرتے ہوئے کہ بغیر ولایت اور ائمہ ھدی کے نماز کا
اثر الٹا ہے کہا: قران کریم مومنین کے لئے صراط مستقیم اور نور ہدایت ہے
مگر داعشی ، وھابی اور سلفی جنہوں نے اس کی آیات سے غلط مطلب نکالے ، گھاٹے
کا شکار ہوگئے ، اور دو قسم کی زمین باغ اور صحرا پر ہونے والی بارش کی
طرح ان کے حق میں اس کا نتیجہ بھی الٹا اور غلط نکلا ۔
انہوں
نے یاد دہانی کی : کربلا اور امام حسین(ع) سے الگ اسلام کا نتیجہ داعش ہے
کہ جنہوں ماوں کے سامنے ان کے بچوں کے گوشت کا کباب بنا کر پیش کیا تاکہ وہ
اپنے دل کے ٹکڑوں کا گوشت کھاسکیں ، حضرت فاطمہ زهرا سلام اللہ علیھا کے
بغیر اسلام ، سقیفائی اسلام ہے ۔
http://ifpnews.com/exclusive/iran-appoints-sunni-woman-local-governor/#
12 Nov 2017:
Iran has appointed, for the first time, a Sunni woman as the head of Chal Talepak village in the border town of Jargalan in North Khorasan province.
https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/11/intelligence-ministry-invites-rouhani-campaign-manager-to-stop-advocating-for-sunni-muslim-rights/
https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-intelligence-pressures-sunni-activists/28868421.html
21 Nov 2017:
Two Sunni former legislators and President Hassan Rouhani’s campaign managers in last May's elections have been summoned and questioned by Intelligence Ministry agents, Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, CHRI reported.
Jalal Jalalizadeh and Hassel Dasseh, Rouhani’s campaign managers in western Iran provinces were also insulted during the questioning, the report disclosed.
....
Dasseh had earlier maintained that a number of Shi’ite grand ayatollahs had contacted Hassan Rouhani and several reformist leaders, forbidding them to pick Sunnis for ministerial positions. However, he had not disclosed the name of the ayatollahs based in Shi’ites’ holy city of Qom.
Later, he also announced that the Interior Ministry’s deputy had told him that his ministry “is not permitted” to nominate Sunnis as governors.
http://ur.rasanews.ir/detail/news/432016/4
29 Nov 2017:
حضرت
آیت الله مظاهری نے مزید کہا: حق کو چھپانے والے رحمت الھی سے دور رہتے
ہیں اور اهل بیت(ع) کی شفاعت بھی انہیں نصیب نہ ہوگی ، نتیجہ میں وہ جہنم
کا ایندھن بنیں گے ۔
حوزہ
علمیہ اصفھان کے سربراہ نے یہ بیان کرتے ہوئے کہ حقیقی اسلام کہ جو شیعہ
مذھب ہے ، مختلف میدانوں میں استحکام سے ہمکنار ہے کہا: یہ مذھب اس قدر
محکم ہے کہ سبھی اس کے برابر عاجز و ناتوان ہیں ، صدر اسلام میں لوگ نے
قران کریم کے چیلنج کا جواب دینے کے بجائے مرسل آعظم(ص) سے جنگیں کی ، سبھی
امیرالمومنین علی (ع) کو امام بر حق جانتے تھے مگر انہوں حق کا کتمان کیا
جس کے نتیجہ میں مسلمانوں بربادی سے ہمکنار ہوگئے ۔
....
