Sunday, November 29, 2015

We have found the enemy and they are us :)

"ISIS is supported by Arabs, who are opposed by Iranians, who are both opposed and allied with the US, who is sort of allied with Turkey and the Kurds, who are opposed to each other. Since the enemy of my friend is now my enemy, it made sense for the US to bomb Israel, Iran’s bitter adversary.”


 “The US is fighting the Taliban by providing billions of dollars in military aid to Pakistan, which is supporting the Taliban. Basically, it’s like that scene in The Empire Strikes Back where Luke Skywalker thinks he’s fighting Darth Vader, only to find his own face in Darth Vader’s helmet. That’s pretty much what we’ve gotten ourselves into.”

Monday, November 23, 2015

Come to tables ;)

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27321942

Saturday, November 21, 2015

US Role in Afghan & Syria war



http://www.conflictsforum.org/2015/obama-and-the-legacy-of-the-dark-side/

There are many problems with this article. I'll start with the first.

1. He refers to Brzezinski's 1998 interview but does not mention that Brzezinski clarified in 2006 interview that it was a sensationalized version of the interview.

http://en.people.cn/200603/20/eng20060320_251953.html
 "I didn't say it was designed to prompt a Soviet invasion. That was a very sensationalized and abbreviated version of an interview."

USSR officially invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 but hundreds of Russian military advisors were already in Afghanistan since March 1979.  (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7883532.stm)
 On 6 April 1979, US had imposed sanctions on Pakistan due to Pakistan's nuclear program. However, CIA officials started meeting Afghan militants. All these meetings were arranged by ISI. Yes, throughout the war, ISI never let CIA directly contact any Afghan leader. All contacts were via ISI.
 On 3 July 1979, Carter signed a presidential directive to fund Afghan militants via Pakistan, but no  funding started yet because Pakistan was under sanctions.
In December 1979, Russia officially invades Afghanistan.
In January 1980, Carter offered $400 million aid to Pakistan which Zia rejected calling it "peanuts" (Zia expected a more generous package).
In June 1981, Reagan lifts sanctions and resumes aid to Pakistan.
In September 1981, Pakistan formally accepts aid and American money starts flowing in.
For details, see this:
http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/pakistan.cfm


This means:
No US aid reached Afghan militants before September 1981.
Pakistan had been supporting Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Masood since 1974 when Bhutto was in power. From 1974 to 1981, it was Pakistan running the show in Afghanistan.
In other words, it was not evil USA who "dragged" innocent Pakistan to fight war in Afghanistan. It was Pak establishment who had unleashed Afghan militants and was desperately looking for donors to invest in their Afghan adventure.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cyclone


https://newrepublic.com/article/63866/back-front
As bizarre as it may sound to the antiwar left, the CIA was deeply wary of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. The Agency didn't think the mujahedin rebels could beat Moscow, and it feared that if it ran the war, it would take the blame if things went awry. As Vincent Cannistraro, who led the Reagan administration's Afghan Working Group from 1985 to 1987, puts it, "The CIA was very reluctant to be involved at all. They thought it would end up with them being blamed, like in Guatemala." So the Agency tried to avoid direct involvement in the war, and to maintain plausible deniability. For the first six years following the 1979 Soviet invasion, the U.S. provided the mujahedin only Eastern-bloc weaponry, so the rebels could claim they had captured it from Soviet troops rather than received it from Washington. And while America funded the mujahedin, it played barely any role in their training. To insulate itself, the U.S. gave virtual carte blanche to its allies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to direct the rebel effort as they saw fit.


2. About Seymour Hersh. I have great respect for Hersh. He did amazing job exposing My Lai massacre and Abu Ghuraib torture, but increasingly he is sounding more like a conspiracy theorist rather than an investigative journalist, as his report on Bin Laden killing indicates. His earlier reports on My Lai and Abhu Ghuraib were confirmed by further investigation by independent sources, but may of his more recent reports have either been debunked or remain unconfirmed. Here is a detailed article about his reports.

http://www.vox.com/2015/5/11/8584473/seymour-hersh-osama-bin-laden
  • He reported that there was planning for a false flag attack attributed to Iran to use a pretense for war in 2006 in the New Yorker
  • In 2011 he claimed in a speech at a university in Qatar that top members of the special forces were members of Opus Dei and the Knights of Malta and that the US is on a crusade to convert the Middle East to Christianity.
  • In 2012, he reported in the New Yorker that the Bush administration had armed an Iranian terrorist group MEK in 2005 and trained them in Nevada.
  • In 2013 and 2014 he wrote two articles for the London Review of Books claiming that the Assad chemical weapons in Ghouta were faked. These stories weren't completely consistent with each other."
About Hersh's story on US and Saudi plot to support  Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, here is a critique by Lebanese journalist:

http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/03/05/seymour-hersh-and-iran/
"The Fatah al-Islam story is based entirely on a quote by one Alistair Crooke, a former MI6 agent, who, we learn, "was told" that weapons were offered to the group, "presumably to take on Hizbullah." The passage on Esbat al-Ansar is not even sourced."

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2007/May-24/114832-destruction-and-deceit-in-north-lebanon.ashx
"Writing in The Independent on May 22, journalist Robert Fisk, who we might forget lives in Beirut, picked up on Hersh, citing him uncritically to again make the case that Hariri was financing Islamists. So we have Fisk quoting Hersh quoting Crooke quoting someone nameless in a throwaway comment making a serious charge. Yet not one of these somnolent luminaries has bothered to actually verify if the story is true.."

https://reason.com/archives/2007/03/01/a-muckraker-on-the-wane

And this from an Israeli newspaper:

http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/thus-are-reports-about-the-mideast-generated-1.223615 
"Hersh said he heard the story from Robert Fisk, the bureau chief of The Independent's Beirut office. But Hersh did not check out the story himself. For his part, Fisk said he heard the unconfirmed report from Alastair Crooke, a former British intelligence agent and the founding director and Middle East representative of the Conflicts Forum, a non-profit organization that aims to build a new relationship between the West and the Muslim world. Crooke, who gained his reputation through his involvement in the conflict in northern Ireland, does not know Arabic. When Lebanese journalists spoke to Crooke about the report, they said he told them only that he had heard it "from all kinds of people."

http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/001449.html

 






Thursday, November 19, 2015

Syrian rebels infighting



https://medium.com/@badly_xeroxed/syrian-opposition-factions-in-the-syrian-civil-war-5d8412c9d7e6#.tv2kshlmq
A detailed guided to Syrian rebel groups

https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/explaining-the-syrian-conflict/
A complex web of parties in Syrian conflict


https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/a-deadly-delusion-were-syrias-rebels-ever-going-to-defeat-the-jihadists/
Lister has claimed that “[Free Syrian Army] groups who fought [al-Qaeda] were abandoned to lose.” But there’s only so much the United States could do when fragmented, basically local rebels abandoned each other, over and over again


http://theconversation.com/explainer-the-syrian-war-in-one-short-easy-read-50866
"The Syrian conflict has been described as a civil war, a proxy war and a sectarian war. On one level, the Syrian government, backed by Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, is pitted against the “moderate” rebels, backed by the US-led coalition, Turkey and the Gulf States, with everyone scrambling to contain Islamic State (who also receive funding from the Gulf States). The Kurds are fighting IS and Assad, and are supported by the West, but are also being bombed by Turkey, which is trying to stem a Kurdish uprising within its own borders. Following the latest atrocities – and France’s growing engagement – things could get even more complex."


http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/12/aq_courier_rebel_leader_zawahiri.php
17 Dec 2013:  A senior al Qaeda operative known as Abu Khalid al Suri is a leading figure in Ahrar al Sham, a Syrian extremist group that is part of the recently formed Islamic Front. Al Suri’s real name is Mohamed Bahaiah.


http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-prophecy-insight-idUSBREA3013420140401
April 1, 2014:  Abu George, a Christian from the nearby village of Jdeide who farmed plums and olives before the revolt, now works with the Sunni-led Liwa al-Hurra battalion, mostly in the town. He said there were about 15 other Christians in the brigade, accounting for around 5 percent of the fighters. "Many Christians participate in the revolution. When the army left we joined the revolution," he said.

Others in Yaqubiyeh, where thousands of displaced Sunnis have settled in recent months, were more circumspect. One woman, a 40-year-old Catholic, said Christians were mostly left alone, but were still nervous.

