Sufism is the mystical side of Islam that prioritizes "inner" spiritual aspects of religion to the "exterior" rituals and laws of the religion, that does not mean it completely writes off the latter. Like orthodox religion, heterodox Sufism is also a grocery shop - so many items of different flavors under the same label :) Various flavors of Sufism stand on different points across "inner vs exterior" religiosity spectrum. There was a "wahdatul wajood" (pantheism) school of Sufism that if taken to logical conclusion, ends up in the unity of all religions, thus undermining the claim of "one true faith". Some Sufis (malamatis) altogether rejected "exterior" (Sharia) for the "interior" (esoteric mysticism) and there were others form whom "interior" complemented, not replaced, the "exterior".
Sufis not homogenous
http://www.islamicpluralism.org/1922/the-moral-crisis-of-pakistani-barelvism
"Sufis are not a homogeneous phenomenon. Some are jihadist (notably Qadiri Sufis who have a long history of association with the Barelvis). Others are "peaceful, but not pacifist," in the description of the outstanding Western historian of Islam, Bernard Lewis. Some Sufis are Sunni-centric and despise Shia Muslims; others claim to have surmounted the Sunni-Shia divide. Some are strictly observant of Islamic shariah law; some refer to "shariah" only as the external practice of religion; some disregard Islamic law, as, for example, the Turkish and Kurdish Alevis, who originated in Shiism. Most, however, are open to dialogue with believers in other faiths."
Sufi militancy across history
http://tribune.com.pk/story/105628/are-sufis-essentially-non-violent/
"In the region now called Pakistan, Sufis, dervishes and mullahs pioneered several millenarian and revivalist movements directed against British colonialists. Mirza Ali Khan, better known as the ‘Faqir from Ipi,’ a hermit from the Waziristan region, led his disciples in a successful rebellion against the British. And the Hur movement of the late 19th century in Sindh was also mobilised by a saintly figure, Sibghtullah Shah Badshah."
Not so well-written but gives a good description of some Sufi warriors. There are some inaccuracies, for example, Mullah Omar's connection with Naqshbandis. But overall, a good list :
http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?61967-Famous-Sufi-Warriors
A detailed article on the history of Sufi militancy (the article has a Marxist slant but a good description of militant Sufi movements):
http://ww4report.com/node/2151
"The first and most successful of the sufi revolutionaries was Amir Abd al-Qadir (also rendered al-Kader) al-Jazairi (1808-1883), of the Qadiri Order, who from his base in Oran began resisting the French almost immediately upon their 1830 arriveal in Algeria. The French originally saw in him a proxy force to fight the Ottoman Turks and signed treaties granting him wide autonomy over much of the country."
Extracts from the page 420 of the book "The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands" By Alfred J. Rieber. Deals with Sufi rebellions against Russian and Chinese empires.
https://books.google.ca/books?id=s6roAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA420#v=onepage
http://eye-on-islam.blogspot.co.uk/2011/01/peaceful-tableau-of-sufism.html
"In the modern day, many influential Muslim leaders who are deemed by most people to be profoundly "radical", including Hasan al-Banna and the Ayatollah Khomeini, also had a great interest in Sufism. In modern times, a Sufi jihadi squadron was formed in Iraq in 2005, and the 2004 Beslan massacre, in which over 300 schoolchildren were murdered by Islamic jihadists in Russia, was orchestrated by a Naqshbandi Sufi, Shamil Basayev."
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=wP1Nz5Y8-voC&pg=PA86&lpg=PA86&dq=janissari+sufis&source=bl&ots=DtSK6QoIht&sig=HgivLuCSYybbTx087sdmXFyYer4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiHhuS4v57SAhWKE7wKHRGFDqQQ6AEIRjAI#v=onepage&q=janissari%20sufis&f=false
Sufism in Ottoman Empire. Janisarri affiliation with Bektashi order.
https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/833630559175790592
https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/833629610067718145
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=t0MsAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA25&lpg=PA25#v=onepage&q&f=false
Militant Sufi orders in Ottoman Empire. Page 25 of the book "From Religious Empires to Secular States: State Secularization in Turkey" By Birol Başkan
https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/833642922625097729
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=t0MsAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA77&lpg=PA77#v=onepage&q&f=false
Sufi origin of Safavids and their suppression of rival Sufi orders in Iran. Page 77 of the book "From Religious Empires to Secular States: State Secularization in Turkey" By Birol Başkan
https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/855707869639041024
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=jV_wAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA100&lpg=PA100#v=onepage&q&f=false
In Tsarist Russia, authorities made use of orthodox Muslim clerics to denounce 'unorthodox' Sufi jihadis. Extract from page 100 of the book "The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia" By Paul W. Werth
https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/854757595474743296
https://www.hudson.org/research/13480-justifying-war-the-salafi-jihadi-appropriation-of-sufi-jihad-in-the-sahel-sahara
During the jihadist campaigns of the 1800s in the Sahel-Sahara region, the Muslim scholars who led the armed movements identified themselves with the Sufi brotherhoods. In the Sahel-Sahara region today, core ideological concepts that animated the historical jihads of the 19th Century—including ideas about takfīr(excommunication), Dār al-Islām (abode of Islam), Dār al-Kufr (abode of unbelief), ḥijrah (migration) and al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ (fealty and disavowal)—can be found in contemporary Salafist ideologies and have also been appropriated by present-day Salafi-Jihadi groups like Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda to justify their campaigns.4
http://stottilien.com/2013/03/01/sufism-the-gnostic-chameleon-muscle-and-brain-of-islam/
"Sufi Dervish were Warrior Orders called by the Calif, often from far distances, when long sieges were expected. They were not only mystics but warriors when necessity demanded. There is good evidence, that their secret close-knit brotherhoods was the role model of the European Knight Templars."