حوزہ
علمیہ اصفھان کے سربراہ نے بتایا : سبھی اس بات سے آگاہ ہیں کہ اسلامی
جمھوریہ ایران اسلام کی ترقی کے سوا کچھ نہیں چاہتا ، سبھی کو اس نظام
اسلام کی ترقی کا اقرار ہے اور وہ یہ بھی جانتے ہیں کہ یہ نظام اسلامی دنیا
کو ادارہ کرنے کی توانائی رکھتا ہے مگر پھر بھی اسے چھپاتے ہیں اور اس
حقیقت پر پردہ ڈالتے ہیں ۔
انہوں
نے مزید کہا: اے کاش فقط حق پر ہی پردہ ڈالتے مگر خلیج فارس کے قارون اپنے
مالکوں سے زیادہ شیعت کو بدنام کرنے میں مصمم ہیں ، قران کریم کا ارشاد ہے
کہ ایسے لوگوں کو شفاعت نہ ملے گی اور جہنم ان کا دائمی مسکن ہوگا ۔
حوزہ
علمیہ اصفھان کے سربراہ نے بیان کیا : حق نور ہے اور اگر نور کو نہ چھاپا
جائے تو وہ خود کو نمایاں کرے گا، شیعت، حقیقی اسلام کے لحاظ سے نور ہے اور
فقہی حوالے سے بھی شیعہ فقہ ، شیعہ اخلاق بھی نیز شیعت کو پھیلانے کے
حوالے ہمارے نظام حکومت کی کوئی خطا نہیں بجز اس کے ہم اسلامی جمھوریہ کا
نارہ لگاتے ہیں ، ہمارا کہنا ہے کہ دشمن کی پیروزی جائز نہیں ہے اور ہم اس
بات کی تاکید کرتے ہیں کہ دشمن سے مقابلے کے لئے اپنے پیروں پر کھڑے ہوں ۔
...
انہوں
نے مزید کہا: عربوں کی جانب سے ایران پر مداخلت کا الزام اس کے دنیا میں
محبوب ہونے کی وجہ سے ہے ، بشریت کی تمام تر مشکلات کی بنیاد ، رسول اسلام
کی رحلت کے بعد حق کا کتمان ہے ، اگر حق واضح ہوتا اور حق کا نور خاموش نہ
کیا گیا ہوتا تو آج کا معاشرہ عصر ظھور کے مانند ہوتا ۔
حوزہ
علمیہ اصفھان کے سربراہ نے آخر میں بیان کیا: امام زمانہ(عج) بم کے وسیلہ
سے دنیا پر مسلط نہیں ہوں گے ، بلکہ آپ اعجاز الھی سے ۶ دن کے اندر دنیا کی
حکمرانی اپنے ہاتھوں میں لیں گے ، اور پھر اسلام و قران کریم کی تعلیمات
کو جامعہ عمل پہنا کر بہشتی دنیا قائم کریں گے کہ جو بہشت موعود سے کم نہ
ہوگی
http://en.rasanews.ir/detail/news/436272/1
4 Feb 2018:
Ayatollah Alavi-Gorgani stated that simultaneously resorting to wilayah and the Holy Quran would prevent human mistakes, noting, “Some people held firm to the Quran but they abandoned the honourable imams and the successors of the Prophet Muhammad while nothing else is commanded in religion at the same level as wilayah.”
The prominent teacher in the Islamic Seminary of Qom stated, “Through Wilayat al-Faqih, we can benefit from the blessings of the Ahlul-Bayt and bring us closer to divine teachings. Therefore, Imam Khomeyni always reminded is to be careful. Wherever we are victorious and successful, we must attribute it God and in the case of the liberation of Khorramshahr, he also said, ‘Khorramshahr was freed by God.’”