"We're living normally, we go pray, we come back, no one bothers us," she said, then leaned closer to a visiting journalist. "There is some theft on our land. They come and go, and none of us knows who does it. We're afraid to talk. Christians can't speak out. You understand me."
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/jabhat-al-nusra-idlib-islamic-emirate.html#ixzz4U3xk3hqe
Oct 2014:
Jabhat al-Nusra found in Idlib a suitable place to declare its emirate and compete with IS to attract jihadists from around the world. Idlib is close to the Turkish border and isolated from major fighting fronts with IS or President Bashar al-Assad’s forces. Al-Nusra also realized that it is bound to win its war against the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on account of its administrative and military superiority, as many FSA fighters refuse to use their weapons against anyone other than Assad and IS.
The presense of brigades of ill repute within SRF helped al-Nusra win popular support for its campaign, allowing it to expand its war and include all US allies in the area in what is known as the “moderate opposition.”
The Syrian rebels see al-Nusra as walking in the footsteps of IS. The latter began its war against the Northern Knights Brigades, calling the group corrupt. It then gradually went up against most opposition factions and took control over large areas in northern Syria, before opposition factions led by the Mujahideen Army forced it to move to the east of the country. IS regained its forces there, taking advantage of the desert environment with which its fighters are well trained to cope.
The clashes between al-Nusra and SRF began on Oct. 26 in the town of Bara, in Idlib’s countryside. The clashes followed Maarouf’s military campaign there, which searched for wanted men who had taken refuge with al-Nusra. The events developed into a war between al-Nusra and SRF and ended in the former taking full control of Jabal al-Zawiya — Maarouf’s stronghold — including the village of Deir Sunbul, Maarouf’s hometown.
Maarouf and the Hazm Movement suffered severe losses by Jabhat al-Nusra in Idlib’s countryside, where al-Nusra confiscated heavy gear and weapons after Hazm's withdrawal from its headquarters. SRF and the Hazm Movement withdrew from Idlib, with the exception of some areas in the southern countryside. Only those who surrendered remained in Idlib.
Sources with ties to Maarouf who wished to remain anonymous told Al-Monitor that he fled to Turkey and no longer has any brigades in Idlib, with the exception of certain groups in Idlib’s southern countryside and southern Syria, where no clashes erupted between the FSA and al-Nusra.
Meanwhile, the Hazm Movement withdrew from Idlib’s countryside to Aleppo and gathered all the gear it could get, following mild skirmishes with al-Nusra. It also took advantage of the agreement on Aleppo's neutrality on the clashes, due to its critical situation and the regime's closeness to besieging its “liberated’ neighborhoods.
However, tensions between the FSA and al-Nusra soon moved to Aleppo’s countryside, where the latter besieged the Northern Knights Brigades on Nov. 4. The brigades burned a T-62 tank before withdrawing from Menagh in Aleppo’s northern countryside. Al-Nusra also killed a field commander from the Dawn of Freedom Brigades on Nov. 8, according to a statement of which Al-Monitor received a copy.



https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/564357-us-strikes-nusra-front-ahrar-al-sham
6 Nov 2014:
The US struck Al-Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham targets in northern Syria, expanding its military campaign to include the two Islamist groups advancing against Washington-backed rebels in the area.


http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/world/middleeast/an-anxious-wait-in-syrian-city-held-by-insurgents.html
30 March 2015:
Tensions are already evident in Idlib over the treatment of Christians, a bellwether issue. Two activists, who asked not to be identified out of fear for their safety, said that foreign fighters from Nusra had killed two Christians after hearing they worked in a liquor store.
They said that fighters from Ahrar al-Sham had rebuked the foreigners and set up checkpoints to protect Christians from them.
Abdullah Mohamad Al-Muhaisini, a Saudi Islamic law jurist traveling with the fighters, used Twitter to construct a complex argument against killing Christians who do not resist.
Christians appeared to be suffering from both sides, as rescuers said government airstrikes hit Christians’ homes. In video of shaken, crying residents in smoking, damaged homes, a non-veiled woman yelled, “bastard tyrant!”
Zaina Erhaim, a journalist from Idlib, returned after the government forces withdrew, but said she did not yet feel free.


https://pjmedia.com/blog/syrian-rebel-group-ahrar-al-sham-executes-christians-in-liberated-idlib/
1 April 2015:
A report from a Christian human rights group in Syria claims that the Syrian rebel group Ahrar al-Sham (Free Men of Syria) executed two Christian men for violating Islamic law after the capture of the city of Idlib last week. 


http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/syria-an-opportunity-in-idlib
3 April 2015: Nusra now fights against ISIS with the rebels in Aleppo, Nusra is also assisting ISIS in its offensive on the Yarmouk Camp of Damascus according to local activists.


http://linkis.com/www.telegraph.co.uk/3Cg5b
Sep 22, 2015: Pentagon-trained rebels in Syria are reported to have betrayed their American backers and handed their weapons over to al-Qaeda in Syria immediately after re-entering the country.
Fighters with Division 30, the “moderate” rebel division favoured by the United States, surrendered to the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, a raft of sources claimed on Monday night.
Division 30 was the first faction whose fighters graduated from a US-led training programme in Turkey which aims to forge a force on the ground in Syria to fight against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isil).
A statement on Twitter by a man calling himself Abu Fahd al-Tunisi, a member of al-Qaeda’s local affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, read: "A strong slap for America... the new group from Division 30 that entered yesterday hands over all of its weapons to Jabhat al-Nusra after being granted safe passage.
"They handed over a very large amount of ammunition and medium weaponry and a number of pick-ups."
Abu Khattab al-Maqdisi, who also purports to be a Jabhat al-Nusra member, added that Division 30's commander, Anas Ibrahim Obaid,had explained to Jabhat al-Nusra's leaders that he had tricked the coalition because he needed weapons.
"He promised to issue a statement... repudiating Division 30, the coalition, and those who trained him," he tweeted. "And he also gave a large amount of weapons to Jabhat al-Nusra."
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), a monitoring group, reported that seventy-five Division 30 fighters had crossed into Syria from Turkey early the day before with “12 four-wheel vehicles equipped with machine guns and ammunition”.
US Central Command confirmed about 70 graduates of the Syria “train and equip” programme had re-entered Syria with their weapons and equipment and were operating as New Syrian Forces alongside Syrian Kurds, Sunni Arab and other anti-Isil forces.
The latest disaster, if true, will be the second to befall the programme. Last month, after the first group of fighters re-entered, the militia was attacked and routed by Jabhat al-Nusra, which stormed its headquarters and kidnapped a number of its members.
At the weekend, the group’s chief of staff also resigned, saying the training programme was “not serious”.
In the statement, Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad al-Dhaher complained of insufficient numbers of trainees and fighters, inadequate supplies, and even “a lack of accuracy and method in the selection of Division 30’s cadres”.
The latest developments have only added to the scorn heaped on the much-criticized $500 million (£320m) program, which aimed to forge a 5,400-strong force of “moderate” rebels to combat Isil.
It has been hampered by problems almost from the outset, with rebels complaining of a laborious vetting process. The biggest point of contention is that they are only allowed to fight Isil, not the Assad regime, which is the principal enemy for most opposition groups.

http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/are-cia-backed-syrian-rebels-really-fighting-pentagon-backed-syrian-rebels/
"One train-and-equip unit, the 30th Division, was very publicly destroyed by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra when it was infiltrated via northern Aleppo, an embarrassing failure for the program. (Some members of the 30th Division actually fled to Afrin and joined a part of the non-U.S.-backed Afrin SDF.)
But the 30th Division was just one cohort from the Pentagon’s train-and-equip program. Others — including Liwa al-Hamzah, Liwa al-Mu’tasem, and the 99th Division — are now fighting alongside CIA-backed rebels with coalition close air support against the Islamic State in northern Aleppo. These U.S.-backed forces have consciously avoided the rebel-SDF fighting, instead focusing exclusively on fighting the Islamic State. Elsewhere, another train-and-equip unit, the New Syrian Army, recently collaborated with other rebels to seize Syria’s southern al-Tanaf border crossing with Iraq from the Islamic State.
So, to sum up: The non-Pentagon-backed SDF are fighting the CIA-backed northern Aleppo rebels, who are fighting alongside Pentagon-backed train-and-equip rebels against the Islamic State. The CIA-backed rebels are not fighting the Pentagon-backed SDF. They are fighting a different faction that does not enjoy U.S. support (and may have actually recently enjoyed Russian support). And the Pentagon-backed SDF is fighting the Islamic State in eastern Syria, half a country away."