"The Sufi Order was widespread in the Ottoman Empire (because the majority of Ottoman Janissaries were Shia-Sufis). The Janissaries were elite soldiers, a heavy armored infantry or Foot Knights of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman Heavy Cavalry were Sipahis (Turkish Nobles) and Ghulams (mostly Persian). Janissaries had “cousins” in Iran (Persia) under the Safavid Dynasty (Persian-Turkic Cousins of the Ottomans) . The Safavid counterpart of the Ottoman Janissaries were called the “Qizilbash. Christian children were brought into the corps through the devshirme system, in which young boys were taken from their Christian families in Greece, Serbia, Armenia, or Bulgaria , which were part of the Ottoman Empire. The word “Janissary” comes from the Turkish yeni çeri or “new soldier.” The child soldiers were converted to Islam, and trained in infantry techniques and tactics.
By the end of the seventh century, Turkish migrants converted to Sunni Islam and became champions of Islamic orthodoxy. Beginning in the twelfth century, new waves of Turkic migrants became attracted to militant Sufi orders, which gradually incorporated heterodox Shia beliefs. One Sufi order that appealed to Turks after they won against Christianity was the Safavi, based in northwest Iran. Safavid adherence to a Sufi version of Shi’a Islam had the support of the Turkic tribes called the mentioned Qizilbash [literary the “Redheads” for the twelve red strips on their turbans symbolizing their adherence to twelve Shi’i Imams]. Qizilbash tribes resided mostly in Asia Minor; northern Syria, and northern Iraq. Concern about the growing influence of the Safavi probably was one of the factors that prompted the Ottomans to permit unorthodox Bektasi Sufism to become the official order of the janissary soldiers.
The Sufi orders enhanced their political role again with Western imperialism. When Islam was under threat, their close-knit brotherhoods were devastatingly effective. Sufi orders led anti-colonial movements from Morocco to Indonesia and are the core of the stubborn Chechen guerrillas. Even Stalin’s terror campaigns could not root out the Sufi brotherhoods."
http://web.archive.org/web/20160326113305/http://jang.com.pk/thenews/sep2009-weekly/nos-06-09-2009/lit.htm
http://jang.com.pk/thenews/sep2009-weekly/nos-06-09-2009/lit.htm
"Frembgen writes that during the twelfth century in the
Taimour period, Ulemas belonging to the Naqashbandi school held strong
positions in the government. Sufis who took part in power politics were
generally either from the Naqshbandi school or its splinters. In NWFP and
FATA areas there was a strong mixture of Pukhtoons and the Naqshbandi school.
One may trace roots of such influences from neighbouring Central Asia. He also writes about a Chishti sufi, Sheikh Muhamad
Rukanudin Junaidi, who did Rasm-e-Tajposhi of the first ruler of Bahmani
kingdom during the year 1347 in Daulatabad, Deccan.
There are various incidents in which Sufis also supported
rebels. The anti-Mughal Roshnya movement is not the only example in this
connection. This movement was headed by Bayazid Ansari, commonly known as
Peer Roshaan. He was a Jalandhri pathan by race. Peer baba of Bunair and Saidu baba of Sawat had lot of
influence on Gujars, Pathans, Hindo Hazara and FATA tribes.
The author also narrates incidents of armed struggle from
Sudan to Russia in which Sufis participated. In this connection he gives
special reference to Imam Shamil (1796-1871) and the Mahdavi movement (1843)."http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sufism-in-asymmetric-warfare
https://www.ethz.ch/content/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/184340
"Though several Sufi orders existed in East Africa in the late-19th century it is generally held that the Saalihiya order, led by Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan and his Dervish resistance fighters, had the greatest influence on the region. Contrastingly, historical evidence shows us that the Qadiriyya tariqa in East Africa was the most important factor in setting the conditions for Hassan’s later success against the colonial empires. This study argues that the Qadiriyya order, led by Uways al-Barawi, used its Sufi networks to wage limited aims warfare against the Europeans and pioneered a style of irregular doctrine that leveraged lesser means against greater forces."...