http://ur.rasanews.ir/detail/news/435008/4
13 Feb 2018:
حوزہ علمیہ قم اور یونیورسیٹی کے مشہور و معروف استاد حجت الاسلام و المسلمین ناصر رفیعی نے روضہ مبارک حضرت معصومہ قم (س) کے زائرین اور نماز مغرب و عشاء میں شریک نمازیوں کے درمیان امام خمینی (ره) ہال میں منعقدہ اپنی تقریر میں حقیقی ایمان کے مختلف پہلو کی طرف اشارہ کرتے ہوئے بیان کیا : مسلسل تاریخ اسلام میں مشاہدہ ہوتا ہے کہ کچھ لوگ اسلام کے لباس میں دین کے دشمنوں سے دوستی کا منصوبہ بنایا اور دین مبین اسلام کو خطرے سے روبرو کیا ۔
روضہ مبارک حضرت معصومہ قم (س) کے مقرر نے دین داری کی سب سے اہم بنیادی معیار میں سے ایک اسلام کے دشمنوں سے بیزاری کا اعلان کرنا جانا ہے اور بیان کیا : بعض مسلمان جو اسلام کے دشمنون سے دوستی کی منصوبہ بندی کرتے ہیں ، اصل میں وہ خداوند عالم پر ایمان نہیں رکھتے ہیں ، اس کے مطابق اگر حضرت زهرا سلام الله علیها نے تاریخ کے حساس ترین موقع پر اس سے پردہ نہ اٹھایا ہوتا تو آج دین اسلام اور تشیع مذہب کا وجود نہ ہوتا ۔
جامعہ المصطفی العالمیہ کے فیکلیٹی ممبر نے اس تاکید کے ساتھ کہ شیعہ کی حقیقی شناخت ایام فاطمیہ میں ثابت ہو جاتی ہے کہا : حوزات علمیہ اور علماء کی سب سے بنیادی ذمہ داری یہ ہے کہ « حضرت فاطمہ الزهرا سلام الله علیها اور امیرمؤمنین علی علیہ السلام پر جو ظلم و جنایت رونما ہوئے ہیں اسے لوگوں تک پہوچائیں تا کہ سب لوگ جان لیں کہ کن لوگوں نے پیغمبر اکرم صلی اللہ علیہ و آلہ وسلم کی بیٹی کو شہید کیا ہے ۔ »
حوزہ علمیہ قم اور یونیورسیٹی کے مشہور و معروف استاد نے اسلام کی متحدہ قوم کے مسئلہ وحدت کی طرف اشارہ کرتے ہوئے بیان کیا : علماء و خطباء و دینی اصول کے مبلغین توجہ رکھیں کہ حضرت فاطمۃ الزهرا (س) کے مقدس وجود پر ڈھائے گئے ظلم کے مطابق واقعات کو بیان کرنا اتحاد کے موضوع کو نقصان نہیں پہوچاتا ہے ۔ بی بی دو عالم پر ہوئے مظالم تاریخ کی معتبر کتابوں میں فریقین کی طرف سے بیان کئے گئے ہیں، علماء خطباء کو چاہیئے کہ سلیقہ بیان سے کام لیں ۔
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-iranian-zeitgeist-success-in-arab-media
The interest of the Iranian-led “Resistance Axis” in the Sunni setting is not mobilization, but the opposite: to ensure that Sunni audiences are not attracted to any opposing recruitment hostile to Iranian pursuits. Towards such purpose, the Iranian-led effort proclaims an embrace of issues believed to be central to Sunni political consciousness, where such a consciousness exists—supporting the Palestinian cause and declaring enmity to Israel, resisting neo-colonialism and external interventions, endorsing the quest for just governance—or merely seeking to satisfy the demand for a local Islamic identity, where no active Sunni political consciousness is noted.
https://www.annahar.com/article/773715
https://www.almarkazia.com/ar/news/show/16027
13 Mar 2018:
Hezbollah Sec Gen. Nasrallah: “we’re in Syria not for the sake of Assad, rather for spreading Shiism.. Shiites are now at the apogee of their power.. the Vilayet-e-Faqih trumps the Lebanese Constitution any time.. Aoun is a grandchild of Ali..” and other gems.
https://twitter.com/AmirTaheri4/status/993813876604063746
8 May 2018: ZAHEDAN-Islamic security prevents #Baluch #Sunni religious leader Maulana #Abdul-#Hamid from travelling to #Qatar to deliver series of lectures on theological issues. He is told he can travel to Tehran but can't visit other provinces in Iran either! A kind of provincial "arrest".
https://twitter.com/SAMRIReports/status/1265935600844181505
https://www.iranfocus.com/en/life-in-iran/34523-mullahs-increase-persecution-of-sunni-muslims-in-iran
24 May 2020:
The mullahs in Iran have increased their persecution of Sunni Muslims in southwestern and southeast Iran, where many Iranian Sunnis live.
In fact, one Iranian official actually called for the Grand Sunni Mosque in Zahedan to be destroyed, tweeting on May 24, the eve of Eid al-Fetr, that it is a “house of corruption”.
Mohammed Bagher Tabatabayi, Advisor to the General Directorate of Islamic Culture and Guidance of Khorasan Razavi Province, deleted his tweet after it caused national outrage.
Roughly, one-tenth of Iranians are Sunnis, but they are treated outrageously by the regime. They are not allowed to have a mosque in Tehran and their mosques in several other cities have been destroyed.
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