http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45381&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=f2157f867f7cd960e0d6004f4d7e7998#.Vyh_8GZuXwd
A coalition of moderate armed opposition groups in southern Syria, primarily organized within al-Jabhat al-Janoobiyya (Southern Front), are confronting the Islamic State affiliate Liwa Shuhada al-Yarmouk in the southwestern area of Dara’a governorate in the Syrian-Israeli and Syrian-Jordanian border region (YouTube, April 10; YouTube, April 10; YouTube, April 10). One of the most powerful Southern Front-affiliated armed opposition groups currently contesting the Islamic State in southern Syria is Jabhat Thuwar Sooria (Syrian Revolutionaries Front), under the command of Captain Hassan Ibrahim (a.k.a. Abu Usama al-Julani).
....
One of the most prominent, U.S.-vetted Syrian armed opposition groups that currently fights against the al-Assad government and its allies, as well as against the Islamic State (IS), is Liwa Suqur al-Jabal (Mountain Hawks Brigade), an organization with over 2,500 fighters spread in northwestern Syria’s Idlib, Lattakia, and Aleppo governorates (Viber Interview, April 28; Twitter; Al-Hayat, February 26; Revolutionary Forces of Syria Media Office, December 24, 2015). [1] Currently, the Mountain Hawks Brigade is one of the major constituent armed opposition groups in a nascent, primarily U.S.-backed Syrian rebel campaign against IS in areas northeast of Aleppo (Viber Interview, April 28; Twitter). The commander of the Mountain Hawks Brigade is Captain Hassan Haj Ali, 36, who is one of the most important moderate armed opposition leaders in northern Syria (Al-Safir [Beirut], February 2, 2016; Shaam [Damascus], November 26, 2015).


http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/turkey-syria-free-syrian-army-military-radoon-qaeda-cia.html#
"Recipients of US TOW armor-piercing anti-tank systems — which other commanders working in the area told Al-Monitor had proven decisive in recent advances there — Radoon’s group was "seen as competition," as one member of an FSA political office put it, due to their effectiveness. Jabhat al-Nusra receives many fighters and support on the basis of its reputation for being the strongest fighting force on the ground."

"the attacking and routing of the Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SRF) and the Hazm Movement — both of whose men had also received weaponry and training abroad — from Idlib in between late October and early November by Jabhat al-Nusra. SRF leader Jamal Maarouf claims that Jabhat al-Nusra was able to gain support for it through propaganda and better resources, as little of the much-touted Western aid ever made it to the moderate groups."

"The arrest in late July of Division 30 fighters — the first contingent of a $500 million train-and-equip program authorized by the US Congress last year — and the subsequent attack on their headquarters by Jabhat al-Nusra, followed by US airstrikes on the local al-Qaeda affiliate, received a great deal of media attention."

The program is parallel to a covert one run by the CIA, but neither one has offered up anything close to the numbers required to have an effect.
Meanwhile, non-Islamist forces are forced to engage in alliances that are pragmatic, unclear and shifting by necessity.


http://www.businessinsider.com.au/cia-vetted-syrian-rebels-fighting-assad-2015-10
Oct 21, 2015: To continue receiving supplies, the vetted rebel groups must also record their use and return spent shells to the closest MOC to prove that they have not sold or shared arms with non-vetted rebel groups.
This arrangement ensures that the TOWs, unless seized by rival rebel groups, stay in the hands of CIA-approved militias. The groups that the CIA currently allows munitions to be shared with are:
13th Division (Forqat 13)
101st Division Infantry (Forqat 101 Masha’a)
Knights of Justice Brigade (Liwa’ Fursan al-Haqq)
Falcons of the Mountain Brigade (Liwa’ Suqour al-Jabal)
Grouping of the Falcons of Al-Ghab (Tajamuu Suqour al-Ghab)
1st Coastal Division (Forqat Awwal al-Sahli)
Gathering of Dignity (Tajammu al-Izza’)
Central Division (Al-Forqat al-Wasti)
46th Division (Forqat 46)
Sultan Murad Brigade (Liwa’ Sultan Murad)
Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, (Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki)
Mujahideen Army/Army of Holy Warriors (Jaish al-Mujahideen)
Revolutionaries of al-Sham Brigades (Kata’eb Thuwar al-Sham)
1st Regiment (Al-Fauj al-Awwal)
Ahmed al-Abdo Martyrs’ Force (Quwwat al-Shaheed Ahmad al-Abdo)
Al-Rahman Legion (Faylaq al-Rahman)
Martyrs of Islam Brigade (Liwa’ Shuhadah al-Islam)
Yarmouk Army (Jaish al-Yarmouk)
Lions of Sunnah Division (Forqat Usood al-Sunnah)
the 18th March Division (Forqat 18 Adhar)
Southern Tawhid Brigade (Liwa’ Tawhid al-Junoub)
Hamza Division (Forqat al-Hamza)
1st Artillery Regiment (Al-Fauj al-Awwal Madfa’a)
Syria Revolutionaries Front — Southern Sector (Jabhat Thuwar Souriya)
The First Corps (Faylaq al-Awwal)
The Dawn of Unity Division (Forqat Fajr al-Tawhid)
Salah al-Din Division (Forqat Salah al-Din)
Omari Brigades (Tajammu Alwiyat al-Omari)
Unity Battalions of Horan Brigade (Liwa’ Tawhid Kata’eb Horan)
Youth of Sunnah Brigade (Liwa’ Shabbab al-Sunnah)
Moataz Billah Brigade (Liwa’ Moataz Billah)
Sword of al-Sham Brigades (Alwiyat Saif al-Sham)
Dawn of Islam Division (Forqat Fajr al-Islam)
Supporters of Sunnah Brigade (Liwa’ Ansar al-Sunnah)
Horan Column Division (Forqat Amoud Horan)
Emigrants and Supporters Brigade (Liwa’ Muhajireen wal Ansar)
Military Council in Quneitra and the Golan
United Sham Front (Jabhat al-Sham Muwahidda)
69th Special Forces Division (Forqat 69 Quwwat al-Khassa)
11th Special Forces Division (Forqat 11 Quwwat al-Khassa)
Partisans of Islam Front (Jabhat Ansar al-Islam)
Al-Furqan Brigades (Alwiyat al-Furqan)





http://news.antiwar.com/2015/11/11/free-syrian-army-faces-mass-desertion-over-low-pay-fragmented-leadership/
11 Nov 2015: "Those familiar with the situation say that poor conditions for FSA fighters and the fragmented leadership are a factor, but the main source of desertion is the low salaries, which are themselves irregularly paid in several of the factions that face constant funding problems.
FSA commanders say that fighters are paid as low as $50 a month to start, and even those fighting for a long time report getting less than $100 a month, when they get it at all. With other rebel factions like ISIS paying $1,000 or more as a monthly salary, the FSA just isn’t a reliable place for rebels to earn a living in a war that seemingly is going to last years."



http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/free-syrian-army-decimated-desertions-151111064831800.html
Nov 2015: The desertions have taken a toll on the FSA's strength. Determining the total number of FSA fighters is difficult, said Columb Strack, a senior Middle East and North Africa analyst at global information company IHS.
"The FSA is made up of more than 2,050 factions," he said. He estimates that FSA groups in southern Syria have about 35,000 fighters. He noted that estimates for northern FSA groups prove harder because the FSA "is so fragmented there".
Wayne White, a scholar at Washington's Middle East Institute and a former deputy director of the US state department's Middle East intelligence office, agrees. According to him, while the FSA's exact numbers are hard to determine, they are weaker than their Islamist counterparts.
"The FSA, compared with various other rebel groupings, such as ISIL, al-Nusra, and various moderate Islamist factions is relatively weak. The current total of FSA combatants in Syria is not precisely known," he told Al Jazeera.



https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/11/17/this-video-shows-the-absurdity-of-the-war-in-syria-in-one-single-blown-up-humvee/
17 Nov 2015: The above video, reportedly recorded outside of Aleppo, Syria and posted online Tuesday, features rebels from the U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army firing a U.S.-supplied anti-tank guided missile at what it is clearly a U.S.-made Humvee.