"Referring to one of the more recent studies of Sufi inspired warfare, Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush write in Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union, about Sufi insurgencies in the Northern Caucasus region of the Soviet Union. Like in East Africa, Sufis in the Northern Caucasus had the ability to preach to and earn the respect of all people in society, even on-Sufis. Sufis earned this respect by making shrines and paying homage to “saints” that were important local community figures, not just Sufi Muslims. In the end, the only qualifier to become a Sufi saint was to do good in the community resulting in the practice of “clan or tribal ancestors, Biblical prophets, even imaginary beings (often pre-Islamic deities of Zoroastrian or, rarely, of Buddhist origin)” becoming revered by Sufis (Bennigsen 94). This act of respect crossed religious, ethnic, and political creeds earning Sufis influence in all spheres of Northern Caucasus life. As a result, organizing recruiting campaigns and logistical operations against the Soviets was not merely a Sufi Muslim task; it became a local community task. As a result of the inclusive practices of Sufis, their shrines became meeting places for people from all walks of life. Mistakenly, the Soviets allowed the Sufis to control these very specific shrine areas and therefore they became “the critical juncture where popular belief meets clandestine organization, where ordinary Muslims come into contact with the highly motivated and rigidly disciplined Sufis” (94). Eventually, the Soviets caught on and concluded that Sufi shrines were “the holy place is the main contact place between ‘Sufi fanatics’ and the population – believers and unbelievers alike” (94-95). In the end two charges were levied against Sufis in the Soviet Union, the first was “The Sufi brotherhoods are the breeding ground of the most radical form of nationalism and nurseries of anti-Russian and anti-communist xenophobia” (102). Second, the Soviets believed that “Sufi communities are ‘closed societies’ which live outside the Soviet legal establishment” (108). From the Soviet’s experience, we can see that Sufism was considered inaccessible to western government, but extremely accessible to community members. Moreover, we learn that Sufis are not so concerned with physically defeating greater militaries are they are with finding a political end state that restores pride and honor in their communities."
http://history.emory.edu/home/documents/endeavors/volume2/LewisOuksel.pdf
The Tungan Rebellion was a great uprising of the Hui in the Northwest of China during the mid-nineteenth century. The rebellion began in 1862 as a series of local level conflicts between Hui and Han militias in the Wei River Valley in Shaanxi province but grew to encompass the entire province as well as those of Gansu, Ningxia and Xinjiang. The Rebellion itself took place during a period of great unrest when a number of rebellions were raging throughout China.
....
f the “New Teaching” caused great anxiety amongst Qing officials. The “New Teaching” arose in the eighteenth century as part of a wave of Islamic revivalism that saw similar movements in other Muslim areas. It came out of the Naqshbandi sufi order that was widespread amongst Chinese Muslims. Two sufi revivalists, Ma Mingxin and Ma Laichi, had studied in Yemen and Mecca and began teaching. Both had studied with prominent Naqshbandi Sufis, but had learned different lessons. Ma Laichi practiced the silent dhikr that was characteristic of the Naqshbandi order. Ma Mingxin, however, studied later at a time when vocal dhikr came to be seen as permissible and taught that to his own disciples. Though seemingly trivial, the issue of the dhikr was one of many contentious concerns among the Chinese Muslims. A greater issue was that of tajdid, the commitment to the political, social and religious renewal of Islam. Ma Mingxin, when he returned to China in 1761, intended to purify Islam as practiced in China and remove the Chinese influences on it. As a practitioner of the vocal dhikr, he named his new sect the Jahriya, after the Arabic word jahr meaning aloud. Ma Laichi and his disciples, the Khafiya, from the Arabic for silent, resented the upstart sect for rivaling their hegemony in the northwest. The Khafiya found the Jahriya practices to be superstitious, heterodox and immoral. The Jahriya, on the other hand, criticized the excessive donations demanded by the Khafiya, the emphasis on saints and tombs, and the development of hereditary succession. Beyond the differences in practice, the Jahriya were committed to the purification of Islam and to its renewal. This made the Jahriya much more militant towards the non-Muslim state and heterodox Muslims. Indeed in the 1760s and again in the 1780s, there was much violent conflict between Jahriya and Khafiya adherents. In 1780, the Jahriya organized large contingents of armed men to attack the Khafiya, who organized themselves but faced great losses. The Khafiya then turned to local Qing officials, who, instead of holding trials and administering punishment, dispatched troops with the intention of exterminating the followers of the New Teaching. The Jahriya responded by eliminating a platoon of troops and killing the accompanying officials.
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=-F4Yk0B16zAC&pg=PA102&lpg=PA102#v=onepage&q&f=false
Page 102 of the book "Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union" By Alexandre Bennigsen, S. Enders Wimbush: “The Sufi brotherhoods are the breeding ground of the most radical form of nationalism and nurseries of anti-Russian and anti-communist xenophobia” (102).