https://news.vice.com/article/rebels-ignored-the-islamic-state-in-south-syria-and-its-come-back-to-haunt-them
6 April 2016: Rebels who spoke to VICE News said they regretted letting the extremists in their midst fester for so long. "The battles happening now are the price of this complacency and leniency with extremism in the south," said Asmat al-Absi, head of the southern rebels' supreme court, which runs judicial affairs in the region. "That's how we got Shuhada al-Yarmouk and Harakat al-Muthanna, and if we're complacent again, we might get new [extremist] factions coming out."
"It was a mistake," said the rebel commander Abu Khaled, who also owns a farm on the front lines with these ISIS-linked forces. "A really big one."
As for why that happened, "we waited so long because we had no choice, militarily," said southern rebel commander Maj. Hassan Ibrahim, who also goes by Abu Osama al-Jolani. 'When you have more than one enemy, you can't open up more than one front at a time."
On top of that, rebels were leery of picking up an unwanted ally: Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Nusra Front, which had been leading the fight against Shuhada al-Yarmouk for more than a year. Rebels were concerned that fighting alongside the Nusra Front might endanger their foreign backing – but also, they also just didn't like Nusra enough to pick a side.


http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/27/world/middleeast/cia-arms-for-syrian-rebels-supplied-black-market-officials-say.html?_r=1
26 June 2016: 
AMMAN, Jordan — Weapons shipped into Jordan by the Central Intelligence Agency and Saudi Arabia intended for Syrian rebels have been systematically stolen by Jordanian intelligence operatives and sold to arms merchants on the black market, according to American and Jordanian officials.
Some of the stolen weapons were used in a shooting in November that killed two Americans and three others at a police training facility in Amman, F.B.I. officials believe after months of investigating the attack, according to people familiar with the investigation.
The existence of the weapons theft, which ended only months ago after complaints by the American and Saudi governments, is being reported for the first time after a joint investigation by The New York Times and Al Jazeera. The theft, involving millions of dollars of weapons, highlights the messy, unplanned consequences of programs to arm and train rebels — the kind of program the C.I.A. and Pentagon have conducted for decades — even after the Obama administration had hoped to keep the training program in Jordan under tight control.

Moderate Sufis? In Pre-modern era


Sufism is the mystical side of Islam that prioritizes "inner" spiritual aspects of religion to the "exterior" rituals and laws of the religion, that does not mean it completely writes off the latter. Like orthodox religion, heterodox Sufism is also a grocery shop - so many items of different flavors under the same label :) Various flavors of Sufism stand on different points across "inner vs exterior" religiosity spectrum. There was a "wahdatul wajood" (pantheism) school of Sufism that if taken to logical conclusion, ends up in the unity of all religions, thus undermining the claim of "one true faith". Some Sufis (malamatis) altogether rejected "exterior" (Sharia) for the "interior" (esoteric mysticism) and there were others form whom "interior" complemented, not replaced, the "exterior".

Sufis not homogenous

http://www.islamicpluralism.org/1922/the-moral-crisis-of-pakistani-barelvism
"Sufis are not a homogeneous phenomenon. Some are jihadist (notably Qadiri Sufis who have a long history of association with the Barelvis). Others are "peaceful, but not pacifist," in the description of the outstanding Western historian of Islam, Bernard Lewis. Some Sufis are Sunni-centric and despise Shia Muslims; others claim to have surmounted the Sunni-Shia divide. Some are strictly observant of Islamic shariah law; some refer to "shariah" only as the external practice of religion; some disregard Islamic law, as, for example, the Turkish and Kurdish Alevis, who originated in Shiism. Most, however, are open to dialogue with believers in other faiths."

Sufi militancy across history

http://tribune.com.pk/story/105628/are-sufis-essentially-non-violent/
"In the region now called Pakistan, Sufis, dervishes and mullahs pioneered several millenarian and revivalist movements directed against British colonialists. Mirza Ali Khan, better known as the ‘Faqir from Ipi,’ a hermit from the Waziristan region, led his disciples in a successful rebellion against the British. And the Hur movement of the late 19th century in Sindh was also mobilised by a saintly figure, Sibghtullah Shah Badshah."

Not so well-written but gives a good description of some Sufi warriors. There are some inaccuracies, for example, Mullah Omar's connection with Naqshbandis. But overall, a good list :
http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?61967-Famous-Sufi-Warriors

A detailed article on the history of Sufi militancy (the article has a Marxist slant but a good description of militant Sufi movements):
 http://ww4report.com/node/2151
"The first and most successful of the sufi revolutionaries was Amir Abd al-Qadir (also rendered al-Kader) al-Jazairi (1808-1883), of the Qadiri Order, who from his base in Oran began resisting the French almost immediately upon their 1830 arriveal in Algeria. The French originally saw in him a proxy force to fight the Ottoman Turks and signed treaties granting him wide autonomy over much of the country."

Extracts from the page 420 of the book "The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands" By Alfred J. Rieber. Deals with Sufi rebellions against Russian and Chinese empires.
https://books.google.ca/books?id=s6roAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA420#v=onepage

http://eye-on-islam.blogspot.co.uk/2011/01/peaceful-tableau-of-sufism.html
"In the modern day, many influential Muslim leaders who are deemed by most people to be profoundly "radical", including Hasan al-Banna and the Ayatollah Khomeini, also had a great interest in Sufism. In modern times, a Sufi jihadi squadron was formed in Iraq in 2005, and the 2004 Beslan massacre, in which over 300 schoolchildren were murdered by Islamic jihadists in Russia, was orchestrated by a Naqshbandi Sufi, Shamil Basayev."


https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=wP1Nz5Y8-voC&pg=PA86&lpg=PA86&dq=janissari+sufis&source=bl&ots=DtSK6QoIht&sig=HgivLuCSYybbTx087sdmXFyYer4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiHhuS4v57SAhWKE7wKHRGFDqQQ6AEIRjAI#v=onepage&q=janissari%20sufis&f=false
Sufism in Ottoman Empire. Janisarri affiliation with Bektashi order.

https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/833630559175790592
https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/833629610067718145
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=t0MsAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA25&lpg=PA25#v=onepage&q&f=false
Militant Sufi orders in Ottoman Empire. Page 25 of the book "From Religious Empires to Secular States: State Secularization in Turkey" By Birol Başkan


https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/833642922625097729
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=t0MsAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA77&lpg=PA77#v=onepage&q&f=false
Sufi origin of Safavids and their suppression of rival Sufi orders in Iran. Page 77 of the book "From Religious Empires to Secular States: State Secularization in Turkey" By Birol Başkan


https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/855707869639041024
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=jV_wAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA100&lpg=PA100#v=onepage&q&f=false
In Tsarist Russia, authorities made use of orthodox Muslim clerics to denounce 'unorthodox' Sufi jihadis. Extract from page 100 of the book "The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia" By Paul W. Werth


https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/854757595474743296
https://www.hudson.org/research/13480-justifying-war-the-salafi-jihadi-appropriation-of-sufi-jihad-in-the-sahel-sahara
During the jihadist campaigns of the 1800s in the Sahel-Sahara region, the Muslim scholars who led the armed movements identified themselves with the Sufi brotherhoods. In the Sahel-Sahara region today, core ideological concepts that animated the historical jihads of the 19th Century—including ideas about takfīr(excommunication), Dār al-Islām (abode of Islam), Dār al-Kufr (abode of unbelief), ḥijrah (migration) and al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ (fealty and disavowal)—can be found in contemporary Salafist ideologies and have also been appropriated by present-day Salafi-Jihadi groups like Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda to justify their campaigns.4

http://stottilien.com/2013/03/01/sufism-the-gnostic-chameleon-muscle-and-brain-of-islam/
"Sufi Dervish were Warrior Orders called by the Calif, often from far distances, when long sieges were expected. They were not only mystics but warriors when necessity demanded. There is good evidence, that their secret close-knit brotherhoods was the role  model of the European Knight Templars."