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/opth.2014.1.issue-1/opth-2015-0003/opth-2015-0003.xml
"Sufism is often viewed as a non-violent and non-political branch of Islam. However, I argue that there are many historical examples to illustrate the presence of anti-colonialist Sufi military movements throughout the “Muslim World,” and I give particular attention to the cases of ‘Abd al-Qadir of the Qadiriyya movement and his anti-colonialist rebellion against France in Algeria in the 1800s, as well as that of Italian colonialism in Libya and the military response by the Sanussi order. Thus, while Sufism clearly has various teachings and principles that could be interpreted to promote non-violence, Sufi political movements have also developed as a response to colonialism and imperialism, and thus, one should not automatically assume a necessary separation from Sufism and notions of military resistance."
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/afghanistan-sufi-leaders-add-dig-20143256634750809.html
"The uprising, led by Habibullah Kalakani who, like a number of conservative Afghans, was offended by King Amanullah's rapid reforms, is said to have been instigated by the British. Interestingly, the head of the Naqshbandiyyah Sufi order of Afghanistan, Hazrat Nur al-Mashayekh Mojaddidi, was actively helping the rebellion against the king.
Historically, Sufism has always been intertwined with Afghan politics. The story of a Sufi dervish placing a wreath of wheat on the head of Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of modern Afghanistan, at a Sufi shrine in Kandahar in 1747 is told to confirm the Durrani king's legitimacy. Zahir Shah, the last monarch of Afghanistan (r. 1933-73), was proclaimed king after Hazrat Nur al-Mashayekh placed the ceremonial turban on his head."Sufi tolerance vs Salafi intolerance?
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/311/html
"Salafism is often associated with intolerance and violence and Sufism with tolerance and nonviolence. In this article we demonstrate that these assumptions are baseless. Based on analysis of historical and contemporary cases from Southeast Asia and West Africa, we show that there is no significant correlation between theology and violent tendencies. Some violent groups are Sufi and others Salafi, while some non-violent groups are Salafi, others Sufi. Policy makers are therefore ill-advised to use theological orientation as a factor in assessing the violent potential of Muslim movements and organisations. "
"Usman dan Fodio, the founder of the Sokoto Caliphate provides a clear example. He had a vision in which he saw the Prophet Muhammad, his companions and other prophets and saints, including al-Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (1077-1166), the founder of the Qadiriyya tariqa to which dan Fodio belonged. According to dan Fodio’s account of this vision, al-Jilani anointed him as the leader of saints (Imam Al-Awliyaa), and enjoined him “to command what is good and to forbid what is reprehensible.” Then al-Jilani decorated dan Fodio with the “Sword of Truth” and ordered him to “unsheathe it against the enemies of God.” (54) For dan Fodio, this was the spiritual and moral authorization for his jihad.
Al-Hajj Umar Tall invoked the doctrines of the Tijaniyya tariqa in his articulation of the doctrinal basis of jihad. In his magnum opus Kitab rimah hizb al-rahim ‘ala nuhur hizb al-rajim (“The Book of the Lances of the Party of Allah the Merciful against the Necks of the Party of Satan the Accursed”), he employed the sectarian Tijani discourse of spiritual election to legitimise his military and political agendas. This discourse proclaims that the Tijaniyya supersedes all other Sufi orders because of the exclusive guarantee of salvation Ahmad al-Tijani, its founder, received from the Prophet Muhammad for himself and his followers. Umar Tall also employed the Tijani doctrine of inkar that demonises all who reject the Tijani doctrine of spiritual election to refute his opponents."
https://books.google.ca/books?id=rdI96px90kUC&pg=PA89#v=onepage&q&f=false
Page 89 of the book "Egyptology: The Missing Millennium : Ancient Egypt in Medieval Arabic Writings" By Okasha El Daly. A Sufi broke Sphynx's nose
http://www.americanthinker.com/2005/05/sufi_jihad.html#ixzz3rwtBydlo
"Throughout the 20th century, and at present, Sufi ideologues and mass movements (especially the Naqshbandiya) have been engaged in defensive—offensive jihad campaigns designed not only to expel real (or perceived) 'colonial powers', but also to create supra—national (regional) shari'a states, or even a frank Caliphate (i.e., a single unified global shari'a state). The restored Shi'ite theocracy in Iran, whose contemporary shari'a—based system of dhimmitude was drafted by a leading Sufi—Sultanhussein Tabandeh—provides a sobering example of what 'Sufi ecumenism' towards non—Muslims means in practice."
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=2875#.VtXkpBjhO8o
"The uniqueness of Sufism in Chechnya lies in the transformation and development of the two tariqas since the 19th century. The Naqshbandiyya, known in the Caucasus as a base of support for those who resisted Russian aggression in the 18th and 19th centuries, abandoned that view and adopted a stance of peaceful coexistence with the official authorities. At the same time, the Qadiri tariqa, which had come to Chechnya promoting nonviolent resistance to Russian colonization in the 19th century, has now become the main force of Sufi opposition to the authorities."
Sufis in Indian sub-continent
Hur rebellion terrorism in Sindh (1890s)
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=_kC421xzMKsC&printsec=frontcover&pg=PA57#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://www.facebook.com/archive150/videos/779935392031541/
Manzilgah Riots, Sukkur (1939)
http://members.shaw.ca/freesindh/sindhstory/Thrown_to_the_Wolves.html
From 3 October to 19 November, 1939, under the leadership of G.M. Syed, Khuhro and Sir Haroon, they forcibly occupied Manzilgah. On I November, 1939, Bhagat Kanwar Ram, the well-known singer-saint of Sindh, was gunned down at Ruk railway station --- and nobody was arrested. Sukkur district observed complete hartal for fifteen days. When Pamnani, MLA, said that the Pir of Bharchundi had got Kanwar Ram killed (earlier the Pir's son had been beaten for kidnapping Hindu girls) he, too, was gunned down. The Sindh Hindus were stunned.
But worse was to follow. Word went round that killing one Hindu was equal to doing seven Haj pilgrimages. Sixty-four Hindus were killed and property worth several million was looted or burnt in the Sukkur countryside. In this violent atmosphere, G.M. Syed said on the floor of the Assembly that the Hindus shall be driven out of Sindh like the Jews from Germany --- a statement he has very much regretted since. But the damage was done.
Sufis view of militant jihad
Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio's jihad against Nigerian Muslim rulers who were deemed "not Islamic enough". Extracts from page 436 of the book "The Blackwell Companion to Religion and Violence" edited by Andrew R. Murphy:
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=MF2Oxz3a0XwC&pg=PT436&lpg=PT436#v=onepage&q&f=false
Views of some Indian Sufis on militant jihad as described on page 123 of "Islamic Jihad: A Legacy of Forced Conversion, Imperialism, and Slavery" By M. A. Khan:
https://books.google.ca/books?id=uHNddAz5cfAC&pg=PA123&dq=auliya%27s+thought+on+jihad&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=auliya%27s%20thought%20on%20jihad&f=false
https://books.google.ca/books?id=uHNddAz5cfAC&pg=PA123#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://twitter.com/Rjrasva/status/609311382819868672
http://islamtimes.org/ur/doc/interview/177506
جب اکبر ہندوستان کا بادشاہ بنا، تو اس نے یہاں اکبری گمراہی کو فروغ دیا، اور اس نے یہاں شراکت ادیان کے تصور کو فروغ دیا۔ ہندوؤں اور مسلمانوں کو اس نے آپسی رشتوں میں منسلک کیا۔ قرآن اور ودھ کو ملا کر پڑھنے کی اس نے ایک ترتیب قائم کی۔ تو وہی اثرات اس کی نسلوں میں نظر آتے ہیں۔ یعنی جہانگیر میں شاہجہان میں اس کے بیٹے مراد میں، شجاع میں اور دارا شکوہ میں۔ اب دارا شکوہ قادری سلسلے سے تعلق رکھتا تھا، حضرت سلطان باہو بھی قادری سلسلے سے تھے۔ اور اورنگریب سخت قسم کے مولویانہ ذہنیت و نظریات کا حامل تھا اور دارہ شکوہ گو کہ حضرت سلطان باہو کا ہم مشرب تھا لیکن آپ نے دارہ شکوہ کا ساتھ دینے کی بجائے سیاسی سطح پر اورنگزیب عالمگیر کا ساتھ دیا اور اپنی فارسی تصانیف میں اس بات کا تذکرہ بار بار کیا کہ اورنگزیب ایک اچھا حکمران ہو سکتا ہے۔
http://indiafacts.co.in/sinister-side-sufism/
"Not a single Sufi, the so-called mystic saints, ever objected to the ongoing senseless manslaughter and reckless plunder, or to the destruction neither of temples, nor for that matter to the ghoulish enslavement of the so-called infidel men and women for sale in the bazaars of Ghazni and Baghdad."
http://www.chakranews.com/beauty-and-the-beast-of-sufism/2454
"Sufism however does not describe a single set of doctrines but a disparate set of spiritual practices and mystical techniques which added a new dimension to Islam. In this the Sufi masters imbibed ancient spiritual traditions of the Greeks, Jews, Zarathustrians and Hindus which predated Islam. Nevertheless Sufis could be as fanatic as any mullah or army on the march of jihad. The history of Islam in South Asia demonstrates this very clearly. Like David Livingstone was to do in Africa these missionaries for the one true jealous male demiurge called ‘God’, acted as sappers and miners for the colonialism which was devastating ancient civilisations without mercy."
"Many other famous Sufis also revered Aurangzeb, including the Punjab Sufi Sultan Bahu who wrote ‘Aurang-i-Shahi’ praising the emperor as a just ruler. Now Aurangzeb or Alamgir is notorious in history as the Mughal who tried to annihilate Hinduism completely, destroying temples and suppressing religious practices. Guru Tegh Bahadur and his two close companions Bhai Matti Das and Bhai Fateh Das were executed for refusing to convert to Islam. Aurangzeb’s tomb is in Khuldabad in Maharashtra within the courtyard of the shrine of the Sufi saint Shaikh Burham-u’d-din Gharib."
https://rossonl.wordpress.com/2015/03/29/what-about-the-sufis/
"Sufis like Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624) said that sharia law should be “fostered through the sword”. Shah Wali-Allah (1703-1762) said that unbelievers “should be reduced to a state of humiliation and treated with utter contempt” and he commanded Muslims to “not be negligent in fighting jihad”, for “by taking up the sword to make Islam supreme and by subordinating your own persona needs to this cause, you will reap vast benefits”.