"The Sufi Order was widespread in the Ottoman Empire (because the majority of Ottoman Janissaries were Shia-Sufis).  The Janissaries were elite soldiers, a heavy armored infantry or Foot Knights of the Ottoman Empire.  Ottoman Heavy Cavalry were Sipahis (Turkish Nobles) and Ghulams (mostly Persian).  Janissaries had “cousins” in Iran (Persia) under the Safavid Dynasty (Persian-Turkic Cousins of the Ottomans) . The Safavid counterpart of the Ottoman Janissaries were called the “Qizilbash.  Christian children were brought into the corps through the devshirme system, in which young boys were taken from their Christian families in  Greece, Serbia, Armenia, or Bulgaria , which were part of the Ottoman Empire. The word “Janissary” comes from the Turkish yeni çeri or “new soldier.” The child soldiers were converted to Islam, and trained in infantry techniques and tactics.
By the end of the seventh century, Turkish migrants converted to Sunni Islam and became champions of Islamic orthodoxy.  Beginning in the twelfth century, new waves of Turkic migrants became attracted to militant Sufi orders, which gradually incorporated heterodox Shia beliefs. One Sufi order that appealed to Turks after they won against Christianity was the Safavi, based in northwest Iran. Safavid adherence to a Sufi version of Shi’a Islam had the support of the Turkic tribes called the mentioned Qizilbash [literary the “Redheads” for the twelve red strips on their turbans symbolizing their adherence to twelve Shi’i Imams]. Qizilbash tribes resided mostly in Asia Minor; northern Syria, and northern Iraq. Concern about the growing influence of the Safavi probably was one of the factors that prompted the Ottomans to permit unorthodox Bektasi Sufism to become the official order of the janissary soldiers.
The Sufi orders enhanced their political role again with Western imperialism. When Islam was under threat, their close-knit brotherhoods were devastatingly effective. Sufi orders led anti-colonial movements from Morocco to Indonesia and are the core of the  stubborn Chechen guerrillas. Even Stalin’s terror campaigns could not root out the Sufi brotherhoods."


http://web.archive.org/web/20160326113305/http://jang.com.pk/thenews/sep2009-weekly/nos-06-09-2009/lit.htm
http://jang.com.pk/thenews/sep2009-weekly/nos-06-09-2009/lit.htm
"Frembgen writes that during the twelfth century in the Taimour period, Ulemas belonging to the Naqashbandi school held strong positions in the government. Sufis who took part in power politics were generally either from the Naqshbandi school or its splinters. In NWFP and FATA areas there was a strong mixture of Pukhtoons and the Naqshbandi school. One may trace roots of such influences from neighbouring Central Asia. He also writes about a Chishti sufi, Sheikh Muhamad Rukanudin Junaidi, who did Rasm-e-Tajposhi of the first ruler of Bahmani kingdom during the year 1347 in Daulatabad, Deccan.
There are various incidents in which Sufis also supported rebels. The anti-Mughal Roshnya movement is not the only example in this connection. This movement was headed by Bayazid Ansari, commonly known as Peer Roshaan. He was a Jalandhri pathan by race. Peer baba of Bunair and Saidu baba of Sawat had lot of influence on Gujars, Pathans, Hindo Hazara and FATA tribes.
The author also narrates incidents of armed struggle from Sudan to Russia in which Sufis participated. In this connection he gives special reference to Imam Shamil (1796-1871) and the Mahdavi movement (1843)."


http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sufism-in-asymmetric-warfare
https://www.ethz.ch/content/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/184340
"Though several Sufi orders existed in East Africa in the late-19th century it is generally held that the Saalihiya order, led by Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan and his Dervish resistance fighters, had the greatest influence on the region. Contrastingly, historical evidence shows us that the Qadiriyya tariqa in East Africa was the most important factor in setting the conditions for Hassan’s later success against the colonial empires. This study argues that the Qadiriyya order, led by Uways al-Barawi, used its Sufi networks to wage limited aims warfare against the Europeans and pioneered a style of irregular doctrine that leveraged lesser means against greater forces."...
"Referring to one of the more recent studies of Sufi inspired warfare, Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush write in Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union, about Sufi insurgencies in the Northern Caucasus region of the Soviet Union. Like in East Africa, Sufis in the Northern Caucasus had the ability to preach to and earn the respect of all people in society, even on-Sufis. Sufis earned this respect by making shrines and paying homage to “saints” that were important local community figures, not just Sufi Muslims. In the end, the only qualifier to become a Sufi saint was to do good in the community resulting in the practice of “clan or tribal ancestors, Biblical prophets, even imaginary beings (often pre-Islamic deities of Zoroastrian or, rarely, of Buddhist origin)” becoming revered by Sufis (Bennigsen 94). This act of respect crossed religious, ethnic, and political creeds earning Sufis influence in all spheres of Northern Caucasus life. As a result, organizing recruiting campaigns and logistical operations against the Soviets was not merely a Sufi Muslim task; it became a local community task. As a result of the inclusive practices of Sufis, their shrines became meeting places for people from all walks of life. Mistakenly, the Soviets allowed the Sufis to control these very specific shrine areas and therefore they became “the critical juncture where popular belief meets clandestine organization, where ordinary Muslims come into contact with the highly motivated and rigidly disciplined Sufis” (94). Eventually, the Soviets caught on and concluded that Sufi shrines were “the holy place is the main contact place between ‘Sufi fanatics’ and the population – believers and unbelievers alike” (94-95). In the end two charges were levied against Sufis in the Soviet Union, the first was “The Sufi brotherhoods are the breeding ground of the most radical form of nationalism and nurseries of anti-Russian and anti-communist xenophobia” (102). Second, the Soviets believed that “Sufi communities are ‘closed societies’ which live outside the Soviet legal establishment” (108). From the Soviet’s experience, we can see that Sufism was considered inaccessible to western government, but extremely accessible to community members. Moreover, we learn that Sufis are not so concerned with physically defeating greater militaries are they are with finding a political end state that restores pride and honor in their communities."

http://history.emory.edu/home/documents/endeavors/volume2/LewisOuksel.pdf
The Tungan Rebellion was a great uprising of the Hui in the Northwest of China during the mid-nineteenth century. The rebellion began in 1862 as a series of local level conflicts between Hui and Han militias in the Wei River Valley in Shaanxi province but grew to encompass the entire province as well as those of Gansu, Ningxia and Xinjiang. The Rebellion itself took place during a period of great unrest when a number of rebellions were raging throughout China.
....
f the “New Teaching” caused great anxiety amongst Qing officials. The “New Teaching” arose in the eighteenth century as part of a wave of Islamic revivalism that saw similar movements in other Muslim areas. It came out of the Naqshbandi sufi order that was widespread amongst Chinese Muslims. Two sufi revivalists, Ma Mingxin and Ma Laichi, had studied in Yemen and Mecca and began teaching. Both had studied with prominent Naqshbandi Sufis, but had learned different lessons. Ma Laichi practiced the silent dhikr that was characteristic of the Naqshbandi order. Ma Mingxin, however, studied later at a time when vocal dhikr came to be seen as permissible and taught that to his own disciples. Though seemingly trivial, the issue of the dhikr was one of many contentious concerns among the Chinese Muslims. A greater issue was that of tajdid, the commitment to the political, social and religious renewal of Islam. Ma Mingxin, when he returned to China in 1761, intended to purify Islam as practiced in China and remove the Chinese influences on it. As a practitioner of the vocal dhikr, he named his new sect the Jahriya, after the Arabic word jahr meaning aloud. Ma Laichi and his disciples, the Khafiya, from the Arabic for silent, resented the upstart sect for rivaling their hegemony in the northwest. The Khafiya found the Jahriya practices to be superstitious, heterodox and immoral. The Jahriya, on the other hand, criticized the excessive donations demanded by the Khafiya, the emphasis on saints and tombs, and the development of hereditary succession. Beyond the differences in practice, the Jahriya were committed to the purification of Islam and to its renewal. This made the Jahriya much more militant towards the non-Muslim state and heterodox Muslims. Indeed in the 1760s and again in the 1780s, there was much violent conflict between Jahriya and Khafiya adherents. In 1780, the Jahriya organized large contingents of armed men to attack the Khafiya, who organized themselves but faced great losses. The Khafiya then turned to local Qing officials, who, instead of holding trials and administering punishment, dispatched troops with the intention of exterminating the followers of the New Teaching. The Jahriya responded by eliminating a platoon of troops and killing the accompanying officials. 


https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=-F4Yk0B16zAC&pg=PA102&lpg=PA102#v=onepage&q&f=false
Page 102 of the book "Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union" By Alexandre Bennigsen, S. Enders Wimbush: “The Sufi brotherhoods are the breeding ground of the most radical form of nationalism and nurseries of anti-Russian and anti-communist xenophobia” (102).



http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/opth.2014.1.issue-1/opth-2015-0003/opth-2015-0003.xml
"Sufism is often viewed as a non-violent and non-political branch of Islam. However, I argue that there are many historical examples to illustrate the presence of anti-colonialist Sufi military movements throughout the “Muslim World,” and I give particular attention to the cases of ‘Abd al-Qadir of the Qadiriyya movement and his anti-colonialist rebellion against France in Algeria in the 1800s, as well as that of Italian colonialism in Libya and the military response by the Sanussi order. Thus, while Sufism clearly has various teachings and principles that could be interpreted to promote non-violence, Sufi political movements have also developed as a response to colonialism and imperialism, and thus, one should not automatically assume a necessary separation from Sufism and notions of military resistance."