This has been just as true in the 20th and 21st centuries. The Shi’ite Sufi Tabandeh (1915-1980s) wrote a nasty treatise against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As recently as 2009, leaders of the Sufi order Naqshbandiyya met with a leader of Hamas, praised the Hamas jihad, and boasted of their own jihad attacks against Americans in Iraq. The Muslim Brotherhood has ties to Sufism, especially to the Tijaniyya order. Al-Qaeda itself betrays Sufi influence: its members take bayat (an oath of allegiance) to their sheik Bin Laden, which is the Sufi ritual of accepting one’s sheik as the special leader of the brotherhood and coming under the protection of the order’s lineage."
http://www.kamakotimandali.com/blog/index.php?p=1417&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1
"Amir Khasrau described many instances of barbaric cruelty, often of catastrophic proportions, inflicted by Muslim conquerors upon the Hindus. But nowhere did he show any sign of grief or remorse, but only gloating delight. While describing those acts of barbarism, he invariably expressed gratitude to Allah, and glory to Muhammad, for enabling the Muslim warriors achieve those glorious feats."
"First, Sufis became an organized and accepted community in the thirteenth and early fourteenth century. By this time, the peoples of the Middle East, Persia, Egypt and North Africa had become largely Muslim. The Sufis could not have played significant roles in their conversion. In agreement, says Francis Robinson, Sufis played a leading part in ‘the remarkable spread of Islam from the thirteenth century onwards.’ Second, the Sufis almost invariably needed the power and terror of the sword to create the dominance of Islam first before their alleged peaceful mission of propagating Islam could proceed."
"(Pir Ma’bari) came here and waged Jihad against the rajas and rebels (of Bijapur). And with his iron bar, he broke the heads and necks of many rajas and drove them to the dust of defeat. Many idolaters, who by the will of God had guidance and blessings, repented from their unbelief and error, and by the hands of (Pir Ma’bari) came to Islam."
https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/833685849027993601
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=j2F9BgAAQBAJ&pg=PA31&lpg=PA31#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=j2F9BgAAQBAJ&pg=PA31&lpg=PA31#v=onepage&q&f=false
Warrior Sufis of Bijapur (1296-1347)
Sheikh Jalal, warrior Sufi in Bengal:
http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft067n99v9&chunk.id=ch03
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=gKhChF3yAOUC&pg=PA73&lpg=PA73#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=O3GXOqPa67MC&pg=PA165&lpg=PA165#v=onepage&q&f=false
Extremist Sufis in Kashmir:
page 232 of "Islamic Jihad: A Legacy of Forced Conversion, Imperialism, and Slavery" By M. A. Khan:
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Mr_eYjoVjz8C&pg=PT232&lpg=PT232&dq=musa+raina+hindus&source=bl&ots=75kvuFX4z0&sig=HAWvmLx70oU11-agZ1CIoTM9kIE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwibztad66bMAhWYOsAKHUWAAqIQ6AEIOjAI#v=onepage&q=musa%20raina%20hindus&f=false
Allama Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi
"Allama Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi was one of the main figures of the Indian
Rebellion of 1857. He was a philosopher, a poet, a religious scholar,
but is most remembered for his role as a freedom fighter. It was he who
issued the fatwa in favour of Jihad against the Britishers in 1857. Allama Fazl-e Haq Khairabadi was one of the pioneer freedom fighters deported to the Andaman Islands in 1859. After the First War of Independence failed, he was arrested on 30 January 1859 at Khairabad, was found guilty of "revolt" against the Government and sentenced for life to the prison at Kalapani (Cellular Jail).
The Allama Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi Convention was organised by by Khanqah-e-Qadariya Badaun Shareef along with Jam-e-Noor with the Cooperation of Jamia
Millia Islamia at Ansari Auditorium to observe the 150 death
Anniversary of Freedom Fighter of 1857 Hazrat Allama Fazle Haq
Khairabadi on 18th Sep 2011.
" Sufism, Salafism, anti-imperliasm
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/821299/posts
The root of all evil
Al-Ahram Weekly ^ | 1-11-03 | Basheer M Nafi
Posted on 12 January 2003 at 14:35:55 GMT by SJackson
Basheer M Nafi* finds interesting similarities between Russia's accusations against Sufism in the 19th century and those the West is currently levelling against Wahhabi Islam
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One has only to skim a daily digest of the Russian print media to realise that the Russian press is united in its understanding of the Chechen problem. Accordingly, the war in Chechnya is the work of a foreign group of radical Muslim activists and an alien culture, namely Wahhabism. More than 10 per cent of the Chechen people have been killed and twice that number are now living in refugee camps in other areas of the Caucasus. Those remaining in Chechnya are daily subject to horrendous forms of oppression at the hands of Russian security forces, including rape, torture and detention in the absence of any kind of legal process. While Russian troops pillage the supposedly autonomous republic, Grozny, its capital, has become a ghost town, deprived of all necessary means of living. Meanwhile, the Russian media puts all of this down to the actions of a group of foreigners and few a Chechen dissidents, motivated by evil Wahhabi influences.
The attribution of an imperialist conspiracy to a particular school of Islam is neither new nor uniquely Russian. During the 19th-century Dagestani resistance (1830-59), Tsarist Russia found in the Naqshbandi Sufi order a convenient scapegoat. The reason behind the vilification of Sufism was the involvement of a number of Naqshbandi followers, most prominent among them Imam Shamil, in the resistance movement. Like her British and French counterparts, 19th-century Russia saw her work in the northern Caucasus as a civilising mission. Any resistance to it was by definition an expression of fanaticism, backwardness and decadence. From the Russian perspective, the project of Russification in the northern Caucasus was driven by the values of progress; consequently, the values embraced by Dagestani fighters were portrayed as nothing more than anti-historical and anti-progressive cultural sentiments. In other words, the problem in mid-19th-century Daghestan (and then in Chechnya) was not the Russian imperialist expansion but the culture of backwardness and fanaticism precipitated by the "alien" Naqshbandi.
In the latest issue of the German academic journal, Die Welt des Islams, Alexander Knysh, professor of Islamic studies at the University of Michigan, published a rigorous challenge to the Russian reading of the 19th-century Islamic resistance in the northern Caucasus, and to all those who adopted this reading. Knysh, who is of Russian origin and highly-regarded as an expert of Sufism, considers the Russian reading an intrinsic part of the Western view of Islamic resistance to imperialism in the 19th century. The Russians, however, did not have a monopoly on the vilification of Sufism: the theme also marks Anglo-French interpretations of Islamic jihadi movements in Sudan, Somalia, Algeria and West Africa, and was used for the same objective by the Dutch in Indonesia and the Italians in Libya. In Sudan, the British faced popular resistance embodied in the Mahdi movement, while the Somali opposition to the British occupation originated in branches of Qadiri and Idrissi orders. Abdel-Qadir Al-Jaza'ri, who led the anti-French resistance in mid-19th-century Algeria, was also an adherent of Naqshbandi Sufism, while the Sanussi order would play, a half a century later, a major role in organising Islamic resistance to European invasions of Chad, Libya and other parts of West Africa. As all these resistance movements had Sufi affiliations, it was expedient for imperialist administrators, commanding officers and their advisers to depict Islamic jihadi forces in the 19th century as desperate cries from an inward-looking and declining Sufi culture that was being pushed to the margins of history by the forces of progress and civilisation.
Basing his argument on a thorough understanding of Sufism and the resistance in the northern Caucasus in the 19th century, Knysh demolishes the theory of militant Sufism from its foundations, describing it as a police-reports historiography. Imam Shamil, for example, was not a main Sufi sheikh but merely a follower of one of the Naqshbandi sheikhs in Dagestan; nor were all sheikhs of the Naqshbandi order associated with the anti-Russian jihad. While a few influential sheikhs declared their support for the jihad, others openly disapproved of the use of armed struggle, emphasising the spiritual and educational mission of Sufism. More important is the utter lack of evidence to link the teachings of Naqshbandi and 19th-century Sufism in general, with jihadi orientations. This is equally true of the case of the Sanussi, which was born as a reformist movement within Islam -- not as a framework for Islamic resistance to foreign domination. The only exception, which can by no means be considered a rule, was the Mahdi in Sudan that carried from its moment of inception strong sentiments against the Egyptian administration, many of whose officials at the time were Europeans. There is no doubt that if Naqshbandi, Sanussi or Mahdi brotherhoods did not exist, Muslim peoples would still have risen against the colonial forces.
This, of course, should raise a number of questions about the ongoing attempt to turn Wahhabism (and sometimes the whole of Salafi Islam) into the source of all evils that have befallen our world. A century and a half after the defeat of Imam Shamil, Sufism is no longer a problem for Russia. In fact, Sufism is now presented in Russian writings as the peaceful, authentic culture of the peoples of the northern Caucasus. The problem is the alien teachings of Wahhabism, the Wahhabi of the foreign Arab mujahidin and scores of their Chechen dissident allies. And exactly like the 19th century, blaming Wahhabism is not restricted to Russian discourse. From writers at the respectable broadsheets of the British media, French specialists in modern Islam, leading American congressmen and women, to those Western Islamicists well-known for their humanist outlooks, there seems to emerge a kind of consensus that it was Wahhabism/ Salafism that provided the eco-cultural system from which Al-Qa'eda and all other currents of armed, radical Islam were born. And just like the international situation in the 19th-century, the distance between Western discourse and Western polices has narrowed to a great extent.