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/afghanistan-sufi-leaders-add-dig-20143256634750809.html
"The uprising, led by Habibullah Kalakani who, like a number of conservative Afghans, was offended by King Amanullah's rapid reforms, is said to have been instigated by the British. Interestingly, the head of the Naqshbandiyyah Sufi order of Afghanistan, Hazrat Nur al-Mashayekh Mojaddidi, was actively helping the rebellion against the king.
Historically, Sufism has always been intertwined with Afghan politics. The story of a Sufi dervish placing a wreath of wheat on the head of Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of modern Afghanistan, at a Sufi shrine in Kandahar in 1747 is told to confirm the Durrani king's legitimacy. Zahir Shah, the last monarch of Afghanistan (r. 1933-73), was proclaimed king after Hazrat Nur al-Mashayekh placed the ceremonial turban on his head."


Sufi tolerance vs Salafi intolerance?

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/311/html
"Salafism is often associated with intolerance and violence and Sufism with tolerance and nonviolence. In this article we demonstrate that these assumptions are baseless. Based on analysis of historical and contemporary cases from Southeast Asia and West Africa, we show that there is no significant correlation between theology and violent tendencies. Some violent groups are Sufi and others Salafi, while some non-violent groups are Salafi, others Sufi. Policy makers are therefore ill-advised to use theological orientation as a factor in assessing the violent potential of Muslim movements and organisations. "

"Usman dan Fodio, the founder of the Sokoto Caliphate provides a clear example. He had a vision in which he saw the Prophet Muhammad, his companions and other prophets and saints, including al-Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (1077-1166), the founder of the Qadiriyya tariqa to which dan Fodio belonged. According to dan Fodio’s account of this vision, al-Jilani anointed him as the leader of saints (Imam Al-Awliyaa), and enjoined him “to command what is good and to forbid what is reprehensible.” Then al-Jilani decorated dan Fodio with the “Sword of Truth” and ordered him to “unsheathe it against the enemies of God.” (54) For dan Fodio, this was the spiritual and moral authorization for his jihad.
Al-Hajj Umar Tall invoked the doctrines of the Tijaniyya tariqa in his articulation of the doctrinal basis of jihad. In his magnum opus Kitab rimah hizb al-rahim ‘ala nuhur hizb al-rajim (“The Book of the Lances of the Party of Allah the Merciful against the Necks of the Party of Satan the Accursed”), he employed the sectarian Tijani discourse of spiritual election to legitimise his military and political agendas. This discourse proclaims that the Tijaniyya supersedes all other Sufi orders because of the exclusive guarantee of salvation Ahmad al-Tijani, its founder, received from the Prophet Muhammad for himself and his followers. Umar Tall also employed the Tijani doctrine of inkar that demonises all who reject the Tijani doctrine of spiritual election to refute his opponents."

https://books.google.ca/books?id=rdI96px90kUC&pg=PA89#v=onepage&q&f=false
Page 89 of the book "Egyptology: The Missing Millennium : Ancient Egypt in Medieval Arabic Writings" By Okasha El Daly. A Sufi broke Sphynx's nose


http://www.americanthinker.com/2005/05/sufi_jihad.html#ixzz3rwtBydlo
"Throughout the 20th century, and at present, Sufi ideologues and mass movements (especially the Naqshbandiya) have been engaged in defensive—offensive jihad campaigns designed not only to expel real (or perceived) 'colonial powers', but also to create supra—national (regional) shari'a states, or even a frank Caliphate (i.e., a single unified global shari'a state). The restored Shi'ite theocracy in Iran, whose contemporary shari'a—based system of dhimmitude was drafted by a leading Sufi—Sultanhussein Tabandeh—provides a sobering example of what 'Sufi ecumenism' towards non—Muslims means in practice."

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=2875#.VtXkpBjhO8o
"The uniqueness of Sufism in Chechnya lies in the transformation and development of the two tariqas since the 19th century. The Naqshbandiyya, known in the Caucasus as a base of support for those who resisted Russian aggression in the 18th and 19th centuries, abandoned that view and adopted a stance of peaceful coexistence with the official authorities. At the same time, the Qadiri tariqa, which had come to Chechnya promoting nonviolent resistance to Russian colonization in the 19th century, has now become the main force of Sufi opposition to the authorities."


Sufis in Indian sub-continent

Hur rebellion terrorism in Sindh (1890s)
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=_kC421xzMKsC&printsec=frontcover&pg=PA57#v=onepage&q&f=false

https://www.facebook.com/archive150/videos/779935392031541/



Manzilgah Riots, Sukkur (1939)


http://members.shaw.ca/freesindh/sindhstory/Thrown_to_the_Wolves.html 
From 3 October to 19 November, 1939, under the leadership of G.M. Syed, Khuhro and Sir Haroon, they forcibly occupied Manzilgah. On I November, 1939, Bhagat Kanwar Ram, the well-known singer-saint of Sindh, was gunned down at Ruk railway station --- and nobody was arrested. Sukkur district observed complete hartal for fifteen days. When Pamnani, MLA, said that the Pir of Bharchundi had got Kanwar Ram killed (earlier the Pir's son had been beaten for kidnapping Hindu girls) he, too, was gunned down. The Sindh Hindus were stunned.   
But worse was to follow. Word went round that killing one Hindu was equal to doing seven Haj pilgrimages. Sixty-four Hindus were killed and property worth several million was looted or burnt in the Sukkur countryside. In this violent atmosphere, G.M. Syed said on the floor of the Assembly that the Hindus shall be driven out of Sindh like the Jews from Germany --- a statement he has very much regretted since. But the damage was done.   



Sufis view of militant jihad

Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio's jihad against Nigerian Muslim rulers who were deemed "not Islamic enough". Extracts from page 436 of the book "The Blackwell Companion to Religion and Violence" edited by Andrew R. Murphy:
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=MF2Oxz3a0XwC&pg=PT436&lpg=PT436#v=onepage&q&f=false



Views of some Indian Sufis on militant jihad as described on page 123 of "Islamic Jihad: A Legacy of Forced Conversion, Imperialism, and Slavery" By M. A. Khan:
https://books.google.ca/books?id=uHNddAz5cfAC&pg=PA123&dq=auliya%27s+thought+on+jihad&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=auliya%27s%20thought%20on%20jihad&f=false
 https://books.google.ca/books?id=uHNddAz5cfAC&pg=PA123#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://twitter.com/Rjrasva/status/609311382819868672



http://islamtimes.org/ur/doc/interview/177506
جب اکبر ہندوستان کا بادشاہ بنا، تو اس نے یہاں اکبری گمراہی کو فروغ دیا، اور اس نے یہاں شراکت ادیان کے تصور کو فروغ دیا۔ ہندوؤں اور مسلمانوں کو اس نے آپسی رشتوں میں منسلک کیا۔ قرآن اور ودھ کو ملا کر پڑھنے کی اس نے ایک ترتیب قائم کی۔ تو وہی اثرات اس کی نسلوں میں نظر آتے ہیں۔ یعنی جہانگیر میں شاہجہان میں اس کے بیٹے مراد میں، شجاع میں اور دارا شکوہ میں۔ اب دارا شکوہ قادری سلسلے سے تعلق رکھتا تھا، حضرت سلطان باہو بھی قادری سلسلے سے تھے۔ اور اورنگریب سخت قسم کے مولویانہ ذہنیت و نظریات کا حامل تھا اور دارہ شکوہ گو کہ حضرت سلطان باہو کا ہم مشرب تھا لیکن آپ نے دارہ شکوہ کا ساتھ دینے کی بجائے سیاسی سطح پر اورنگزیب عالمگیر کا ساتھ دیا اور اپنی فارسی تصانیف میں اس بات کا تذکرہ بار بار کیا کہ اورنگزیب ایک اچھا حکمران ہو سکتا ہے۔



http://indiafacts.co.in/sinister-side-sufism/
"Not a single Sufi, the so-called mystic saints, ever objected to the ongoing senseless manslaughter and reckless plunder, or to the destruction neither of temples, nor for that matter to the ghoulish enslavement of the so-called infidel men and women for sale in the bazaars of Ghazni and Baghdad."

http://www.chakranews.com/beauty-and-the-beast-of-sufism/2454
"Sufism however does not describe a single set of doctrines but a disparate set of spiritual practices and mystical techniques which added a new dimension to Islam. In this the Sufi masters imbibed ancient spiritual traditions of the Greeks, Jews, Zarathustrians and Hindus which predated Islam. Nevertheless Sufis could be as fanatic as any mullah or army on the march of jihad. The history of Islam in South Asia demonstrates this very clearly. Like David Livingstone was to do in Africa these missionaries for the one true jealous male demiurge called ‘God’, acted as sappers and miners for the colonialism which was devastating ancient civilisations without mercy."
"Many other famous Sufis also revered Aurangzeb, including the Punjab Sufi Sultan Bahu who wrote ‘Aurang-i-Shahi’ praising the emperor as a just ruler. Now Aurangzeb or Alamgir is notorious in history as the Mughal who tried to annihilate Hinduism completely, destroying temples and suppressing religious practices. Guru Tegh Bahadur and his two close companions Bhai Matti Das and Bhai Fateh Das were executed for refusing to convert to Islam. Aurangzeb’s tomb is in Khuldabad in Maharashtra within the courtyard of the shrine of the Sufi saint Shaikh Burham-u’d-din Gharib."

https://rossonl.wordpress.com/2015/03/29/what-about-the-sufis/
"Sufis like Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624) said that sharia law should be “fostered through the sword”. Shah Wali-Allah (1703-1762) said that unbelievers “should be reduced to a state of humiliation and treated with utter contempt” and he commanded Muslims to “not be negligent in fighting jihad”, for “by taking up the sword to make Islam supreme and by subordinating your own persona needs to this cause, you will reap vast benefits”.
This has been just as true in the 20th and 21st centuries. The Shi’ite Sufi Tabandeh (1915-1980s) wrote a nasty treatise against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As recently as 2009, leaders of the Sufi order Naqshbandiyya met with a leader of Hamas, praised the Hamas jihad, and boasted of their own jihad attacks against Americans in Iraq. The Muslim Brotherhood has ties to Sufism, especially to the Tijaniyya order. Al-Qaeda itself betrays Sufi influence: its members take bayat (an oath of allegiance) to their sheik Bin Laden, which is the Sufi ritual of accepting one’s sheik as the special leader of the brotherhood and coming under the protection of the order’s lineage."

http://www.kamakotimandali.com/blog/index.php?p=1417&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1
"Amir Khasrau described many instances of barbaric cruelty, often of catastrophic proportions, inflicted by Muslim conquerors upon the Hindus. But nowhere did he show any sign of grief or remorse, but only gloating delight. While describing those acts of barbarism, he invariably expressed gratitude to Allah, and glory to Muhammad, for enabling the Muslim warriors achieve those glorious feats."

"First, Sufis became an organized and accepted community in the thirteenth and early fourteenth century. By this time, the peoples of the Middle East, Persia, Egypt and North Africa had become largely Muslim. The Sufis could not have played significant roles in their conversion. In agreement, says Francis Robinson, Sufis played a leading part in ‘the remarkable spread of Islam from the thirteenth century onwards.’ Second, the Sufis almost invariably needed the power and terror of the sword to create the dominance of Islam first before their alleged peaceful mission of propagating Islam could proceed."

"(Pir Ma’bari) came here and waged Jihad against the rajas and rebels (of Bijapur). And with his iron bar, he broke the heads and necks of many rajas and drove them to the dust of defeat. Many idolaters, who by the will of God had guidance and blessings, repented from their unbelief and error, and by the hands of (Pir Ma’bari) came to Islam."


https://twitter.com/cybertosser/status/833685849027993601 
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=j2F9BgAAQBAJ&pg=PA31&lpg=PA31#v=onepage&q&f=false 
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=j2F9BgAAQBAJ&pg=PA31&lpg=PA31#v=onepage&q&f=false 
Warrior Sufis of Bijapur (1296-1347)


Sheikh Jalal, warrior Sufi in Bengal: 

http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft067n99v9&chunk.id=ch03 
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=gKhChF3yAOUC&pg=PA73&lpg=PA73#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=O3GXOqPa67MC&pg=PA165&lpg=PA165#v=onepage&q&f=false


Extremist Sufis in Kashmir:
page 232 of "Islamic Jihad: A Legacy of Forced Conversion, Imperialism, and Slavery" By M. A. Khan:
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Mr_eYjoVjz8C&pg=PT232&lpg=PT232&dq=musa+raina+hindus&source=bl&ots=75kvuFX4z0&sig=HAWvmLx70oU11-agZ1CIoTM9kIE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwibztad66bMAhWYOsAKHUWAAqIQ6AEIOjAI#v=onepage&q=musa%20raina%20hindus&f=false


Allama Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi






"Allama Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi was one of the main figures of the Indian Rebellion of 1857. He was a philosopher, a poet, a religious scholar, but is most remembered for his role as a freedom fighter. It was he who issued the fatwa in favour of Jihad against the Britishers in 1857. Allama Fazl-e Haq Khairabadi was one of the pioneer freedom fighters deported to the Andaman Islands in 1859. After the First War of Independence failed, he was arrested on 30 January 1859 at Khairabad, was found guilty of "revolt" against the Government and sentenced for life to the prison at Kalapani (Cellular Jail).



The Allama Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi Convention was organised by by Khanqah-e-Qadariya Badaun Shareef along with Jam-e-Noor with the Cooperation of Jamia Millia Islamia at Ansari Auditorium to observe the 150 death Anniversary of Freedom Fighter of 1857 Hazrat Allama Fazle Haq Khairabadi on 18th Sep 2011.
"



 
Sufism, Salafism, anti-imperliasm
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/821299/posts
The root of all evil
Al-Ahram Weekly ^ | 1-11-03 | Basheer M Nafi
Posted on 12 January 2003 at 14:35:55 GMT by SJackson

Basheer M Nafi* finds interesting similarities between Russia's accusations against Sufism in the 19th century and those the West is currently levelling against Wahhabi Islam

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One has only to skim a daily digest of the Russian print media to realise that the Russian press is united in its understanding of the Chechen problem. Accordingly, the war in Chechnya is the work of a foreign group of radical Muslim activists and an alien culture, namely Wahhabism. More than 10 per cent of the Chechen people have been killed and twice that number are now living in refugee camps in other areas of the Caucasus. Those remaining in Chechnya are daily subject to horrendous forms of oppression at the hands of Russian security forces, including rape, torture and detention in the absence of any kind of legal process. While Russian troops pillage the supposedly autonomous republic, Grozny, its capital, has become a ghost town, deprived of all necessary means of living. Meanwhile, the Russian media puts all of this down to the actions of a group of foreigners and few a Chechen dissidents, motivated by evil Wahhabi influences.

The attribution of an imperialist conspiracy to a particular school of Islam is neither new nor uniquely Russian. During the 19th-century Dagestani resistance (1830-59), Tsarist Russia found in the Naqshbandi Sufi order a convenient scapegoat. The reason behind the vilification of Sufism was the involvement of a number of Naqshbandi followers, most prominent among them Imam Shamil, in the resistance movement. Like her British and French counterparts, 19th-century Russia saw her work in the northern Caucasus as a civilising mission. Any resistance to it was by definition an expression of fanaticism, backwardness and decadence. From the Russian perspective, the project of Russification in the northern Caucasus was driven by the values of progress; consequently, the values embraced by Dagestani fighters were portrayed as nothing more than anti-historical and anti-progressive cultural sentiments. In other words, the problem in mid-19th-century Daghestan (and then in Chechnya) was not the Russian imperialist expansion but the culture of backwardness and fanaticism precipitated by the "alien" Naqshbandi.