If Wahhabism/Salafism is the problem, then American armed forces should be unhesitatingly deployed to uproot centres of violence, backwardness and anachronism wherever they are -- even if that requires invading the entire eastern part of the Arab world. It apparently did not cross the minds of the makers of the Russian expansionist policy in the 19th century, or their counterparts in London, Paris and Amsterdam, that invading and oppressing other peoples was in itself an act of evil. What dominated the world outlook of the European metropoles was an unquestionable sense of self- righteousness to do whatever they had to do as long as they were fighting the battle of civilisation against backwardness, of freedom against fanaticism, and of the values of human progress and advancement against values of decline and attachment to the past. One perhaps has only to read a recent speech by George W Bush or Tony Blair to discover that almost nothing has changed in the Western discourse on Islam and Muslims. The discourse underpinning Western policies at the beginning of the 21st century is almost a literal reproduction of the Russian, British and French imperialist readings of Islamic resistance in the 19th century.
The Wahhabi movement, which is identified with sheikh Mohamed Ibn Abdel-Wahhab, was born in the Najdi region of the Arabian Peninsula in the second half of the 18th century. In terms of its intellectual antecedents, Wahhabism belonged to the wider pool of the Salafi school of thought and its deep roots in Islamic culture. Modern Salafism encompasses multiple currents, the common denominator of which is their affirmation of the position of the founding Islamic texts (the Qur'an and Hadith) and their opposition to various manifestations of popular religion.
Like the Sanussi, Wahhabism was a within-Islam reformist movement that for more than two centuries after its appearance showed no specific anti-imperialist tendencies. A considerable degree of violence was associated with the rise of the Wahhabi movement, but that violence was largely engendered by the Saudi political expansion and inherent tribal rivalries in the Arabian Peninsula. Today, even if we accept that Al- Qa'eda subscribes to Wahhabi doctrines, there exist manifestations of Wahhabism that reject recourse to violence despite their opposition to foreign influence and the state. Other Wahhabi manifestations are closely linked with the Saudi regime and denounce all forms of dissent that threaten the prevailing political order.
Within the broader context of Salafi Islam, Salafis of the 20th century evidence a wide range of intellectual and political concerns, from Mohamed Abdouh and Rashid Rida to Youssef Al-Qaradawi and independent Islamic intellectuals such as Mohamed Salim El-'Awa, Tariq El-Bishri and Fahmy Howeidy. Some of the 20th-century Salafis, like Haj Amin Al-Husseini, Izzeddin Al-Qassam and Abdel-Karim Al- Khattabi, were national liberation leaders; others, like Mustafa Al-Maraghi and Tahir Al-Jaza'iri, were advocates of reform in its civic sense. There is nothing inherent to the Salafi world-view that calls for recourse to violence or leads to it.
In the mid-20th century, as the nationalist trend moved to the forefront of the anti-imperialist movement in the Arab world, Arab nationalism became an object of relentless Western animosity. Preparing British public opinion for war on Egypt in 1956, Prime Minister Anthony Eden equated Nasser with Hitler. And for several decades afterward, Western powers saw in Islam (including Wahhabi/Salafi Islam) a dependable partner in the global war against the Soviet empire with which Arab nationalist leaders like Nasser and Boumedienne seemed to ally themselves.
What Bin Laden is doing today is to invoke the cultural themes and motifs he is most intimate with in an attempt to legitimate the political strategy he is following -- exactly as Imam Shamil, Mohamed Ahmad Al-Mahdi and Al-Qassam had done before him. As a grand narrative, Islam has time and again been invoked, especially during the past two centuries, to provide the symbols that are the points of reference for a variety of political choices and programmes of action. For long, nonetheless, it was the political meaning and orientation -- rather than the ideological content -- which determined the nature of relations between the Western powers and the Arabs and Muslims. Wasn't Wahhabi/Salafi Islam the great, courageous instrument of the West against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan? How, then, did it become such an evil in Western eyes, only a decade after the Soviet defeat?
Perhaps, then, the vilification of Sufism and Salafism tells us more about the crisis of imperialism than about a crisis in Islam. With their absolute sense of self-righteousness, imperialists are never sure of what to make of the resistance they are faced with by the "lesser" peoples. The marathon- like conflict between Western imperialist powers and the world of Islam was caused neither by 20th-century Sufism nor by 20th-century Salafism. This conflict is rooted in a dominant set of international relations, known simply, in university textbooks, as the imperialist system. It is no doubt imperative for Islam to confront and deal with the forces of pathetic radicalism and nihilist violence that are trying to speak on its behalf -- a task that Islam has successfully engaged in on numerous occasions during its historical venture. Yet, this is will not put an end to the conflict. An end to the conflict and the development of normal relations between Western powers and the world of Islam are contingent upon an end to imperialist relations in our world.
* The writer teaches history and Islamic studies at Birkbeck College and the Muslim College, London.
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