In the latest issue of the German academic journal, Die Welt des Islams, Alexander Knysh, professor of Islamic studies at the University of Michigan, published a rigorous challenge to the Russian reading of the 19th-century Islamic resistance in the northern Caucasus, and to all those who adopted this reading. Knysh, who is of Russian origin and highly-regarded as an expert of Sufism, considers the Russian reading an intrinsic part of the Western view of Islamic resistance to imperialism in the 19th century. The Russians, however, did not have a monopoly on the vilification of Sufism: the theme also marks Anglo-French interpretations of Islamic jihadi movements in Sudan, Somalia, Algeria and West Africa, and was used for the same objective by the Dutch in Indonesia and the Italians in Libya. In Sudan, the British faced popular resistance embodied in the Mahdi movement, while the Somali opposition to the British occupation originated in branches of Qadiri and Idrissi orders. Abdel-Qadir Al-Jaza'ri, who led the anti-French resistance in mid-19th-century Algeria, was also an adherent of Naqshbandi Sufism, while the Sanussi order would play, a half a century later, a major role in organising Islamic resistance to European invasions of Chad, Libya and other parts of West Africa. As all these resistance movements had Sufi affiliations, it was expedient for imperialist administrators, commanding officers and their advisers to depict Islamic jihadi forces in the 19th century as desperate cries from an inward-looking and declining Sufi culture that was being pushed to the margins of history by the forces of progress and civilisation.

Basing his argument on a thorough understanding of Sufism and the resistance in the northern Caucasus in the 19th century, Knysh demolishes the theory of militant Sufism from its foundations, describing it as a police-reports historiography. Imam Shamil, for example, was not a main Sufi sheikh but merely a follower of one of the Naqshbandi sheikhs in Dagestan; nor were all sheikhs of the Naqshbandi order associated with the anti-Russian jihad. While a few influential sheikhs declared their support for the jihad, others openly disapproved of the use of armed struggle, emphasising the spiritual and educational mission of Sufism. More important is the utter lack of evidence to link the teachings of Naqshbandi and 19th-century Sufism in general, with jihadi orientations. This is equally true of the case of the Sanussi, which was born as a reformist movement within Islam -- not as a framework for Islamic resistance to foreign domination. The only exception, which can by no means be considered a rule, was the Mahdi in Sudan that carried from its moment of inception strong sentiments against the Egyptian administration, many of whose officials at the time were Europeans. There is no doubt that if Naqshbandi, Sanussi or Mahdi brotherhoods did not exist, Muslim peoples would still have risen against the colonial forces.

This, of course, should raise a number of questions about the ongoing attempt to turn Wahhabism (and sometimes the whole of Salafi Islam) into the source of all evils that have befallen our world. A century and a half after the defeat of Imam Shamil, Sufism is no longer a problem for Russia. In fact, Sufism is now presented in Russian writings as the peaceful, authentic culture of the peoples of the northern Caucasus. The problem is the alien teachings of Wahhabism, the Wahhabi of the foreign Arab mujahidin and scores of their Chechen dissident allies. And exactly like the 19th century, blaming Wahhabism is not restricted to Russian discourse. From writers at the respectable broadsheets of the British media, French specialists in modern Islam, leading American congressmen and women, to those Western Islamicists well-known for their humanist outlooks, there seems to emerge a kind of consensus that it was Wahhabism/ Salafism that provided the eco-cultural system from which Al-Qa'eda and all other currents of armed, radical Islam were born. And just like the international situation in the 19th-century, the distance between Western discourse and Western polices has narrowed to a great extent.

If Wahhabism/Salafism is the problem, then American armed forces should be unhesitatingly deployed to uproot centres of violence, backwardness and anachronism wherever they are -- even if that requires invading the entire eastern part of the Arab world. It apparently did not cross the minds of the makers of the Russian expansionist policy in the 19th century, or their counterparts in London, Paris and Amsterdam, that invading and oppressing other peoples was in itself an act of evil. What dominated the world outlook of the European metropoles was an unquestionable sense of self- righteousness to do whatever they had to do as long as they were fighting the battle of civilisation against backwardness, of freedom against fanaticism, and of the values of human progress and advancement against values of decline and attachment to the past. One perhaps has only to read a recent speech by George W Bush or Tony Blair to discover that almost nothing has changed in the Western discourse on Islam and Muslims. The discourse underpinning Western policies at the beginning of the 21st century is almost a literal reproduction of the Russian, British and French imperialist readings of Islamic resistance in the 19th century.

The Wahhabi movement, which is identified with sheikh Mohamed Ibn Abdel-Wahhab, was born in the Najdi region of the Arabian Peninsula in the second half of the 18th century. In terms of its intellectual antecedents, Wahhabism belonged to the wider pool of the Salafi school of thought and its deep roots in Islamic culture. Modern Salafism encompasses multiple currents, the common denominator of which is their affirmation of the position of the founding Islamic texts (the Qur'an and Hadith) and their opposition to various manifestations of popular religion.

Like the Sanussi, Wahhabism was a within-Islam reformist movement that for more than two centuries after its appearance showed no specific anti-imperialist tendencies. A considerable degree of violence was associated with the rise of the Wahhabi movement, but that violence was largely engendered by the Saudi political expansion and inherent tribal rivalries in the Arabian Peninsula. Today, even if we accept that Al- Qa'eda subscribes to Wahhabi doctrines, there exist manifestations of Wahhabism that reject recourse to violence despite their opposition to foreign influence and the state. Other Wahhabi manifestations are closely linked with the Saudi regime and denounce all forms of dissent that threaten the prevailing political order.

Within the broader context of Salafi Islam, Salafis of the 20th century evidence a wide range of intellectual and political concerns, from Mohamed Abdouh and Rashid Rida to Youssef Al-Qaradawi and independent Islamic intellectuals such as Mohamed Salim El-'Awa, Tariq El-Bishri and Fahmy Howeidy. Some of the 20th-century Salafis, like Haj Amin Al-Husseini, Izzeddin Al-Qassam and Abdel-Karim Al- Khattabi, were national liberation leaders; others, like Mustafa Al-Maraghi and Tahir Al-Jaza'iri, were advocates of reform in its civic sense. There is nothing inherent to the Salafi world-view that calls for recourse to violence or leads to it.

In the mid-20th century, as the nationalist trend moved to the forefront of the anti-imperialist movement in the Arab world, Arab nationalism became an object of relentless Western animosity. Preparing British public opinion for war on Egypt in 1956, Prime Minister Anthony Eden equated Nasser with Hitler. And for several decades afterward, Western powers saw in Islam (including Wahhabi/Salafi Islam) a dependable partner in the global war against the Soviet empire with which Arab nationalist leaders like Nasser and Boumedienne seemed to ally themselves.

What Bin Laden is doing today is to invoke the cultural themes and motifs he is most intimate with in an attempt to legitimate the political strategy he is following -- exactly as Imam Shamil, Mohamed Ahmad Al-Mahdi and Al-Qassam had done before him. As a grand narrative, Islam has time and again been invoked, especially during the past two centuries, to provide the symbols that are the points of reference for a variety of political choices and programmes of action. For long, nonetheless, it was the political meaning and orientation -- rather than the ideological content -- which determined the nature of relations between the Western powers and the Arabs and Muslims. Wasn't Wahhabi/Salafi Islam the great, courageous instrument of the West against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan? How, then, did it become such an evil in Western eyes, only a decade after the Soviet defeat?

Perhaps, then, the vilification of Sufism and Salafism tells us more about the crisis of imperialism than about a crisis in Islam. With their absolute sense of self-righteousness, imperialists are never sure of what to make of the resistance they are faced with by the "lesser" peoples. The marathon- like conflict between Western imperialist powers and the world of Islam was caused neither by 20th-century Sufism nor by 20th-century Salafism. This conflict is rooted in a dominant set of international relations, known simply, in university textbooks, as the imperialist system. It is no doubt imperative for Islam to confront and deal with the forces of pathetic radicalism and nihilist violence that are trying to speak on its behalf -- a task that Islam has successfully engaged in on numerous occasions during its historical venture. Yet, this is will not put an end to the conflict. An end to the conflict and the development of normal relations between Western powers and the world of Islam are contingent upon an end to imperialist relations in our world.

* The writer teaches history and Islamic studies at Birkbeck College and the Muslim College, London.